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Abstract
The West plays a pivotal role in many commentaries and discussions of world 
politics, yet International Relations theory provides little assistance in thinking 
conceptually about what the West is. This study seeks to broaden our 
understanding of international relations through reflecting on various conceptions 
of the West in writings on world politics. It argues that the West is not monolithic 
or homogeneous; its conceptualisation varies in different contexts. The dissertation 
examines conceptions represented in the work of a range of scholars drawn from 
different periods of the twentieth century and a variety of schools of thought. These 
illustrate a range of important perspectives on what critical qualities constitute the 
West, and of the role of the West in world politics. The scholars examined are 
Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Francis Fukuyama, 
Samuel Huntington and Edward Said. Comparison of these conceptions produces 
interesting contrasts and parallels which suggest that conceptions of the West are 
not simply shaped by the influence of the era in which they are framed, but are also 
significantly shaped by the intellectual and normative concerns of the particular 
author. These conceptions demonstrate the degree to which images of the West are 
constituted by norms and values as much as by objective boundaries such as 
territory or race.
Conceptions of the West are not formed in isolation, but in the context of 
assumptions about the composition and nature of interaction between different 
civilisational identities in world politics, defined here as ‘the cultural world order’. 
The study finds significant variations amongst the scholars examined regarding 
perceptions of the cultural world order and of the role of the West within it. Their 
conceptions of the West reflect important assumptions with regard to whether 
civilisational identities are plural or converging towards a universal civilisation.
The dissertation suggests that International Relations theory can be enriched by 
reflection on how our understanding of world politics is framed by assumptions 
about the way in which we conceive of the West and its role in relation to other 
civilisational identities. These assumptions help to shape an image of the world and 
frame perceptions of what is feasible and desirable in interaction with other 
peoples. The way in which the West and non-West are conceptualised influences, 
shapes and legitimises the attitudes and actions adopted or prescribed for the 
interaction between peoples. Different conceptions produce different prescriptions 
and can induce or legitimise diverse, even contrary forms of interaction between 
the peoples of the West and non-West.
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Introduction
The West and Cultural World Order
Amongst the debates stimulated by the conclusion of the Cold War, two of the 
most dramatic focus on the contrasting visions of world order presented by Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ and Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ 
theses. Huntington’s 1993 essay1 2 has become one of the most widely discussed 
articles of contemporary International Relations. His analysis of the post-Cold 
War world is radical and shocking, suggesting an era in which world politics is 
dominated by conflicts between civilisations. Fhs thesis contains dire warnings to 
the West that it must consolidate to meet the threats of disintegration from within 
and attack from without. Conversely, Fukuyama’s image of world politics is one of 
a world divided between societies still evolving through the processes of history, 
and those which have successfully evolved to a post-historical state. In this context, 
the West is viewed as at the forefront of a broad civilising process, providing the 
model of the rational state towards which the rest of humanity is evolving.
The West plays a pivotal role in both these images of world order, yet, intriguingly, 
International Relations theory provides little assistance in thinking conceptually 
about what or who the West is. International Relations primarily theorises the 
world as one of states. The paradigms of the discipline provide no explicit category 
into which civilisations as actors in world politics can be placed. Consequently, 
civilisations have been largely absent as actors from International Relations theory. 
For instance, although Huntington’s essay tapped into a broader discussion about 
the future of the West/ there was no contemporary debate on civilisational
1 The thesis in Huntington’s original 1993 essay in Foreign Affairs was elaborated upon most fully 
in his 1996 book The Clash o f Civilisations and the Remaking o f World Order.
2 The term ‘International Relations’ in capitals will be used in this thesis to refer to the academic 
discipline, whereas the term ‘international relations’ in lower case will be used to refer more 
generally to the realm of world politics.
J See, for instance, Fukuyama(1989), Mahbubani(1992) and Deudney & Ikenberry( 1993/4) and 
their respondents, and more recently Coker(1998), Gress(1997) and McNeill( 1997a) .
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interaction in International Relations scholarship to which it could contribute. This 
dissertation is one contribution towards remedying this absence.
The Objectives of the Study
This study seeks to broaden our understanding of international relations through 
reflecting on conceptions of the West in writings on world politics. At one level, its 
objective is to consider in more depth how the West is conceptualised through 
exploring how it is described in different contexts and under different influences. It 
identifies both continuities and variations in these conceptions in order to enhance 
our awareness of the complexity of representations of the West, and to suggest that 
these relate to the complexity of the community itself. It assumes that ideas and 
perceptions matter in International Relations, contending that how a community is 
perceived and represented is important since this shapes and influences analysis 
and prescriptions. The study is also based on the belief that political identities are 
not innate or given, but shaped and reshaped on an ongoing basis by the context in 
which they operate, as well as by interpretations of histories and traditions. They 
are embedded in social and cultural contexts and constituted by relationships and 
interaction. In asking how the political identity of ‘the West’ is conceptualised, 
shaped and reshaped under different conditions, the study does not try to identify 
one, authoritative definition of the West. Nor is it an effort to disprove the 
existence of the West. Instead, it seeks to use these conceptions to explore the 
West’s complexity and dynamism.
At a second level, the dissertation explores conceptions of the West in relation to 
broader assumptions about the nature of the cultural world order. The dissertation 
suggests that the way in which the West, a pivotal actor and influence in modem 
international relations, is conceptualised provides insights into different 
possibilities for interaction, and different assumptions about the possibilities for 
world order. Through this, the dissertation seeks to contribute to a broader debate 
about how conceptions of cultural identities and cultural world order contribute to 
perceptions of, and prescriptions for, world politics. While it seeks to avoid 
overstating their significance, the project investigates perceptions of cultural
2
identity as an important, if at times implicit, element which frames important 
debates in world politics.
Cultural World Order
The concept of ‘cultural world order’ is introduced to examine assumptions about 
interaction between broad cultural identities, the most significant of which are 
referred to as civilisational identities, at the global level. It refers to assumptions 
about the nature of interaction between civilisational identities in world politics. 
Cultural world order is distinguished from the concept of the political world order, 
taken as relating to the interaction of political communities; and of economic world 
order, taken here to concern the structure of relations of production and exchange.
The political, the economic and the cultural cannot ultimately be treated as totally 
separate; they are deeply interwoven and interactive dimensions of any society. 
Assumptions about the cultural world order frame perceptions of interaction and 
the possibility for progress and change in relations between peoples, and are deeply 
connected to perceptions of the political and economic world orders. Although this 
dissertation does not argue that assumptions about culture are the sole determinant 
of the political and economic world order, perceptions of the political world order 
can be influenced by assumptions about whether interaction between peoples from 
different civilisational identities are likely to be characterised by conflict and war 
or by cooperation and peace. Perceptions of both the economic and political world 
orders may be influenced by presumptions about the potential for, and impact of, 
the transfer of ideas and institutions between civilisations. For some, such 
processes promises convergence and interdependence; for others, domination or 
imperialism. Therefore, analysis of assumptions about civilisational interaction can 
deepen our understanding of the perceived possibilities for interaction in all realms 
of world politics.
Assumptions about the cultural world order vary widely and are influenced by 
perceptions of civilisation. Two key strands can be identified in the etymology of 
‘civilisation’. The first is a singular sense which implies a universal process of 
development towards a higher form of society. This strand can be seen as evolving 
in tandem with the evolutionary and progressive ideals of the French Revolution.
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The second is a pluralist sense which refers to diverse cultural communities. The 
evolution of this strand can be seen in association with the elements of the 
Romantic tradition in Western thought which emphasise the plurality and diversity 
of cultures.4 Increased awareness of the diversity of human culture enhanced the 
pluralist concept of civilisation, but this awareness has not necessarily produced a 
broad acceptance of the equality of civilisations, leading to the perception by some 
of a hierarchy of civilisations. Furthermore, it has continued to co-exist with the 
concept of civilisation as progress towards a superior form of society. In nineteenth 
century Europe, it was widely assumed that Western civilisation was at the 
forefront of this process.5 In the twentieth century, both the singular and pluralist 
sense of civilisation persist in the vocabulary of politics.
The way in which the term civilisation is employed is significant in what it says 
about the cultural world order as conceived by the particular author. This can be a 
world order defined by a sense of the unity of humanity flowing in a single 
developmental process, or an order which encompasses essentially separate 
communities pursuing their own distinctive history. It may also shape perceptions 
of interaction between human communities. These may be conceived as relations 
of conflict, of domination, or cooperation and exchange. The pattem of 
civilisational history has also been variously conceived. It has been perceived as 
occurring in cycles, in waves, and in a linear pattern of teleological development. 
Conceptions of the West occur within these differing perceptions of the pattem of 
civilisational histories. These perceptions shape expectations and interpretations of 
interaction between cultures as following trends of integration or
incommensurability. These assumptions are important in framing perceptions of 
the possibilities for interactions between different peoples. They may also be 
significant in framing the analysis of the role of a major civilisational identity such 
as the West in the cultural, political and economic world.
4 See Walker( 1984a) for a discussion of universalist and pluralist dialectic in discussions of culture 
and world politics.
3 See Appendix for a fuller discussion of the evolution of the term ‘civilisation’.
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Andrew Linklater has noted that a recurrent theme in Western moral and political 
thought is the tension between particularism and universalism. In the context of 
International Relations, this is represented in the question of whether there is or 
could be a universal human community or a plurality of communities(Walker, 
1988; Linklater, 1990; Rengger, 1992). This study does not seek to promote either 
side of this debate. However, it suggests that underlying assumptions about cultural 
plurality or universality are implicit in how images of self and other are constructed 
in International Relations. These assumptions influence readings of the past, 
analysis of the present and prescriptions about the future. They are critically linked 
to conceptions of civilisational identity, such as the West, of cultural world order 
and of the possibilities in interaction.
This study is not a history of the West, although it does consider the way in which 
the history of the West has been perceived. Nor does it pretend to establish a new 
grand theory, or paradigm within International Relations. Instead, it suggests that 
existing paradigms would benefit from more consciously reflecting on the way in 
which political communities are conceptualised, and on the role of culture and 
history in shaping perceptions of communities and their interaction.
The West: The Power of the Word
As a central actor in world politics, and a civilisational entity, the West is a critical 
element of any cultural or political world order. Furthermore, given the extent of its 
intellectual and political influence, ‘the West’ is a critical force which is not only 
shaped by, but also helps to shape, perceptions of cultural world order. Therefore, 
how it is conceptualised, and how its role in that cultural world order is perceived 
can tell us much about broader assumptions relating to that cultural world order.
The status of the West as a powerful entity in world politics is indisputable; its 
power is in part demonstrated by the prevalence of the term. The Oxford English 
Dictionary devotes no less than three pages to its definition, and another four to 
associated terms. It begins by defining the West as a location or direction - the 
place where the sun sets. Its definitions then encompass the West as jurisdiction - 
the Western part of the Roman Empire subsequent to 395 A.D.; a religious 
community - the Latin Roman Church in contrast to the Eastern Orthodox church;
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a cultural and racial community defined in antithesis to Asia or the Orient, perhaps 
its most common usage; and, more recently, as an ideological community, denoting 
the non-communist states of Europe and North America in the twentieth century.6 
William Safire(1993) similarly provides a variety of definitions which encompass 
the West as a geographical locus for the origin of ideas, outlooks and institutions; a 
political community defined by its democratic and liberal values in contrast to 
communist societies, but also to monarchical and fundamentalist societies; and as 
the affluent, industrialised societies of the world whose economies are based on 
free enterprise.
This range of definitions indicates the complexity of the West. This complexity is 
enhanced when we consider that for each of the criteria cited by Safire, at least one 
or two exceptions can be suggested. For instance, Japan geographically and 
culturally falls outside the West. However, it is frequently included in conceptions 
of the West in the economic and political contexts.7 Alternatively, the West is 
often characterised by the democratic nature of its societies. However, Western 
societies only really became democratic in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, highlighting how recent a phenomenon democracy is. Western 
governance did not always mean democratic government. Whilst developing 
democratic structures at home, many European states exercised imperial practices 
in their colonies until the mid twentieth century.
The term ‘the West’ peppers the language of commentary and scholarship in world 
politics. It appears in an abundance of books and articles, such as The Decline of 
the West (Spengler, 1928), Islam and the West (Lewis, 1993), ‘The West and the 
Rest’ (Mahbubani, 1992) and Twilight of the West (Coker, 1998). The West, 
meaning the antithesis to the communist East, was central to the language of Cold 
War politics. It remains central to the language of post-Cold War politics,
6 There is one further sense in which the West appears in the O.E.D definitions, the ‘wild West’ as 
in the United States. Interestingly, used in this sense, the West is represented as a territory lacking in 
order and civilisation. Note also Springborg’s observation that in Arabic, the term the West - Gharb 
- also connotes darkness, the incomprehensible, a frightening place (Springborg, 1994).
7 See, for instance, Deudney & Ikenberry’s definition of the West which includes Western Europe, 
North America and Japan in a community based on shared liberal political and economic, 
institutions, structure and norms (Deudney & Ikenberry, 1993/4).
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illustrated by references such as those to the West’s role in the Balkans or the 
West’s position on the environment or human rights; the extension of NATO in 
1997 was discussed as bringing former Eastern bloc states under ‘the protection’ of 
the West. The West is often invoked in antithesis to a similarly broadly constituted 
other - the East, the Orient, Islam, Asia. It has been used to call upon a loyalty 
which goes beyond local priorities. Its ‘membership’ appears fluid and capable of 
contextual redefinition. It is perhaps from this fluidity or plasticity that the idea of 
the West derives its power and continued currency, allowing it to flow across, and 
co-exist with, existing local and regional communities and identities. However, its 
power also derives from the sheer scale of Western influence in world politics.
The Impact of the West
The impact of the West on the modem world has been unprecedented in its scope 
and extent. We can divide the influence of the West on modem international 
relations into three key elements: the West as actor; the West as institutional 
model; and the West as an intellectual foundation. As actor, the West, or perhaps 
more accurately Western powers, have been a dominant force in modem world 
politics. As Mann notes, the nineteenth century West, although a multi-power 
civilisation, was the undisputed global hegemon (Mann, 1993:vol.2, 262-4). 
European expansion from the sixteenth century onward meant that Western powers 
became involved economically, militarily and politically in Asia, Africa and the 
Americas; the affairs of Europe coming to influence and dominate those of other 
continents. Fieldhouse estimates that by 1800, Europeans controlled 35 per cent of 
the world’s landed surface; by 1878, 67 per cent; and by 1914, 84 per cent 
(Fieldhouse, 1984:3).* 8 Mann estimates that by 1913, Western powers contributed 
to nine-tenths of global industrial production.9 Even when the West’s direct 
control of other societies was reduced through decolonisation, it maintained
s This percentage rose even further after World War I with the establishment of French and British
mandates in the Middle East (Gordon, 1989:3).
9 Mann bases his estimate on statistics compiled by Paul Bairoch. He qualifies this estimate by 
acknowledging that this figure may underestimate the production of subsistence economies in which 
surplus may be consumed before marketed or measured. However, as he notes, despite this 
qualification, the economic power of the West remained overwhelming (Mann, 1993:vol.2, 261).
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predominance in the world’s systems of production, trade and finance. This meant 
that the newly emerging societies continued to operate within the context of 
extensive Western power. During the Cold War, the former imperial powers were 
split by the ideological bi-polarisation which created the Western and Eastern 
blocs. While this produced tremendous rivalry for global influence in the political, 
military and economic field, it did not undermine the dominance of these powers in 
the international system. Only in recent decades has the West felt the pressure of 
serious economic competition, emanating from the industrialising economies of 
East Asia. The military, economic and political capacity of the West has therefore 
been a dominant feature of modem world politics.
Furthermore, through its expansion, the West transmitted ideas and institutions 
generated in a European context, but which came to provide the framework of 
‘international society’ (Wight, 1966a; Bull & Watson, 1984). This is a further 
mechanism through which the influence of the West continued even after the 
dismantling of the colonial empires. The framework of the twentieth century 
international system rests upon foundations derived from Western models; the 
sovereign territorial state, the network of diplomacy, the procedures of 
international law (Bull & Watson, 1984:2). In addition, many of the major 
economic and political institutions of the twentieth century - the League of 
Nations, the UN, the GATT and WTO, and the International Monetary Fund - were 
modelled around Western political and economic principles, and Western interests.
Concepts now widely utilised in international parlance, such as democracy and 
capitalism, also have their foundations in the West. For a long time,
‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ were taken as synonymous with
Westernisation. Although modernisation theory has since been subject to criticism 
and review, in many parts of the developing world modernisation and 
Westernisation are still assumed to be the same thing (Gordon, 1989:48-51). 
Concepts such as ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ have been the vehicles for the 
internationalisation of the principles of the European Enlightenment, such as 
rationality and progress.
Moreover, the way in which the academic discipline of International Relations 
describes and analyses world politics derives largely from Western historical
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experience and intellectual traditions. As Stanley Hoffmann(1977) points out, the 
discipline emerged out of British and American scholarship, dominated in the post- 
World War 13 period by American scholars reflecting American concerns. The 
intellectual tradition from which International Relations draws its main theoretical 
models are Western school of thought. The ‘classic’ texts of the discipline are 
drawn from Greek, European and American scholars such as Thucydides, 
Macchiavelli, Carr, and Waltz. The historical memory of the discipline is almost 
exclusively that of the evolution of the Western states-system. As Walker( 1993:31) 
notes, the origins of International Relations’ traditions are drawn from the Greek 
city states, the Italian Renaissance or the European states-system of the eighteenth 
century. The models of behaviour upon which theory is based are drawn primarily 
from the history of European, then American, engagements in international politics 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The problems investigated stem from the 
experiences of the ‘great powers’. Although other societies are viewed as 
implicated in these politics, the system is presumed to rotate around the dynamics 
and concerns emanating from the European core.
International Relations Theory and the West
The West, then, is a central actor in, and shaper of, world politics. Yet when we 
turn to International Relations theory to help us understand the nature of this 
significant community, we discover that it provides us with little assistance. The 
main paradigms of the discipline provide no category within which to analyse this 
entity. Whilst the West is often referred to in discussions of international history or 
in commentaries on world politics, International Relations scholars rarely 
interrogate the nature of the West as a complex community.
This absence is in part attributable to the conditions in which the discipline 
evolved. Although early twentieth century thinkers demonstrated an interest in the 
role of civilisations in world politics, this interest effectively lapsed in International 
Relations studies until recently.10 The environment of post-World War II
10 This included the work of scholars such as Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, Pitrim Sorokin 
and later by Martin Wight. Historians such as Adda Bozeman and William McNeill also 
demonstrated an interest in the role of civilisations in world politics. More recently, interest has
9
International Relations was not conducive to the consideration of broad cultural 
communities. The period saw the discipline focus on the state as the primary 
political community, and on the structure and system of power politics. The 
discipline sought to establish itself as objective and scientific. In part this was in 
reaction to the seemingly discredited ‘idealism’ of the pre-war liberal era. Students 
of international politics were encouraged to study the facts of power rather than to 
be ‘misled’ by consideration of motives, ideas or morals (Morgenthau, 1964). 
Normative issues, relating to how political communities perceived themselves or 
their interests, were believed to be of little relevance to the forces within the system 
that drove power politics, these being the pursuit of interests within the system, 
defined primarily as power (Morgenthau, 1964) or security (Waltz, 1979). 
Although the discipline’s focus on the unitary state was challenged by the 
arguments of behaviouralists, pluralists and structuralists (Banks, 1984; 1985; 
Smith, 1995), attention has largely remained fixed on this entity as the most 
significant actor in international relations.
In the post-Cold War era however, International Relations has been subject to 
rethinking and review in response to the transformation, or indeed turbulence, of 
contemporary world politics (Rosenau, 1990; Lapid, 1996:4). The shape of the 
international system has been radically altered by the collapse of bi-polarity. The 
states-system itself is being subjected to a variety of centrifugal and centripetal 
pressures, witnessing both the fragmentation and the convergence of states as a 
result of the pressures of technological, political, economic and social change.* 11
been demonstrated in the work of Huntington (1993a; 1996a) and the responses which this 
provoked, for instance Alker(1995) and Puchala(1997). See also Chakrabarti Pasic(1996) in which 
the author adopts a cultural approach to theory which also involves reintroducing the concept of 
civilisation.
11 The integrity and sovereign authority of some states appears challenged by pressures such as 
those stemming from globalisation. Other states have been subject to forces of fragmentation, with 
new ethnic, national and racial identities seeking their own distinct political communities in the 
wake of political and economic dislocations which accompanied the end of the Cold War, and in 
particular, the collapse of the Eastern bloc alliance. Still other states, such as some of the post­
colonial states of West Africa, appear to be collapsing under the weight of social, economic and 
political pressures (Kaplan, 1997). Ferguson & Mansbach note that this is not a unique feature of 
modern world politics. Instead they note that this ‘tale of two tendencies’ characterised historical 
change: ‘the elaboration of larger networks of interaction and interdependence, alongside the 
fragmentation of other collectivities into vulnerable and tiny units of self-identification’ (1996:34). 
See, for instance, Camilleri & Falk(1992) and Ferguson & Mansbach(1996) for a discussion of the
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These changes are forcing International Relations scholars to reconsider their 
perceptions of political communities in world politics in order to understand, let 
alone explain or predict, events and trends. These events have encouraged a more 
explicit interest in forces which shape political communities, their interests and 
their interactions.
Over the last decade or so, the discipline has experienced a growth in new, critical 
voices. Lapid notes it has been subjected to a ‘burst of critical scrutiny’ which, 
whilst not totally undermining the dominant paradigms, has ‘instituted greater 
intellectual and sociological flexibility in IR scholarship’ (Lapid, 1996:4, Cox & 
Sjolander, 1994). The growth of alternative perspectives under the rubric of critical 
social theory, including post-modernism, feminism and more recently 
constructivism, has generated discussion of more explicitly normative concerns. 
Scholars have been encouraged to question the assumptions and the epistemology 
of more orthodox International Relations perspectives, in order to unveil their 
normative and cultural underpinnings, and to suggest the existence of alternative 
possibilities for world politics.12
Theoretical Influences
In seeking to broaden our understanding of world politics through reflecting on 
conceptions of the West, the dissertation suggests that the West can be usefully 
conceived of as a civilisational identity.lj In order to bring consideration of 
civilisations into International Relations, it is necessary to consider expanding 
concepts of political community. This study questions at the outset whether
changes occurring in the Westphalian system with, for instance, the evolution of European 
interdependence in institutions such as the European Union.
12 Ashley & Walker(1990). Lapid notes the preoccupation of orthodox International Relations with 
considering invariance rather than flux in the nature of the international system (Lapid, 1996:6) 
Kratochwil is similarly critical of the lack of reference in International Relations, and particularly in 
neo-realism, to the precise way in which change occurs (1993:63-4; 1996:214). Scholars such as 
Cox(1981; 1987), Linklater(1996) and Ruggie(1993) have also demonstrated an interest in 
processes of change.
lj By civilisational identity, I mean a form of identity which involves an awareness of the location 
of the immediate ethnic or national community within the context of a transnational cultural 
community, broad in geographical and temporal scope. Societies within these communities may 
share certain traditions, beliefs, values and histories which may influence perceptions of world 
order.
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International Relations as represented by the dominant paradigms can fruitfully 
reflect upon the complexity of communities and forms of interactions which world 
politics contains. It seeks to look beyond the widely accepted parameters which 
dominate International Relations thought, which consider international relations as 
primarily concerning the interaction of states, to discuss broader conceptualisations 
of community and interaction in world politics. In this process, the study draws on 
theorists such as Robert Cox(1981) and Andrew Linklater(1990; 1992; 1995) to 
suggest that the concept of political community in International Relations can be 
usefully expanded.
One of the factors which has perhaps militated against the treatment of civilisations 
as significant actors in world politics is their somewhat intangible nature. The 
frontiers between civilisations are broad and murky. In contrast, sovereign states 
appear to provide a more concrete representation of community, with their 
territorial frontiers and institutions encased in solid buildings. However, as 
Benedict Anderson(1991) points out, the nation-state owes its identity and 
cohesion as much to intangible, intersubjective factors as to the more tangible 
manifestations of community. As he argues, community is as much an ‘imagined’ 
as a tangible entity. His work on the constitution of national communities provides 
important theoretical insights into the constituting of broadly based and dispersed 
political communities. Anderson’s work on ‘imagined communities’ can be 
usefully applied to civilisational entities such as the West to assist in understanding 
their substance and importance in world politics. The West is an imagined 
community in the sense that it is a broad transnational association, which extends 
over a broad geographical and temporal canvass. It encompasses peoples who may 
have no immediate contact with one another, but who perceive themselves to be 
part of the West. There is, therefore, a shared identity and some element of 
common interests, ideas and values. It is taken to represent certain traditions, 
handed down in the course of the long history of the West.
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This study effectively treats the West as an intersubjective or socially constituted 
community. It shares with constructivists14 an interest in the importance of the 
normative dimensions of community, the social constitution of communities, and 
the way in which identities shape perceptions of interests and action in world 
politics (Reus-Smit, 1996; Klotz, 1995; Wendt, 1992). The work of constructivists 
to date, however, has largely focused on the constitution of state identities. This 
study delves a little deeper into the social and cultural context of world politics in 
looking at civilisational identities.
Treating the West as a civilisational identity and an imagined community 
encourages drawing on literature on culture and the politics of identity in 
international relations. As Walker notes, although a number of works have drawn 
attention to the significance of culture as a force shaping world politics, it has not 
been substantively treated by the majority of International Relations theorists as a 
subject ‘of significance or urgency’ (Walker, 1990:8).15
Discussion of the role of culture has become more prominent with the rise of 
critical perspectives in International Relations. This includes the work of authors of 
the World Order Models Project who reflect on the cultural underpinnings of 
International Relations and the prominence of Western culture in shaping the 
discipline.16 More recently, collections such as the Millenium Special issue of 
Culture(1993) and that edited by Lapid & Kratochwil(1996) explore the impact of 
reintroducing culture into International Relations, noting its relevance to both
14 This rubric, as always, covers a wide range of scholars. It is most immediately associated with the 
work of Alexander Wendt. However, many scholars who consider themselves constructivists do not 
share Wendt’s focus on systemic theory. Reus-Smit distinguishes between ‘systemic constructivists’, 
such as Wendt; unit-level theorists, such as Katzenstein who focus on how domestic politics shape 
interests and identities; and ‘holistic’ constructivists who adopt a broader perspective which 
encompasses both domestic and international phenomena in analysing systems, focusing on change 
either within existing systems as in the work of Kratochwil, or across systems, as in the work of 
Ruggie (Reus-Smit, 1996). This genre also encompasses scholars who would describe themselves as 
modernist, and those such as Richard Price, who pursue a post-modern approach in their work.
15 See also Falk(1990), and Darby & Paolini(1994) on the absence of culture from International 
Relations. See Rengger(1992) for a discussion of some of reasons behind the resistance of 
International Relations theory to treating culture as a substantive issue. For illustrations of authors 
within the field who did regard culture as a significant element of International Relations, see works 
by Toynbee, Bozeman, Wight and Bull.
16 See for instance Walker(1984b), Mazrui(1990), Chay(1990), Falk(1994a).
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theory and practice. As Cox(1981) observes, all theory is founded on a particular 
perspective; the recent work on the role of culture in International Relations further 
highlights the argument that all theories of International Relations are founded in 
particular social and cultural contexts (Bleiker, 1993; Chan, 1993).
Literature on the politics of identity and representation can also make an important 
contribution to this investigation, raising questions about how communities are 
constituted and circumscribed. Identity politics play a critical role in both defining 
the boundaries of any community, and in providing the community with an inner 
sense of cohesion (Norton, 1988; Dittmer & Kim, 1993; Campbell, 1992; 
Connolly, 1991; Inayatullah & Blaney, 1996). Discussion of the processes of 
differentiation, of inclusion and exclusion, have been important to our 
understanding of how communities define and represent themselves and others 
(Linklater, 1990; 1992; Connolly, 1991; Inayatullah & Blaney, 1996). This in turn 
influences the forms of interaction which are anticipated and legitimated. Works by 
authors such as V.G. Kieman(1969) Edward Said(1978) and Tvetzan 
Todorov(1984) explore how the West’s self-image evolved through representations 
of others in colonial and imperial encounters. Analysis of the way in which the 
West represented non-Westem peoples, and the power which it exercised through 
such representations has become an important facet of post-colonial studies. 
Elsewhere, authors such as Bradley Klein(1990), David Campbell(1992; 1996) and 
Simon Dalby(1990) have investigated how the non-West has been represented in 
the context of Cold War politics. The politics of representation that these works 
highlight is important to this study which focuses on how the West is 
conceptualised and represented.
The significance of perceptions and representations has been acknowledged within 
International Relations in fields such as foreign policy analysis. However, it has 
been most prominent in the literature produced by critical theorists and, in 
particular, post-modern scholars.17 Drawing on theories of discourse, language and 
signification, these scholars argue that representations and discourse do not just
17 See Doty(1996) on the absence of questions about representation from academic studies of 
International Relations. As Doty notes, the work of authors such as Shapiro, Der Derian, Walker 
and Ashley have demonstrated, and stimulated interest in, this aspect of International Relations.
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reflect, but constitute the social world. They challenge the faith of what they 
characterise as ‘modem culture’ in uncontested, coherent representations of 
communities and identities as homogeneous, fixed and authentic. They stress that 
power and received assumptions order perceptions and representations of reality 
(Ashley & Walker, 1990; Der Derian, 1989; Shapiro, 1989). This study does not 
engage in many of the deeper debates stemming from post-modem perspectives. 
However, it does draw on insights from some of these debates. In particular, it is 
influenced by the contention that conceptualisation and representation are 
meaningful and important dimensions of world politics. It also contends that the 
representations of a community are not always consistent, but can demonstrate 
great diversity. Communities and their representations are therefore often complex.
The study demonstrates points of commonality and difference that coexist across a 
range of conceptions. However, as noted above, it does not seek to produce or 
sanction the definitive conception of the West. This raises questions regarding how 
we can understand the co-existence of complex and multiple images of the West 
without seeking to authorise any one of these. This study suggests that the answer 
to this problem lies in recognising the influence of context on the various 
conceptions. One of the features of the recent work on culture and identity has been 
to highlight the dynamic and fragmented or pluralist nature of these forces (Lapid, 
1996; Dittmer & Kim, 1993; Campbell, 1992; Lawson, 1996; 1997). For instance, 
Campbell(1992) argues that the identity of the state is not fixed, but constantly in 
the process of constitution and reconstitution; Bloom(1990) argues that, to retain 
their attractiveness, identities must evolve to maintain their relevance to changing 
circumstances. Therefore, to understand the co-existence of a variety of concepts of 
the West, it is useful to keep in mind the contexts in which they were formed, and 
the perspectives from which they evolve (Cox, 1981); no author is totally 
independent of the context in which they write (Said, 1978). This study, therefore, 
will seek to locate the conceptions of the West in the context of their historical 
environment, intellectual influence and broader perceptions of the cultural world 
order.
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Methodology
Drawing on the above influences, the dissertation assumes this community to be a 
social construction and examines factors such as the historical and intellectual 
environment, which shape interpretations of it. This dissertation approaches the 
West as a series of representations, investigating how it is conceptualised in the 
work of seven twentieth century thinkers. They are not all International Relations 
scholars, but all were significant in articulating and shaping contemporary thought 
on the role and future of the West in world politics. All made major and often 
radical contributions to contemporary debates on the political world order based 
upon important and distinctive assumptions about the nature of the cultural world 
order. This study examines their conceptions of the West within the context of their 
assumptions about cultural world order. It applies to each a framework of analysis 
which uncovers points of commonality and difference in these conceptions, and 
explores factors which influence this diversity.
All are authors writing in the twentieth century, the period in which International 
Relations developed as a the discipline; but from different periods of the century. 
In looking at conceptions drawn from different parts of this century, the study 
examines how the historical context frames perceptions of civilisational identity. In 
examining the West from a historical perspective, this study aims to escape one of 
the pitfalls that International Relations is often accused of falling into, that is the
1 o
neglect or misuse of history. However, the study also compares perspectives 
drawn from similar periods, highlighting the influence of other factors, such as the 
intellectual environment, on these conceptions.
18 History is often used in International Relations in a selective or deterministic manner to illustrate 
certain strands of theory rather than as a means with which to explore theory. Neo-realist theorists in 
particular, such as Waltz, have been criticised for adopting an ahistorical approach to International 
Relations in their quest to establish universally applicable models and laws (Ashley, 1984; 
Kratochwil, 1996). Cox describes neo-realism as using history as a quarry providing materials with 
which to illustrate recurring themes (1981:131). There is often a failure to recognise or explore the 
historical context in which significant texts or institutions have been produced (Walker, 1989). This 
study employs a historical perspective as a means of exploring the ways in which ideas of 
community change. In this, the influence of Robert Cox’s work is acknowledged. In ‘Social Forces, 
States and World Orders’ (1981), Cox stresses the importance of historical context in shaping world 
orders. His interest is in exploring how contemporary social forces can influence the shape of power 
and institutions, in particular world orders. My aim is slightly less ambitious: that is to explore the 
relationship between historical context and the ideas through which the West is conceptualised.
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The first two scholars selected, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, illustrate 
the interest in this early part of the century in civilisational interaction as an 
important aspect of world politics. Spengler’s controversial The Decline of the 
West sold over one hundred thousand copies and provoked debate throughout 
Europe. Written in wartime Germany, it demonstrates a Romantic pessimism for 
the future of the late modem West in the context of a broad cyclical view of 
civilisational history. It expressed a sense of disillusionment, if not doom, which 
reflected an important aspect of that era. Arnold Toynbee, also writing in the first 
half of the twentieth century, shared Spengler’s interest in placing the West in the 
broader context of civilisational history. He was one of the most prolific and 
widely respected scholars of international relations of his generation. In a series of 
studies which captured the imagination of scholars and the public at the onset of 
the Cold War, his work presents a critical analysis of the modem West.
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull are discussed together as foundational authors of the 
influential International Society or ‘English school’ of International Relations. In 
contrast to many of their contemporaries, their work encompassed an awareness of 
the relevance of civilisational interaction to international relations in the context of 
the evolution of international society. Although the majority of their work was 
produced during the Cold War era, they provide an analysis of international 
relations which, whilst encompassing the dynamics and structures of the Cold War, 
exceeds that immediate environment.
The final set of scholars examined present three very different representations of 
the West in the later part of the twentieth century. The works of Francis Fukuyama 
and Samuel Huntington represent two distinct approaches to thinking through the 
meaning and implications of the end of the Cold War and the future world order. 
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ essay provoked a storm of debate by heralding the end 
of the Cold War and the victory of the West. His thesis is studied as an influential 
example of a liberal, progressive conceptualisation of the future of world politics 
and the role of the West. In contrast, Samuel Huntington’s equally provocative 
‘clash of civilisations’ essay has become one of the most widely discussed essays 
in modem International Relations, articulating a pessimistic, realpolitik perspective 
of future world order. Edward Said’s work focuses not on the Cold War or its
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fallout, but on the West as an imperial entity. Said’s Orientalism is widely regarded 
as one of the most important works in generating the genre of post-colonial studies. 
His work provides a radical and critical view of the West and civilisational 
interaction drawn, in some respects, from outside the West.
The examination of these important thinkers in tandem presents a rich and diverse 
range of perspectives both on the West, and on the cultural world order which 
suggest a variety of possibilities for cultural and political interaction.
The method chosen is necessarily limited in that only a small selection of 
perspectives could be examined. A number of other important and influential 
scholars could have been included in this study; scholars such as Fernand Braudel, 
William McNeill or Immanuel Wallerstein to name but a few. However, the study 
aims to examine a representative rather than a comprehensive selection of 
conceptions of the West and this selection is sufficient to this task. Those chosen 
are Western scholars or scholars who have worked in the West, meaning here 
Europe or the United States. 19 While this limits the dissertation’s capacity to 
reflect on non-Westem conceptions of the West, it does demonstrate a rich 
diversity of conceptions within the West, indicating that even within the 
community, there is no single or homogenous conception of self.
Discussions relating to the West in world politics in the mid twentieth century 
often conceive of it primarily in antithesis to the Soviet-led Eastern bloc. This is 
not the focus of this study. While assumptions which underlie conceptions of the 
West in the Cold War context are not excluded, this study seeks to place them in a 
broader context which precedes, succeeds and exceeds the Cold War environment. 
It examines conceptions of the West which precede the Cold War, in addition to 
those which discuss the West in the post-Cold War context, and those which 
discuss the West in relation to societies beyond communist Europe and the Soviet 
Union.
In Chapter One, the thesis discusses the main paradigms of International Relations, 
demonstrating that none provides an adequate conceptual framework for analysing
19 Though bom in Palestine, Edward Said completed his education in the United States and has 
spent most of his career working in this country.
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the West as a complex political community in world politics. It considers this 
absence, suggesting that it is in part due to the epistemological premises and 
theoretical aspirations of these paradigms. Chapter Two suggests a framework for 
the analysis of conceptions of civilisational identities such as the West and their 
relationships to cultural world order. The chapter discusses how this framework 
can address the complexity and contingency of the West by drawing on insights 
from literature on the politics of identity and representation. The framework 
focuses on the context in which the conceptions were formed and articulated; 
assumptions about the nature of the cultural world order; the objective and 
normative boundaries of the West which these conceptions present; and 
perceptions of cultural interactions within the context of these assumptions about 
the cultural world order and the community’s boundaries.
Chapters Three to Eight apply this framework to each of the authors selected. 
Chapter Three examines the work of Oswald Spengler. His conception of the West 
is of a great, but decaying civilisation in a cultural world order comprising separate, 
self-contained civilisations pursuing independent histories rather than a universal 
history' of human progress. Chapter Four looks at the work of Arnold Toynbee, 
who also conceptualised the West within a cultural world order comprising 
separate civilisations experiencing cycles of expansion and retraction. Toynbee’s 
West was the leading civilisation, but one threatened with spiritual and physical 
decline. Toynbee did not see the West as a universal civilisation, but did perceive it 
to provide a framework for a global, multicultural society. Chapter Five looks at 
the work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull on international society. The concept of 
the cultural world order found in their work also involves a plurality of 
civilisations, but one which appears more integrated than Spengler and Toynbee’s. 
Their West is a central, formative influence shaping modem interaction through the 
structures and institutions of international society. Chapter Six examines the 
conception of the West which emerges from Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ 
thesis. In contrast to the preceding authors, Fukuyama’s concept of the cultural 
world order is shaped unambiguously by a belief in teleological human progress. 
Man is seen as involved in a civilising process with the West at its forefront. 
Chapter Seven examines the conception of the West found in Samuel Huntington’s
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‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. Huntington’s cultural world order comprises a 
plurality of competing and essentially incommensurable civilisations. Furthermore, 
he argues that cultural identity is becoming the organising principle of the political 
world order. In this context, he perceives the West to be a powerful civilisation in 
decline which needs to regroup and consolidate. Chapter Eight examines the work 
of Edward Said. Said’s cultural world order implies a plurality of civilisations, but 
suggests that this has been dominated by an imperial West in the modem era. His 
conception of the West entails a representation of representations. Through this, he 
critiques how the West constructed its identity through its representations of non- 
Westem peoples.
Examination of this range of perspectives illustrates the complexity and 
contingency of conceptions of the West. Observing these conceptions in relation to 
assumptions about cultural world order, the study suggests that perceptions of 
cultural identity help to frame perceptions of interests and options in world politics; 
but also that perceptions of cultural world order help to frame perceptions of the 
political world order. In these respects, this study seeks to both contribute to 
reflection on the nature of the West in International Relations, and to the 
importance of perceptions of cultural world order in world politics.
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Chapter One
The West, Civilisations and International Relations Theory
The Absence of the Westfront International Relations Theory
The starting point of this study is an exploration of how the discipline of 
International Relations has understood and explained the West in relation to world 
politics. The first task is to identify how the frameworks of analysis the discipline 
provides relate to a civilisational community such as the West. In his 1959 work, 
Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz identifies three levels of analysis for 
understanding the dynamics of international relations: the individual; the state; and 
the system of states. This conceptualisation, with minor variations, has been highly 
influential in the discipline. However, none of these categories accommodate 
analysis of the West or of civilisations more generally. Furthermore, whilst the 
West is frequently referred to in discussion of world politics by International 
Relations scholars and commentators, and is widely assumed to be an important 
actor and influence in international affairs, its nature and composition remain 
largely unexamined in International Relations theory. In these respects, the West is 
absent from International Relations theory.
This chapter examines the absence of thinking about the West at a conceptual level 
in the main paradigms of International Relations, taken here to be realism, 
liberalism and, to a slightly lesser extent, Marxism (Holsti, 1985; Smith, 1995:18; 
Wasver, 1996). It examines key assumptions about the primary units of analysis 
employed by these paradigms to demonstrate that, whilst useful in analysing 
aspects of world politics, they are limited in their capacity to examine the role and 
nature of the West. It considers some of the reasons for the absence of examination 
of the West in International Relations theory. In part, these are linked to the 
epistemological premises of International Relations’ main paradigms and to their
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theoretical aspirations. This chapter suggests, however, that the absence deprives 
International Relations of important insights into the nature of world order, and that 
the discipline would benefit from a framework of analysis which could reflect on 
the importance and nature of civilisational identities in world politics.
Realism, the State and the West
The state is the central political community employed in the study of world 
politics. The discipline of International Relations was bom from a desire to 
understand and prevent war between states. Even pluralists and structuralists who 
regard other units of analysis as important, or as even more fundamental, 
acknowledge the state as the main institution through which contemporary world 
politics functions. Realism, the major school of thought which gives primacy to the 
state as a unit of analysis, assumes that the principal actors in world politics are 
groups, rather than individuals (Buzan, 1996; Schweller & Priess, 1997); and, for 
most realists, the state is presumed to be the primary form of political community 
in modem society (Carr, 1939:124; Bull, 1972a:251). Realists view international 
relations as the interaction of sovereign territorial states in a situation of anarchy in 
which states are driven by the pursuit of interests defined by some as power 
(Morgenthau, 1964:5), by others as security (Waltz, 1979:91; Holsti, 1995).
Whilst realism is not fixed upon the nation-state as a timeless and universal 
category, it is fixed in its view of the nature of the units in world politics. The units 
change in form and composition, but retain their essential character, motivation and 
goals - the drive for power or security. Whether the units examined are tribes, city 
states or empires, they remain ‘self regarding units’ (Waltz, 1979:91; Gilpin, 
1979:18). Therefore, while the character of the state may change, its basic nature in 
the realist schema of international politics does not. It remains the key unit of 
analysis operating under the logic of anarchy in pursuit of its own interest 
regardless of its cultural character.
Within the realist school, there is a division between thinkers of the ‘classical’ 
school, such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and E.H. Carr, and ‘neo­
realists’, such as Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Joseph Grieco. One of the 
principal features dividing these two tendencies is the focus which neo-realist
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thinkers place on the structure of the system (Buzan, 1996).1 However, neo-realists 
continue to see states as the key actors in the international system (Buzan, 
1996:49).2 Their systemic focus makes no additional space for consideration of 
civilisations in international relations.
Realism recognises the potential for associations between states, but this does not 
open up the possibility of including broader communities, such as civilisation, in 
its conceptual scheme. In realist thought, states may ally with each other but they 
always do so on the basis of the pursuit of their own interests. For instance, they 
may form an alliance to maintain a balance of power in the system. Morgenthau 
stresses the expediency and functionality of such alliances which will be 
necessarily temporary and subject to states interests: ‘Whether or not a nation will 
pursue a policy of alliance is, then, a matter not of principle but of expediency’ 
(Morgenthau, 1964:181). Similarly, Waltz’s argument suggests alliances are 
functional and do not presuppose ideological, normative or cultural links:
If pressures are strong enough, a state will ally with almost anyone 
... It is important to notice that states will ally with the devil to avoid 
the hell of military defeat. (Waltz, 1979:166)
If states are self-seeking, self-regarding units, one would expect that associations
on the basis of a transnational form of identity such as the civilisational would have
little or no relevance. However, assumptions of transnational identities such as the
West slip into realist discussions of world politics. Morgenthau, for instance,
assumes the West to be an important actor in world politics. In discussing the Cold
War bi-polar system, he notes:
The superpower that could add India or a united Germany to its 
allies might well have gained a decisive victory in the struggle 
between East and West. (1964:360)
1 For Waltz, neo-realism is characterised by its development of a concept of the structure of the 
system which allows analysis of how the structure affects the interaction of units and the outcomes 
they produce (Waltz, 1995:74).
2 As Buzan(1996) notes, neo-realism started as a response to criticisms of classical realism. Neo­
realism responded by reasserting the ascendancy of the state and the importance of great powers, in 
contrast to pluralist thinkers who promoted the significance of non-state actors in international 
relations. Waltz uses the term ‘unit’ in order to achieve a universal theory, with the contemporary 
system being one of states. The discussion of interaction within the international system in Theory of 
International Politics (Waltz, 1979) is primarily a discussion of interaction between states.
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In relation to challenges to colonialism, he argues:
The moral challenge emanating from Asia is in its essence a triumph 
of the moral ideas of the West. ... In the wake of its conquests, the 
West brought to Asia not only its technology and political 
institutions, but also its principles of political morality. (1964:359)
Furthermore, Morgenthau presupposes the West to be a fundamental element of the
international system as a whole. For example, he acknowledges that his discussion
of the conduct of international politics focuses primarily on Western civilisation,
‘[t]he civilisation with which we are here of course mainly concerned’ (1964:231).
He also attaches great importance to the intellectual and moral cohesion of Western
civilisation as a critical element of the balance of power:
...the fuel that keeps the motor of the balance of power moving is 
the intellectual and moral foundation of Western civilisation. 
(1964:221)
The West is, therefore, important to Morgenthau in being both an instrumental and 
a moral force. It assumes an importance which does not derive from his theoretical 
structures of international politics. Morgenthau's references to the West make 
assumptions about its nature, constitution, and its centrality. Such assumptions are 
not accounted for in his state-centric model of power politics.
Morgenthau’s position is not unusual. It is also evident in the work of other 
classical realists such as George Kennan. Kennan like Morgenthau views states as 
the central actors in international relations, but proceeds to further assume 
important divisions between the communities of West and East; this is 
demonstrated in the title of his work, Russia and the West. Kennan frequently 
phrases his analysis in terms of the relationship of Russia, or the Soviets, to the 
West, stressing the need for the ‘Western world’ to stand firm against the threats 
emanating from the Soviet Union (Kennan, 1967:vol.l, 250). This is something 
more than simply relations between self-regarding states pursuing functionally 
defined national interests. For Kennan, the West is clearly a broader community 
which encompasses states; there are strong assumptions of normative links 
between its members. Such communities, however, are not explained or analysed 
by realist theory.
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John Mearsheimer’s neo-realist analysis of the implications of the end of the Cold 
War clearly conceives of the international system as a system of states. At the same 
time, the concept of the West remains relevant to his understanding of the 
contemporary world order. The bi-polar Cold War order is based upon an ‘East- 
West’ division, with the West comprising democratic states united under American 
hegemony in the face of the Soviet threat (Mearsheimer, 1990). Therefore, the 
West continues to be perceived as an actor whose presence helps to define the 
shape of the Cold War world order, but its presence and role are not clearly 
accounted for in the neo-realist paradigm. The sense of the West as a significant 
community for realist authors has been further accentuated by the post-Cold War 
debate with regard to the future of the West, with authors such as Owen 
Harries(1993), Conor Cruise 0 ’Brien(1992/3) and Stephen Walt(1994) debating 
the possible forthcoming division or collapse of the West. These discussions 
highlight the implicit significance of the West in world politics, but also accentuate 
the absence of a suitable category of analysis within realism for examining the 
nature and interaction of civilisational communities.
In the work of Robert Gilpin(1979) we find a greater sense of the West as a 
civilisational entity. Gilpin is conscious of the West as a civilisation which has 
become pre-eminent on a global scale for a variety of developmental and 
organisational reasons, effectively establishing the parameters of the international 
system. The Western system and the international system consequently become 
virtually indistinguishable. Yet whilst Gilpin is aware of the West in his work and 
of the impact it had as a civilisation in shaping world politics, he does not analyse 
it as a community except to explain its superiority. In part, this is because he does 
not reflect on how civilisations fit into his structural theory of world politics, with 
civilisations appearing to be pre-modem communities subsumed under the Western 
states-system/
Authors in the realist tradition, therefore, incorporate conceptions of the West into 
their commentary on international relations but not into their theoretical stmcture.
J Although Gilpin does demonstrate some concern of a possible revolt against the hegemony of 
Western values resulting in a return to a pre-modem clash of civilisation in world politics (Gilpin, 
1979:225) .
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Furthermore, there is little reflection on the extent to which their theoretical 
structures are premised on Western historical and intellectual traditions. Realist 
International Relations scholars acknowledge their intellectual debt to a range of 
‘classic’ texts by European authors. These include Thucydides, Hobbes, Rousseau 
and Machiavelli and their contemplations on the assumed universal laws of states 
in conflict. Histories of the evolution of international relations typically focus on 
the establishment of the modem European state system of secular, sovereign, 
territorial entities through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the Concert of Europe, 
and the operation of the balance of power in nineteenth century Europe. The 
discipline focuses in more depth on the twentieth century and the politics of World 
War I, World War II, the Cold War and, more recently, the turmoil of the post-Cold 
War era. The politics of Europe and US-Soviet relations receives the most detailed 
analysis. As Walker notes, there is a tendency to neglect the interaction between 
political communities prior to and outside of the system of territorial, sovereign 
states (Walker, 1989).4 The story is essentially very modem and, for the most part, 
Euro-centric. The paradigm’s historical perspective is almost exclusively that of 
the West and the Western states-system.5 Therefore, whilst realism aims to present 
a theory of international relations which is universal in its application, it draws 
predominantly on Western historical, intellectual and institutional precedents in 
constructing this theory. The theory it constructs allows little conceptual space for 
reflection on the role and nature of broad cultural communities such as the West 
out of which it evolves.
Liberalism, Individualism and the West
During the rapid growth of International Relations as a discipline since the mid 
twentieth century, realism has been the dominant theoretical paradigm. As noted
4 One obvious exception here is Martin Wight who, in Systems of States(\971) considered Chinese 
and Hellenic states-systems in addition to his analysis of the evolution of the European states- 
system, on which he primarily focused. Wight’s work, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five, demonstrates the broader historical focus of the British school of International 
Relations scholars.
3 Ferguson & Mansbach( 1996:34) note that the state in International Relations has many 
definitions, but tends to be associated with the Westphalian model of the sovereign territorial entity. 
However, this model serves as something of an ideal which few actors actually approach.
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above, realism focuses its attention on the state as the primary international 
political community. However, other strands of thought consider a broader range of 
actors in world politics. The most prominent of these paradigms is often labelled 
the pluralist or liberal paradigm. Unlike realism, liberalism is not a tradition of 
thought which developed within the International Relations discipline. It entails the 
application of ideas which have evolved within the broader stream of political 
thought and were then applied to the global context. As Stanley Hoffmann notes, 
the international dimensions of liberalism effectively project domestic liberalism 
onto world politics (Hoffmann, 1995:160; Richardson, 1995). Like realism, 
liberalism is a broad, generic title used to describe a wide range of thinkers and 
positions.6 Despite this diversity, liberalism can be viewed as ‘an integral outlook’ 
(Gray, 1995:xiii). These strands of thought share core assumptions defined by 
Zacher & Matthew as a belief in progress towards greater human freedom through 
promotion of peace, prosperity and justice; the belief in the realisation of human 
freedom through greater cooperation; and the belief in transformation of human 
society via modernisation. At the heart of classical liberal thought are the principles 
of freedom and progress. The central subject of these processes is the individual:
The metaphysical and ontological core of liberalism is 
individualism. It is from this premise that the familiar liberal 
commitments to freedom, tolerance and individual rights are 
derived. (Arblaster, 1984:15)7
6 Indeed, as Doyle(1986:l 152) is frequently quoted as noting, there is no canonical description of 
liberalism, and there are several opinions on how various strands of liberal thought should be 
classified. Zacher & Matthew(1995) identify republican liberalism, commercial, military, cognitive, 
sociological and institutional liberalism. The latter three of these are particularly associated with 
developments in liberal thought in the twentieth century. Keohane(1989) discusses republican, 
commercial and regulatory liberalism. Dunne(1997) suggests liberal international thought can be 
usefully divided into liberal internationalism, idealism and institutionalism. His concept of neo­
idealist liberals include ‘radical liberals’, such as Richard Falk, who lay greater emphasis on the role 
of social movements than do neo-institutionalists, such as Keohane. This suggests important 
differences, if not tensions, in the perspectives of liberal schools. The most prominent is perhaps the 
distinction between ‘negative’ liberalism, which focuses on freedom from constraint or oppression, 
and ‘positive’ liberalism, which focuses on freedom to achieve emancipation and equality. 
McKinley & Little( 1986) distinguish between ‘pure’ and ‘compensatory’ liberalism; whilst 
Richardson(1995) identifies within the liberal tradition two contending trends of thought, the 
liberalism of privilege and the radical perspective which is critical of the privileges conferred on the 
advantaged.
7 Arblaster discusses the emergence of the concept of the individual in relation to humanist thought, 
a central feature being the emergence of the sense of man as separate from the natural world, and of 
man as self-possessed, capable of exercising free will (Arblaster, 1984:37). Gray(1995:xii) also
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Whilst much of contemporary liberal and neo-liberal international thought accepts 
the importance, if not the primacy, of the state as the most important collective 
international actor (Keohane & Nye, 1977; 1987; Baldwin, 1993:9), its attitude to 
the relationship between the citizen and the state differs fnwhat of realism. It 
understands the state as a pluralist community composed of individuals. As Robert 
Keohane notes, liberalism
...is an approach to the analysis of social reality that begins with
individuals as the relevant actors ... [and] ... seeks to understand
how organisations composed of aggregations of individuals interact.
(Keohane, 1989:174)
The concept of the individual on which liberalism focuses is that of the rational 
individual. This shapes broader perceptions of the individual’s relationship with 
the state. The concept of the enlightened and rational individual is at the heart of 
liberal ideas concerning representative, open government, open diplomacy and the 
influence on policy makers of public opinion which can be found in liberal thinkers 
such as Locke and Kant, and became prominent in the liberal thinking of the early 
twentieth century, encapsulated in the Wilsonian idea of self-determination 
(Knutsen, 1992; Kegley, 1993).
Whilst liberal, and particularly neo-liberal thinkers, have not rejected the analysis 
of the international system as anarchic (Baldwin, 1993:4), they see an international 
system which has more incentives towards cooperation and a greater focus on the 
potential for progress, learning and change. For instance, democratic peace theory 
suggests the spread of the community of liberal democratic states can potentially 
reduce the instance of international war (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993). In the 
economic field, a recurrent theme in liberalism is the idea that free trade and 
increased economic interdependence can both improve general prospenty and 
discourage war (Carr, 1939:45; Knutsen, 1992:154; Rosecrance, 1986). Therefore, 
liberal theorists have investigated how states learn to cooperate, and how
highlights the role of individualism in liberalism, arguing that liberalism ‘asserts the moral primacy 
of the person against the claims of any social collective’.
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transnational structures and interests evolve through processes of interaction, 
interdependence and integration in both the economic and political fields.8
In emphasising the potential for cooperation and interdependence, the liberal 
perspective also suggests that states may not be as hostile and self-regarding as 
realism implies. For instance, Karl Deutsch’s work on security communities 
indicated that factors which contribute to mutual identification, shared values and 
procedures, and ‘a trust bred of the predictability that mutual identification’ brings 
are important in world politics, suggesting these are important to the formation of 
political associations (1957:36, 56).
Furthermore, liberal International Relations theorists, particularly the neo-liberals, 
have been more willing than realists to acknowledge a broader range of significant 
actors in world politics. As Keohane notes,
...liberalism focuses not merely on states but on privately organised 
social groups and firms. The transnational as well as domestic 
activities of these groups and firms are important for the liberal 
analysts, not in isolation from the action of states but in conjunction 
with them. (Keohane, quoted in Kegley, 1995a:26)
This pluralist conception of world politics acknowledges the role of non-state
actors such as multinationals and non-government organisations (Keohane & Nye
1972; 1977; 1987). Neo-liberals examine the evolution and impact of institutions,
acknowledging their role in facilitating and constraining state activities (Keohane,
1989; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Schweller & Priess, 1997). The role which
regimes and international organisations play in the international system has also
been a major feature of neo-liberal research (Krasner, 1983; Ruggie 1983).
Therefore, liberal International Relations theorists do acknowledge a broader range 
of significant actors in world politics, and conceptualise interaction as 
encompassing possibilities for change and integration. However, in practice, liberal 
International Relations theory still presents little conceptual space or active 
reflection on broad cultural communities such as the West. Despite acknowledging
s See, for instance, works by Ernst Haas on the possibilities of learning by states, David Mitrany on 
processes of integration, Karl Deutsch on transnational communities, and Robert Keohane & Joseph 
Nye on transnational actors and interdependence evolving from increased interaction. See also 
Zacher & Matthew(1995) for a discussion of these trends in liberal international thought.
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a role for different actors, civilisational identities are not easily accommodated in 
this paradigm. The conceptual space offered by this perspective for analysis of the 
West is once again, limited.
The West in Liberal theory
Despite the fact that civilisational identities such as the West are not easily 
encompassed by the conceptual framework of most liberal international theorists, 
‘the West’ and associated terms appear in the work of these scholars. For instance, 
Keohane & Nye(1977:28) refer to the role of force in ‘East-West’ relations in their 
discussion of complex interdependence, as does Hoffmann in his discussion of 
liberal international theory (Hoffmann, 1987:135). In these cases, the West implies 
the community of democratised and industrialised capitalist states in contrast to the 
community of communist states led by the Soviet Union. This is also the sense of 
the West which Richard Rosecrance employs when he speaks of ‘Western weapons 
of technology’ confronting ‘Eastern numbers and ideological zeal’(1986:160-1). 
However, the West in liberal international theory is not only an ideological alliance 
constituted in antithesis to the communist bloc. If it was, one would assume that 
the end of the Cold War and the end of the ‘East’ would have led to the dispersal of 
the West. However, the idea of the West continues to be employed in contemporary 
liberal international theory. Authors such as Francis Fukuyama(1992) refer to the 
West as a community of liberal, democratic states achieving relatively peaceful 
relations amongst themselves in contrast to the still developing world in which 
power politics still prevail.9 Elsewhere, Fukuyama refers to the West in relation to 
societies based upon European cultural traditions in contrast to those, for instance, 
of Asia (1995b:37). David Deudney & John Ikenberry clearly articulate a sense of 
the West as a community with a ‘reality beyond bi-polarity’. For them, the West 
encompasses the liberal democracies of western Europe, North America and Japan, 
forming a ‘civic union’ which draws on a tradition of ‘industrial democracy’ which
9 Max Singer & Aaron Wildavsky(1993) similarly argue that Western Europe, the United States and 
Canada, Japan and the Antipodes form a zone of peace and democracy, whereas the rest of the 
world, which includes East and Southeastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, most of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, form a zone of turmoil and development where peace and democracy are not 
well established.
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precedes and exceeds the Cold War. They understand the peace and stability of the 
West as based on the structural integration of their organs of security, economy and 
society (Deudney & Ikenberry 1993/4:18).
Not only do these authors suggest that the West is a significant form of community 
in world politics; their comments also suggest that it is a community deeply 
associated with the liberal tradition itself. In fact, ‘the West’ is the implicit context 
within which liberalism is embedded. As Anthony Arblaster observes, ‘[liberalism 
is the dominant ideology of the West’ (1984:6). It is an ideology drawn from the 
experiences and philosophy of Western Europe; a philosophy of modernity, 
emerging out of the scientific, political and intellectual revolutions of sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Europe, expressing faith in man’s capacity for material and 
moral progress. Although a product of a secular revolution, it provided ‘a basis for 
moral and ethical life consistent with deep-seated Christian values and beliefs’ 
(Zacher & Matthew, 1995:111).
The development of liberal thought is closely linked to the political, social and 
intellectual evolution of Europe and North America. The intellectual antecedents of 
modem liberal theorists are predominantly European and American thinkers, such 
as Locke, Kant, Bentham, De Tocqueville and Hegel. Liberalism evolved from the 
European Enlightenment and the ideas of the British, French and American 
revolutions, including the underlying concepts of freedom, equality and 
individualism.10 The liberal political models and institutions of republicanism and 
democracy derive from European and American institutions.
European expansion eventually encouraged the globalisation of liberal ideas, 
ultimately helping to stimulate revolt against European colonialism and 
imperialism (Panikkar, 1953; Bull, 1984b; Barraclough, 1964). However, 
liberalism remains closely equated with the West, and liberalisation with 
Westernisation. In the context of the Cold War, the West and liberalism were 
virtually synonymous, the West believing it represented the liberal ideals of
10 The idea of the rational, maximising individual emerged out of the European Enlightenment, with 
concepts of what constitutes the appropriate rights, standards and values of the individual deriving 
from the same source.
31
freedom, democracy and the free market. For Fukuyama, the ‘triumph’ of 
liberalism at the end of the Cold War is synonymous with the ‘triumph’ of the 
West:
The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all
in the total exhaustion of all viable systematic alternatives to
Western liberalism. (Fukuyama, 1989:3)
Linguistically and conceptually, the West and liberalism blend into one.11
However, liberalism is not viewed universally as an emancipatory philosophy and 
has been associated by some with the continuing projection of Western control 
over the non-West. “ Voices from the developing world have argued that liberal 
standards and procedures are a form of cultural imperialism, imposing Western 
standards under the guise of universal standards. For instance, during the Iranian 
Revolution, Western powers were perceived as having utilised Western ideas to 
undermine traditional culture and thus oppress and control the Iranian people 
economically and politically through the Shah. This culminated in the radical 
rejection of Western liberal values and models of government, as advocated in the 
teachings of Khomeni (Khumayni, 1981).
Arblaster argues that in the later twentieth century, liberalism has become 
increasingly conservative and more closely associated with describing the interests 
of Western societies, giving priority to the individual’s freedom over issues such as 
achieving of equality in social and economic areas. This has helped to discredit 
liberalism in the Third World (Arblaster, 1984:326-332). For instance, in the 
contentious debate over human rights, it has been argued that the current human 
rights regime is not sufficiently sensitive to the diversity of social, economic, 
cultural and political realities in different countries (Liu, 1993; Alitas, 1993; Chua, 
1992). Instead, human rights are often seen to represent Western values, pursued, at
11 For a further illustration of the close equation of liberal and Western values, see, for instance, 
Fuller(1995).
12 See, for instance, Mahbubani(1993a), Zakaria(1994), Kausikan(1993) and Dunne(1997).
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times, to further the Western economic and political goals (Awanohara, Vatikiotis 
& Islam, 1993; Kausikan, 1993) . u
Liberal norms and values are, therefore, closely associated with the West, despite 
the ambition of liberalism to describe universal values and aspirations for all 
humanity. Whilst liberal theoretical approaches in International Relations can 
encompass serious consideration of a broader range of actors, in practice, 
mainstream liberal theorists have not availed themselves of opportunities to reflect 
on the role in world politics of broader communities such as civilisational 
identities. In principle, liberal theories focus on the individual as the foundation of 
pluralist communities. In practice, modem liberal theorists have acknowledged the 
primacy of the states-system and focused on understanding how other actors 
interact with, and constrain, states in their analysis of institutions, regimes and 
processes of interdependence or regional integration. Although in the post-Cold 
War environment liberal international theory may provide openings for reflection 
on issues relating to civilisations, cultures and identity, it still provides no category 
in its framework of analysis for civilisational communities. Whilst references to the 
West as a significant actor in world politics can be found in liberal commentaries, 
the nature and role of this actor is rarely interrogated at a conceptual level. In part, 
this may be due to the embeddedness of liberal theory in Western historical and 
intellectual traditions. Whilst projecting a universalist theory, liberalism privileges 
the history, structure and traditions derived from Europe and the United States.
Marxism, Neo-Marxism and the Unit of Class
A third paradigm found in International Relations pertains to perspectives deriving 
from Marxist thought. Although Marx was not primarily concerned with the
13 For instance, at the 1997 meeting of ASEAN heads of state, the Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Mohamed Mahathir, called for a review of the UN Convention on Human Rights with a view to 
correcting its Western-centric focus. He argued that the 1948 UN Declaration ‘was formulated by 
superpowers which did not understand the needs of poor countries’ (The Economist, 2 August, 
1997, 20). It should be acknowledged that, in principle, Western theorists and states acknowledge 
that human rights are indivisible, with social and economic rights deemed as important as political 
and civil. There is, however, greater debate on the role of community over individual rights. For 
discussion of these issues, see, for instance, Donnelly(1989), Chua(1992), Milner & Quilty(1996), 
Yash Gai(1995) and Vervoom(1998) See also the Bangkok Declaration issued by the Ministers and 
representatives of Asian States , 29 March, 1993, prior to the Vienna Conference.
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specific functions of international politics,14 his ideas have significantly influenced 
International Relations theory, particularly in the area of international political 
economy, and the practice of international politics (Kubalkova & Cruikshank, 
1985).15 Marx viewed the states-system as a superstatetural effect of the struggle 
between classes in a succession of modes of production (Linklater, 1989:2). It 
would ultimately wither away when replaced by a universal social order, which 
would be both classless and stateless. The most basic unit of analysis is, therefore, 
class (Kubalkova & Cruikshank, 1985:17). While Marx focused primarily on class 
division within and across states, later thinkers, such as the dependencia school and 
‘world systems’ theorists looked more closely at the structures of the international 
system.16 This mode of analysis, whilst discussing relations between states, gives 
primacy to economic relationships and the international division of production, 
labour and exchange rather than to political relations. Political relations become 
more a function of economic structure, as do relations between civilisations. Yet 
again, while the West is implicit both in the language and structures of Marxist- 
based International Relations thought, and in its application to international 
politics, again the scope for analysing the West within its theoretical structure is 
limited to that of an agent of structure.
Marx and the West
For many years the perception of what constituted East and West which dominated 
International Relations derived from the division between the liberal capitalist
14 As Maclean( 1988:297) remarks, this is not unusual. International Relations has drawn theoretical 
inspiration from a wide range of scholars whose works were concerned with philosophy, political 
theory and economics and who did not focus specifically on international politics. See also 
Halliday(1994) for a discussion of historical materialism and the limited engagement of Marxist 
analysis in International Relations.
13 The influence of Marx’s methodological approach on developments in the area of Critical Theory 
is of great to importance to recent developments in International Relations theory, but will not be 
discussed in detail in here. See Linklater(1996) and Cox(1981) for a discussion of how Marx’s 
historical materialism has influenced the development of critical theoretical approaches to 
knowledge, and towards the structures and process of society.
16 Like realism, Marxism has effectively accepted the state as the fundamental actor in international 
relations for the foreseeable future (Falk, 1990:270). As Maclean notes, in practice, most Marxist 
scholars have tended to focus their analysis at the level of the states-system (Maclean, 1988:298); 
although, as Halliday(1990) observes, the conception of the state found in Marxism differs 
markedly from that found in realism.
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system and the communist system based on Marxist thought. This is ironic since 
Marxism is itself derived from Western intellectual traditions. As Wallerstein 
points out, Marx was also a child of the Enlightenment drawing from this tradition 
an emphasis on the secular, and a commitment to science and reason (Wallerstein, 
1984:165; O’Brien, 1995). He drew from Hegel a concept of dialectical history, but 
one which entailed a sense of teleological progress (Turner, 1978:7). Much 
common ground exists between Marxism and liberalism in their attitudes to 
growth, nature and the more efficient harnessing of productive resources (Falk, 
1990:269-70). Marx was writing within the context of the relatively stable and 
highly ordered nineteenth century European states-system on the cusp of the 
penetration of the non-Westem world by imperialism and large-scale expansion of 
European investment capital (Kubalkova & Cruikshank, 1985:27-8; Linklater, 
1989:5). His views of the non-Westem world, particularly in his early work, have 
been described as being divided on East-West lines, with the West characterised by 
the triumph of individualism and the growth of capitalism, while the rest of the 
world was largely lumped together under the ‘Asiatic mode of production’, the 
most primitive of four historical stages of development (Sawer, 1978; Lichtheim, 
1979:166; Turner, 1978). Although Turner notes some ambiguity in Marx’s 
discussions of colonialism/imperialism,17 Marx’s remarks on colonialism’s impact 
on the non-West suggest that he understood it to be ultimately a force for progress. 
The Asiatic mode of production, characterised by Oriental despotism, was seen as 
inherently stagnant and needing the stimulus of Western capitalism as a cruel but 
necessary revolutionary force (Marx, 1983a).18 In 1853, for example, Marx argued:
England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the
other regenerating - the annihilating of the old Asiatic society, and
the laying of the material foundation of Western society in Asia.
(Marx, 1983b:337)
17 For instance, Marx’s commentaries on Ireland suggest he viewed capitalist colonialism as a 
destructive force which could stunt development (Marx, 1930:239-56; Turner, 1978:17).
IS Turner notes that Marx and Engels comment upon the Orient as societies which lack the critical 
ingredients for social evolution through conflict, class. India is referred to in The Communist 
Manifesto as a society without history (Turner, 1978:27).
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In this respect, Marx explicitly distinguishes between civilisations of West and 
non-West on the basis of perceived levels of development (Lichtheim, 1979; 
Sawer, 1978). His views on the value of progress, the beneficial impact of Western 
science and technology, and the superiority of the Western model of development 
place him firmly within the Western tradition.19
Neo-Marxism, International Relations and the West
In the twentieth century, ideas derived from Marxist analysis have been used to 
explain inequalities between developed and underdeveloped countries. In analysing 
a world structured along a core/periphery division, it is a community’s location in 
the international schema of production which is the relevant issue. For instance, 
Andre Gunder Frank examined the uneven development of capitalism not predicted 
by Marx or Lenin. He argued that the underdevelopment of peripheral countries 
was a direct result of development at the core which had drawn away surplus from 
the periphery through the structures established under colonialism (Frank, 1967). 
This method of analysis discusses the consequences of capitalist development for 
the non capitalist world. However, although it considers the consequences of 
Western expansion and colonisation, it is not overtly an analysis based upon 
distinctions between the West and non-West as civilisational identities.
Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the most prominent of structuralist scholars, does 
give some consideration to the role of the West as a distinct social system in 
international relations. In doing so, he provides useful insights into its nature and 
its role in world politics. However, his conception of the West is shaped by his 
interpretation of it as an element of the structure of the world system. Wallerstein’s 
analysis of international relations focuses on the structure of this system rather than 
on the political communities within the structure; their role and place is related to 
their location in the world system. His analysis is holistic in that he rejects the 
employment of divisions between the realms of economy, polity and culture 
(Wallerstein, 1990b). Economic factors are represented as prior and the source of
19 Sawer also critiques later models of Marxist thought, such as those found in the writings of Lenin, 
Stalin and Mao, for their Euro-centricity in essentially universalising the European or Western 
revolutionary experience in their analysis of the course of world revolution (Sawer, 1978: 40-1).
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significant processes and structure in his analysis.20 The inter-state system is 
viewed as one institutional structure amongst a number in the integrated framework 
of the modem world system. This modem world system is the capitalist world 
system, a system which began in fifteenth century Europe and expanded outward 
achieving unprecedented global scope, incorporating other societies into it. The 
system of sovereign states is represented as the political framework which evolved 
in concert with the expansion of the capitalist system, as the framework which best 
facilitated this expansion (Wallerstein, 1990a; 1996:89). The West, as represented 
by the modem capitalist mode of production, became the dominant social system in 
the modem era and stands at the core of the capitalist world system.
Wallerstein argues that the modem capitalist mode of production, in absorbing all 
other social systems and establishing itself as the only world system, used the tools 
of the Enlightenment to promote itself as the only form of civilisation. In this 
respect, the West, or Western civilisation, came to absorb or replace the plurality of 
civilisations which preceded it (Wallerstein, 1984:165; 1991b:223). Therefore, 
Wallerstein does consider the role of civilisations on world politics. However, he 
does not treat civilisations as an empirical reality; rather they refer to ‘a 
contemporary claim about the past in terms of its use in the present to justify 
heritage, separateness, rights’ (1991b:235). Consequently, he views civilisational 
claims as a means of seeking legitimacy, or more recently, part of the rhetoric of 
resistance within a capitalist economy (Wallerstein, 1984:167). Therefore, 
civilisational interaction is treated as fundamentally a function or product of 
economic interaction.21
Wallerstein is interested in the impact the West has had on other members of the 
world system. Placing it at the core of the global core-periphery structure, his 
analysis is, in a literal sense, Western-centric since he views the West as the core 
around which all other societies rotate. However, his perspective focuses on the
20 Wallerstein writes: ‘The capitalist world-economy is a system socially structured by an integrated 
axial division of labour, whose guiding principle is the ceaseless accumulation of capital’(1996:87).
21 He argues that in the past, new world empires sought ideological legitimacy by claiming direct 
links with prior world empires, and in so doing, used the concept we call civilisation (Wallerstein, 
1984:163-4).
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West as an element of structure rather than as an evolving political community. His 
discussion of the ideas and norms which constitute the West focuses on their 
relation to the process of capitalist accumulation which is the real heart of his 
structural framework.
Neo-Marxist authors have, therefore, demonstrated some interest in, and awareness 
of, the West as a significant community in world politics. However, they focus
oh
primarily^the West as a system of production, operating at the core of the structure 
of the world system. It is the power relations between core and periphery, rather 
than the changing constitution of the West as a political community which interests 
this school of thought.
Once again, the language of the West and non-West permeates the application of 
neo-Marxist analysis: the West is synonymous with the core, the non-West with the 
periphery. In the language of international affairs, the West was for a long time 
automatically equated with the developed world; in other words, the successful, 
industrialised, capitalist economies which were members of the dominant 
international trade regime. The map of East and West, in terms of levels of 
development, is better explained by the map of nineteenth century European 
imperial expansion than by geography. For instance, the club of advanced 
industrialised societies included not only the geographic West, in the sense of 
Western Europe, but also those former colonies and dominions in which white, 
European culture had become predominant. How else could an Australia or New 
Zealand be considered as Western? The West of politicians and commentators such 
as Sukarno (Modelski, 1963), Mahathir(1986), Panikkar(1953) and Said(1978) is a 
West characterised by colonial expansion, and by economic and technological 
power. Therefore, a core/periphery analysis of recent world politics presents the 
West as the developed world, and the capitalist social system becomes synonymous 
with an aspect of the structure of the world system.
The West is, then, a critical community in structural theories of world politics. In 
contrast to realism and liberalism, the Marxist paradigm does in some respects 
accommodate analysis of the West as an actor in world politics. However, these 
theories are interested in the West as an aspect of the broader structure of the world 
system rather than as an evolving political community. Therefore, as with the more
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prominent paradigms of International Relations thought, structural theories allows 
limited conceptual space for reflection on the role of the West as a civilisational 
identity.
Why the Absence?
The main paradigms of International Relations theory, then, provide limited 
theoretical space for the exploration and explanation of the constitution of the West 
as a community within world politics. Indeed, until the recent revival of interest in 
its role and future in the post-Cold War period, it was rarely seen to be a category 
that required explanation and exploration within the discipline. Realism displays 
little interest in communities beyond the state. Liberalism, whilst displaying more 
interest in transnational communities, has largely failed to provide analysis of the 
West as a distinct political community. Neo-Marxism draws the West into its 
analysis, but analyses it as an agent of the structure of the international system 
rather than a multifaceted political community. However, all these paradigms are 
built on the foundations of European historical experiences and intellectual 
traditions. International Relations theory is, therefore, deeply embedded in the 
history and philosophies of the West, making more puzzling the fact that so little 
room is provided for analysis of this important community and for its role in world 
politics.
Explaining this theoretical silence may be assisted by considering the West as in 
essence a cultural entity, a civilisational identity. The absence of reflection on the 
West in International Relations may then be usefully considered in the broader 
context of the discipline’s treatment of issues of culture and identity. The 
epistemological and universalist theoretical premises of International Relations 
have constrained discussion of culture, and tend to marginalise the discussion of 
civilisations in the modem discipline.
Culture and Epistemology
Until recently, culture has been largely marginalised from the main paradigms of 
International Relations. A number of scholars have pointed to its importance but, 
as Walker notes, it has not been treated as an issue of significance or urgency in
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International Relations (Walker, 1990:8; Rengger, 1992; Darby & Paolini, 1994). 
For Darby & Paolini, one of the causes of this marginalisation is the sheer 
complexity of culture. Characterising International Relations as a discipline which 
feels more comfortable with precise, concrete terms, they argue culture may be 
perceived as too loose and imprecise a concept for analysis (1994:382). This 
suggests that the epistemology of International Relations is one factor which has 
inhibited the study of culture. From the 1950s, when the discipline began to 
blossom, there was an impetus towards making International Relations a truly 
scientific enterprise. This was signalled by Hans Morgenthau’s efforts to define 
International Relations as an empirical science which studied facts rather than 
values or aspirations (Morgenthau, 1964). As Hoffmann notes, efforts to apply 
instrumental reason and scientific methodology to the study of international 
relations were well received in the atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s, the era in 
which the behaviouralist revolution moulded the emergent social sciences 
(Hoffmann, 1977). The resurgence of neo-realism reinforced the positivist 
tradition, whilst reducing the emphasis on quantifiable methods (Cox & Sjolander, 
1994). Neo-liberal institutionalists have also largely seen themselves as working 
within a positivist epistemological framework (Keohane, 1988, Goldstein & 
Keohane, 1993:4). The editors of the Millennium special issue on ‘Culture and 
International Relations’ support the contention that the positivist tradition strongly 
influenced International Relations theory through behaviouralism, limiting its 
capacity to deal with culture. Its bias for observable and measurable processes and 
behaviour, they argue, led to research agendas that excluded ideas, perceptions, 
meanings and values which did not lend themselves to quantification, inhibiting the 
study of culture in International Relations (Jacquin, Oros & Verweij, 1993:375).
International Relations Theory and Universal Truths
Criticisms leveled at the discipline’s scientific methodology have been broadened 
in a more general critique of the rationalist epistemological foundations of the 
discipline, drawing attention to the universalist assumptions of the main paradigms 
of International Relations theory. Post-modern scholars have argued that from the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment to the present day, Western thought has been 
dominated by a scientific approach to knowledge and society, characterised as
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empiricist and positivist, projecting a narrow concept of social reality as a universal 
agenda for all theory and practice (George, 1989). Scholars such as George, and 
Der Derian have criticised the ‘totalising narratives’ which presuppose modem, 
rational man as a universal category. They are critical of an ahistorical, rationalist 
approach which is unable to reflect upon the historical and social contingency of its 
own concepts (Der Derian, 1988; George & Campbell, 1990).
These criticisms have been leveled at a broad spectrum of International Relations 
scholarship, most noticeably neo-realist thought. They highlight the tendency of 
the most prominent paradigms of International Relations to present theories of 
international relations which are universal in application; that is they presume to 
identify rules of behaviour or process in the international system which are relevant 
across time and space and ultimately operate regardless of the characters of the 
actors under consideration. Realism posits a vision of international relations as a 
realm of recurrence and repetition as actors pursue their quest for security and 
power. Liberal theories are ultimately premised on a faith in human progress and 
greater emancipation achieved through reason and the capacity to learn, presenting 
what is, ultimately, a teleological theory of world politics. Structuralist theories 
generated from Marxist foundations exhibit a belief in change generated by the 
dialectical forces of history. Therefore, these paradigms present theories which are 
presumed to be universally relevant and transcend local or regional cultural 
features and differences. In this sense, they present culture-neutral theories of 
world politics. This has meant that issues such as culture and identity are treated as 
variables which should be viewed as attributes of the actors that do not impact on 
the broader workings of the international system. Questions about culture, argues 
Walker, become translated into questions about ‘values’; state sovereignty is 
represented as the ultimate source of value, thus the agent in conflict between 
different value communities (1990:9). Cultural diversity becomes subsumed into 
the claims of the state; cultural difference becomes an issue of national identity. 
Realism, in particular, has tended to treat culture as a factor which should be 
analysed at the unit, or state level. Therefore, culture may be removed from the
22 See, for example, Ashley(1984), Cox(1981), George(1994) Walker(1993).
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equation, either as a factor which distracts the analyst from the ‘facts’ of power and 
capability, or, as in the work of Waltz, as a unit-level characteristic which does not 
alter the impact of the structure of the system which constrains all states in the 
same way (Waltz, 1979:80; Rengger, 1992:94).
In part, the tendency towards positing universal truths in International Relations is 
facilitated and reinforced by a tendency towards the neglect of history as a tool of 
critical analysis in the discipline. As Kratochwil notes:
For many, if not most, international relations scholars ... history is 
still, in the memorable words of Henry Ford, ‘mostly bunk’. This 
does not mean that IR treatises are not peppered with historical 
‘data’, but the use of ‘history’ shows mostly a confirmationist bent 
rather than a critical distance and theoretical sophistication. 
(Kratochwil, 1996:216)
The neglect of history as a critical tool is, in many respects, a consequence of the 
preference for scientific and quantitative methods which came to dominate the 
discipline in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the United States; but, as 
Kratochwil and Walker point out, there is also reason to draw attention to the 
limited and narrow notions often employed when history has been appealed to in 
the discipline. Historical discussions often focus on the emergence of the modem 
states-system from a past which Walker describes as ‘[l]ife before International 
Relations’. The sequel, he notes, will generally tend towards one of two trends; the 
liberal focus on progressive emancipations of statist communities, and the 
emergence of concepts such as freedom, rationality and justice; or the realist trend 
of violence and recurrence in the world of power politics (1989:169). This 
tendency limits the possibility for consideration of other communities, histories, 
possibilities within, let alone outside, the European context.
It has been suggested that the neglect of history is a result of the preference for 
thinkers in the discipline, particularly in neo-realism, to identify structures and 
fixity in world politics, rather than to focus on understanding the ebb and flow of 
change (Lapid, 1996; Cox, 1981). Walker argues that identifying structures of 
permanency is particularly alluring to those seeking to develop an explanatory 
science of international politics:
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Discontinuity and historical transformation have long been viewed 
as threats to the accumulation of objective knowledge ... Against 
temporal flux, contingency, idiosyncrasy and revolutionary praxis, 
the identification of structural form offers an alluring possibility of a 
universalising objectivity. (Walker, 1989:171)
However, the neglect of history tends to undermine the discipline’s capacity to
reflect upon the broader social and historical context from which key concepts,
institutions and presumptions about the international system have been derived
(Chakrabarti Pasic, 1996). This not only leads to a failure to illuminate the
contingency of concepts and presumptions, and to limit consideration of alternative
possibilities, but also allows the discipline to perceive itself as universal and
acultural since it tends to mask the cultural foundations upon which the discipline
is built.
The universalist assumptions of International Relations theory is, then, a second 
important reason for the lack of reflection on the role culture in International 
Relations. However, the capacity to present these theories as universal is facilitated 
by a lack of awareness of, or reflection on, the degree to which they themselves 
emanate from particular cultural premises. Such an awareness qualifies the sense of 
International Relations theory as culture-neutral. Masked by aspirations toward 
universality and culture-neutrality is the fact, as noted above, that Intentional 
Relations theories are largely founded upon Western European historical 
experiences and intellectual traditions.
We noted above the degree to which International Relations has drawn upon 
Western intellectual traditions. Whilst International Relations scholars may 
demonstrate knowledge of this legacy, this does not necessarily translate into a 
consciousness of how, or if, the cultural specificity of the legacy constrains its 
broader relevance to world politics. Furthermore, key texts are rarely discussed as 
ideas emanating from a particular historical or cultural context. Der Derian(1988) 
and Walker(1993) both note the tendency to reify certain texts, such as works of 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Carr, elevating them above alternatives, and, 
furthermore, reifying particular readings of these texts without considering the
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social and historical circumstances which contributed to their production. In the 
process, Walker argues, the ‘great tradition’ of International Relations theory tends 
to present these figures as unproblematic, obscuring differing interpretations, and 
erasing the background of the historical transformations to which these thinkers 
were responding ‘in favour of assertions that they all articulate essential truths 
about the same unchanging and usually tragic reality’ (Walker, 1989:172).
Similarly, Der Derian and Walker argue that there is a tendency to project certain 
key concepts and institutions within International Relations, such as the state, 
sovereignty and security, as universal, rather than considering these as evolving at 
particular points in time to meet particular circumstances.24
This suggests that the conceptual evolution of International Relations is closely 
linked to the intellectual and historical evolution of the West, particularly Western 
Europe. As Richard Falk comments: ‘The framework of modernism associated 
with the rise of the West is the main intellectual background against which thought 
about international relations developed’ (Falk, 1990:268). Falk associates the shift 
from feudalism to modernity in Western Europe with shifts in legal and 
institutional frameworks from those based on natural law to legal positivism. The 
system evolved from one based on ‘overarching principles and standards resting on 
revelation and authority’ to one based on consent between territorial states (Falk, 
1990:268). This was the system which became the foundation of a global 
international society.
The power of the West, in terms of political and economic capabilities, facilitated 
the expansion of Western ideas, institutions and structures. This has occurred
2~ Der Derian describes the ‘classical discourse’ in International Relations, referring largely to the 
scholars of classical realism and the international society school, as canonical in their selection and 
interpretation of great texts. This discourse, he argues, privileges a Western, rationalist, analytical 
body of work over multicultural, revolutionary texts, imparting a conservative, rationalist order to 
reality (1988:191).
24 Walker notes: ‘It is tempting to minimise the significance of the historical experiences through 
which crucial concepts and ways of speaking have been formed. The longing for timeless categories 
has exercised a profound influence on many of those we associate with rationalism in the more 
philosophical sense of this term. Yet it is possible to trace the history of the terms ‘state’, 
‘sovereignty’, ‘individual’, ‘culture’, ‘security’, and many other terms we now take for granted. In 
doing so, it is possible to discover how they emerged in response to specific historical conjunctions 
and contradictions (Walker, 1989:172).
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through the globalisation of institutions such as the sovereign state, the system of 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and, underlying these, the system of 
international law producing, in effect, the hegemony of Western political culture in 
international society.2"^ As Falk comments, the globalist rhetoric which evolved in 
association with international society and, more broadly, international relations 
tended to ‘disguise patterns of interstate hegemony, especially as between Europe 
and the rest of the world’ (Falk, 1990:268). This hegemony masks the cultural 
premises of the international society and of International Relations in general. 
However, the perception of International Relations and the international systems it 
describes as culture-neutral inhibits inquiry into the role of cultural communities in 
International Relations, one of the most central of these being the West itself.
Civilisations on the Margins
For a variety of reasons, then, there has been a tendency to marginalise issues 
pertaining to culture in International Relations. The tendency to marginalise
of-
cultural communities has meant that consideration of the role/ civilisations in 
contemporary International Relations has been minimal. There was interest in the 
role of civilisations in writings on world politics in the early twentieth century. 
Civilisations played a critical role in the ideas of scholars such as Oswald Spengler, 
Pitrim Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee. Elements of this interest remained in the work 
of British International Relations scholars in the international society school. It was 
also evident in the work of international historians such as Adda Bozeman, 
William McNeill and Fernand Braudel. However, the state-centric tendencies of 
post-war realism and the narrowing of theoretical constructs during the Cold War 
effectively pushed this area of inquiry out of main schools of the discipline. In the
23 For discussion of the concept of the expansion of international society, see Bull & Watson(1984), 
Watson(1992). The evolution of concepts of international society and international law have been 
discussed as closely linked to the concept of civilisation as an aspect of Western hegemony. See 
Gong(1984) and Keal(1995).
26 Chakrabarti Pasic(1996) also stresses the need to highlight the social and historical context from 
which the international system emerges. She criticises scholars such as Wendt and Buzan for 
focusing on interaction alone as a factor shaping the character of actors in the international system. 
Chakrabarti Pasic stresses the importance of shared cultural systems for the evolution of 
international relations and communities.
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post-Cold War era, renewed attention has been stimulated by the challenges of 
understanding political community and identity.
As with the term ‘the West’, occasional references to civilisations can be found in 
International Relations literature, yet these references often demonstrate a lack of 
reflection on a conceptual level of the role and nature of civilisations. For instance, 
Morgenthau’s references to civilisations cited above assume the primacy or 
hegemony of Western civilisation. Gilpin’s( 1979) references imply a sense of 
teleology; civilisations were communities that existed in history. The plurality of 
civilisations of the past, however, have been subsumed into the global span of 
Western civilisation and its political institutions. Wallerstein, as noted, links 
civilisational claims to claims of ideological legitimacy. As a result of this lacuna 
of conceptual reflection in International Relations, the recent revival of discussion 
of the role of civilisational interaction in world politics fell into something of a 
theoretical vacuum.
However, the term is ever more present in the language of world politics. 
Underlying its usage are a complex range of implicit assumptions. The tendency to 
neglect civilisations in the discipline may have been encouraged by the complexity 
of the concept.27 It may also have been enhanced by a sense of redundancy, with 
civilisation being associated with political communities of the past, as in Gilpin’s 
usage. However, whilst the concept of civilisation is certainly a complex one, it is 
not redundant. It can be viewed as informing important underlying assumptions 
about the cultural world order and interaction in world politics.
Conclusion
A greater awareness of assumptions regarding civilisation may enhance 
International Relations’ capacity to reflect on the nature and role of the West in 
world politics. The West remains largely uninterrogated in the main paradigms of 
International Relations theory. These conceptual gaps are at least in part a result of 
a broader tendency to marginalise issues relating to culture and cultural 
communities in world politics by the discipline. This tendency, however, tends to
27 See Appendix for a further discussion of ‘civilisation’.
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stifle inquiry not only into the impact of culture in shaping communities, 
perceptions and interests in world politics, but also in shaping the discipline of 
International Relations itself. The cultural premises that underlie the main 
theoretical paradigms of International Relations tend to be hidden. The existing 
paradigms are unlikely to provide us with the tools to reflect upon the nature and 
role of the West in world politics. Therefore, we need a framework for bringing 
analysis of conceptions of the West and, through this, the role of civilisations into 
International Relations to facilitate our understanding of the possibilities for world 
order that are being envisaged.
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Chapter Two
Towards a Framework for Conceptualising the West in 
International Relations
The preceding chapter noted the absence of reflection on the West and on 
civilisations more broadly from International Relations theory, and considered 
some factors which may have produced this gap. The challenge presented by this 
absence is to provide a framework for thinking critically and conceptually about the 
West and civilisational interaction in International Relations. Any such framework- 
should suggest a way to critically analyse various conceptions of the West, linking 
these to the broader context of assumptions about the cultural world order, whilst 
allowing for consideration of the complexity and contextuality of the West.
In proposing such a framework, this chapter first considers the complexity of 
conceptions of the West and its contingency in relation to the historical and 
intellectual environments in which these conceptions are articulated. The 
framework suggests ways of thinking about the West in the context of this 
complexity and contingency. It then discusses how we might draw on literature on 
the politics of identity and representation in constructing a framework for analysis, 
suggesting that we treat the West as a civilisational identity and an imagined 
community. Finally, it establishes a framework through which various conceptions 
of the West will be analysed in subsequent chapters.
Conceptualising the West
The West features prominently in the history and language of world politics. The 
West is often presented as a cohesive community, its evolution following a natural 
progression from ancient times to the future. Yet the legacy of ideas and concepts 
on which the West draws is diverse and, at times, contradictory (Dasenbrock,
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1991). In the twentieth century, the concept of the West evokes very different 
images in different contexts. The West of the early twentieth century was still an 
imperial West. Through the processes of trade and colonialism, Europeans had 
acquired political authority over the peoples of Africa, Asia and the Americas. 
Western states possessed unprecedented strength and authority in the military, 
economic, political and cultural realms. Political authority was supported by, but in 
turn supported, military might and economic strength. Economic development 
helped to fund military structures, and military institutions stood in defence of 
economic expansion. The West’s power was based on an interweaving of all three 
dimensions, and fired by continuing technological innovation. These resources and 
capabilities were rationalised and further enhanced by the perception of Western 
civilisation as more advanced and other societies more backward and in need of 
Western guidance or governance (Bull & Watson, 1984; Said, 1978; Keal 1995). 
Even such a power as the United States, whose colonial possessions were limited 
(to the Philippines post 1898), came to wield enormous power in contrast to, and 
increasingly over, the non-Westem world. The West of this era is likely to be 
conceived of as predominantly white, Christian, and with its heartland in Europe.
The First World War undermined both the confidence, and image and authority of 
the Western powers, but they still retained unprecedented power relative to other 
societies. However, the post-war period saw efforts to introduce Western liberal 
principles into the structures and institutions of international politics. This was 
demonstrated by the establishment of the League of Nations and the promotion of 
international law, open diplomacy and self-determination.1
The liberal dimension of the West became more pronounced in the international 
realm in the mid twentieth century. The concept of the West in this era is most 
immediately associated with resistance to forms of totalitarianism, first in the form 
of fascism, then communism. In this context, the West appears more as an 
ideological community than a territorial, racial or religious one. Geographically,
1 This did not mean the relinquishment of imperial possessions, but the Mandates system 
demonstrated a desire to legitimise the continuing governance of colonial peoples on developmental 
grounds. This entailed the idea that the international community had a ‘sacred trust’ to govern and 
‘nurture’ peoples not yet sufficiently developed to practice self-governance (Gong, 1984:76-80).
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the line dividing West and East was drawn in Europe, and the heartland of the 
West moved towards the United States, but the term ‘the West’ effectively 
assumed a conceptual rather than a geographical meaning, connoting a community 
of liberal, capitalist societies. However, the conceptions of the West in the bi­
polar context co-existed with the concept of the West constituted in antithesis to 
the Third World. In this context the West represented the world’s wealthy 
developed and industrialised societies/ The axis of wealth and development in the 
1950s and 1960s which distinguished West from non-West, strongly resembled the 
axis of race distinguishing white from non-white peoples. Furthermore, the legacy 
of colonialism remained as a further axis of difference, with many countries in Asia 
and Africa only gaining their independence during this period.2 34
In the post-Cold War era, the conceptions of the West no longer revolve 
exclusively around concepts of ideology or development. Some commentators have 
speculated that the West as a political community would be unable to retain its 
cohesion without the threat of the Soviet Union (Harries, 1993).5 However, despite 
the demise of the communist East, and the rapid development of previously 
underdeveloped and post-colonial societies, particularly in East Asia, the West as a 
concept has become neither redundant nor universal. It remains part of the political 
vocabulary in discussions about the maintenance of international order, security 
and economics. It is, perhaps, increasingly understood as a regional, cultural 
community than a global one; one which is powerful but not unrivalled 
(Huntington, 1996a). However, in an increasingly fluid international environment,
2 In theory, this meant attachment to political and economic liberalism but in practice the Western 
powers tolerated many illiberal regimes who were, nevertheless, anticommunist.
3 This is the concept of the West which is to be found in colonial and post-colonial critics of the 
West. See for instance Sukarno in Moldelski(1963), Panikkar(1953) or Mahathir(1986).
4 These include Algeria and Uganda (1962), Singapore and Brunei (1963) and Zambia (1964). 
Angola and Mozambique, and Fiji and Papua New Guinea in the Pacific did not achieve 
independence until the 1970s.
5 Harries describes the political West as an artificial construction which emerged as a response to a 
threatening and hostile ‘East’. He argues that, despite sharing ‘vast commonalities’ in areas such as 
history, culture, political ideas and institutions, the countries of the West - Europe and America - 
have only formed a community in response to overwhelming threats. This has occurred in 1917-18, 
1941-45 and the Cold War. Without such a threat, Harries maintains that differences and 
incompatibilities will overwhelm the unity of that community. See also 0 ’Brien( 1992/3) and 
Walt(1994).
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it is hard to conceive of the concept of the West becoming a purely territorial or 
racially exclusive one.6
What these broad conceptualisations of the West demonstrate is that it is a 
community which not only changes and is represented differently over time, but 
exhibits apparent inconsistencies. The West is first and foremost a locational 
concept, yet the community it encompasses expanded its territorial scope to 
establish and include societies from all over the globe. The West might primarily 
be conceived of as based on peoples of the white race, yet it has incorporated 
people of many races in its communities and alliances over the years. The West 
may be conceived of as primarily a Christian community, yet it is equally 
characterised by the secularisation of public life. Furthermore, many people of the 
Christian faith, in Russia or the Middle East for instance, would not be seen as part 
of Western society. The West was the birthplace of liberalism and liberal values are 
frequently held to be the normative heart of the West. Yet the West also created the 
most powerful series of colonies and empires which the globe has ever seen. 
Moreover, it was the birthplace of both fascism and of communism, an ideology 
seen as the antithesis of the West during the Cold War. The West is widely 
perceived as representing wealth and power; yet within Western societies there 
existed, and continues to exist, poverty and enormous inequalities.
This prompts several questions. Are these all the same West? Does one of these 
conceptions represent the authentic West? The discussion suggests that the West is 
a complex and varying community and that rather than seeking one authentic and 
definitive West, it may be more useful to consider what such variation tells us 
about the West and the role of like communities in world politics. Whilst it has 
strong territorial associations, the West is not simply defined by inhabiting a 
particular territory; whilst it has strong racial and religious overtones, it cannot
6 For instance, as noted in Chapter One, Deudney & Ikenberry(1993/4), define the contemporary 
West as consisting of Western Europe, North America and Japan. It is based on the logic of 
‘industrial liberalism’ and distinguished by a private economy, a common civic identity and public 
institutions. Its hub, and ultimately the model upon which this conception is built, is the United 
States. These authors recognise the importance which political culture and shared norms play in 
their conception of the West. However, there is a tendency for their discussion to overlook tensions, 
inconsistencies and problems which exist within these communities. See Cummings(1994) 
Falk( 1994b) and Walt(1994) for commentaries.
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simply be defined as a racial or religious community. It is a community which 
encompasses a broad range of material and normative dimensions. Furthermore, 
perceptions of the central characteristics which distinguish it vary, across time and 
perspectives. This indicates that conceptions of the West should be explored with 
an awareness of the context in which they are articulated.
These features pose difficulties for constructing a framework for analysis. They 
suggest that it is problematic to construct a framework which seeks to identify 
essential qualities of the West which persist across time and contexts in order to 
ascertain the definitive West. Whilst this study acknowledges the importance of 
recognising and seeking to identify continuities in conceptions of the West, it 
argues that it is also necessary to address the complexity of the West. Rather than 
seeking to eliminate this complexity, it can be useful to ask what this tells us about 
the West as a community, and what it implies for its interaction with other 
communities in world politics.
The West is often perceived as not simply a military or political alliance, but as a 
community distinguished by a common culture, histories and traditions. One of the 
first tasks of this framework is to seek to come to grips with the nature of the West 
as a cultural entity. As Richard Falk has observed, ‘[t]hose who emphasise the 
cultural basis of political action often tend to regard the appropriate unit of analysis 
to be civilisation rather than the state’ (1990:268). In keeping with the spirit of this 
observation, this study views the West as a civilisational identity. By a 
civilisational identity, I mean a form of identity which locates the immediate ethnic 
or national community within the context of a broader, cultural community; a 
transnational community, often extensive in geographical and temporal scope. As 
Braudel’s definition of civilisations reminds us, these are communities which 
endure across lengthy periods of time and which comprise both material and 
philosophical dimensions (Braudel, 1980). A civilisational identity may encompass 
a multiplicity of languages, ethnicities, religious denominations; but it is united by 
some elementary shared histories, traditions, values and beliefs. These influence 
the way people believe the world should be, the goals that should be striven for 
and, perhaps more fundamentally, the things that are at stake. It may also influence 
perceptions of what is the acceptable mode of conduct in the global arena.
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Civilisational identity is important in helping to form values, priorities, goals and 
norms. In this respect, a civilisational identity is a normative community. Viewing 
the West as a civilisational community also allows us to be more comfortable with 
understanding the West conceived as broad in geographic and temporal range. 
Consequently, it can be conceived of as capable of change, evolution, diversity and 
even inconsistency!
As noted above, to date, the International Relations community has largely focused 
on the modem state as the predominant political community in world politics. This 
is a territorially defined community, its borders inscribed on maps, its population 
enumerated in censuses, its government and constitution operating through 
officials, representatives, and formally designated channels and institutions. 
However, as Benedict Anderson has pointed out, despite the firm material 
institutions and structures through which it is represented, the community which 
underlies the nation-state is as much a social as a tangible, material construction 
(Anderson, 1991). Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ presents the 
nation-state as something more than a territorial community containing a 
population. Indeed, he argues that the demarcation and quantification of the state 
that instruments such as the map and the census performed required an ability to 
conceptualise a community existing amongst diverse and dispersed populations 
with little or no physical or day-to-day contact, but were able to conceive of 
themselves existing simultaneously (Anderson, 1991:24). In this sense, the 
community must be imagined to permit it to exist. Anderson conceives of the 
community of the nation as ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (1991:7). Its 
existence is facilitated by some form of mental bonds. Anderson’s study focuses on 
the importance of language, in facilitating the process of imagining the nation in 
the modem world. He discusses the role of language in establishing links between 
peoples across time and space, and in forming the bonds of attachment between 
people and the imagined community of the nation:
What the eye is to the lover ... language ... is to the patriot. Through 
that language, encountered at mother’s knee and parted with only at 
the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures 
dreamed. (1991:154)
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Without such mental bonds, the community of the nation would have little or no 
substance.7
Anderson’s work on ‘imagined communities’ can be usefully applied to thinking 
about civilisational entities such as the West. The West is not a clearly defined 
territorial entity. It is not constituted by any single language or ethnic group. 
However, this is not to say that it does not have an identity constituted by 
boundaries, symbols, myths and histories and a broad, if dispersed, sense of 
fraternity. The West is an imagined community in the sense that it is a transnational 
community which extends over a broad geographical and temporal canvass, 
encompassing peoples who may have no immediate contact with one another, but 
who perceive themselves to be part of it. There is, therefore, a shared identity and 
some element of common interests, ideas and values. As an identity, it entails a 
fluid and dynamic sense of community. The West is not linked by a common 
language, but the ‘language’ which constitutes it draws on concepts and principles 
whose lineage is traced deep into history and perceptions of history play a crucial 
role in representing, legitimising and perpetuating the ‘imagined community’.
Considering the West as imagined community helps in coming to terms with the 
intangible dimensions of its role as actor and influence in International Relations. 
In addition, it allows us to be more comfortable with its complexity. Viewing the 
West as a civilisational identity further contributes to our acceptance of this 
complexity. Treating the West as a civilisational identity also facilitates examining 
perceptions of the West in the context of broader concepts and assumptions about 
cultural world order.
7 This is not to understate other critical factors in state formation, such as those outlined by Charles 
Tilly( 1975), including war and the development of administrative and taxation systems, and the 
evolution of norms of governance and legitimacy. Nor does it underestimate the importance of the 
apparatus of the state in generating an image of the nation to which loyalty could be pledged and 
identity focused. What is important in Anderson’s work, however, is the identification of 
intersubjective understandings of community across time and space as a critical element in creating 
and sustaining the modem nation-state.
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Identity Politics and International Relations
In addition to providing useful tools with which to approach the study of the West, 
viewing the West as a civilisational identity and an imagined community 
encourages us to draw on literature from studies of the politics of identity and 
representation.8 Discussion of the politics of identity was not a prominent aspect of 
International Relations literature until the 1980s. Questions of identity tended to be 
treated at the unit level, being subsumed into studies of domestic and comparative 
rather than international politics (Bloom, 1990; Tickner, 1996). As Lapid(1996:6) 
comments, identity like culture has tended to be treated as self-evident and 
unproblematic by much of the theoretical literature. In effect, this meant privileging 
certain political communities and treating their identities as given, rather than 
investigating the processes through which political identities are constructed and 
the way in which they shape interests and actions. These privileged identities have 
been the state and the nation. The collective political identity of the state as equated 
with the nation has effectively become the presumed starting point for International 
Relations (Tooze, 1996). The tendency to accept these collective identities as given 
led to a fairly static, monolithic perception of identities. States and nations tended 
to be assumed as stable and homogeneous in their identities (Krause & Renwick, 
1996).
Since the 1980s, however, interest in the role of identities in international relations 
has become more evident. As Neumann(1996), notes, one of the first full length 
studies to critically discuss the role of identity politics in the context of 
civilisational encounter and world politics, Todorov’s The Conquest of America 
and the Question of the Other (1984), was not written in the discipline of 
International Relations.9 However, International Relations scholars such as Der 
Derian, Shapiro and Campbell have set out to consider the impact of processes of 
identity politics on world politics, drawing into International Relations insights
8 This study does not, however, presume to offer an exhaustive discussion of the literature on 
identity politics. Instead, it draws on insights from aspects of this literature to assist in developing its 
own framework of analysis.
9 Todorov is a student of comparative literatures, as is Edward Said, another prominent scholar 
whose Orientalism (1978) has been important in the discussion of the construction of identity in 
encounters in world politics.
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from disciplines such as philosophy and linguistics (Neumann, 1996; Doty, 1996). 
In addition, feminist International Relations scholarship has been an important 
force which has ‘nudged’ the discipline into questioning whom the nation and state 
really represent and speak for, drawing attention to the significance of other 
identities, such as gender, which are formed below and across state level. This 
actually presents a more realistic perspective of the complexity of the communities 
which operate in world politics (Zalewski & Enloe, 1995:302; Tickner, 1992).
Interest in the role of identity politics in shaping international relations has been 
further stimulated by developments in world politics. In the post-Cold War era, 
issues relating to forms of identity such as ethnicity and religion have become 
increasingly prominent as world politics emerges from the shadow of a bi-polar 
ideological divide. Globalisation has also heightened this interest. The 
globalisation of production, services, finance and labour, and the consequences of 
flows of refugees and migrants, for instance, has created challenges to traditional 
conceptualisations of political communities and their identities.10
Identity is now being more consciously incorporated into the traditional agenda of 
International Relations. Security studies and democratic peace theory have 
sharpened the focus on perceptions of threats or possibilities for cooperation which 
arise from shared or differing political identities (Tickner, 1996:147-8). However, 
here again, the identities of the units involved are still taken as a given. 
Constructivist scholars, in contrast, have demonstrated an interest in the interplay 
between identity and interest formation in shaping the structures and institutions of 
the international system. These authors maintain that the identities of states are not 
exogenously given, but emerge through interaction. They are shaped by the 
domestic and international environment.* 11
10 This is not to argue that these forces were not important influences during the Cold War, but that 
their impact often tended to be overshadowed or absorbed into the ideologically-structured system. 
See, for instance, essays in Krause & Renwick(1996), Alker & Shapiro(1996) Linklater & 
Macmillan(1995) for discussions of some of the challenges to concepts of community and identity.
11 See, for example, Wendt(1992;1996); Katzenstein(1996) and Reus-Smit(1996). See Chakrabarti 
Pasic(1996) for a critique of Wendt’s overreliance on interaction and neglect of historical, social 
and cultural factors and institutions which shape interaction.
56
However, exploration of the role of identity in international relations has been most 
evident in critical theory.12 Critical perspectives have strongly challenged the 
perception of political identities as autonomous and fixed. Like the constructivists, 
these authors are critical of the failure of the main paradigms of International 
Relations to consider the structures and institutions of world politics, and the 
international system as socially constructed rather than objective givens (George & 
Campbell 1990; Campbell, 1992; George, 1 9 9 4 ) . One consequence, they suggest, 
is the neglect of the role of identity in shaping world politics. They argue that the 
way in which identities are constituted and represented is in itself a significant 
exercise of power and important aspect of world politics (Shapiro, 1989; Campbell, 
1992). Rejecting the notion that the state or nation are the only significant 
collective identities in world politics, critical theorists treat identities as multiple, 
complex and constantly in the process of constitution and reconstitution (Alker & 
Shapiro, 1996).
‘Community or Death’: Processes of Identification and
Differentiation
The evolving interest in the role of identity politics and the formation of political 
communities and their identities creates opportunities for reflection on a broader 
range of communities in world politics and provides an opening for exploration of 
the role of civilisational identities in world politics. It also offers useful insights 
into the processes of the constitution of community and identity which can assist in 
devising a framework for analysis of the West.
The concepts of community and of identity are closely interwoven. A shared 
identity is an essential component to the constitution of a community. A sense of 
community implies a group of people who perceive themselves to have something 
in common at some level, a sense of shared identity. The constitution of identity is
12 See, for example, works by Shapiro, Der Derian, Walker, Campbell, Dalby, Klein, Doty, 
Linklater, and some of the essays in Lapid & Kratochwil(1996).
lj Tooze(1996) points to the separation of object and subject which is maintained in the approach of 
orthodox International Relations as a central problem in their treatment of identity. This separation 
tends to privilege objective knowledge over subjective. Given the inherently intersubjective nature 
of identity formation, this limits the capacity of these approaches to deal seriously with this issue.
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part of the process of defining political community; of defining the borders of 
inclusion and exclusion and the basis upon which they are drawn.
The impulse to identify with the group is a fundamental human impulse. In its most 
basic form, the individual human must engage with the community to survive; 
infants, for instance, depends on their immediate community for nurture. ‘We are 
bom into community or death’ remarks Ann Norton(1988:l I). Likewise, William 
Bloom discusses identification as:
...an inherent and unconscious behavioural imperative in all 
individuals. Individuals actively seek ... to maintain, protect and 
bolster identity in order to maintain and enhance psychological 
security. (Bloom, 1990:53)
However, humans rarely limit their sense of identification to only one group. An 
individual can simultaneously identify with a variety of collectives in different 
contexts. This is particularly the case in contemporary societies. As Connolly 
notes, ‘the channels that connect personal identity to collective identity in late- 
modern states are multiple and deep’(1991:198). Each community may appeal to a 
different quality or need in the individual. Bloom, in his discussion of the links 
between personal identity, national identity and international relations, argues that 
shared group identification can be triggered only by real and meaningful 
experience. He further argues that the individual must perceive positive 
psychological benefits from such identification; the community must have some 
form of relevance to the individual to invoke identification (Bloom, 1990:51-2): 
‘Identities can be imposed, but most are not; rather they are embraced because they 
deliver what people want’ (Ferguson & Mansbach, 1996:29).
Identities are social as much as psychological constructs. A basic element of 
identification is the perception of some form of common quality or experiences 
amongst the potential members of the community. They must have something, 
though not necessarily everything, in common.14 Norton argues that an awareness
14 For instance, Smith identifies the basic common assumptions of national communities as an 
historical territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories; a common or mass public 
culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; and a common economy with territorial 
mobility for all members. He suggests that the common assumptions which characterise an ethnic 
community include a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historic 
memories; one or more differentiating elements of common culture; an association with a specific
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of this commonality provides a basis for the establishment of common interests, 
goals and even common action (Norton, 1988:47).13 This may lead to the 
establishment of structures and, or, norms to enhance or protect the common 
identity. Conversely, it could be argued that shared practices can produce a sense of 
common interests and collective identity.
An awareness of a collective identity at some level, or in relation to certain 
attributes, values or goals forms an important aspect of the constitution of a 
community. The community is, in part, defined by the ways in which this collective 
identity is defined. This process of definition involves the drawing of boundaries 
which describe who may be included or excluded from the community (Linklater, 
1990). The process of definition involves differentiation.10
The process of differentiation is an inescapable part of identity formation. In 
recognising that which is different, the self begins to define itself:
Meaning is made out of difference. Definition begins in the 
negation, in the designation of what a thing is not ... Oppositions - 
left and right, black and white, in and out, man and women - 
provide points of reference and sets of linear relations which, when 
placed in relation to one another, construct those networks of 
meaning that cultures comprise. (Norton, 1988:3)17
Without differences, argues Connolly, an identity loses its distinctness and solidity:
‘Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness
in order to secure its own self-certainty’(Connolly, 1991:64).18
‘homeland’ and a sense of solidarity amongst significant sectors of the population (Smith, 1991:14, 
21) .
15 Similarly, Bloom proposes that ‘[t]hrough a shared identification, individuals are linked within 
the same psychological syndrome and will act together to preserve, defend and enhance their 
common identity’ (1990:26).
16 Neumann(1996) identifies four main strands in social theorising on collective identity. They vary 
in their conception of the constitution and relationship between self and other, but the process of 
differentiation and conceptualising an other is central to all.
17 Relating this to theories of identification, she observes that ‘[t]he construction of identity 
described by Freud and Lacan begins in the recognition of difference, in the opposition of self and 
other’ (Norton, 1988:3).
lsBy this, I understand Connolly to mean that difference is perceived as creating something quite 
distinct from, even alien to, oneself.
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The move to establish an authentic or homogeneous identity for a community can 
prove dangerous, primarily for those constituted as the ‘other’ in antithesis to one’s 
own identity. This can mean not only the exclusion of the other but also its 
constitution as inferior or threatening. Connolly observes that
...a powerful identity will strive to constitute a range of differences 
as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick primitive, 
monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical - other. It does so in order to 
secure itself as intrinsically good, coherent, complete, or rational 
and in order to protect itself from the other that would unravel its 
self-certainty and capacity for collective mobilisation if it 
established its legitimacy. The constellation of the constructed other 
therefore becomes both essential to the truth of the identity and a 
threat to it, by just being other. (1991:65-6)
Connolly appears concerned here, not with the necessity to differentiate, but with
the tactics of devaluing the other because of this difference. The other can become
a scapegoat created and maintained to secure the appearance of a true identity.
Furthermore, the drive to achieve self-certainty, to confirm the ‘true’ nature of
one’s identity is fraught with implications if we accept the contention that identities
are not only multiply held, but also relative and repeatedly constituted, rather than
fixed and objectively given (Campbell, 1992; Ashley & Walker, 1990:260).
Edward Said’s discussion of the constitution of the ‘Orient’ anticipates Connolly’s 
hypothesis. In his analysis of European and American encounters with peoples of 
the Middle East, Said describes the constitution of the Orient as a device which, in 
itself, helped to constitute and reinforce the identity of the West. Said argues that 
Orientalism was a family of ideas which constructed the Orient as a community in 
antithesis to the West. The East was irrational, authoritarian, lazy; the West 
rational, logical, peaceful, liberal, vigorous and scientific. The depiction of the 
Orient is highly generalised, ahistorical and threatening to the West. Said’s analysis 
presents a West which perceives the Orient as distinctly different, hostile and 
essentially inferior. Such perceptions helped to reinforce the West’s self-perception 
as progressive, and justified in its intellectual and institutional subjugation of such 
hostile and backward societies, if only for their own benefit (Said, 1978).19 Such
19 V.G. Kieman made similar observations. See, for instance, his discussion of the British in India. 
The Indians are variously stereotyped as backward, apathetic, cruel, treacherous: ‘By thinking the
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perceptions were crucial to concepts such as the ‘civilising mission’ which
9Q
normatively legitimated European colonial expansion.
Tvetzan Todorov also demonstrates concern with regard to the impact that tactics 
of differentiation can have on the course of civilisational interaction. In his analysis 
of the European encounter with the peoples of the Americas, Todorov outlines a 
form of ‘othering’ described as the ‘double movement’. In these encounters, 
difference is equated with inferiority, whereas equality is equated with similarity. 
He argues that, in their encounters with the peoples of the ‘New World’, the 
Spanish largely alternated between viewing the ‘Indians’ as either ‘noble savages’ 
or ‘dirty dogs’. They were perceived as people without culture. It was, therefore, 
legitimate to project one’s own culture onto these ‘objects’. Todorov argues that 
the Spanish, as led by Columbus and Cortes, were unable to treat with these 
peoples ‘as a subject, having the same rights as oneself, but different, Columbus 
has discovered America, but not the Americans’(Todorov, 1984:49). The peoples 
of the New World were presented with the options of conquest or conversion, but 
not co-existence.
Todorov confronts the problem of meeting the other as both different and equal.21 
His work demonstrates how processes of differentiation are of relevance to the 
conduct of international and inter-civilisational relations, and how a community’s 
perception of its identity can be constituted, reconstituted and reinforced through
worse of their subjects’, Kieman argues, ‘they avoided having to think badly of themselves’ 
(Kiernan, 1969:35).
20 Bernard McGrane(1989) observes the shifting grounds on which the West differentiated itself 
from the other. In the sixteenth century, the other was distinguished on the basis of religion; the 
revolution in scientific and humanist thought then saw the other as chiefly constituted by their 
degree of enlightenment or ignorance; in the nineteenth century, the criteria of differentiation shifted 
to degrees of evolution and progress.
21 Todorov’s discussion of the debate between Sepulveda and Las Casas at Valladolid demonstrates 
that even so, the Europeans drew upon two distinct, but equally Euro-centric traditions in their 
perception of the Indians. He argues that Sepulveda’s position was based essentially on the 
Aristotelian principles of social hierarchy whereas Las Casas’ defence of the Indians derived from a 
more egalitarian Christian tradition, but a tradition which saw equality stemming from men’s 
qualities as Christians, or potential Christians, rather than an innate equality amongst men. If seen as 
equal, then equality is translated into sameness, making it legitimate to project ones own values on 
the Indians, ignoring differences and forcing assimilation. If different, then difference is translated 
into inferiority, justifying their destruction or enslavement (Blaney & Inayatullah, 1994:28). The 
choice offered to these people was, then, conquest or conversion (Todorov, 1984:151-167).
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contact with those perceived as different. In describing the carnage and upheaval 
heaped upon the Indians, he illustrates the potentially devastating consequences 
that equating difference with inferiority may have on these relations.
Todorov’s discussion of the relationship between the Spanish and the peoples of 
the Americas depicts a series of encounters in which the sense of difference and 
distance between two broad cultures was vast and apparently radical. These 
encounters doubtless helped to bolster the Europeans’ self-image as a superior and 
progressive culture. In a more recent context, Bradley Klein’s work discusses how 
the identity of the West was constituted in response to the perceived threat of the 
Soviet Union. Klein analyses the creation and perpetuation of NATO as an 
institution, arguing its success derived as much from the unity which it provided 
within the fragile post-war West, as from deterrence of its Soviet adversary. 
NATO, argues Klein, was widely perceived not only as a military institution, but 
one which protected Western values, the Western way of life.22
A community’s sense of its own identity is constituted and reinforced through 
encounters with that perceived as outside the community, but it is also shaped by 
processes of differentiation within. In Zygmant Bauman’s words: There are 
friends and enemies. And then there are strangers' (1996:143). The stranger is the 
outsider who comes not to visit but to stay. They are ‘other’ within the community 
and as such can be seen as presenting a particular threat by upsetting the spatial 
separation and order of inside/outside. As Ann Norton argues, political identity 
often emerges with greater clarity when the polity confronts the individual whose 
inclusion is ambiguous, or in other words, where the lines of difference may not at 
first be so clearly drawn:
In confronting the question of whether these people belong within or 
without the polity, those within it are obliged to enunciate those 
differences that distinguish them from all others, to consciously 
define the limits of their identity. (Norton, 1988:4)
22 As Klein notes, in the post-war period, the West was viewed by analysts such as George Kennan 
as threatened by the ‘weakened fabric of Western life’ as much as by Soviet military power. 
However, with the onset of the Cold War, the West was faced with an adversary ‘whose culture and 
world view offered ... a reverse image of everything celebrated by the emergent allies’ (Klein, 
1990:314, 317).
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In this way, the process of defining the community’s identity enhances or 
contributes to the constitution of the community by helping to define the 
parameters of the group, defining the qualities thought appropriate and those alien 
to it. For Dalby, the ‘other’ provides the axis on which acceptable and unacceptable 
political activities and identity are constructed (Dalby, 1990:13). For Klein, an 
institution like NATO helps to produce and protect a singular image of Western 
identity as progressive, modem and industrialised, marginalising a variety of other 
identities relating to religion, gender, or race. Such identities can become sites of 
political contestation. In this, they can be seen as threatening the perceived unity 
and identity of the West2j whilst making the political identity of the West appear 
homogeneous rather than multifaceted. However, these contests may also provide 
the vehicle for extending or redefining the community’s identity over time.
The process of differentiation, particularly with respect to those ‘liminal’ to the 
community, helps to generate abstract principles upon which the community or 
polity is based. It helps to define the normative dimensions of any community. It 
also contributes to the conceptualisation of the community as an apparently 
objective entity, independent of the views or wishes of any single constituent 
members. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of the community as an objective 
entity assists the community to continue beyond the active participation of any 
single member and to retain what Norton calls a constant character over time 
(Norton 1988:53-4).
The Boundaries and Bonds of Community
Differentiation facilitates the drawing of the boundaries of the community. In turn, 
boundaries reinforce strategies of inclusion and exclusion.24 As Linklater reminds 
us, understanding strategies of inclusion and exclusion, and the grounds upon 
which these are justified are central to understanding the nature of political and
2j See, for instance, Kurth(1994) in which the author argues a grand alliance of multicultural and 
feminist activists are undermining the cohesion of Western civilisation.
24 For instance, David Campbell’s study of the United States argues that its boundaries were not just 
reflected in, but were constituted by, US foreign policy. Foreign policy helped to constitute US 
identity by defining external threats, which were both strategic and moral. These were also linked to 
perceived threats within the community (Campbell, 1992).
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moral communities (Linklater, 1990). In the context of international relations, 
territory has come to provide one of the most immediate and obvious sites for the 
drawing of boundaries. The territorial definition of community is particularly 
significant in the modem Western political tradition where communities are 
physically separated through frontier lines. The concept of political community has 
become intimately incorporated with the concept of territory in the modem 
European state system in which the state’s sovereign capacity is conceptualised in 
relation to its exercise of control over a defined territory (Ruggie, 1993; Mount, 
1997).25 This has led to the expectation of a ‘necessary alignment’ between 
territory and identity which has been prominent in International Relations 
(Campbell, 1996:171).26
However, whilst territorial boundaries may constitute a significant dimension of 
the identity of communities, they present only one dimension. As Norton observes, 
political boundaries are also drawn in history, culture and ideology: ‘The
demarcation on each of these planes constitutes one dimension of political identity’ 
(Norton, 1988:4). One of the most significant features of post-Cold War 
international politics has been the rediscovery of the importance of other 
dimensions of identity, such as ethnicity, language and religion. The contribution 
of such elements of identity to political communities to a large extent had been 
overshadowed by the ideological geopolitics of the Cold War.
In the twentieth century, the nation-state has been a potent political symbol and 
goal, its legitimacy enhanced by the broad appeal of the idea of self-determination.
23 See also Anderson(1991) and Said(1978) on the significance of mapping and census making in 
the European conceptualisation of space. See Springborg(1994) on the historic links between the 
concepts of territoriality, property and the Western state.
26 This ‘necessary alignment’ is under challenge. For instance, the relationship between identity and 
territory is challenged by the identities of migrants, refugees and transnational communities as well 
as alternative claims on identity such as ethnic identities within existing state communities. See 
Alker & Shapiro(1996); Krause & Renwick(1996) and Mount(1997) for further discussion of the 
challenges which shifting perceptions of territory and identity present to International Relations.
27 Issues of class and gender are also important dimensions of political identity, although their 
impact on world politics has often been neglected by International Relations. Notable exceptions to 
this neglect include the growing body of literature on feminist International Relations by authors 
such as Cynthia Enloe, Spike Peterson, Jan Jindy Pettman, Ann Tickner and Christine Sylvester, and 
on class, work by structural theorists, for example Immanuel Wallerstein.
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Although many national identities highlight a dominant race, language or religion, 
in practice, very few states are homogeneous (Walker Connor, 1978; Dittmer & 
Kim, 1993:10). Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of most states has not weakened the 
power of national identity as a political force in international relations. This 
suggests that the identity of a national community is built around something more 
than seemingly objective criteria such as territorial boundaries, language or race. 
There must be some sense of commitment by members to the community and a 
need for a form of acceptance as a member of the community.28 Dittmer & 
Kim(1993) suggest that to understand the constitution of a community’s identity it 
is necessary to go beyond purely analytical concepts of identity which describe the 
‘objective’ features of a community to understand the subjective qualities which 
give the community substance. In their discussion of national identity, they seek to 
explore more fully the networks and relationships that attach the individual to the 
community and the values it is perceived to represent. These attachments can be 
powerful, in many cases persuading individuals to make enormous sacrifices for 
the perceived good of the community. As Anderson observes, in the last two 
centuries, millions have been willing to die for the imagined communities of 
nations (Anderson 199T.7). In the twentieth century, many have also sacrificed 
themselves for concepts such as freedom as much as for a specific territorial 
homeland. The bonds of attachment which can inspire such actions must be 
strong and deeply rooted.
As noted above, Benedict Anderson explores the way in which language can 
develop the attachments of national identity. He notes that using the vocabulary of 
kinship and home, idioms to which all people feel a natural attachment, the 
language of nationalism is able to evoke self-sacrificing love (Anderson, 1991:143-
28 Doty(1993) argues race is a category or identity which may be imposed by outside, but that a 
community so defined can build up within it a sense of its own identity, for instance belonging, 
shared purpose. In discussing the distinction between an ethnic category and an ethnic community, 
Davies(1996) observes that a community is distinguished by not only by objective criteria, but also 
by a subjective consciousness of belonging to a community.
29 For instance, in the conflicts of the twentieth century, large numbers of troops have been sent 
from abroad sent to fight in far-off continents. Australians and New Zealanders fought in Europe, 
Americans to Southeast Asia, Cubans to Africa in conflicts tied as much to ideologies as to threats 
to territorial integrity of the homeland.
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5). Dittmer & Kim stress the relationships established via common symbols, and 
shared myths and histories in constituting communal identity. In this, they seek to 
capture what makes the identity dynamic/0 This suggests looking not only at the 
borders which delimit a community, but also at the channels through which 
individuals relate to the identity of the collective, and through which this identity is 
regenerated. Dittmer & Kim explore
...the ensemble of symbols collected to represent the principles on 
which the group was founded and on the basis of which its members 
have contracted to live together. (1993:17)
This helps to explain how the community is constituted on an intersubjective basis
by its members, its leaders, its narrators and scholars.
Symbols, myths and histories can legitimise a community’s rules and goals; help to 
define its membership and provide a vehicle to perpetuate it beyond the lifetime of 
its individual members as myths and symbols are passed from generation to 
generation, and to new members (Norton 1988:5). If we conceive of symbols as 
also incorporating concepts, we can see how the myths and symbols of a 
community can contribute to its normative bonds. In the West we might consider 
the French Revolution, the American Declaration of Independence or the erection 
and fall of the Berlin Wall as foundational and powerful symbols of traditions of 
individualism, freedom and equality. In Australia, the Anzac tradition provides a 
powerful myth of sacrifice for the good of the community. The first landing of man 
on the moon remains a potent symbol of progress and the power of the rational, 
scientific mind. The examination of such symbolic dimensions helps to elucidate 
the qualities which provide a community with cohesion and continuity.
The Role of Histories and Representations
Community identities are treated here as dynamic and ongoing. Histories provide a 
way in which changing identities can be represented. Drawing on the work of Erik 
Erikson, Bloom observes that a person’s identity continues to evolve from youth to
30 For instance, they describe national identity as ‘an ongoing process or journey rather than a fixed 
set of boundaries, a relationship rather than a free-standing entity or attribute’ (1993:13).
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old age (1990:35). Similarly, the identity of the collective evolves with changing 
historical circumstances. All political communities are subject to challenge and 
change, as shifting social and political circumstances bring about new 
identifications and loyalties, sometimes superimposed on old loyalties and
*7 i
identities (Bloom, 1990:63). The identity of a community must be to some 
degree flexible if the community is to remain relevant to changing historical 
circumstances. Without this flexibility, a community may become irrelevant to its 
members, perhaps even redundant. In this sense a community’s identity is dynamic; 
it is continually being reconstituted.
How, then, does this identity maintain both continuity and dynamism? Norton 
assists in understanding how this is achieved through representation. She argues 
that the seemingly established order is constantly in flux. People both preserve the 
collective identity and bind themselves to it through material embodiments - 
constitutions, institutions, documents, monuments. These materialities she 
describes as representations. A representation (or a re-presentation) preserves 
things in their absence, but in repeating things, it also reinterprets them:
...each representation, occurring in a different context, attaches 
additional associations to the act or individuals that is recalled, and 
disguises the significance of once meaningful attributes. Thus 
representation shows itself to be at once endlessly repetitive and 
ever changing. (Norton, 1988:97)
Norton’s concept of representations in some ways parallels Dittmer & Kim’s 
notion of symbols and myths. These authors focus our attention on the significance 
of conceptual icons which articulate the norms and goals of the community. They 
provide a focus for its identity and a vehicle for its perpetuation, a means by which 
the identity of the community can maintain a sense of continuity. As the 
interpretations of these myths and symbols, these representations evolve to meet 
changing historical circumstances, so does the constitution of the community. This
jl As Ferguson & Mansbach point out, no polity remains unchallenged or unchanged for ever; but 
the pull of old loyalties can remain powerful. In such cases, polities must co-opt old loyalties, 
memories and identities or risk these becoming the basis of rival political associations or faiths 
( 1996:36).
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allows the community to be re-constituted in relation to the context in which it 
occurs.
The concept of ‘representation’ is also critical to the work of post-modern authors 
such as Michael Shapiro. For Shapiro(1989), our understanding of the world is 
mediated by meanings and values imposed not only by our immediate 
consciousness, but by various ‘reality making scripts’ inherited from surrounding 
cultural and linguistic conditions. It is influenced by interpretations shaped by our 
cultural context. Shapiro emphasises representations as not just reflecting, but also 
constituting the social world, imparting meaning and value to things (Shapiro, 
1988). Representations, then, contribute to the production of knowledge and 
identity. They circulate through discursive practices, become naturalised, and 
acquire the air of ‘truth’ (Doty, 1996). These ‘truths’ become part of our social 
reality and shape our understanding of the past.
Farrands(1996) observes that all societies, traditional and modem have 
‘foundational myths’; incidents or situations which explain their origins and 
character. Campbell( 1996:165) similarly refers to coup de force, performative acts 
or events which provide a critical sense of foundation to the community’s identity. 
The French Revolution could be seen as such a foundational myth in 
conceptualisations of the modem West; the Chinese Long March fulfilled a similar 
role in modem Chinese society (Farrands, 1996).
The significance of foundational myths in interpreting a society’s past highlights 
the importance of history in shaping and maintaining political identities for the 
present/2 History, argues Farrands, is central to modem identity: ‘Our identity is 
part of our history, defined by our sense of history, and validated by history’ 
(Farrands, 1996:6). A sense of common history, shared by the members of the 
community, helps to provide or explain continuity in its symbols and
j2 Walker also points to the importance of ‘myths of origins’ for academic discourses. These, in 
effect, are particular readings of history and texts which implicitly affirm the assumptions of the 
modern discipline. In the case of International Relations, for instance, this relates to readings of the 
emergence of the interstate relations: ‘By identifying when interstate relations began, and providing 
a sharp contrast with what came before, these stories offer a powerful account of what interstate 
politics must be, given what it has always been since the presumed beginning’ (1989:170).
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representations; it can enhance the cohesion of the community and its sense of 
identity. History links the community of the present with that of the past:
The remaking of public myth, of the history of the people, which 
necessarily accompanies each representation of national identity, 
reconstitutes not only the living but the dead. It reveals the 
representation that invests the reformed community with a history 
distinct from that of its predecessors. It denies the boundaries that 
divide the living and the dead, making them, at least in the 
understanding of the people, one. The remaking of history expresses 
an affirmation of continuous identity, transcending material 
conditions. (Norton, 1988:112)
History, then, functions to explain the identity of the community, and to justify its 
current constitution and conduct. History is annunciated in many locations in a 
society. It can be produced through official histories authorised by administrations, 
through academic discourses and the school system - a critical site for the 
reproduction of historical memory. History is also produced and reproduced 
through the media, and discussions in community, family and peer groups. The 
creating and reproduction of histories is not a simple process. Histories can be 
highly contested, particularly when interpretations of the past are at odds.JJ Even 
the most comprehensive of historical texts is, of necessity, selective; all histories 
are ultimately interpretations.34
In a sense, history is as much about forgetting as remembering in that our 
perception of the past is influenced by what is left out as well as by what is
Consider, for instance, the ongoing debate in Australia about the history of white settlement. 
While many argue that the history of Australia has for too long ignored the dispossession and 
extreme suffering experienced by the aboriginal inhabitants as a result of white settlement, others, 
including, Prime Minister Howard, have expressed a sense of resentment at what they see as the 
‘black armband’ interpretation of Australian history which takes into account the aboriginal 
experience. Another vivid example of history as a site of contest was the dispute which arose in 
1994 over the Smithsonian’s exhibition The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End o f World War 
II in Washington D.C. Those who opposed the exhibition included the Air Force Association, the 
American Legion and various Congressional members. They argued that the exhibition unfairly 
represented the American side too harshly and as aggressors, and the Japanese too sympathetically 
and as victims. They succeeded in having the exhibition, which opened in January 1995, radically 
scaled down. See Linethal(1995), Sherry(1995) and Fenrich(1995).
j4 The reasons for this may range from a conscious decision to manipulate the presentation of a 
certain era or event to the fact that only certain of the numerous events which occur even in one 
period may be recorded or remembered. There are, and always will, be many potential histories of 
any one event. See E.H. Carr’s ‘A Historian and His Facts’(1961), for a discussion of facts, 
evaluations and interpretations.
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included in our histories. Furthermore, our perception or sense of history may not 
always be accurate. For example, traditions which may appear ancient might, in 
fact, be recent innovations. Nation-states, Hobsbawm reminds us, are a relatively 
recent innovation, but often seek to portray themselves as ancient and natural
^ /T
political communities rather than modem constructs (Hobsbawm, 1983:7).
Invented traditions, and possibly traditions in general, build upon particular 
interpretations of a community’s history, serving to enhance the cohesion and 
legitimacy of existing structures by drawing on the community’s sense of the past: 
‘All invented traditions use history as a legitimiser of action and cement group 
cohesion’ (Hobsbawm, 1983:12). The work of Hobsbawm and his colleagues 
serves to demonstrate the significance of traditions in enhancing authority and 
group cohesion. It also highlights the importance of establishing links with the 
past, of a sense of historical continuity in the constitution and sustaining of 
community and its structures. Legitimacy is often, although not exclusively, drawn 
from a sense of continuity with the past.
The past can be used to provide a sense of authenticity for the present. Lawson, for 
instance, argues that ethno-nationalism has often used the idea of the ethnos as the 
natural and authentic community forming the basis for the ‘authentic’ state 
(1995:10). Strong links may be made between claims to sovereignty and collective 
memories of past injustices, such as Serbian suffering under Turkish rule or the 
dispossession, famine and migration which the Irish suffered under British 
authority (Lawson, 1995). Particular interpretations of events in history', of culture 
and tradition can be used to support and authenticate political institutions, or as 
Lawson argues, the positions of particular elites (1996; 1997). At the same time,
j;> See, for instance, Martin Bernal’s controversial Black Athena(\9S7) in which Bernal argues that 
nineteenth century European archaeology and history effectively wrote out the significant ties which 
ancient Greek society had with African society. Bernal suggests that attitudes to race underlay this 
selective reading of the history of the society which was seen as the antecedent to the modem 
Western. Or consider Aime Cesaire’s observation that Europe’s rejection of the barbarity of Hitler’s 
regime neglected, or forgot, the parallel incidents of European barbarism which were tolerated when 
inflicted on Europe’s colonial subjects (cited in Shapiro, 1996:xix).
The functions of such traditions are as interesting as their origins. Hobsbawm cites three general 
types of invented tradition: those which seek to establish or symbolise social cohesion; those 
establishing or legitimising authority; and those whose purpose is socialisation, to inculcate beliefs, 
values or conventions of behaviour (Hobsbawm, 1983:9).
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this can delegitimise alternative readings of history or alienate opposition by 
casting it as somehow unauthentic or foreign/' In this sense, history can be used to 
reinforce, rather than examine claims to authority.
History can be used to provide a sense of cohesion in a community by reaffirming a 
shared identity. The role of history in the process of differentiation and identity 
formation can be most obvious in times of flux, when communities are losing their 
cohesion and identities are in the process of re-inscription. Such periods can see the 
intensification of a sense of identity which may previously have been weak or less 
relevant to political and social life.38
History, tradition and culture, in enhancing the sense of solidarity within the 
community, can also alienate and exclude those who do not conform to the 
authorised identity. Members of the community can become ‘strangers’. Defining 
the stranger can be a political and a violent process with claims to authenticity of 
one identity displacing or dominating others. Campbell speaks of the violent 
deployment of history in the present as a means of defining political struggle and in 
support of contemporary political goals (Campbell, 1996:174). For example, in the 
case of Yugoslavia, intellectuals have been accused of feeding the process of 
fragmentation by promoting memories of ancient conflicts, ancient divisions which 
glorified the self and stereotyped the other (Job, 1993; Campbell, 1996:174).39 
Whilst this may have enhanced a sense of Serbian or Croatian solidarity in the 
post-Cold War environment, it simultaneously promoted the exclusion of ethnic 
groups from what had been a heterogeneous, if not always united, political 
communities. Representations of history are, then, a critical element in process of 
differentiation.
37 See Lawson’s discussion of the political dimensions of ‘Asian’ as opposed to ‘Western’ values 
debate in Lawson(1996).
38 For instance, ethnic, racial and religious identities may become paramount in dividing 
communities which had previously co-existed with heterogeneity when other forms of political 
identity held primacy, such as in Rwanda in 1994 or during the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s. This 
is not to deny the prior presence of difference, but difference then did not lead to the violent 
exclusion of the other from the polity.
j9 As Lawson reminds us, the political deployment of culture in processes of differentiation can lead 
to a reductionist, static representation of cultures as incommensurable (Lawson, 1996).
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A Framework for Analysis
The growing body of literature on the politics of identity and representation 
therefore offers a rich source of ideas and insights for exploring conceptions of the 
West as a civilisation identity. It suggests that while important boundaries are 
drawn around communities through processes of differentiation, community 
identities are also constituted by perceptions of shared norms and beliefs. Recent 
works on identity politics encourages the consideration of identities as dynamic, 
constituted and reconstituted in response to issues and circumstances. Finally, this 
literature encourages the consideration of how community identities are sustained 
through history and tactics of representation which provide continuity between 
past, present and future, but also allow for adjustment as perceptions of the nature 
and role of the community shift over time.
Relating these insights to exploration of the West as a civilisational identity 
suggests that a framework for analysis should acknowledge and investigate the 
boundaries conceived as differentiating the West from other communities. 
However, it should also investigate perceptions of shared norms and beliefs and 
their expression through institutions which provide the subjective dimension of a 
community, giving it substance and character and enhancing its cohesion. It also 
suggests the need for awareness of how history and representations have been 
employed to explain the community’s past and present. Finally, it suggests that 
civilisational identities, like other identities, should be treated as dynamic and 
subject to reconstitution under the influence of the context in which they are being 
conceived of and articulated. One of the critical contexts within which the West is 
conceptualised is that of its relationship to other civilisational identities. 
Conceptions of the West occur within the broader context of perceptions of the 
nature of civilisational interaction. These are discussed here as constituting 
perceptions of the cultural world order.
This study acknowledges and examines the complexity and contextuality of 
conceptions of the West by adopting a comparative approach, discussing its 
conception by a range of selected authors. In order to examine the influences which 
may have shaped the perspectives of these authors, the study first outlines the
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broad historical and intellectual context in which they worked. It does not argue 
that these influences are in themselves sufficient to explain particular approaches, 
but it suggests that they do help us to understand the interpretations and priorities 
which can be identified in their respective conceptions of the West and cultural 
world order. The study then identifies in these works key underlying assumptions 
about the nature of civilisations and their interaction, and the shape of the cultural 
world order. These assumptions provide the cultural context for conceptions of the 
nature of the West, of its role in the cultural world order, and its relationship with 
other civilisational identities.
The study then moves to focus on how each of these authors conceptualises the 
tangible and normative boundaries of the West. Four ‘objective’ boundaries have 
been selected which have the potential to express significant, visible dimensions of 
the West’s identity. The first selected is perhaps the most obvious one of territory. 
The study examines the extent to which each conception identifies the West as a 
specific territorial location, but it further outlines the role which geography, or the 
relationship to territory, plays in defining the West. The second is the critical 
boundary of religion. Religion is widely understood as a significant and powerful 
feature of community identity. This is no less the case with the West where 
Christianity is commonly perceived as providing both spiritual and political 
foundations for the modem West. The study therefore examines the way, and 
extent to which, religion is perceived as defining and differentiating the West in 
each case. Race is also a powerful dimension of community identity, although one 
which has often been neglected in discussions of international politics. The study 
explores the extent to which racial identity, or its management, features in these 
conceptions of the West and its relations with other civilisational identities. The 
fourth boundary considered is that of power. One of the most common features of 
conceptions of the West is the perception of it as a community distinguished by its 
exercise of unprecedented power. The study examines how this power is 
conceptualised, exploring the extent to which it is perceived not only as material 
capacity, but also as the exercise of influence in the international system through 
mechanisms such as international institutions, law and culture. It also examines 
whether Western power is seen as declining or increasing.
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The study then proceeds to explore perceptions of the more subjective dimensions 
of the West in examining interpretations of its norms and institutions. It analyses 
the key norms taken to characterise and distinguish the West, investigating how 
these help to frame analysis of the West’s interaction with other civilisational 
identities. Similarly, it examines the key institutions assumed as characterising the 
West.40 Again, the study investigates the relationship between perceptions of 
Western institutions and their role or impact on relations with other civilisational 
identities.
Finally, keeping in mind the boundaries perceived as defining the West in each 
case, the study examines the way in which interaction between the West and non- 
West is understood and interpreted, both historically and in the present. It examines 
the role which the West is perceived as playing and the possibilities envisaged for 
interaction as shaped by perceptions of the cultural world order.
Starting from the premise that the West may be usefully conceived of as an 
imagined community and a civilisational identity, this framework explores various 
dimensions of the West’s boundaries, its norms, and the way in which the history 
of the West and its interactions with other civilisational identities are perceived 
within the broader context of the cultural world order. It compares how the selected 
authors conceptualise the West and seeks to relate variations in these conceptions 
to the impact of different influences and contexts on the authors, and to their 
perceptions of cultural world order. In this way, the framework seeks to give some 
substance to the complexity and contextuality of the West.
This framework provides a mechanism for addressing the absence in International 
Relations theory of reflection on the conception of the nature and role of the West 
in world politics. Furthermore, it locates conceptions of the West in relation to 
broader assumptions about cultural world order which are an important, if often
40 The term institutions is used here in the sense in which it was defined by Hedley Bull as ‘a set of 
habits or practices shaped towards the realisation of a common goal’ (Bull, 1977a:74).
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understated, dimension of our image of world politics and of the possibilities for 
interaction between peoples.
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Chapter Three
Faust in the Twilight: Conceptions of the West in Oswald
Spengler
‘Nineteen-nineteen was the “Spengler year.” Everyone seemed to be reading him; 
everyone was wondering just who he was.’ Within eight years of its publication in 
1919, sales of The Decline of the West had reached one hundred thousand (Hughes, 
1952:89). Why did this weighty and complex tome excite so much interest in the 
years following the First World War?1 One of its attractions was that it purported 
to explain the turbulent past; but it also claimed to forecast the future of the West.
Oswald Spengler’s approach was radical in a number of respects. He had written a 
history of civilisation in which the West appeared as one of many civilisations, 
departing from the more conventional contemporary assumption of the West and 
civilisation as virtually synonymous.2 Spengler views the cultural world order as 
comprising multiple, organic, self-contained and essentially incommensurable 
civilisations. His conception of the West is infused with the sense of the organic 
development of society as an integrated whole within the framework of an 
essentially self-contained history. Furthermore, his prognosis for the West is a 
gloomy one of decline and disintegration. This ‘Faustian’ civilisation is seen as 
entering the twilight of its life-cycle. This was a significant departure from 
conventional assumptions of the innate progressiveness of the West; but it was one 
which spoke to the insecurities of the era.
1 As William Dray(1980) and Wemer Dannhauser(1995) note, there was also a renewed burst of 
interest in Spengler’s work in the period following World War II, a period in which people sought 
once again to understand a terrible period of devastation and destruction.
2 As William McNeill points out, the majority of nineteenth century European scholars effectively 
denied the historical significance of eras and places that failed to contribute to ‘Progress’ ‘and 
regardless of whether ‘Progress’ was defined in terms of truth, freedom, power or wealth, it 
remained always a European monopoly’ (McNeill, 1989:164).
76
Spengler’s work provides a remarkable conception of the West as a civilisational 
identity moving towards decay and demagoguery, which even today is unsettling. 
However, the ideas used to construct this conception are not unprecedented. 
Spengler drew on influences and traditions which represent important elements of 
Western culture and thinking, including views which are anti-liberal and post or 
anti-modem.
This chapter comments upon the ideas expressed in Spengler’s key work, The 
Decline of the West, but also refers to some of his shorter works. These include 
the essay ‘Prussianism and Socialism’(1967), published between the first and 
second volumes of the Decline; and two works published towards the end of his 
life, Man and Technics (1932) and Spengler’s last book The Hour of Decision 
(1934). Each of these works develops themes and ideas touched upon in the 
Decline. They illustrate one perspective of the West at a time of great flux in 
European and world history. At the same time, Spengler’s West is deeply 
embedded in a broader, complex conception of civilisational history
Spengler’s Era and Influences
The Decline of the West provided a grand, panoramic and ultimately pessimistic 
vision of a gradually decaying Civilisation.* 4 His conception was moulded both by 
his own perceptions and experiences, and the intellectual and political currents of 
the time. Although Spengler was not necessarily typical of intellectuals in his era, 
his work drew on an important intellectual tradition which was suspicious, if not 
pessimistic, with regard to the prospects and consequences of development, and the 
increased sophistication of Western civilisation. As an individual, Spengler was 
lonesome, moody, shy and poor in health. It has been suggested that Spengler’s 
pessimistic temperament and keen sense of tragedy enabled him to illuminate a 
dimension of man’s past as few other historians had done (Fischer, 1989:72).
J The first volume of The Decline of the West was completed in 1917; the second, although
substantially drafted, was not published until 1922. A revised and definitive version of volume 1
was published in 1923.
4 The capitalisation of Culture and Civilisation is used in this chapter to conform with Spengler’s 
usage of the terms, as translated by Atkinson.
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Spengler (1880-1936) lived during an era of transition and growing tension. He 
was bom into a Germany recently unified, a country described as a hybrid society 
which saw the persistence of feudal institutions within a context of modem 
capitalism and machine technology, a powerful community still somewhat unsure 
of how to achieve its role as a force in the world (Fischer, 1989; Tuchman, 1966). 
The genesis of the idea for the Decline came to Spengler during 1911. He viewed 
the Moroccan crisis of that year, which brought Germany to the brink of war with 
France, as a portent of the catastrophe to come. In international politics this was an 
era of arms races, imperialist clashes and developing blocs of alliances. It was also 
an era of growing militancy and militarism (Hughes, 1952:15). Spengler’s sense of 
pessimism and tragedy was enhanced by the personal poverty and hardship which 
he experienced during the course of World War One when he was writing The 
Decline of the West. He wrote during an era of trauma and change for Germany. 
Following defeat and humiliation in the World War 1, Germany experienced a 
period of turbulence under the Weimar Republic. This political system struggled 
with the extreme economic pressures of hyperinflation, reparations and depression 
in the 1920’s, and eventually crumbled under the pressure of the rise of extremist 
political groups which brought the National Socialists to power in 1933. Spengler’s 
work is infused with a sense of shame and dismay at the fate of Germany after the 
war. There is a palpable sense of betrayal which Spengler places on the shoulders 
of the German liberals and intellectuals whose influence he believed had 
undermined the German nation. There is also a sense of threat emanating from the 
challenge of revolutionary Russia and the increasing political and economic vitality 
of the colonial peoples.3 *5
Intellectually, this was also an era of uncertainty. Confidence in Western liberal 
ideas of rationalism and progress was challenged by the scepticism of authors and 
philosophers such as Georges Sorel, Vilfredo Pareto and Friedrich Nietzsche. In
3 See, for instance, ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ (Spengler, 1967), first published in 1919. In this
work, as elsewhere, Spengler demonstrated an intense anti-intellectualism, a resentment at the men
of ideas who he felt were removed from the more brutal grist and mill of life and power politics, and 
were consequently the pawns of more powerful forces such as big business. Spengler’s anti- 
intellectualism is somewhat ironic given that he himself spent his life devoted to study and writing 
and did not hold an occupation outside of the literary and academic fields.
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the nineteenth century, Alexis De Tocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt had raised 
questions about the wisdom and future of democracy, Burckhardt fearing the 
manipulation of the masses by tyrants. Nietzsche took Burckhardt’s criticisms of 
the decadence of contemporary Western society further, forecasting that a new 
elite, Nietzsche’s supermen, would sweep away the decadence of the nineteenth 
century bourgeois society, introducing new values of barbaric simplicity. Scholars 
such as Freud and Pareto proposed ‘intuitive theories’ of human action, arguing 
that the basis of human action might lie beyond the level of logical thinking 
(Hughes, 1952:19-25). Such ideas challenged the assumption of man as an innately 
rational actor, implying human action may be driven by deeper impulses.
In intellectual currents of this era, there was a prevalent view that struggle and 
conflict were forces of growth and renewal. The idea of struggle was integral to 
both the ideologies of Darwinism and Marxism and was an important element of 
realpolitik in the political arena:
There was a profound conviction among statesmen and thinkers, 
supported by the evidence of contemporary science, that nations 
were engaged in a ceaseless struggle for survival, and that only the 
strongest nations stood the chance of emerging victoriously from it. 
(Fischer, 1989:38)
Spengler’s images of the productive impact of struggle and his pessimism with 
regard to the future course of Western civilisation reflect these trends.6 However, 
his opposition to rationalism and scientific historical approaches led him to reject 
Darwinism as based on superficial causality (Decline:231).
Within Germany, some elements of the intellectual community sought to blend the 
old cosmopolitan and liberal ideas of the Romantics with the 'Realpolitik' of the 
Germany in the machine age (Fischer, 1989:42-4). Spengler demonstrates the 
influence of both of these trends but he stands outside the German historicist 
tradition which encompasses Hegel, Marx and Weber (Farrenkopf, 1993:391-2). 
His anti-liberal and anti-modem views reject the faith in reason and progress found
6 Michael Howard warns against the tendency to overestimate the extent to which ideas such as 
Social Darwinism were subscribed to by the general public, although they were widely discussed in 
intellectual circles. However, he himself comments that in pre-World War I era, wars were probably 
seen not so much as a terrible evils but necessary struggles to be fought and won (1987:15).
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in these authors, as well as the belief in continuities in history found in Hegel, for 
instance.7 On the other hand, Spengler can be located within a tradition of 
pessimistic thought which is represented in the German context by Nietzsche 
(Farrenkopf, 1993:391; Springborg, 1993:77).8
Spengler’s work reflects the influence of his training as a classical scholar. For 
instance, his conceptualisation of history as a cyclical process involving organic 
cultures demonstrates both his rejection of progressive thought and the influence of 
classical thinkers. Both Aristotle and Heraclitus had applied the idea of life-cycles 
as observed in nature to human society. This facilitated the notion of viewing 
human society as passing through stages of spring, summer, autumn and winter, or 
youth, maturity and old age. Heraclitus further observed not only the cyclicality of 
nature but also its transience. 9 Spengler knew the work of Heraclitus well, having 
written his doctoral thesis on the philosopher. His own work applied this concept 
of the natural order of things to human history. Spengler viewed cultures as 
progressing through a cyclical life span while constantly engaged in a process of 
self-transformation.
Cyclical conceptions of history were not confined to the classical scholars and can 
also be found in the work of Machiavelli and Vico. They were also adopted by the 
Romantic movement in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century. In contrast to 
traditional Christian and secularised Enlightenment views of history in terms of the 
linear progression of mankind, the Romantic movement preferred to investigate the 
unique development of distinct cultures which grew like biological organisms. 
Spengler echoed the Romantics in his presentation of history as the study of an 
organic society, studying the spirit or Geist of that community as it was expressed 
through all aspects of society, including art, architecture and philosophy.
7 Dannhauser describes Hegel as Spengler’s ‘silent enemy’ (Dannhauser, 1995:123).
8 Patricia Springborg(1993) includes Spengler’s work amongst a body of post-modern criticism 
which had antecedents in a tradition of critique of civilisation with roots in Stoic thought and 
developed in the Enlightenment by authors such as Rousseau, Diderot and Adam Smith.
9 Transferring his theories on nature to human affairs, Heraclitus saw human society as proceeding 
through a series of cycles with strife as the motive force of change. Fischer suggests Spengler 
extrapolated Heraclitus’ idea of struggle as a generative force (Fischer, 1989:86).
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One of Spengler’s chief influences and a key proponent of the Romantic movement 
was Goethe. His work provided Spengler with the principal character in his 
conceptualisation of the West - Faustian man. Spengler maintained that he further 
derived his methodology from Goethe, taking from him a preference for deep 
contemplation of a subject rather than scientific analysis:
...Spengler found in Goethe’s theories (of natural science) the model 
for his own ‘morphological’ method. He admired Goethe’s practice 
of contemplating natural phenomena in their total configuration.
Like him, Spengler argued, the historian should seek out the 
Urphänomen, or whole prime phenomenon, that would reveal the 
spiritual depths of a whole civilisation. (Hughes, 1952:59)
The second key influence whom Spengler acknowledged was Nietzsche.10
Nietzsche’s influence was substantial, although there were points on which
Spengler differed from his predecessor.* 11 Nietzsche also subscribed to a cyclical
view of history believing that contemporary Western civilisation was on the verge
of major change. The force which for Nietzsche impelled change was a ‘will to
power’. This is a central theme in Spengler’s Decline. Like Nietzsche, Spengler
believed that politics was essentially driven and governed by elites rather than the
masses.12
Spengler’s perceptions of the West and of cultural world order were carved from 
this compilation of morphological conceptualisations. His pessimism with regard 
to the fate of the West is in no small part founded on his perception of civilisational 
histories as natural process of growth and decay. His perception of struggle and the
10 In the 1923 Preface of The Decline, Spengler acknowledged those scholars ‘to whom I owe 
practically everything: Goethe and Nietzsche: Goethe gave me method, Nietzsche the questioning 
faculty’ (Decline:xxxi; Dannhauser, 1995:127).
11 H. Stuart Hughes argues that Nietzsche attached greater importance to the role of the individual 
as the supreme moral value. Spengler, in contrast, subordinated the individual to the working of the 
greater historical process and attached greater importance to the role of the state, to which Nietzsche 
had expressed hostility. Spengler also criticised Nietzsche’s limited perspective in focusing 
primarily on Western Civilisation in his philosophy (Decline: 19; Hughes, 1952:62).
12 Other concepts which Spengler appears to have interpreted from Nietzsche’s work include the 
idea of history as universal symbolism; the quest for the essential tempo, or melody of a particular 
culture; a non-biological view of race; and the perception of Hellenic civilisation as Apollonian. 
However, in Nietzsche, Apollonian man was balanced out by the slightly wilder character of 
Dionysian man, giving Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of Hellenic society greater breadth. See Klaus 
Fischer(1989:105) and H. Stuart Hughes(1952:62).
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will to power as the dynamic forces which drive cultures derived in part from his 
readings of authors such as Heraclitus and Nietzsche, but were no doubt reinforced 
by the intellectual and political environment during which he wrote. These forces 
helped to shape Spengler’s distinctive understanding of the role of civilisations in 
history and politics.
Conceptions of Civilisations
Civilisations stood at the heart of Spengler’s complex historical philosophy. As 
John Farrenkopf notes, he played a path-breaking role in choosing to focus on 
civilisations rather than on nations or peoples as had been conventional in the 
nineteenth century historiography.1^ As a classical scholar, he was aware of the 
significance and vulnerability of civilisations in history (Farrenkopf, 1993:393-4). 
His conception of civilisations is characterised first and foremost by a sense of 
their plurality, and secondly by their impermanence.
Spengler distinguished between Culture and Civilisation. He saw Cultures as single 
organic entities:
The high Culture ... is the waking-being of a single huge organism 
which makes not only custom, myths, technique and art, but the 
very peoples and classes incorporated in itself the vessels of one 
single form-language and one single history. {Decline:234)14
Like any other organic being, they enter into a life-cycle which brings them through
periods of growth, blossoming, maturity and decline - or childhood, youth, maturity
and old-age.15 This process lasted, on average, a thousand years. The transition
from a culture at its height to the processes of decline mark the transition from
Culture to Civilisation:
The aim once attained - the idea, the entire content of inner 
possibilities, fulfilled and made externally actual - the Culture
In the Decline o f the West, Spengler identifies eight High Cultures: the Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, 
Classical or Hellenic, Magian or Arabian, Mexican, Western and Russian.
14 The edition referred to in this chapter will be the abridged edition of The Decline o f the West 
listed in the bibliography except in the cases where the actual volume number is cited.
15 See Tarnas’s discussion of the Romantic and Enlightenment traditions in Western thought in 
which he notes the Romantic vision of the world as a unitary organism rather than as an atomistic 
machine (1991:366-94).
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suddenly hardens, it mortifies, its blood congeals, its force breaks 
down, and it becomes a Civilisation. {Decline:74)
Civilisation is the period when the soul of a Culture has exhausted its truly creative
potential, reached fulfilment and becomes mummified in the culture and society of
the metropolis.
The distinctions which Spengler draws between Culture and Civilisation have 
precedents in German literature. H. Stuart Hughes credits Nietzsche with the 
invention of the distinction, later popularised by Thomas Mann’s work Reflections 
of an Unpolitical Man (Hughes, 1952:72). However, Norbert Elias notes that Kant 
distinguished between ‘civilisation’, interpreted as a form of propriety or outward 
behaviour, in contrast to ‘culture’, conveying a sense of accomplishment. In 
contemporary usage, the distinction between the term Zivilization and Kultur 
retained this distinction. Elias argues that Zivilization was a term which meant 
something useful, but superficial and second rank in comparison to Kultur (Elias, 
1978:4).16 Spengler’s employment of the terms similarly tends to privilege Culture 
as a more creative and valuable phase of social existence.
Spengler advocated a morphological approach to the study of these organic entities 
rather than a systematic one.n To him, the history of mankind was the history of 
the separate development and decline of various Cultures and Civilisations. 
Cultures may intersect and effect one another. However, their development is not 
interdependent. Cultures were independent entities and mutually incomprehensible 
(Hughes, 1952:72). Pursuant to this thesis, Spengler set out to demonstrate that all 
aspects of a Culture are shaped by the character and dynamic of the Culture rather
16 The concept of Kultur, Elias argued, refers essentially to intellectual, artistic and philosophical 
facts. It relates more to the achievements or accomplishments of an individual. In broader terms, he 
argued that Zivilization tends to emphasise common qualities between human beings and minimise 
differences. In contrast, the concept of Kultur stresses the particular identities of groups. Elias noted 
that the term Kultur took on a new meaning in Germany in 1919 and the preceding years, partly 
because a war was waged against Germany in the name of civilisation. Spengler’s use of this 
distinction reflects his attachment to the term Kultur which Elias saw was part of Germany’s 
rebuilding of it’s self-image in the post war world (Elias, 1978:5-8). See Appendix for a fuller 
discussion of the term ‘civilisation’.
17 A morphological approach may be defined as the application to history of the biologist’s 
concept of living form. However, as noted above, Spengler was not an evolutionist. He categorically 
rejected all shreds of Darwinism which he defined as ‘the systematic natural science based on 
causality’ {Decline:72).
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than by a universal system of progression. Each Culture was perceived to have its 
own unique soul. The soul shapes a Culture’s world view, its view of history and of 
nature. The uniqueness of each Culture is reflected in every aspect of its societies:
Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and 
age as the oaks and pines, the blossoms twigs and leaves, but there 
is no ageing ‘Mankind’. Each Culture has its own new possibilities 
of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay and never return. There 
is not one sculpture, one painting, one mathematics, one physics, 
but many, each in its deepest essence different from the others, each 
limited in duration and self-contained, just as each species of plant 
has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special type of growth and 
decline. (Decline: ! ! )
Spengler’s vision of history was of the cyclical life histories of independent 
cultures, ‘separate worlds of dynamic being’ (Decline: 14). Therefore, he did not 
see history as a rational, linear progression of mankind. Spengler rejected teleology 
and the rationalistic school of history that constantly sought causality instead 
seeing history as more spontaneous and phenomenal: ‘a picture of endless 
formations and transformations, of the marvellous waxing and waning of organic 
forms’ rather than ‘a sort of tapeworm industriously adding onto itself one epoch 
after another’ (Decline:6, 18).18
In Spengler’s conception of history, not all populations form ‘peoples’. ‘Culture 
peoples’ were distinguished from primitive peoples in that they have an inner, 
spiritual unity which defines them as ‘nations’. Underlying nations, he argued, is an 
‘Idea’. The pursuit of this idea forms the quest for the fulfilment of a Culture’s 
‘Destiny’. It is the pursuit of ‘Destiny’ which forms ‘world-history’. Thus, the 
foundations of a Culture as a community were as much normative as objective. 
Spengler was only truly interested in what he described as ‘world-history’. The 
majority of mankind, he argued, was locked into an ahistorical cycle of life and 
death. Only Cultures made history (Decline:73, 243).
For Spengler, history was about the quest for spiritual fulfilment. Not all Cultures 
achieved fulfilment, some being snuffed out through contact with another
18 This may seem at odds with his morphological conceptualisation of distinct patterns in the life 
cycles of Civilisations. Spengler argued that, like a human being, within the confines of the natural 
life-span and aging process, a Culture is in charge of its own quest for fulfilment.
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civilisation, as happened with Mexican Culture; others having their creative spirit 
stifled by the weight of an older, alien Culture, as was the case, argued Spengler, of 
Arabian and Russian Cultures {Decline:268).19 Still other Cultures, having 
proceeded through the stages of growth and decline, lingered on long after their 
cultural decay as the ‘scrap material’ of history, as in the case of Indian and 
Chinese Civilisations (Dray, 1980:107). What is most significant here is the sense 
of the histories of Civilisations as independent. The essence of their historical 
experiences were derived from within, not through interaction with other Cultures. 
Spengler’s morphological imagery described each Culture as like a seed which 
contains within it the vital DNA which determines its potential growth. World 
history becomes like a forest composed of a variety of plants. These plants may co­
exist, they may compete for light and nutrition and impact upon each others 
growth, but they remain separate plants (Dray, 1980).
A Culture’s pursuit of its ‘Idea’ was not perceived as a purely intellectual process, 
but one of action and struggle. Ideas are realised through actions not words 
(Spengler, 1967:70). Struggle is a critical dynamic in Spengler’s reading or history. 
In this he echoes contemporary modes of thought with regard to the productive 
impact of conflict in which the stronger wins out. His work is littered with images 
of battle, warriors and struggles. War is for Spengler a form of creative tension, the 
dynamic of history. ‘War is the creator of all things. All that is meaningful in the 
stream of life has emerged through victory and defeat’ {Decline, 198:vol.2, 363). 
Countries existed for war, and only through war did a nation or ideology 
demonstrate superiority over another (Spengler, 1967:70; Hughes, 1952:103). 
Although Spengler may have rejected the Darwinist model of evolution through 
struggle, his own theories posit a cultural state of nature, nasty and brutish if not 
always short. The beast of prey appears repeatedly as a metaphor for a strong and 
vigorous leadership or culture. Pacifism is treated as symptomatic of weakness and 
decay (Spengler, 1934:225). The achievement of universal harmony, even through
19 Both of these Cultures are described as suffering the process of ‘historical pseudomorphosis’ in 
which a younger Culture is suffocated by the weight of an older alien Culture. In the case of Arabian 
or Magian Culture, the older civilisation was the Classical civilisation which blanketed Magian 
civilisation during the Hellenic era. Russian Culture was described as forced into the moulds of 
Western Culture and Civilisation (Decline: 268-74).
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the hegemony of a dominant order, appears to be unattainable (Spengler, 1967:70). 
Spengler’s overall conception of civilisational interaction differs markedly from 
one which sees the evolution of cultures as deriving from interaction and cross­
fertilisation, or views different cultures as phases of civilisational evolution.
The Boundaries of Spengler1 s West
Spengler’s understanding of civilisational history leads to a distinctive conception 
of the West. This has profound implications for the way which he interpreted the 
West’s relationship with other civilisations. His conception of the West must be 
understood within the overall thesis of The Decline. His aim was firstly to 
determine the position of the contemporary West within a hypothetical organic 
cycle of Culture and Civilisations. Secondly, he sought to portray the West as a 
Culture separate from Classical antecedents. Spengler depicts Hellenic, Magian 
and Western Civilisations as three distinct Cultures.20 As Dannhauser remarks, this 
is a clear rejection of the traditional Hegelian division of history into ancient, 
medieval and modem as a process which ‘fudges’ three completely different 
Cultures and Civilisations. Spengler saw no such continuities in world history 
(Dannhauser, 1995:123).
Each civilisation was for Spengler an organic unit, with its own history and life- 
cycle. In The Decline of the West, Spengler wove an integrated history of the 
Western culture and politics throughout his text, linking the different stages of 
growth to architectural styles which characterised them. Spengler’s West was bom 
with the awakening of Faustian Culture in the German plains c.1000 A.D.21 During 
what is traditionally known as the High Middle Ages, Spengler’s new Faustian 
culture was characterised by Christianity, the institutions of feudalism, the 
establishment of imperial authority and the reformed Papacy. This era reached a
20 Magian culture is a term devised by Spengler to delineate a culture of the southern Mediterranean 
and Arabic worlds which combined elements of Judaism, Byzantium and Islam. It had links with 
both the Hellenic and Western world.
21 As Hughes notes, the period from the fall of Rome in 476 A.D. until the eleventh century, 
normally viewed as the ‘early medieval’ era of the West, was treated by Spengler as a twilight era in 
which Europe was influenced by the older Hellenic and Magian and the new indigenous spirit 
(Hughes, 1952:80). Hughes provides a clear synopsis of Spengler’s fairly complex portrayal of the 
history of the West. See Hughes (1952:80-5).
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stage of fulfilment in the architecture of the Gothic era, but Spengler viewed the 
West as reaching its pinnacle in the art, architecture and scholarship of the Baroque 
era.22 Intellectually, it was a period of free inquiry. Politically it was a time 
characterised by the authority of the dynastic state. This era also saw the shift of the 
focus of the Culture to the cities.
The Renaissance however, represented not an era of rebirth and growth, but 
‘breakdowns in internal contradictions’. As Werner Dannhauser observes, it 
represented a rebirth of the classical spirit in a Faustian setting, an occurrence 
which could not be accommodated in Spengler’s theory of the independence of 
Cultures (Dannhauser, 1995:124). Consequently, the Renaissance is treated as a 
counter-movement to the Gothic ideal, but one ultimately rooted in the Gothic 
spirit and form (Decline: 121-5; Spengler, 1967:32). The Baroque era descended 
into the charm of the Rococo which for Spengler marked the development of style 
and form, the real creative spirit of the West beginning to ebb.23
The Enlightenment was viewed as an era of criticism and destruction as expressed 
through rationalism, intellectual and artistic life focusing on the great cities, and 
the political rise of the bourgeoisie. Philosophically, culturally and politically, the 
nineteenth century was the commencement of ‘winter’ for the West with 
intellectualism and money as the key forces in politics. The industrial age was 
recognised as greatly empowering the West and stemming from the spiritual 
dynamism and ingenuity of Western culture, but it is treated as a transient phase.24 
Spengler saw the twentieth century presaging the new era of blood and warfare, the 
coming of the new ‘Caesars’ to restore passion and traditional values to politics. 
The new era would be one of perpetual and total warfare for power between 
outstanding personalities. The great cities, or megalopoli, would continue as foci, 
but the cities would be beset with social problems, their intellectual and cultural
22 Spengler viewed this as an era during which art and architecture explored the limits of space and 
infinity in the use of form, perspective, and light and shadow.
2j Although Spengler admired the styles and forms of this era expressed in the music of Mozart, the 
philosophy of Kant and Goethe, the ‘perfection of diplomatic technique (Hughes, 1952:82).
24 As John Farrenkopf notes, Spengler does appear to revel in the achievements of Faustian culture 
as expressed through the technology of the industrial age, despite his lamentations for the passing of 
the purer, pre-industrial era (1993:399).
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life essentially sterile. Spengler forecast an eventual descent into a new 
primitiveness for the West - an end of history.
Therefore, Spengler’s aim in The Decline of the West was to locate the West of the 
epoch 1800 A.D.-2000 A.D. in the broader chronology of Western cultural history, 
viewed as an organic cycle. His conclusion was that this epoch corresponds to the 
period of transition in the West’s maturation from Culture to Civilisation. The 
West had already reached its peak and entered into the latter half of its life-cycle, 
onto the path of gradual decline. Whilst Spengler predicted the onset of major 
wars, he did not envisage the sudden epochal destruction of the West, but its 
gradual decline over several generations. The West was entering its twilight or 
sunset years.
Spengler placed a high priority on the internal dynamic or soul of a civilisation. To 
him, the Western or Faustian soul was dynamic, constantly questing, seeking to 
command nature, to penetrate space and to explore the concept of the infinite. 
Spengler’s conceptualisation of the West and its boundaries are deeply interwoven 
with the way in which he perceived the spirit of the West.
Territory
Spengler attaches great importance to the relationship between Cultures and their 
territories or locations, a relationship which changes as a Culture matures. Territory 
provides not only objective boundaries, but is also perceived as organically linked 
into the moulding of the community.
From the outset, Spengler established a crucial link between territory and 
community. For him, the Culture of a race arises out of a particular soil and is 
inextricably bound to it. The shape and nature of a landscape; its flora, light and 
atmosphere are reflected in a Culture. Populations which migrate to a new soil or 
homeland gradually change and become a new race.25 The relationship between 
land and community is also seen as changing as the locus of a Culture shifts from
25 ‘A race does not migrate. Men migrate, and their successive generations are bom in ever- 
changing landscapes; but the landscape exercises a secret force upon the plant-nature in them, and 
eventually the race expression is completely transformed by the extinction of the old and the 
appearance of a new one’ {Decline'.254).
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land to city. A Culture is bom on the land, but as cities develop, they become the 
focus of the Culture. Cities grow into large cosmopoli, becoming densely 
populated and rigidly constructed. The cities, he implies, are necessary for the 
fulfilment of a Culture, but are also the catalyst of its destruction and decay. They
' y s
act as the terminus of a Civilisation {Decline'.245-52).
These preconceptions are important to Spengler’s territorial conceptualisation of 
the West. He sees the West as primarily a culture of north-west Europe, bom in the 
eleventh century on the plain between the rivers Elbe and Tagus (.Decline:91). Its 
character, art and architecture were shaped by the plains and forests of the brooding 
North and its subtle light, hardened by its difficult climate (Spengler, 1932:78).27 
Spengler portrays the West as blossoming in the Germanic heartland, but not solely 
confined to this region. He discusses the West as growing westward as it matured, 
shifting in its focus from the rural north to the cities of the late nineteenth century, 
such as New York, London, Paris and Berlin {Decline:253; Spengler, 1967:40).
Spengler’s territorial conceptualisation of the West is striking, not only for its 
Germanic locus, but for what it excludes or marginalises. The Mediterranean is 
traditionally viewed as the source of Western culture. Yet Spengler painted the 
societies of the Mediterranean as on the margins. Spengler’s Mediterranean appears 
to occupy an ambiguous position, caught between the influences of three Cultures - 
the Hellenic and Magian and Western. The territory of Spengler’s West also 
explicitly excluded Russia. The distinction between Russia and the West’, he 
maintained, ‘cannot be drawn too sharply’ (Spengler, 1967:122). Given that Russia 
was commonly regarded as one of the great powers of Europe at this time, its 
exclusion from the West would have been regarded as unusual by many (Hughes, 
1952:76).28 However, Spengler regarded the Westernisation which had occurred in
26 Spengler described the cosmopoli of Civilisations as ‘vast, splendid, spreading in insolence. It 
draws within itself the being-streams of the now impotent countryside, human masses that are 
wafted as dunes one to another or flow like loose sand into the chinks of stone. Here money and 
intellect celebrate their greatest and their last triumphs. It is the most artificial, the cleverest 
phenomenon manifested in the light-world of human eyes’ (Decline.319).
27 He argued, for instance, that the Gothic cathedral and the complexity of organ music echo the 
deciduous forest of the Northern plains (Decline: 199-200).
28 Spengler may have been influenced here by the work of the Pan-Slavists who were advocating 
the viewing of Russia as a society distinct from Europe. For instance, in 1869 Nikolai Danilevsky
89
Russia from Peter the Great onward as essentially superficial. In its soul, Russia 
was completely alien to the West. This difference had been exacerbated by the 
Russian Revolution which Spengler argued, installed an Asiatic regime in Russia: 
‘Russia is lord of Asia. Russia is Asia’ (Spengler, 1934:213; Decline:21\). 
Spengler’s conception of the relationship between the West and territory is 
therefore both powerful and unusual.
Race
Spengler’s work is popularly, although often misleadingly, associated with his 
views on race. Race was for Spengler a ‘decisive element’ in life which helped 
shape a Culture (Decline:251). His references to the importance of race and ‘blood’ 
in a Culture’s history are frequent. However, he treats race as a spiritual, rather 
than a biological category. Cultures appear to comprise various races in his 
conceptualisation of societies.27 Consistent with his organic methodology, 
Spengler argued that races have roots in the landscape which they inhabit. The 
landscape influences and colours the body and soul of the race. However, he 
rejected notions of race as bred by physiological features, or racial identity as a 
function of blood descent. It was the strength not the purity of a race which 
Spengler viewed as important (Spengler, 1934:219). He dismissed physiological 
definitions of race as symptomatic of the heavy hand of Darwinism. The qualities 
which defined race were inner qualities; in particular, a sense of a common ideal or 
destiny - ‘racial feeling’. Race was a spiritual and cultural bond between people, 
not a physical one:
In race there is nothing material but something cosmic and 
directional, the felt harmony of a Destiny, the single cadence of the 
march of historical Being. (Decline:265)
had published a series of articles entitled Russia and Europe: A Viewpoint on the Political Relations 
between the Slavic and Germano-Roman Worlds in which he argued that European and Russian 
civilisations were inimical. Sketching out a thesis which preceded Spengler in describing the history 
of civilisations as organic and cyclical, he argued that European civilisation was on the decline and 
Russian in the ascendancy (De Beus, 1953:11-16). It is unlikely that Spengler had read Danilevsky’s 
work prior to writing the first volume of the Decline. (It was not released in German translation until 
1920.) However, it is likely that he was familiar with the ideas of the Pan-Slavists (Hughes, 
1952:53).
29 Whilst closely linked, race and Culture were not synonymous for Spengler, although the 
distinction he makes between them is not always clear.
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In keeping with this understanding of race, Spengler described the racial 
boundaries of the West in terms of its spiritual qualities. He describes the West as 
comprising Faustian races, emanating from Northern Europe, first thrusting 
outward into the world in the Viking migrations (Spengler, 1932:81). While 
Spengler recognised important differences between national groups within the 
West, he believed they all shared the same Faustian spirit/0 Consequently, 
Spengler distinguished the races of the West from the peoples of the Hellenic and 
Magian cultures of the past, and from contemporaries such as the Russian, Jewish 
and Arabic races.
Spengler’s West is implicitly a predominantly white West. This became more 
explicit in his later works, where he demonstrated a growing concern with regard to 
tensions and rivalries between the white races of the West and the ‘coloured
n  i
races’. The coloured races, Spengler believed, resented the imperialist West and 
were filled with a burning desire to destroy it. This included Russia, which had 
now removed its ‘white mask’ and become Asiatic ‘with all its soul’ (Spengler, 
1934:209). In both Man and Technics and The Hour of Decision he warned that the 
coloured races would eventually turn against and conquer the exhausted Faustian 
man (Spengler, 1932; 1934; Hughes, 1952).
Although racial distinctions are critical to Spengler’s schema of civilisations, this 
does not make him a racist in the sense of believing in a hierarchy of the races. He 
dismissed notions of innate racial superiority, or of there being a master race/“ 
However, he did argue that the West was in the process of committing racial 
suicide through policies such as population control and the employment of medical 
science to sustain the weak in society, reducing the vigour and strength of the white
j0 In ‘Prussianism and Socialism’, Spengler expanded on this theme identifying different political 
traditions developed from different universal ideals held amongst three nations of the West: Prussia, 
developing the bureaucratic service state; Britain, developing the commercial notion of imperialism; 
and Spain developing militant Catholicism. These three nations represented for Spengler the 
strongest expression of the Faustian spirit (Spengler, 1967; Hughes, 1952:107).
jl The ‘coloured races’ included all non-white peoples living both within and outside the territory 
controlled by the West. Therefore it encompassed the peoples of Asia, Africa, the Americas, 
including the Indian and negro peoples, and Russia (Spengler, 1934:208).
In fact, he once remarked that only racial inferiors preach racism, racial inferiors meaning mental 
inferiors, a remark allegedly aimed at the National Socialist Party. Quoted by Fischer (1989:76) 
from Spengler (Decline, 1928:vol. 1).
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races (Spengler, 1934:222-4). Furthermore, he argued that the last best hope for the 
West for resistance and rejuvenation lay in the German people, the youngest and 
least exhausted of the Western peoples (Spengler, 1934:225).
Race provided a crucial boundary for Spengler’s West. However, it is more a 
spiritual and normative boundary than an objective one. The racial feeling of the 
West was identified as part of the Western spirit which has driven it to probe and 
explore to the limits of its technical and intellectual capacity.
Religion
Spengler’s philosophy of culture and history was strongly relativist. Not 
surprisingly then, he rejected the idea that there was one universal truth: There are 
no eternal truths: Every philosophy is the expression of its own and only its own 
time’{Decline:31). It follows, therefore, that for Spengler, religion was something 
unique to each Culture, shaped by the spirit of that Culture. He believed that 
religions evolved and changed as Cultures matured, but remained integrally related 
to the community. Consequently, Spengler conceived of the West as characterised 
by unique and evolving religious traditions rather than a community participating 
in a universal religious experience. His conception of the religious boundaries of 
the West is distinctive for its Germanic focus, and for the emphasis placed on the 
spirit of the individual.
Disillusioned with contemporary religion, Spengler focused on German Catholic 
Christianity of the Gothic age as the quintessential religious expression of youthful 
Western Cu l t u r e . He  emphasised the importance of the Latin Church of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, noting its expression in the cult of the Virgin 
interwoven with the equally powerful imagery of the Devil {Decline:330-3).
Given the historical roots of Judeo-Christian religion, it would be impossible to 
conceive of the West’s Christian faith as without antecedents, and Spengler did 
acknowledge these. He discussed Western Christianity’s complex interdependence 
with the Magian faiths out of which it arose, and traced the development of the 
Christian Church from an Aramaic peasant faith which had been absorbed by
Fischer argues that Spengler saw contemporary religions as dead rituals (Fischer, 1989:31).
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Hellenic society (Decline:281-5). He noted the significance of the ministry of Paul 
in the development of a Western church which was Greek, urban and literate in its 
focus (Decline:291)/4 However, Spengler pointed not only to antecedents from the 
Hellenic and Magian Cultures, he also traced the elements which linked the Gothic 
church with pre-Christian paganism, and with the Faustian myths and gods of 
Valhalla/3 Spengler saw a unity rather than a tension in the myth-making of the 
northern-heathen and Christian circles, conceiving the consolidation of the German 
hero-tales and the Arthurian legends as a similar force and movement to the 
flourishing of Catholic hagiology in the tenth and eleventh centuries (Decline:202). 
These elements combined in Spengler’s West to give birth to a unique religion of 
the West.
Whilst acknowledging its antecedents, Spengler firmly distinguished the character 
of the Western Church from the Hellenic and Magian religions. He emphasised the 
monotheism of Western religion in contrast to Hellenic. Even more pronounced 
was the emphasis he placed on the spirit of the individual in Western Christianity. 
He distinguished Western Christianity from its antecedents in the nature of man’s 
relationship with God. He portrayed Hellenic and Magian religions as essentially 
fatalistic. In contrast, Western man has an individual relationship with his God, a 
relationship within which the individual assumes some measure of responsibility. 
In essence, the Western church was distinguished by the participation of the free 
individual who chooses their fate. The sense of Free Will was central to 
Spengler’s concept of the Faustian soul. This soul was:
An Ego lost in Infinity, an Ego that was all force, but a force 
negligibly weak in an infinity of greater forces; that was all will, but 
a will full of fear for its freedom. (Decline:334)
In a sense, Spengler spoke of an east/west fissure in the Christian church which preceded the 
schisms of the fifth century and later. In discussing these schisms, Spengler argued that the Christian 
church essentially split into three movements which arose out of the ‘landscapes’ of East, West and 
South (Decline:313-5).
He argued that the early stages, or ‘springtime’, of a Culture were rich with myth making. These 
were not the acts of primitive men, but the first formative act of spirituality (Decline:201).
36 Spengler focused on the concepts of grace and contrition to illustrate this point. He argued in 
Western eyes, grace was not simply bestowed on man by the will of God, but had to be won by the 
individual through a voluntary act of contrition (Decline 300-4).
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The Germanic-Catholic Church undoubtedly represented the high point of the 
religious identity of Spengler’s West. As a Culture matures, so its form and 
institutions change. Spengler traced the changes in the West’s religious identity 
with the shifts in the Faustian religion through the challenges provided by the 
reformation towards puritanism, described as a fanatical revival of piety which 
contained within it the seeds of rationalism. This in turn was followed by 
materialism (Decline:343; De Beus, 1953:28). Spengler viewed the emergence of a 
more secular society, governed by rationalism and materialism, as an element in 
the West’s ultimate decline. This contrasts to the conception of the creation of a 
secular society as a mark of the West’s progress and aspect of its strength/7 
Protestant faith is portrayed as a diminution of the purity of the earlier church. This 
stands in contrast to his contemporary, Max Weber, who related the spirit of 
Protestantism to the success of the West through capitalism (Weber, 1930; 
Farrenkopf, 1993:402).
The boundaries of religion formed a distinct element of Spengler’s conception of 
the West. Yet once again, these were not boundaries which were objectively 
defined. The religion of the West was organically linked to the identity of an inner 
spirit of the West. Religion was a further expression of the unique soul of the 
West; evolution and change within Western religion were regarded as related to the 
maturing of the West.
Power
Spengler’s concept of power was in many ways fairly abstract, containing spiritual 
and morphological components. Power stemmed in part from the inner spirit of a 
Culture; in part from the stage of growth which a Culture was experiencing. The 
power of the West was viewed by Spengler as unrivalled due to its status as a still 
growing Culture, but also to its dynamic character. The power of the West both 
enabled and endangered it.
j7 Spengler predicted that the late phase of Civilisation would eventually stimulate a spiritual 
reaction in the form of a second wave of religiousness. This would be a naive religion born amongst 
the masses which revives new forms of old religion (Decline-.348). In the case of the West, this 
would mean the rebirth of Gothic Christianity (De Beus, 1953:30-1).
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Spengler conceptualised the West as the only extant Culture still in the phase of 
fulfilment. Other extant Cultures had either ossified or failed to achieve their 
potential. This naturally gave the West enormous advantages relative to other 
Cultures, enhanced by its dynamic character. For Spengler, the exploratory spirit of 
the West was demonstrated in its science, technology, art and a will to travel. He 
applauded the work of Spanish explorers as demonstrations of a spirit unafraid to 
challenge nature and explore space, pushing aside boundaries on a global scale:
The discoveries of Columbus and Vasco de Gama extended the 
geographical horizon without limit, and the world-sea came into the 
same relation with land as that of the universe of space with earth. ... 
with the discovery of America, West Europe became a province in a 
gigantic whole. Thenceforward the history of the Western Culture 
has a planetary character. (Decline:!! 4)
The Faustian soul not only inspired the physical conquest of the world around us, 
but also the morale of shaping that world. The Faustian ‘will to power’ is one 
‘which laughs at all bounds of time and space, which indeed regards the boundless 
and endless as its specific target’, which seeks to mould and shape the natural and 
intellectual world (Spengler, 1932:79). The West is treated as exceptional in terms 
of its global scope and its transformative impulses.
Spengler argued that the West’s drive to explore the infinite was expressed in its 
mathematics and science, principally physics. His discussion focused on the ability 
of Western mathematicians to conceptualise the abstract and therefore the potential 
of the infinite (Decline:62-3). Combined with a preoccupation for measurement, 
these qualities facilitated the development of machines and technologies, a theme 
explored in Man and Technics(1932). In many ways, technology provided the 
ultimate expression of the Faustian soul. He described the West’s passion for 
technology as:
...the outward-and upward-straining life-feeling- true descendant, 
therefore, of the Gothic. ... The intoxicated soul wills to fly above 
Space and Time. (DeclineAl!)
Technology, therefore, was seen as evolving from the Faustian spirit. The West’s 
monopoly of technical power and knowledge translated into economic capacity and 
wealth. This was treated as the critical foundation on which the West’s military
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capacity was built, and the foundation of the West’s unrivalled superiority in the 
nineteenth century (Spengler, 1932:99).
However, whilst the industrial age is treated as a period of unrivalled Western 
superiority, it is regarded as transitory rather than the foundation point of further 
growth and development, again distinguishing Spengler from modernist thinkers 
(Farrenkopf, 1993:398). Furthermore, within the fruit of the West’s sources of 
power lay the seeds of its destruction. Spengler felt that machines which had at first 
allowed men to enslave nature had now enslaved man (DeclineA l l -2). Spengler 
argued that, on the one hand, technical thinking had become too esoteric and 
artificial; on the other, mechanisation had taken over Western civilisation, 
threatening to poison and sterilise both the natural environment and the soul of 
Faustian man (Spengler, 1932:93). Furthermore, he castigated the West for 
squandering its privileges by foolishly liquidating its monopoly of technical 
knowledge as more non-Westem societies became industrialised (Spengler, 
1932:100-1). Writing in an era in which Germany was being devastated by 
economic depression, Spengler suggested the privileged but increasingly alienated 
Western economies had become vulnerable to competition from low wage 
economies where the work ethic was stronger (Spengler, 1932:89, 100). The 
West’s power in terms of technological capacity is therefore treated as exceptional. 
At the same time, it is qualified externally by the challenge of other Cultures, but 
also internally by the forces which the West’s technical and intellectual capacity 
had unleashed.
Spengler’s pessimism with regard to the increasingly negative dimensions of 
technology in the West accorded with his organic thesis on the cycle of Cultures 
and the finite nature of growth and power. He believed that in the early twentieth 
century, the West was reaching the limits of achievement, exhausting its inner 
possibilities in all fields (Decline: 212-25). Consequently, many of the 
achievements which other commentators would regard as signifying the growth 
and expansion of the West and its power, Spengler viewed as indications of the 
consolidation of the West as a creative intellectual force. This is also evident in his 
attitude to economics and politics, in particular to ideas with regard to capitalism, 
or the ‘money-economy’.
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As in other fields, Spengler rejected the idea of a universally valid form of 
economic thought, seeing economic life as unique to each Culture. However, all 
economies matured through the cycles of their Cultures. The development of the 
money economy coincided with a Culture becoming increasingly urban. The world- 
city economy was the economy of Civilisations {Decline:406). As a Culture 
matured in the metropoli, money rather than ideas becomes a source of power, and 
comes to dominate politics. Eventually, the money economy tears away at the soul, 
and destroys the unity of a Culture. Spengler saw modem Western capitalism as 
such a progression. Curiously for one who admired the spirit of struggle and 
competition, Spengler did not hold the spirit of capitalism in high esteem. This low 
regard appears to stem from the perception that capitalism promotes individual 
aggrandisement rather than the welfare of the community. He characterised it as 
emanating from the English aspect of the Faustian spirit, depicting Anglo- 
American society as the heartland of this particular development in Western 
Civilisation {Decline:402; Spengler, 1967).38 The Culture was, in a sense, moving 
westward away from its spiritual heartland in Germany and becoming more tawdry 
and materialistic. In the process, the power of capital, expressed through big 
business, was viewed as dominating and corrupting Western politics (Spengler, 
1967:118). Spengler believed that the dominance of money would eventually be 
overthrown by the reawakening the old traditions in the era of the warring states, 
the call to ‘blood’ by the new forces of ‘Caesarism’ {DeclineAlA) .39
Spengler therefore treats the West as an exceptional Civilisation which has 
achieved unprecedented levels of power. Yet it is not the sheer weight of this 
capacity which defines the West for Spengler, but its Faustian character which is 
also the source of its power. The West’s desire and capacity to explore and shape 
the rest of the world are an inseparable aspect of his conception. At the same time, 
the power of the West is transient, founded upon the continuing strength of its
3S Note that at this stage of its development, Spengler is treating the West as a Civilisation rather 
than a Culture.
j9 By ‘Caesarism’, Spengler meant a return to an imperial form of politics where power is 
concentrated in the hands of strong individuals, becoming a ‘wholly personal power’ such as that 
wielded by an Augustus or a Ghengis Khan (Decline:31S-S\ ).
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spirit. As the spirit ebbed towards exhaustion, so the power of the West became 
vulnerable. This was marked for Spengler by tendencies towards pacifism, 
complacency and urban alienation.40
Norms
Underpinning the boundaries of the West’s identity is a strong normative 
dimension. Spengler’s cultural communities were constituted around, and driven 
by, an inner spirit or central idea. Concepts of territory, race, religion and even 
power were derived from inner sources as much as they were objectively generated. 
Spengler emphasised the roots of community in common perceptions, such as ‘race 
feeling’, and shared traditions and histories. He saw the ‘peoples of Cultures’ as 
metaphysical communities. For him ‘the people’ was a spiritual, rather than a 
biological, political or linguistic category. The defining feature of the Western soul 
is the ‘will-to-power’, (Spengler, 1932:79). Yet, whilst the normative dimension is 
critical to Spengler’s conception of the West, many of the norms, values and 
institutions commonly associated with the West he regards as transitional or 
specific to a part of the West.41 Liberal values and structures often celebrated as 
achievements of the West are treated by Spengler as masking the realities of power 
which underlie politics.
Spengler laid great emphasis on the spirit of the individual as a central aspect of the 
Faustian character. This is most powerfully expressed in his exploration of the 
exercise of the individual’s free will in Western Christianity {Decline:303). He also 
observed the emergence of the ‘ego’, the T , in the languages of the West 
{Decline: 136-7), and the celebration of the inner-person in Western history and art, 
in biography, portraiture and drama {Decline: 136, 166, 171). However,
individualism cannot be described as the defining norm of Spengler’s West. The 
spirit of individualism did not overwhelm or detract from the significance of the
40 These were symptoms of decline which Spengler also identified as occurring in other decaying 
civilisations, such as in the Roman empire (Farrenkopf, 1993:400; Spengler, 1934:205-7).
41 The ideals of the French revolution, liberty, equality and fraternity, often taken as central to the 
modern West are described by Spengler as represented in three distinct political programs 
propounded by three revolutions; the English representing the ideal of liberal parliamentarianism; 
the French representing the ideal of social democracy; and the German representing authoritarian 
socialism (Spengler, 1967:16).
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community, it was part of the spirit of that community.42 Within the West, 
Spengler recognised some nations as more individualistic than others. For example, 
the English national spirit was characterised as one of individualism, a spirit 
expressed in its economic institutions through capitalism, and in its political 
institutions through liberalism. However, Spengler juxtaposes these norms and 
institutions with those of the Prussian nation whose spirit gives priority to the 
community. The individual achieves fulfilment within and through the community, 
through service and obedience. These values are expressed in the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state through ‘Prussian socialism’, a term which Spengler employs to 
mean ‘collective instinct’ rather than class theory (Spengler, 1967:10).4j
In his 1919 work, ‘Prussianism and Socialism’, Spengler represents the tension 
between ideas which privilege the individual and the community, between 
capitalism and socialism, as one of the central struggles of modem history. This is 
not represented as a struggle between the West and outside ideas, but as a battle for 
ideological supremacy within the West linked to the battle for hegemony between 
the Anglo-American tradition, representing individualism and capitalism, and the 
Prussian tradition, representing the collective ideal (Spengler, 1967).44
In other areas, norms and values often viewed as central to defining the West are 
portrayed in Spengler’s work as manifestations of the West as a maturing Culture.
42 Hughes argues that Spengler essentially subordinated the role of the individual to the working of 
the vast historical process. He also stresses the centrality of the state to Spengler’s historical scheme 
(Hughes, 1952:62). However, we cannot neglect the significance which the spirit of individualism 
played in Spengler’s conceptualisation of the character of the Faustian West.
43 In his essay ‘Prussianism and Socialism’, Spengler detailed his ideas of what true socialism 
represents. He identifies ‘ethical socialism’ as a constant element of the West’s political make-up. 
This he defined as a desire to mould and change the world. However, he was hostile to socialism as 
described by Marx. He viewed it as an ideology of the late period of a Culture. As Fischer notes, 
Spengler saw Marxism as a cancer on the body politic which produced class war the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and the destruction of the state. He was also critical of English socialism which he 
argued was actually driven by capitalist motivation to enrich the less well off. In ‘Prussianism and 
Socialism’, he proposed a form of Prussian socialism, one which advocated a strong but benevolent 
state around which a classless society could rally (Spengler, 1967; Fischer, 1989:46).
44 In Man and Technics, Spengler further links this great internal conflict to the traditional orders of 
the warrior nobility and the priesthood; the first representing the world of facts, the other the world 
of philosophy which privileges the intellect. In Faustian culture, this struggle is represented in 
political conflicts ranging from that between the Empire and Papacy in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, through to the conflict between the forces of tradition and those of ‘plebeian rationalism’ 
in the French and German revolutions (Spengler, 1932:79).
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For instance, the spirit of rationalism is represented not as an aspect of the West’s 
growth, but as symptomatic of a Culture whose creative spirit is waning. Spengler 
saw all later Cultures entering into a period where intellectualism gained 
prominence and power. Intellectualism, he suggested, with its focus on words and 
abstract ideas, masked the reality that politics was driven by power. The dominance 
of intellectualism in the West was signalled by the Enlightenment which 
introduced the critical spirit of rationalism, a school of thought which Spengler 
defined as based purely on materialism {Decline:343). This was viewed as a 
negative force which attacked and undermined the traditions of a Culture, replacing 
them with empty ideas and catchwords {Decline:365). Rationalism was a new 
religion which replaced God with force, but which itself had no soul.
Similarly, Spengler had little or no faith in the concepts of rights and freedom as 
propounded by Enlightenment thinkers, seeing them as symptomatic of a Culture 
heading towards spiritual decline. Liberalism and socialism were philosophies of 
an age of theory which Spengler believed was drawing to an end {Decline:390). 
Based on the principles of liberty and equality, these philosophies promoted a 
broader distribution of political power through practices such as universal suffrage. 
But for Spengler, whilst democracy promised to devolve power to the people, in 
reality, power remained in the hands of a minority. Elections were manipulated by 
those with the real power in the late West, those with money such as big business 
and those who controlled the Press.45 He argued:
The concepts of Liberalism and Socialism are set in effective 
motion only by money. ... There is no proletarian, not even a 
Communist, movement that has not operated in the interest of 
money, in the directions indicated by money and for the time 
permitted by money. {Decline:361)
45 Likewise, Spengler argued that the democratisation of education had simply created a class that 
was more easily but unwittingly manipulated by the media. See his virulent attack on the power of 
the Press {Decline:393-7) For his discussion of democracy as a vehicle for money and transition to 
‘Caesarism’ see The Decline{391-3). Money ultimately destroys democracy and intellectualism but 
is itself overcome in the final conflict with ‘blood’, the new Caesarism which overwhelms politics 
(DeclineAlA). Spengler continues his attack on the control of politics, both national and 
international in ‘Prussianism and Socialism’. The League of Nations, he argued for instance, was in 
reality not a system of self-governance, but a system of provinces and protectorates for the 
exploitation of business oligarchies with the aid of corrupt politicians (Spengler, 1967:118).
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These ideas which promised to free the peoples of the West were enslaving rather 
than emancipating them. Democracy was but a transition phase to the new era of 
‘Caesarism’. Again, there is a sense of the Culture moving westward as it declined, 
and of the significant tensions within the Culture. The development of many of the 
unsavoury norms and ideas of late Culture in the West are ascribed to England and 
the United States. These include the development of political and economic liberal 
ideas, the press and the extensive financial manipulation of elections (Decline:368, 
393).46
Spengler was, then, very conscious of the importance of the spiritual and normative 
dimensions of a Culture. However, he was equally conscious of the underlying 
power structures and forces of politics. These forces were as central to the 
constitution of the West as other cultures. Spengler’s treatment of the ideas and 
norms often viewed as representing the West is therefore unconventional. A similar 
trait can be found in the way he viewed the institutions of the West.
Institutions
In Spengler’s work, no one institution emerges as a permanent or fixed expression 
of the West. The meaning of institutions is closely related to the context in which 
they are formed. Hence, Spengler argues that concepts such as ‘democracy’ and 
‘republicanism’ were not constant but meant different things in different cultural 
contexts (Decline:361). This entails a rejection of the idea of universal institutions.
The state was a central institution of politics for Spengler. In ‘Prussianism and 
Socialism’, the state is described as the ultimate form of community. World history 
is referred to as the history of states, and of the wars between them (Spengler, 
1967:69). However, Spengler did not see the state as constituted by abstract 
universal institutions and norms, but by the spirit of a community at its particular 
point in history. Therefore, Spengler does not appear to have a fixed concept of 
how a state should be constituted:47
46 Whilst these were accepted as appropriate to Anglo-American culture, Spengler denounced them 
as disastrous when transferred to other contexts, such as Germany (Spengler, 1967:44).
47 For instance, the English state was described as a loose society of individuals, structured on a 
hierarchy of wealth. The Prussian state was described as an integrated community structured on a
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The true political shape of any given country is not to be found in 
the wording of its constitution; it is rather, the unwritten, 
unconscious laws according to which the constitution is put into 
effect. (Spengler, 1967:71)
Spengler laid great emphasis on the unity of spirit in a community, on the quality 
of leadership and on the relationship between the leadership and the people. Good 
leadership was understood as due in part to the skills of the leader, but also 
developed through traditions passed on through the ruling classes. These 
traditions contributed to stability in the political community. Leaders were 
preferably drawn from an elite class, for Spengler was elitist in his view of politics 
as in other areas of society:49
Politically gifted peoples do not exist. Those which are supposed to 
be so are simply people that are firmly in the hands of a ruling 
minority and inconsequence feel themselves to be in good form. 
(Decline: 382)
Spengler believed political communities were divided into estates with leadership 
drawn mainly from the first estate, a nobility that has an instinct for statesmanship, 
a minority such as the English ‘gentry’ or the merchant-aristocracy of Venice. As 
leadership devolved to the lower estates, it became less responsible, more self- 
interested (Decline: 364).50
Spengler’s understanding of leadership patterns lead to a distinctive reading of 
political institutions of the West. The high point of politics in the West was 
represented by the dynastic states of Europe, particularly the unified strong 
leadership the ancien regime of French-formed culture (.Decline:83). The rise of the 
bourgeoisie in eighteenth century Europe marked the beginning of the transition of
hierarchy of rank achieved through ability and work to the state. However, Spengler did 
demonstrate preferences for some structures over others. For instance, he refers to the Prussian state 
as ‘a true state in the most exacting sense of the word’, a state in which there were no private 
individuals since each person was an integral member of the state-system (Spengler, 1967:79).
48 Spengler believed that leadership qualities were inculcated through ‘breeding’, or training in the 
ruling nobility.
49 This sense of elitism permeates Spengler’s work. For instance, he argues elsewhere that all great 
discoveries spring from ‘the delight of strong men in victory' , not from the utilitarian thinking of the 
masses (Spengler, 1932:87).
50 Leadership qualities were also to be found in the second estate, the Church. However, not so in 
the third estate, the urban bourgeoisie. This estate introduced a negative element into politics, ‘the 
politics of opposition’, seeking to replace tradition with their own interests.
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the West from a Culture to a Civilisation.31 It coincided with the rise of the cities. 
Urban politics provided the arena for forces which rose to undermine tradition and 
stability. These forces were the rise of intellectualism and of money: ‘Intellect 
rejects, money directs - so it runs in every last act of a Culture drama, when the 
megalopolis has become master over the rest’ (D e c lin e 'll). The French 
Revolution, described by Spengler as ‘glorious’ in some respects, also signalled the 
introduction of the destructive element of ‘the mob’ as a force in politics. The rise 
of representative politics and of parliamentary politics signalled the civilisational 
phase of the West.
Parliament is another Western institution which Spengler treats with some caution, 
if not scepticism. For Spengler, parliamentary government is a product of English 
society. In this context, he admired its success. But the secret of this success, is that 
informally, power continued to be held by the educated and traditional elite. This 
helped to maintain a basic political cohesion. On the continent, however, the 
parliamentary system became a divisive rather than a cohesive force (Decline:313). 
Once again, Spengler outlined significant differences in the character of 
communities within the West, this time with respect to institutions. Institutions of 
representative politics which might be thought of as characterising the West are 
represented by Spengler, not only as not universal, but as appropriate only to a 
subsection of Western civilisation (Spengler, 1967:71-2).52 Furthermore, no 
institutions were treated as fixed features of the West. In fact, current Western 
institutions such as parliamentarianism were predicted to change and decay with 
the onset of the new ‘Caesarism’ (Spengler, 1967:89).
Spengler identifies no single institution as a permanent expression of the West. His 
approach accommodated a range of different political traditions and institutions 
within this community. The norms and institutions underlying authoritarianism, 
liberalism and socialism, are all accounted for in his historical mosaic. In part, they
51 He also argued that the inadequacy of the leadership by the bourgeoisie allowed a fourth estate, 
‘the mob’, to become a force in politics, pointing to the evolution of the French revolution to 
illustrate his point. This force is portrayed as a force of destruction (Decline:364-5).
52 Spengler’s criticism in ‘Prussianism and Socialism’ is mainly aimed at the German liberals and 
the Weimar constitution. He advocated authoritarian Prussian socialism as more appropriate to this 
sector of the West, meaning a benevolent, all encompassing state.
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are understood as aspects of the West’s morphological growth, but at other times 
the coexistence of different ideas is explained as expressing different national 
characteristics within the West. Spengler’s discussion is however imbued with a 
sense of decline rather than progress in the quality of the institutions of the modem 
West.
Interaction Between the West and Non-West
An understanding of Spengler’s views on civilisations, and on the boundaries 
within which he conceptualised the West, contributes important insights into how 
he perceived and analysed interaction between the West and other civilisations. His 
work celebrates the West as a Culture which has achieved unprecedented levels of 
technical and intellectual growth and control; but it is distinctive in its rejection of 
theories of broad human progress, and its consciousness of the finite nature of the 
West’s own development and progress. It is also distinctive in its Germanic focus.
Underlying Spengler’s perception of civilisational interaction is his belief that 
civilisations are multiple. He acknowledged not only the existence, but also the 
importance of other civilisations in human history. The West was not taken as the 
sole representative of civilisation. As Farrenkopf notes, Spengler played a 
pioneering role in expanding the horizons of historical inquiry beyond Euro-centric 
constraints to include non-Westem cultures on a roughly even footing with the 
West (Farrenkopf, 1993:398). In fact, Spengler was critical of the Euro-centric 
focus of Western scholarship. He considered Western ‘world-history’ as 
inordinately skewed towards the history of the West and the sense that the West 
represented some form of fulfilment in man’s overall development. The West, he 
complained, ‘rigs the stage’ of world history:
The Western European area is regarded as a fixed pole, a unique 
patch chosen on the surface of the sphere for no better reason, it 
seems, than because we live on it - and the great histories of 
millennial duration and mighty faraway Cultures are made to 
revolve around this pole in all modesty. It is a quaintly conceived 
system of sun and planets! (Decline: 13)
Spengler was critical of viewing history as falling into ‘ancient - medieval - 
modem’ periods as used by Western historians. This, he felt, privileged the
104
significance of the ‘modem’ age and failed to represent the significance and 
independence of Cultures which preceded the West in other parts of the globe. 
World-history should be ‘the complete biography’ of these independent cultures 
(Decline:230; Farrenkopf, 1993:396).
Furthermore, whilst Spengler recognised the spectacular growth and achievements 
of the West, he emphasised the limits of that growth:
...the future of the West is not limitless tending upwards and 
onwards for all time towards our present ideals, but a single 
phenomenon of history, strictly limited and defined as to form and 
duration, which covers a few centuries and can be viewed and, in 
essentials, calculated from available precedents. (Decline-30)
The stage of growth achieved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ‘hitherto
looked on as the highest point of an ascending straight line of world history’ are
really ‘a stage of life which may be observed in every Culture that has ripened to its
limit’(Decline:29-30). He dismissed what he saw as misguided and inaccurate
conceptions of world-history which adopted a progressive perspective. The West
progressed, therefore, only within the terms of reference of its own Culture. Its
growth was not seen by Spengler as representing the broader progress of mankind
as a whole. There is no teleological, civilising process, but the rise and fall of a
series of civilisations across time and space. In this he echoed Nietzsche who had
remarked: “Progress’ is merely a modem idea, that is to say, a false idea’
(Farrenkopf, 1993:393).
At the same time, he excused the tendency to view Western history as world- 
history due to the unique breadth of the West’s world view: ‘We men of the 
Western Culture are, with our historical sense, an exception not a rule. World- 
history is our world picture and not all mankind’s’ (Decline: 12). Therefore, whilst 
rejecting Western notions of universal progress, Spengler still treated the West as 
exceptional and global in its world view.
Spengler wove his discussion of the contributions of different facets of Western 
society into the history of the whole Culture. Three nations are identified as 
embodying the most powerful expression of the Faustian spirit, England, Spain and 
Prussia; other nations, such as Italy and France, provide elements antithetical to the
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Faustian spirit (Spengler, 1967:32-5). The French nation appears to occupy a 
particularly complex place for Spengler. At points it is castigated as provincial in 
its political thinking, failing to bring forth a single political idea (1967:78). 
Elsewhere, the dynastic states of the French ancien regime and the character of 
Napoleon are praised, and French culture described as presenting Western creative 
principles in their sweetest form in the Rococo era: ‘Indeed, French culture is the 
only culture. England meant the beginning of civilisation’(Spengler, 1967:36).
Overall, however, Spengler’s work seeks to convey a deeply integrated 
understanding of Western history and culture in which all aspects of social 
development relate to internal dynamics rather than trans-cultural movements. 
Whilst Spengler could not ignore the influence of other cultures, he strongly 
emphasised the qualities which made the West unique. From the outset, he 
distinguished the West from Hellenic Culture, which he referred to as Apollonian 
Culture.5^  Whilst most historians trace the history of the West from its Graeco- 
Roman antecedents, Spengler sought to distance the two, comparing and 
contrasting many aspects of the two cultures throughout his work, constantly 
illustrating difference rather than progression from one to the other.54
Given that Spengler saw Civilisations as historically independent, it is 
understandable that the historical dynamic was viewed as coming from within a 
Civilisation rather than from interaction with other Cultures (Dray, 1980:102). This 
does not mean that the impact of interaction is insignificant. However, it was not 
read as the source of history. Interaction emerges more as part of the function of the 
inner dynamics of Civilisations, driven by their internal spiritual quest for 
fulfilment.53 Spengler certainly appeared most interested in the internal dynamics 
of Western Culture, with interaction presented as a secondary concern.
53 Apollonian Culture refers to Hellenic cultures which he describes as reaching maturity and then 
decline in the Imperial Roman era. It was a term borrowed from Nietzsche.
34 Spengler did demonstrate his admiration for Graeco-Roman culture. However, in contrasting it to 
the West, Apollonian Culture was portrayed as stereo-scopic in its conceptualisation of the world; 
incapable of envisaging the abstract in its arts and sciences; parochial, pantheistic, ahistorical and 
lacking a strong sense of the individual.
35 This contrasts with more liberal perspectives which see interaction and cross-fertilisation as an 
important source of growth. See, for instance, the work of William McNeill(1991).
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Whilst Spengler denied the historical interdependence of Cultures, he could not 
deny the impact which the West had made upon the lives of other Cultures and 
Civilisations. Whilst the West is cited by Spengler as one of a number of 
Civilisations, it is also perceived as the only one still at a stage of growth. Other 
Civilisations are seen as fossils of the past, or strangled without reaching 
fulfilment. Therefore, the West is again treated as exceptional in that other 
Civilisations were not viewed as coexisting in the present on an equal footing. 
Western Culture was defined as one which constantly pushed outward, to explore 
and shape the world, and Spengler acknowledged that this had influenced the fate 
of non-Westem peoples. For instance, the encounter between Mexican and 
Western Cultures led to the collapse of the young Aztec Culture. The vigorous 
Aztec culture, which had emerged to challenge the decaying Mayan civilisation, 
was effectively wiped out by a handful of European bandits. This encounter 
demonstrated for Spengler the brutality, randomness and irrationality of history 
{Decline:239-42). Russian Culture is also described as one which has been 
suffocated by the West. For Spengler, the ‘primitive soul’ of Russia is a peasant 
soul which was not allowed to evolve, but was forced into an alien Western mould 
through the policies initiated by Peter the Great. Westernisation imposed a false, 
abstract, urban culture on Russia which effectively detached the Westernised upper 
classes from the peasant lower classes (Decline:210-4). This implies that the 
underlying spirit of the Russian revolution was a desire of the Russian people to 
throw off this alien superstructure36
For the most part, the West’s relationship with the non-West was accepted as 
unequal. The white races of the West had physically spread throughout the globe 
(Spengler, 1934:208). The rest of the world was effectively the market for Western 
products and the supplier of raw materials (Spengler, 1932:100). The relationship 
between West and non-West in the late nineteenth century was perceived as largely 
an imperial one. Spengler does not applaud or romanticise imperialism. It is 
portrayed as exploitative and oppressive, but a normal aspect of the relationship
56 The future of Russia, therefore, belonged not to Marxism or Bolshevism, which Spengler saw as 
equally alien, but the reassertion of the Russian spirit {Decline'.!!4; Spengler, 1934:209).
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between High Cultures and other peoples (Spengler, 1934:204; Farrenkopf, 
1993:402). It was, however, perceived as a signifier of decline: ‘Imperialism is 
Civilisation unadulterated.’ Cecil Rhodes is represented as not only a paragon of 
Western imperialism, but a precursor to a Western type of Caesar (Decline:28).
There is then a strong sense of civilisational hierarchy implied in Spengler’s 
discussion in the relationship between the modem West and non-West, although 
this was not perceived as a permanent hierarchical relationship. In its decline, 
Spengler foresaw a significant shift in the nature of the West’s relationship with the 
non-West. In his later works, this was discussed in terms of the relationship 
between the white and non-white races, an early twentieth century image of the 
‘West against the Rest’.
In the twentieth century, Spengler perceived the non-West posing major threats to 
the West, both economically, through low wage economies, and politically, 
through the non-West’s uptake of liberal and socialist ideas. The two central threats 
identified were Russia and an increasingly dynamic Japan. In this context,
cn
Spengler’s differentiation of Russia from the West becomes highly significant.
Spengler recognised that the threat from the non-West stemmed from an 
understandable resentment felt towards the imperialist West, but it was fuelled by 
an increased capacity to challenge the West. This shift in the balance of power 
Spengler ascribed to foolish dissemination of the technological knowledge, skills 
and political ideas (Spengler, 1932:101).
However, whilst the non-West constituted a visible external threat, the real enemy 
of the West for Spengler was internal decline. Loss of the fighting spirit, 
intellectual and creative sterility, falling birth rates, the breakdown of the family, 
all were seen as feeding the internal decay which makes the imperial power 
vulnerable to attack from the ‘barbarians at'(h*. gate’ (Spengler, 1934:205). Here, 
Spengler drew upon his classical scholarship to model a pattem of Western decay 
that paralleled the history of other declining civilisations. The fear of civilisations 
becoming jaded and lethargic with prosperity and age can also be found in other
37 Described as ‘an Asian nation’, Russia presented to the West the risk of both class war and race 
war (Spengler, 1934:210).
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authors, even amongst liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Toynbee. 
Spengler adds to this fear the concept of a West riven throughout its history by 
ongoing struggle for hegemony of the Faustian soul (Spengler, 1967:6). The 
vitality of the West is, therefore, a critical factor in Spengler’s reading of the course 
of civilisational interaction.
Spengler’s perception of interaction is coloured by an intensely competitive 
perception of civilisational relationships. Cultures and civilisations are portrayed as 
not only incommensurable, but locked into relationships of struggle where 
weakness in one creates opportunities for others. Therefore, World War I and the 
League of Nations, in which the coloured races were allowed a say in disputes 
between white states, were regarded by Spengler as critical points at which the 
West demonstrated weakness, loosing the respect of the ‘coloured races’ (Spengler, 
1934:209-10). He perceived the non-West as not simply wishing to compete with 
the West, but to destroy it (Spengler, 1934:218). However, Spengler’s discussion 
of the threat posed to the West from other peoples does not suggest that these 
peoples would be able to build upon the civilisation of the West. As Farrenkopf 
notes, they are seen as inheriting the tools, but not the spirit of the West, with non- 
Westem people ‘taking over forms that have virtually completed their process of 
cultural evolution and exhausted their inner possibilities - they are end forms’ 
(Farrenkopf, 1993:395; Spengler, 1932:103). The assimilation of non-Westem 
peoples of Western science and technology amounted to ‘little more than an 
impressive act of imitation’ (Farrenkopf, 1993:399). Most importantly, the 
challenge posed by the non-West through imitation of the West was not viewed as 
the commencement of a new global culture.
Therefore, Spengler’s perception of the West’s interaction with other peoples, 
cultures and civilisations presents a curious mix of opinions. He argued that there 
is no world history as a universal process due to the independence, 
incommensurability and mutual incomprehension of Cultures. He stressed 
competition and challenge more than cross fertilisation in his discussion of 
civilisational interaction. At the same time he portrayed the West as a global 
civilisation which has a sense of world history, due not to teleology, but to the 
unique qualities of the West. The West is a civilisation which is global in scale and
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one which has touched all other civilisations. Its expansion, however, is not seen as 
an infinite process. It is a civilisation in long term decline, heading for an era of 
war and demagoguery. Whilst other civilisations may imitate in order to compete 
with the West, it was not viewed as providing the foundations for a universal 
civilisation. Therefore, Spengler did not suggest that humanity was moving 
towards the evolution of a single human civilisation through emulation of the 
West.
Conclusion
Spengler’s conception of the West is embedded in a cultural world order comprised 
of independent and largely incommensurable civilisations. Civilisations are organic 
entities, pursuing independent cycles of growth and decay. Within this context, 
Spengler presents a deeply integrated conception of the West which radically 
differs from conventional images of this community. The history of the West 
which Spengler presents sought to explain the present point in history within a 
broad, cyclical process. It is distinctive in its sense of the organic development of 
society as an integrated whole within the framework of an essentially self- 
contained history. It is also distinctive in its rejection of theories of broad human 
progress and its consciousness of the finite nature of the West’s own development 
and progress. Looking at an era which to many demonstrated the West at a stage of 
unprecedented growth, Spengler saw only consolidation that would lead to 
retraction.
Critical to Spengler’s constitution of the West are the internal bonds and shared 
characteristics which unite the diverse components of this community. The external 
characteristics of the West were seen to emanate from the internal Geist of the 
community. Therefore, his conception is essentially of a spiritual and normative 
community rather than a material one. However, Spengler is critical of many of the 
norms and institutions commonly associated with the West, such as progress and 
rationalism. In arguing that beliefs, values and histories are relative, and in 
rejecting the idea that the West is a universal culture, Spengler shares something 
with contemporary post-modem theorists.
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One of the distinctive features of Spengler’s West is its strongly Germanic nature, 
demonstrated, for instance, by his treatment of the Renaissance as an outgrowth of 
Gothic rather than Mediterranean Culture. The youthful creative source of the West 
was located in the German heartland, but mature features of the West are 
associated with the societies of England and the United States. The decline of the 
West is therefore associated with the influence of these regions. Spengler’s 
consistent differentiation of Western and Hellenic Cultures is also striking. The 
West is not simply a natural progression or rearticulation of Hellenic Culture but a 
unique entity in itself. This is consistent with Spengler’s theory that the history and 
culture of civilisations are essentially self-contained, rather than linked by trans- 
cultural trends and movements. Spengler’s ideas were not unique. Hughes argues 
his interpretation of the history of the High Middle Ages through to the seventeenth 
century as high points in Western culture is less original than it at first appears 
(Hughes, 1952:85-6). Likewise, there are precedents for his critical assessment of 
nineteenth century Western culture. However, Spengler’s overall panorama and 
pervading pessimism with regard to the future of the Western community were and 
remain disturbing. His work reminds us of the range and complexity of ideas and 
traditions which contribute to the civilisational identity of the West. Furthermore, it 
shows that it is possible to draw on Western traditions and thinkers to produce a 
conception of the West which rejects much of what is often assumed to be 
quintessential^ Western.
Spengler’s cultural world order resembles a state of nature. His image of inter- 
civilisational relations, particularly in his later work, is not only competitive but 
conflictual. The impact which civilisations have upon one another is largely 
negative. Within this context, Spengler viewed the West as exceeding its 
civilisational predecessors and dominating its contemporaries through the sheer 
scale of its intellectual, technical and spiritual capacity. However, whilst the West 
is conceptualised as exceptional and global in scope, and the dominant civilisation 
in modem world history, Spengler does not suggest that it provides a model, 
foundation or framework for a universal civilisation. His concept of the 
separateness and cyclicality of civilisation eliminates any prospects for a universal 
order outside the framework of imperialism. Instead, Spengler is anti-cosmopolitan
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in tone. Spengler’s image of cultural world order is one which encourages cultural 
consolidation rather than the pursuit of universal ideals or structures. Ultimately, 
Spengler’s conceptions are shaped by the perception that the West’s power is in 
decline; Faustian man is entering his twilight years. However, whilst he 
acknowledges that the fading West is increasingly challenged by non-Westem 
rivals, he does not identify a potential successor to the West. Therefore, in the long 
run, the world order which Spengler describes is an uncertain and insecure one, 
likely to be characterised by struggles for power, both within the decaying West 
and outside.
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Chapter Four
The Parochial Civilisation: Arnold Toynbee’s Conception of
the West
‘The encounter between the World and the West may well prove ... to be the most 
important event in modem history’ wrote Arnold Toynbee (Toynbee, 1958b:223). 
He further notes that this civilisational encounter is an outstanding instance of a 
historical phenomenon which is one of the keys to understanding the history of 
mankind. The quotation suggests the importance of civilisations in Toynbee’s 
reading of world history. Like Oswald Spengler, Toynbee’s cultural world order 
comprises a plurality of independent civilisations in various stages of growth and 
decline. However, unlike Spengler, he sees encounters between civilisations as 
critical events in the broader context of human history.
The quotation also highlights the significance which Toynbee attaches to the role 
of the West in such encounters in modem history. He wrote extensively on the role 
of the West in world politics, both past, present and future; this despite his own 
criticism of the Western-centric focus of contemporary history. However, the West 
features in his work as but one actor in a complex set of relationships between a 
plurality of civilisations. Toynbee recognises the West as an ascendant civilisation, 
suggesting that, at one level, it has created the foundation for a global society. At 
the same time, he adopts a critical attitude to aspects of the West and its impact on 
other societies, rejecting the idea that the West in itself represents a universal 
civilisation. Whereas Spengler characterised the West as a civilisation striving 
always for the infinite, Toynbee characterises it as one which is global in reach, but 
wedded to narrow and parochial ideas and institutions.
113
Toynbee (1889-1975) was a prolific, provocative and complex author. His work is 
breathtaking in scope and volume.1 His distinguished career as a historian and 
commentator on world politics spanned more than sixty years of the twentieth 
century. The impact of the century’s dramatic events and changes can be seen in 
his reading of world history and politics. The volume and scope of his work 
naturally gives rise to a degree of complexity. This is augmented by significant 
tensions within Toynbee’s work, relating, for instance, to the degree to which a 
civilisation’s history is seen as pre-determined or driven by the actions of society; 
to the role of religion in civilisational history; and to the role of the West as one of 
many actors in the cultural world order, or as a central, formative force in that 
order.
This chapter does not survey Toynbee’s complete works, but draws on a selection 
of key publications relating to civilisational interaction and the West. These 
include A Study of History, his major work published in three stages between 1934 
and 1954;2 Civilisations on Trial, a collection of articles and lectures published in 
1948; and The World and the West, a published collection of Toynbee’s 1952 BBC 
Reith lectures. In these, we find a complex concept of the cultural world order in 
which the modem West becomes a central actor.
Toynbee’s Era and Influences
Toynbee’s career was highly varied. Unlike Spengler, he was not solely an 
academic. In fact, he seemed uneasy within the confines of academia, resigning 
from teaching positions at both Oxford and the University of London after 
relatively short periods. Whilst pursuing his academic interests, Toynbee travelled 
widely as a journalist and commentator on world affairs. He worked with 
organisations affiliated with the British Foreign Office during the First and Second 
World Wars and was a member of the British delegations to the Peace Conferences
1 S. Fiona Morton’s bibliography of Toynbee’s works lists 2974 separate publications that appeared 
between 1910 and 1979 either written by Toynbee or reviews of his publications (McNeill, 
1989:289).
2 Volumes I-III were published 1934; vols. IV-VI in 1939; and vols. VII-X in 1954. The references 
in this chapter refer to D.C. Somervell’s abridged version of A Study o f History (2 volumes). The 
first number refers to the volume, the second to the page number.
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in 1919 and 1946. Most of his working life was spent as Director of Studies at the 
British, subsequently Royal, Institute of International Affairs in London. There, he 
divided his time between writing and editing the annual Survey of International 
Affairs (1925-1955).3 He achieved fame in Britain, Europe and Japan, and 
celebrity status in the United States.
Bom into a middle class family, Toynbee attended Balliol College, Oxford where 
his main studies were in Greek and Latin. On graduation, he became a don at 
Balliol, teaching Ancient History. His work was to reflect both his early interest in 
Byzantine and Middle Eastern history and his classical education.4 The era in 
which Toynbee received his education was one in which Classical thought 
remained a significant intellectual influence, as illustrated by studies such as James 
Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890), and the contemporary interest in archaeology 
and philology. Toynbee’s work reflects these influences. William McNeill, for 
instance, suggests that his work effectively translates models of the classical city 
states onto the global and civilisational scale.5 Like Spengler, Toynbee was 
influenced by the cyclical view of history common in classical literature.
Three scholars who strongly influenced Toynbee were Plato, Herodotus and 
Thucydides. McNeill identifies Plato as the most significant influence (McNeill, 
1961:37). Toynbee shared with Plato the quest for unity in complexity, exploring 
the interconnectedness of things (McNeill, 1961:44). He also echoed Plato in his 
use of metaphors to convey his message 6 His early work was influenced by
3 Technically, he retained the research position of Stevenson Professor at the University of London.
4 Stromberg notes that Hellenic thought was Toynbee’s ‘first intellectual love’ (1972:14).
3 Toynbee is also again thoroughly within the classical tradition in seeing the breakdown of 
civilisations as occurring primarily on the political plane (McNeill, 1961:35-6). Both Stromberg and 
McNeill note the strong influence of Toynbee’s classical education on A Study. As McNeill points 
out, in the first three volumes of A Study, classical cultures provide a measuring rod against which 
other civilisations are measured. (McNeill, 1961:35-6; Stromberg, 1972:14). For A.J.P. 
Taylor(1956), the tendency to consistently draw on generalisations from classical history was a 
weakness in Toynbee’s discussion of comparative civilisations.
6 The theory of the impact of the withdrawal and return of creative forces in a civilisational 
development can also be found in both Plato and Toynbee (Stromberg, 1972:22). Perhaps one of the 
best known of Toynbee’s metaphors is the image of civilisations as climbers on the face of a steep 
rock. The rock face represented the challenges which civilisations had to meet and conquer in order 
to proceed in their ascent. This image was used as a backdrop to Toynbee’s portrait when he 
appeared in the cover of Time in March 1947.
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Herodotus’ study of the Persian War from which Toynbee drew the theme of the 
dichotomy between east and west. However, both McNeill and Stromberg 
speculate that the structure of A Study ultimately reflects the stronger influence of 
Thucydides, who conceived of the breakdown of societies along the model of 
Greek tragedy (Stromberg, 1972:14; McNeill, 1989:96). The First World War 
brought the work of Thucydides to life for Toynbee in a vivid and powerful way, 
suggesting parallels between Graeco-Roman and Western civilisations, and the 
idea of cyclical patterns of history:
Thucydides had declared that war ‘proves a rough master, that 
brings most men’s characters to a level with their fortunes.’ It was 
this kind of psychological brutalisation that Toynbee had in mind in 
attributing the breakdown of civilisations to unregulated warfare. 
(McNeill, 1989:96)7 8
The conjunction of insights into classical history and the War strongly influenced 
Toynbee’s views of the destructive impact of war on civilisations. In marked 
contrast to Spengler, Toynbee portrayed war as a destructive, degenerative force 
rather than an agent of creativity (Stromberg, 1972:92).
Toynbee’s initial ambition- was to write a history of Greece. However, in the early 
1920s this expanded to a history of European civilisation as a whole, his ideas 
increasingly shaped by the perception of patterns of growth, breakdown and
o
dissolution of civilisations. Toynbee’s macro approach was unusual, though not 
unprecedented. Working models existed, for instance, in Eduard Meyer Geschichte 
des Altetrums (1884-1902) (McNeill, 1989:31). However, two significant 
influences which shaped Toynbee’s method of comparative civilisational history 
were the works of F. J. Teggart and Oswald Spengler. Teggart advocated a broad, 
comparative historical methodology, studying of societies such as India and China 
as well as those of the Europe and the Near East (McNeill, 1989:100). Such a
7 The idea of a tragic model of history was developed by Toynbee in his 1922 lecture ‘The Tragedy 
of Greece’ which discussed the role of unregulated warfare in the breakdown of civilisations. In his 
technique of applying ideas drawn from classical studies to the contemporary world, Toynbee was 
no doubt influenced by his teacher, friend and father-in-law Gilbert Murray, a don at Balliol. See 
McNeill(1989).
8 Toynbee’s interest in the cyclical rise and fall of civilisations was stimulated by an extensive 
walking tour of Greece which he undertook in 1911.
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comparative methodology was also adopted in Spengler’s Der Untergang des 
Abendslandes which Toynbee read in 1920. McNeill describes Spengler’s work as 
‘a powerful factor’ in altering Toynbee’s outlook from focus on the perennial 
interaction between ‘east’ and ‘west’ in Eurasia to the history of multiple, separate, 
parallel civilisations whose rise and fall conformed to certain broad, tragic patterns 
(McNeill, 1989:98). This facilitated Toynbee’s radical departure from conventional 
nineteenth century European history in portraying Western civilisation as one of 
many such communities rather than epitomising civilisation itself. McNeill further 
argues that Toynbee also borrowed from Spengler the idea that civilisations were 
‘intrinsically separate’ and incapable of meaningful communication (McNeill, 
1989:101).9 However, Toynbee’s concepts of civilisational affiliation and 
renaissance indicate that, in some instances, relationships between civilisations can 
be meaningful and constructive.
Toynbee theorised that civilisational growth was stimulated by the development of 
a creative minority. This idea has been attributed to the influence of the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson who argued that progress in society was not automatic 
or unconscious, but stimulated by the acts of creative individuals (Stromberg, 
1972:22). Bergson appears to be one of the few contemporary philosophers who 
influenced Toynbee whose thinking was not shaped by modem scholars such as 
Weber, Dürkheim or Freud. Unlike Spengler, he seems little influenced by 
intellectuals such as Nietzsche and Pareto, or writers such as Elliot, Joyce or 
Proust. In fact, Stromberg suggests that these contemporaries made Toynbee look 
like Pollyanna rather than a pessimist with regard to the state of Western 
civilisation.10
9 Both authors made an enormous popular impact with their theories. However, Toynbee’s ideas 
appear to have had greater outreach. This was due to his style, which was more lucid in comparison 
to Spengler’s polemics, the fact that he wrote in English, and also to the era in which Toynbee 
publishedSee McNeill(1989:165).
10 Stromberg describes Toynbee as essentially Victorian in his thinking, an ‘old-fashioned 
rationalist in his. evaluation of men and their motives’ (Stromberg, 1972:80-1). Lewis 
Mumford(1956), however, suggests some parallels between Toynbee and Reinhold Niebuhr who 
also saw the resolutions of the problems of the contemporary world in another, spiritual world. 
Toynbee’s interest in Christianity and politics was also shared by Martin Wight, who for a time 
worked with Toynbee at the R.I.I.A. See Kedourie(1979).
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Nevertheless, Toynbee’s conception of the West was powerfully shaped by the 
broader political environment and by his personal involvement in the events of this 
era. Toynbee was deeply influenced by the suffering and destruction of the First 
World War when he worked at the Foreign Office Political Intelligence Unit, 
documenting atrocities in Armenia by the Turks and in Europe by the Germans. In 
1919, he was a member of the British delegation to the Peace Conference where he 
advised on Middle Eastern Affairs. He was deeply disillusioned by the handling of 
affairs by the imperial powers and the duplicity of Allied policy towards the 
Middle East.11 During the 1921 war between Greece and Turkey, Toynbee 
travelled to the front line and witnessed the war from both sides, there observing 
further atrocities, this time waged on the Turkish population by their Greek 
adversaries. These experiences provided a living demonstration of the result of 
encounters between civilisations. In The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: 
A Study in the Contact of Civilisations (1922), he argued that both the Greek 
(Byzantine) civilisation and Turkish (Middle Eastern or Islamic) civilisation were 
in a process of dissolution due to their encounters with the more dynamic West. 
This process was exacerbated in both civilisations by the borrowing of elements of 
Western culture, in particular the institutions of the Western nation-state (McNeill 
1989:110). This theme became central to Toynbee’s work on civilisational 
interaction and the impact of the West. His suspicion of the negative impact of the 
borrowing of elements of Western culture was reinforced by his observations of 
Asian societies during a trip to Japan in 1929. He interpreted the disruptions and 
radical changes in societies such as India, China and Japan as indications of the 
breakdown of other civilisations under the pressure of contact with the West 
(McNeill, 1989:135-40). His work on the West’s impact on the non-West, 
particularly as expressed in The World and the West (1953), brought him a great 
deal of criticism from many in Britain who felt he had been unduly harsh on the 
West, representing only the negative aspects of its impact on the non-West and 
failing to point to the benefits it had brought (McNeill, 1989:223).
11 McNeill discusses Toynbee’s disappointment at failing to have his recommendations for the 
peace settlement with Turkey adopted. The policies adopted by Lloyd George soon broke down, 
resulting in war between Greece and Turkey (McNeill, 1989:82).
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Toynbee’s suspicion of the nation-state was reinforced and heightened by the 
course of international affairs in the 1920s and 1930s when he was involved in the 
production of the annual Surveys of International Affairs. He observed the rise of 
aggressive nationalism in Germany, Japan and Italy, and the failure of its 
containment through collective security at the League of Nations. Underlying his 
observations of international affairs was a conviction that plural sovereignties of 
the ‘parochial’ nation-state was ‘an evil that had to be transcended’ (McNeill, 
1989:174). Toynbee’s experience of war had led him to support the key tenets of 
post-war liberal diplomacy, such as the settlement of international disputes by 
arbitration, international legal structures and collective security. The failure of 
collective security and sanctions produced some disillusionment with secular and 
legal structures as a means to settling international quarrels.
Toynbee came to see the failure of the League of Nations as a failure in faith, 
particularly when contrasted with the mass support generated by ‘quasi-religious’ 
movements such as communism and fascism (McNeill, 1989:185). Elements in 
Toynbee’s personal life combined to heighten the role of religion in his theories of 
the course of world history.12 This, added to his disappointment with the secular 
structures of 1930s diplomacy, led Toynbee to argue that Western civilisation 
could only be saved from destruction by the redirection of the mind and spirit 
towards God and away from the nation-state (McNeill, 1989:170). In the early 
1940s, Toynbee’s writings and speeches laid increased emphasis on the 
significance of religion and especially the relevance of Christianity to Western 
civilisation.13
As the war drew to a close, Toynbee’s emphasis on Christianity lessened slightly, 
but he remained convinced that national-state structures had to be superseded if a 
just and lasting peace was to be attained.14 In the post-war period, Toynbee
12 These included the trauma of his son Tony’s suicide in March 1939 and conversion to 
Catholicism by his wife Rosalind, to whom he was deeply attached despite growing increasingly 
distant.
13 See, for instance, ‘Christianity and Civilisation’ (1958a).
14 He argued this case during his tenure as head of the Foreign Research and Press Office and later 
Foreign Office Research Department.
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travelled frequently to the United States, where he was extremely popular between 
1947 and 1954. He believed the era signalled the emergence of the United States as 
the new world empire, the West’s ‘universal state’, adjudging it likely to be a more 
benevolent regime than its rival, the Soviet Union (.A Study:2/328-31; McNeill 
1989:210-8).
This diverse range of personal, political and intellectual influences led Toynbee to 
produce a complex theory of civilisational history and a critical and distinctive 
conception of the West.
Conceptions of Civilisations
Toynbee’s conception of the West, whilst influenced by his analysis of 
contemporary world politics, is deeply embedded within a philosophy of history 
focused on civilisational development and interaction; that is to say, like 
Spengler’s, its context is a world history constituted by a plurality of civilisations. 
Toynbee also viewed civilisations or ‘societies’ rather than nations or periods as 
the intelligible units of historical studies (A Study.1/11; Toynbee, 1958a: 195-7). 
Toynbee and Spengler both believed that civilisations evolved through life-stages 
rather than existing in fixed states. This consciousness of the multiplicity and 
mortality of civilisations in both scholars is related to the broad historical 
perspective which they derived from their studies of the classics. However, 
although Toynbee like Spengler identifies patterns in the rise and decline of 
civilisations, he rebuffed the notion that civilisations are destined to follow a fixed, 
predetermined life history. He rejected Spengler’s theory of civilisations as organic 
entities and any suggestion that a civilisation’s course is predetermined by factors 
such as race or environment (A Study.• 1/51-9, 210). Instead, he argued that 
civilisations grow in response to challenge, suggesting that ‘creation is an outcome 
of an encounter, that genesis is a product of interaction’ (A Study
15 The environment is treated as one element which can challenge a civilisation. Other challenges 
might arise from the pressure of enemies, from the impact of defeat or subjugation, but the growth 
that constituted a civilisation arose from the creative and continued response to such occurrences (A 
Study: 1/187). Growth continues to be stimulated by challenge since the perfect containment of 
challenges might lead a society to petrify. If challenges prove too strong, the society might be
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Where Spengler presented a morphological concept of civilisations, Toynbee 
presents an anthropomorphised and social one. For Toynbee, true growth is a 
process of self-realisation; an inner, spiritual rather than an external, material 
process.16 It is the achievement by a people of a sense of self-determination, 
meaning the capacity to control their own destiny rather than be driven by external 
or natural forces. Loss of this sense of self-determination indicates decline (A 
Srwdy.T/208). Toynbee believed that the process of response to challenges is led by 
creative leaders within the society, surrounded by an elite described as the ‘creative 
minority’ (A S t u d y This elite must be able to inspire the majority to adopt 
or emulate their chosen course of action, a process Toynbee called mimesis (A 
Study: 1/214-6).
Toynbee did not view the growth of a civilisation as limitless and infinite. Indeed, 
his diagnosis of the current state of civilisations implies that most eventually 
entered a process of disintegration. The process of breakdown involves political 
and social conflicts, ‘times of troubles’, characterised by wars, ‘routs and rallies’, 
leading to the establishment of peace under the auspices of a ‘universal state’ 
established by the ‘dominant minority’ within the civilisation. Finally, a ‘universal 
church’ emerges from the ideologies of the ‘proletariat’ becoming the final 
expression of the civilisation. The ‘universal state’ is ultimately undermined by the 
combination of the ‘universal church’ and external attacks, but it can also be 
weakened by complacency within. For Toynbee, the complacency or arrogance 
bred by success can inhibit a civilisation’s capacity to meet new challenges, or lead 
to overextension and decline. Toynbee suggests that successful societies of the past 
had ‘rested on their oars’ and fallen into the ‘nemesis of creativity’ during which
overwhelmed. A society which grew too complacent as a result of its past success might likewise be 
unable to meet a future challenge.
16 Toynbee argued that the criterion for growth ultimately lies not in the conquest of the external 
environment, but ‘rather in a progressive change of emphasis and shifting of the scene of action out 
of this field into another field, in which the action of challenge-and-response may find an alternative 
arena. In this other field challenges do not impinge from outside but arise from within, and 
victorious responses do not take the form of surmounting external objects or of overcoming an 
external adversary, but manifest themselves in an inward self-articulation or self-determination’ (A 
Study:\l\99). However, he acknowledged the importance of meeting material challenges, noting 
that technical achievement was valuable in the way that it freed man to work in a more ethereal 
medium (A Study:2/198).
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they bound themselves to ephemeral institutions and techniques (A Study:l/301- 
37). This tendency was based on the illusion that the universal state is immortal 
rather than a transient set of structures (A Study:2/4-10). Some civilisations, 
however, never achieve their full potential, being arrested or absorbed by other 
cultures (A Study: 1/164-85). Others become frozen in time, proceeding gradually 
on a course of collapse, making them vulnerable to the influence of, and even
17absorption by, more vigorous cultures such as the West in the modem era.
McNeill argues that Toynbee saw civilisations as essentially separate entities, 
hypothesising only two meaningful forms of interaction could be recognised; 
affiliation and renaissance (1989:102).18 However, encounters between 
civilisations do play a critical role in Toynbee’s cultural world order, such 
encounters leading to cumulative changes within the weaker civilisation. Toynbee 
theorised that ‘any civilisation, any way of life is an indivisible whole in which all 
the parts hang together and are interdependent’ (Toynbee, 1958b:251). His concept 
of the cultural world order is premised on the belief that encounters between 
civilisations lead to the breakdown of weaker civilisations, their integrity 
undermined by cultural borrowing from the stronger (McNeill, 1989:102-3).
At the same time, the decline of a civilisation is ascribed to internal rather than 
external factors, with war and class strife cited as causing the destruction of most 
of the known previous civilisations (Toynbee, 1958a:32). Societies in a state of 
growth do not submit to external attack, only those already weakened by a process 
of internal decline.19 Hence, he argues that the crises occurring in non-Westem
17 See, for example, his ongoing discussion of Eastern Orthodox Christendom, Islam as it 
transformed into the Ottoman empire, and references to Sinic culture. The Roman Empire was seen 
the final, universal state of the Hellenic civilisation.
18 Toynbee defined ‘affiliation’ as contact in time between successive civilisations; whereas 
‘renaissance’ refers to a relation between ‘a grown up civilisation and the ghost of its long-dead 
predecessor’ (A Study:2/146).
19 Toynbee sees three central elements to the process of decline: a failure of creative power amongst 
the creative minority, which could lead to the adoption of an oppressive stance by this group which 
might then become the dominant minority; a withdrawal of allegiance and mimesis on the part of the 
majority; and a consequent loss of social cohesion in the society as a whole (A Study: 1/246). 
Toynbee sees such societies then fragmenting into three: a dominant minority that instigated a 
universal state; an internal proletariat that instigated a universal church; and an external proletariat 
who in the past formed roving war-bands (A Study: 1/368-370).
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societies during the modem era resulted from their inability to resist the challenge 
of the stronger West.
Therefore, Toynbee’s theory of civilisational encounter allows him to account for 
both external and internal challenges. There is, perhaps, some tension in Toynbee’s 
theory of civilisational history in the degree to which a civilisation’s history is 
shaped by patterns of growth or by internal resources. He ultimately appears to 
place the responsibility for the course of a civilisation’s fate in its own hands, 
determined primarily by its response to challenges and new social forces. Such 
forces should give rise to new elites, but if this does not occur, it is possible that 
the old institutions of the society might adapt to new pressures. Failure to do so 
results in either hazardous revolution or complete breakdown (A Study. 1/280). 
Civilisational decline, therefore, is regarded as a likely but not inevitable process.
Toynbee did not assume that conquest either of other peoples or nature was 
necessarily a sign of growth; it can indicate disintegration. In this, Toynbee 
demonstrates his antipathy towards war and his suspicion of technology and 
materialism. War is perceived as a destructive force, waged by wicked aggressors 
(Stromberg, 1972:92); militarism seen as often a sign of excess. Technical 
achievement, he argued, can also be a misleading indicator of growth, since many 
civilisations have continued to expand and innovate whilst in a state of social 
decline (A Study: V189-91)20
Toynbee thus presents a rich theory of civilisational history, and a cultural world 
order comprising interacting civilisations in various stages of growth and decline. 
However, one recurrent criticism of this theory is its failure to provide a clear 
definition of what constitutes a civilisation (Braudel, 1980; Fitzsimons, 1961; 
McNeill, 1961). For instance, in his earlier work, Toynbee analyses civilisation as 
commencing at a point in which ‘human will takes the place of the mechanical 
laws of the environment as the governing factor in the relationship.’21 In A Study,
20 Toynbee also argues that the development of specialisation in a society comes to inhibit that 
society’s creative capacity (A Study:l/321-S).
21 Remarks made by Toynbee in lectures on ancient history delivered at University of London in 
1919-20. Quoted in McNeill (1989:94).
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Toynbee distinguishes primitive peoples, whom he sees as static and essentially 
backward looking in their social habits, from civilisations which are dynamic and 
forward looking (A Study. 1/49). Elsewhere, he describes civilisation as ‘a 
movement not a condition, a voyage, not a port’, an effort to perform an act of 
creation (Toynbee, 1958a:57-8; Braudel, 1980:190). These definitions lack clarity. 
However, Toynbee was clear in dismissing any suggestion of the unity of 
civilisation, that is to say that there is only one civilisation (A Study.lßl).
Western Christendom, which evolved into the modem West, is listed in Toynbee’s 
A Study of History as but one of twenty one known civilisations, five of which are 
currently in existence (A Study:ll34).2j However, the West is treated as 
exceptional in that it is the only civilisation believed to be in a stage of growth 
rather than petrification or decline. However, he felt the West was currently 
undergoing its ‘times of trouble’ and on the edge of the disintegrative process (A 
Study: 1/275-349). It had undergone a crucial breakdown with the outbreak of the 
Wars of Religion in the seventeenth century, the ensuing centuries witnessing three 
cycles of warfare. This did not preclude the West’s continued physical and 
technological expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, 
Toynbee perceived the West as reaching a crisis point, entering a fourth cycle of 
war and upheaval that in preceding civilisations had led to social disintegration, 
following the collapse of the universal state (A Study:2/213).24 Whilst Western 
civilisation had successfully conquered the challenges which the natural world and 
other civilisations had presented, it was vulnerable to destruction from internal 
forces, the risk of war, exacerbated by the modem threat of nuclear annihilation. 
There is some ambiguity in Toynbee’s work as to whether the West was 
irrevocably doomed to extinction as Spengler had surmised (Geyl, 1956). Perhaps 
Toynbee himself was not sure of the answer. He maintained the hope that
22 In his essay ‘The Present Point in History’ (1958a:32), Toynbee also distinguishes between 
civilisations, which have come and gone over the course of human history, and Civilisation (big C) 
which has successfully re-incarnated itself in fresh civilisations as old ones pass. He does not, 
however, elaborate on what constitutes the spirit of Civilisation in this context.
23 In A Study (1/8), he identifies these as the Orthodox Christian Society in South-Eastern Europe 
and Russia; Islamic society; Hindu society and Far Eastern society in addition to the West.
24 His work suggests that the United States is the most likely and attractive candidate for the role of 
the universal state.
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disintegration was not inevitable; that the West could save itself through the correct 
inspiration and insight. That inspiration was spiritual and could only be found in 
religion (A Study:2/319). Furthermore, he suggests that if the West could avoid 
nuclear annihilation, it could provide the framework for a global, multicultural 
society.25
The Boundaries of Toynbee’s West
Toynbee’s conception of the West is shaped by his broad, historical perspective. 
He distinguishes between a medieval and modem West, with the modem West 
emerging from the collapse of Christendom as a political community; the 
emergence of humanism as the philosophy guiding perceptions of political 
community; and, in the twentieth century, the West moving from the modem to the 
post-modem age (A Study:2/30S). However, the boundaries of the modem and 
post-modem West’s evolve, and are moulded by the processes of growth shaped by 
its inner spiritual character, implicitly linking all three phases of development.
Territory
Territorial ideas are important to Toynbee’s conception of the West in two key 
respects. Firstly, they help to locate the West as a community which emanated from 
the Mediterranean region and then proceeded to expand geographically. Secondly, 
they provide an important institutional dimension to Toynbee’s West in the form of 
the territorial state. Toynbee saw the West’s geographical boundaries expanding 
outwards over time. The genesis of the West is seen as occurring on the fringes of 
the old Hellenic civilisation. The ‘backbone’ of the West was the old Roman 
Imperial frontier running from Rome to Aachen and forming the core of the 
Carolingian realm. From this region, the political core of Western Christendom 
grew. The frontiers of the West expanded and contracted during the medieval 
Crusades. However, the consistent physical expansion of the modem West
25 Toynbee favoured some form of supra-national world government which would enable the West 
and thus, given the West’s influence, mankind to rise above the then pervasive, parochial state 
politics (A Study:2/328). However, the failure of universal states of the past to avoid decline, and to 
provide world government provides a pessimistic precedent for any such endeavours on the part of 
the West. See Barraclough(1956).
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commenced in the fifteenth century. Unlike Spengler, Toynbee embraced 
Renaissance Italy as the core of the West at this time. The influence of the Italian 
intellectual and administrative revolution is viewed as flowing northwards across 
the Alps to the Atlantic coast of the West where England and Holland assumed 
leadership of the Western world (A Study: 1/232; 2/150). Furthermore, the 
Renaissance brought the revival and further evolution of the concept of the 
territorial sovereign state as the central political unit. An important feature of 
Toynbee’s evolving West is the pronounced emphasis it placed on the territorial 
dimensions of political community:
The essential feature of the Western political ideology had been its 
insistence on taking as its principle of political association the 
physical accident of geographical propinquity. (A Study.2/222)
Toynbee treats the physical expansion of the West as a function of Western
technological innovations and intellectual revolutions. Ocean navigation allowed
Europeans to establish contact with previously unknown civilisations.
Subsequently, the West grew as a territorial entity through colonisation. However,
Toynbee does not automatically equate the spread of Western ideas and political
control with the physical expansion of the West as a community. As he makes clear
in his essay ‘The Psychology of Encounters’, Westernisation and membership of
the West are not synonymous for him (Toynbee, 1958b). In A Study, only the
countries ‘occupied by Catholic and Protestant peoples in Western Europe,
America and the South Seas’ are cited as forming the geographic domain of
Western Christendom (A StudyAll). By the late 1940s, the centre of Toynbee’s
West was clearly shifting away from Europe and towards the United States, which
Toynbee saw emerging as the West’s universal state. Toynbee, therefore,
demonstrated clear conceptions of the territorial boundaries of the West.
Race
Toynbee was sceptical of the way racial differentiation had been employed by the 
West; yet race still played a significant role in defining his conception of this
26 See, for instance, his discussion of the weakening of Europe and growth in stature of the United 
States in the post-war period in his essay The Dwarfing o f Europe (1958a).
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community. At the commencement of A Study of History, Toynbee dismissed race 
as a determinant of the growth of civilisations, rejecting links between superficial 
physical characteristics and the qualities which stimulate civilisational 
development (A Study: 1/52). He had little time for notions of racial superiority and 
was dismissive of theories suggesting that civilisational decline is related to racial 
degeneration (A Study: 1/249). The destiny of civilisations is determined by their 
responses to challenges, not predetermined by physical characteristics, he argues. 
He regarded the practice of stigmatising certain races as inferior as part of a process 
of dehumanisation applied by aggressive and ascendant races. Although 
dehumanisation might take religious, cultural or racial forms, Toynbee found the 
racial form the most despicable since it provides an insurmountable barrier to the 
discriminated. Foreshadowing the work of contemporary scholars, such as Edward 
Said, Toynbee argues:
In stigmatising members of an alien society as ‘Natives’ in their 
own homes, ‘top-dog’ is denying their humanity by asserting their 
political and economic nullity. By designating them as ‘Natives’ he 
is implicitly assimilating them to the non-human fauna and flora of 
a virgin New World that has been waiting for its human discoverers 
to enter in and take possession. On these premises the fauna and 
flora may be treated either as vermin and weeds to be extirpated or 
as natural resources to be conserved and exploited. (A 
Study:2/230)27
Although Toynbee did not see the West as constituted by a superior civilisation, he 
did see it as predominantly white. Whilst dismissing notions of racial superiority, 
he still employed racial differentiation. Whilst acknowledging the expansion of the 
West to encompass many other races in its global net of political and economic 
interests, Toynbee conceived of the ‘dominant minority’ of the West as 
predominantly white, with non-Westem peoples forming the bulk of the West’s 
‘internal proletariat’ (A Study:2l99). In the latter stages of A Study, he appears 
concerned with the implications of racial differentiation for the West, speculating 
on the challenges which the successful ‘Westernisation’ of the peoples of Asia and 
Africa might pose to the West and Russia. He anticipates this might lead to
27 Toynbee argues that such discrimination was utilised by European peoples in their encounters 
with new and different societies during Western expansion.
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demands for a more equitable distribution of territories and resources for the new 
powers. In the face of such a challenge, Toynbee speculates that the West and 
Russia might find common cause sufficient to override their ideological 
differences. In contrast to Spengler, who treated Russia as an Asian civilisation, 
Toynbee suggested that Russia might act as ‘the White Man’s Hope’ against ‘the 
Yellow Peril’ (A Study.lß ll). Although not necessarily advocating policies of 
racial inequality, Toynbee did employ racial distinctions in his analysis of world 
politics. He seemed less conscious of racial distinctions and affinities in the context 
of the Cold War. For instance, when constituting the ‘free world’ in antithesis to 
the Soviet Union, India is readily included as an ally of the coalition of the free 
world opposed to tyranny. Thus whilst Toynbee was not racist, his conception of 
the West entailed a racial dimension.
Religion
Religion in the form of Christianity, and particularly the Catholic church, is a 
fundamental force shaping Toynbee’s West. The West is conceived of as a 
civilisation which occurs in the context of the Christian era, Western Christendom 
providing the antecedent to the modem West. He saw the Catholic church as 
playing a seminal role in establishing and enhancing the community of Western 
Christendom, facilitating the growth of nascent political institutions which came to 
characterise the West.
Firstly, Christianity is viewed as a chrysalis which linked the Hellenic with 
Western society. Toynbee’s theory of history suggests that universal churches bom 
out of the collapse of one civilisation in their turn nurture the growth of a new 
civilisation. ‘Christianity had arisen out of spiritual travail that was a consequence 
of the breakdown of the Hellenic civilisation’(A Study:2/SS). In its turn, it nurtured 
the new civilisation. It flourished in the spiritual vacuum of the declining Roman 
Empire, retaining its ‘integrity’ through the ‘dark ages’ to lay the foundations for 
Western achievements in economics, politics, and culture (A Study.2/82-8; 
Toynbee, 1958b:297).
Emphasising the strong links between Judaism and Christianity, Toynbee notes that 
Christianity was produced by a synthesis of elements from Hellenic and Syriac
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societies (A Study:2/257-60). However, the civilisation which it nurtured proved 
homogeneous and relatively intolerant of other religions within its midst. This 
homogeneity was expressed in religious terms by the high level of religious 
intolerance which existed in Western Christendom until after the Wars of Religion; 
subsequently, it was expressed politically in the evolution of the communal 
homogeneity of the parochial nation-state (A Study:!/173-4).
Christianity also played a formative role in the territorial expansion of the West. It 
expanded both through ‘peaceful penetration’, absorbing other communities 
through conversion; and through military encounters such as the Crusades in which 
‘warriors consciously, and not entirely hypocritically, thought of themselves as 
extending or defending the frontiers of Christendom’ (A Study:2/188).28 Whilst 
medieval Christians were unable to consolidate the territories conquered during the 
Crusades, the encounters provided a territorial dimension to the conception of 
Christendom. Toynbee also notes that the battle with Islam provided some impetus 
for Western Europeans to explore the oceans beyond Europe’s shores. Western 
reaction to Syriac pressure was the incentive for Europeans to push out of the 
Iberian Peninsula to Africa, Asia and the Americas. The ‘Iberian energy’ provided 
the ‘mustard seed’ which transformed Western Christendom into ‘the Great 
society: a tree in whose branches all the nations of the Earth have come and 
lodged’ (A Study: 1/124-5).
Religion further helps define the boundaries of Toynbee’s West in distinguishing it 
from the Christendom of the East. Toynbee traces the growing estrangement of the 
two civilisations which emerged from the old Roman empire; the eastern section 
traditionally looking to Constantinople as its political and spiritual capital, the 
western to Rome. 29 Both claimed to be the sole heir to the Christian universal
28 Toynbee defines the Crusades in broad terms as ‘all the warfare of Western Christendom on its 
frontiers in the Medieval chapter of its history, against Islam in Spain as well as in Syria, against the 
rival Christendom of the East Roman Empire, and against the pagan barbarians on the north-eastern 
frontier’ (A Study:2/\S8).
29 The Roman Empire was divided into two sections in 395 A.D. after the death of the emperor 
Theodosius. In the West, the Empire was ‘revived’ first by Carolingian, then by German leadership. 
Toynbee points to a series of atrocities in the twelfth century which exacerbated tensions, leading to 
an irreparable breach. These included the massacre of Frankish residents of the Eastern Roman 
Empire in 1182 A.D., the sack of Salonica by a Norman expeditionary force in 1185 A.D., and the 
sack of Constantinople by Franco-Venetian forces in 1204 A.D. (A Study:2l\93, fn.l).
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church, and the Roman Empire, their interests clashing in a struggle for 
predominance in South Eastern Europe and Southern Italy:
These two Christendoms found it more difficult to come to terms
with one another than with their Muslim neighbours. (A
Study:2ll9S)
Toynbee highlights the mutual dislike of these two societies: ‘To the Greeks the 
Latins were barbarians; to the Latins the Greeks were on their way to becoming 
‘Levantines’’(A Study. 2/195).j0 This was exacerbated by ecclesiastical
controversies which masked political conflict (A Study:2/194).jl The divisions led 
to a breach between the two civilisations in the late twelfth century which widened 
until, in the fifteenth century, the Eastern Orthodox Christians opted for political 
submission to Turkish rule in preference to accepting the Latin Pope’s 
ecclesiastical supremacy (A Study:2/195).32 In Toynbee’s eyes, the rivalry between 
Western and Eastern Christendom helped to further define the distinctive character 
and boundaries of Western Christendom, the forerunner of the modem West.
The Western Papacy grew in strength during the medieval era and, for Toynbee, 
contributed substantially to the political unification and identity of Christendom. 
The reforms of the Ehldebrandian Papacy facilitated the creation of a Respublica 
Christiana. The constitutional doctrine of Respublica Christiana provided a 
spiritual unity which superseded temporal authority whilst simultaneously allowing 
the development of secular diversity and devolution that led to the emergence of 
the ‘parochial sovereign state’. At its zenith,
Toynbee uses Greek and Latin literature of the tenth century to illustrate this mutual dislike. The 
impression of the Greeks conveyed by the Latin literature is of a miserly, inhospitable, deceitful 
people, over burdened with intellectuals. In contrast, the Greeks saw the Latins as coarse, 
impetuous, impudent and covetous (A Study:2/195-199).
jI The breach may also have been aggravated by the shifting balance of power which in the tenth 
century had favoured the wealthy and politically unified Byzantine society. From the eleventh 
century, the formally agrarian and largely illiterate society of Western Christendom began to gain in 
economic and political strength (A Study:2/189-195).
32 Subsequently, leadership of the Orthodox community was assumed by Ivan II of Russia, Moscow 
seeing itself as the new Rome. Toynbee noted that the attitude towards the West underwent a change 
in the seventeenth century when Serbs, Greeks and other Orthodox peoples began to look westward. 
They had suffered under the mismanagement of the declining Ottoman Empire and were attracted 
by Western ideas filtering in through various channels (A Study:2/154-5).
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[t]he gossamer filaments of the Papal spider’s web, as it was 
originally woven, drew the medieval Western Christendom together 
into an unconstrained unity which was equally beneficial to the parts 
and to the whole. (A Study: 1/351)
Toynbee, then, saw the Catholic church as playing an important role in establishing 
the community of Western Christendom; in enhancing its growth and expansion; 
and in nurturing its unity at critical points in time. However, he did not view the 
modem West as a Christian, but as a post-Christian society. Ironically, the demise 
of Christendom can be read from Toynbee as a further formative force since it 
facilitated the rise of secularism.
The rise of secularism in the West was, for Toynbee, intimately related to the 
demise of religion as a political force (A Study: 1/350). He links this demise both to 
the hubris of the papacy and to the disillusionment with religion bred by the 
religious wars of the seventeenth century, weariness with these seemingly futile 
conflicts producing a new sense of tolerance in Western society (A Study: 1/300; 
2/153). It also strengthened the secular tendencies that were evolving with 
humanism. For Toynbee, the spirit of humanism critically distinguished the modem 
from the medieval West:
From the Modem West’s own point of view, its modernity had 
begun at the moment when Western Man thanked not God but 
himself that he had outgrown his ‘medieval’ Christian discipline. (A 
Study:!/150)
The Renaissance is a central moment in Toynbee’s conception of the evolution of 
the modem West, which he saw as constructing a secular cultural heritage that 
eliminated religion. The growth of secularism in Western society is perceived as 
facilitating its expansion into non-European societies, Toynbee arguing that the 
nineteenth century secular West was more attractive to other societies than the 
seventeenth century religious variant/'3 However, he goes on to argue that the 
spiritual vacuum left in modem Western society by the exclusion of religion from
In his series of lectures The World and the West, delivered in 1952, Toynbee compares the course 
of Western expansion into the ‘Far East’, China, Korea and Japan, in the seventeenth century and 
nineteenth century. He contrasts the rejection of the West in its first coming with its more positive 
reception in the nineteenth century (Toynbee, 1958a:81-2; 1958b:269).
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politics was filled by the ideologies such as liberalism, fascism, communism and 
nationalism (A Study:!/\4S).
As Toynbee’s life and work proceeded, he modified his views on the relationship 
between religion and civilisations. He laid greater emphasis on the significance of 
religion in the cultural world order, eventually subordinating civilisations to 
religions by suggesting the breakdown of civilisations assisted and provoked 
spiritual progress (McNeill, 1989:188). Increasingly, he saw history as a process of 
spiritual revelation and an arena that provided the potential for progress/4 He 
treated Christianity as the culmination of the advent of higher religions and became 
increasingly convinced that power politics could only be subordinated by religious 
commitment, which alone could supersede parochial interests (McNeill, 
1989:219).35 In the later volumes of A Study, he suggests that the West’s best hope 
for salvation lay in the rediscovery of the Christian spirit that remained within 
secular Western society (A Study:2/319). Although he ultimately identified spiritual 
progress as an experience of the individual soul, he also sought in religion 
salvation for the West and for mankind more broadly. However, Toynbee’s 
increased focus on religion somewhat obscures his concept of the nature and 
structures of civilisational interaction (Barraclough, 1956:120).
Power
Toynbee’s West is characterised by an unprecedented and largely unrivalled level 
of power (A Study:2l320). The source of this power is seen as both technical 
capacity and the spiritual capacity to meet a range of challenges and achieve self- 
determination. However, Toynbee’s West, like Spengler’s, is not primarily defined 
by its capacity. Power was again treated as much as a threat as an asset of the West.
34 In 1940, he wrote: ‘If religion is a chariot, it looks as if the wheels on which it moves towards 
Heaven may be the periodic downfalls of civilisations on Earth. It looks as if the movement of 
civilisations may be cyclical and recurrent, while the movement of religion may be on a single 
continuous upward line.’ Quoted in McNeill(1989:188).
35 In this context, the chief challenge to man is that posed by God. See Toynbee’s chapter on ‘The 
Prospects for Western Civilisation’ in A Study. See also ‘Christianity and Civilisation’ and ‘The 
Present Point in History’(1958a) for an insight into Toynbee’s tone.
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The modem West is defined by Toynbee as maintaining a monopoly of world 
power until 1945 when it was finally challenged by the ‘Western heresy’ of Soviet 
Communism (A Study:2 / 1 4 8 ) . The emergence of the modem from the medieval 
age was marked with the consciousness of a sudden increase in power,
...including both power over other human beings, manifested by 
military conquests, and power over physical nature, manifested in 
geographical explorations and scientific discoveries. (A 
Study:2/200)
For Toynbee, technical prowess is a key element of the West’s power, science a 
central element of its character. Even the medieval West is described as 
mechanically ingenious and ‘disgustingly materialistic’, and the modem era 
described as the era of the machine (A Study: 1/242). Technological innovations in 
the field of locomotion are viewed as seminal in elevating Western civilisation to 
its position of power and influence. Shipbuilding and navigation techniques 
allowed the West to reach beyond the perimeters of Eurasia and familiar 
civilisations, allowing physical access to all the inhabited and habitable lands of the 
planet. Most significantly, the Western technological revolution knitted together 
the world of previously separate societies through innovations in transport and 
communications (A Study:2/23). Through these, mankind was transformed into a 
single society of world-wide range. The unification of the world, although not 
initiated by the West, had been completed within a Western framework (Toynbee, 
1958a:69, 142).
However, whilst in some respects, the boundaries of Toynbee’s West are 
delineated through its power in the sense of technical capacity, capacity as an 
indicator is treated with caution. Toynbee suspected geographical expansion and 
technical innovation could be misleading measures of a civilisation’s development 
since both could continue to occur once a civilisation had begun to decline (A 
Study: 1/190). The West was not necessarily immune from such trends. In addition, 
Toynbee like Spengler feared the damaging impact technology was having on
36 In both A Study and in his essay ‘Russia and the West’, Soviet Communism is described by 
Toynbee as a non-Western power pursuing an ideology which was a Western heresy, a secular 
ideology which had arisen out of the Modem West as a substitute for Christianity (A Study:2/148; 
1958b).
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Western society. He was concerned that modem Western society was becoming 
increasingly mechanised, bureaucratised, specialised and depersonalised, draining 
the spirit of creativity so crucial to a civilisation’s capacity to innovate (A 
Study.2/334-9). In his later writing, Toynbee was very concerned with the threat of 
annihilation posed by atomic weaponry (Toynbee, 1958a:33-5); and with the 
impact of science at the spiritual level, implying that science and technology could 
be a source of hubris and complacency for Western civilisation. Furthermore, the 
satisfaction derived from scientific achievement is ultimately limited:
Man’s intellectual and technological achievements have been 
important to him, not in themselves, but only in so far as they have 
forced him to face, and grapple with, moral issues which otherwise 
he might have managed to go on shirking. (A Study.2/99)
Processes of inner growth which empowered the West, the expansion of mental as
well as physical horizons, were extremely important for Toynbee (A Study:2/150).
This spiritual strength underlies a civilisation’s capacity to meet the challenges
presented to it.
The spiritual power of the West is demonstrated for Toynbee by its creative 
responses to a series of challenges. First came the challenge of anarchic barbarism 
which followed the collapse of imperial Rome; this was met with creation of an 
ecumenical ecclesiastical community, Respublica Christiana. The second 
challenge to Western Christendom was the need for a politically and economically 
efficient parochial state system. This was met by the resurrection and subsequent 
adaptation of the city-state system. The institution of parliament and the industrial 
revolution assisted in making this system one which was transferable to the rest of 
the Western world. Toynbee saw the replacement of economic autarky with an 
ecumenical economic interdependence as creating a third challenge which the West 
was in the process of facing in the mid-twentieth century(A Study.21215-6). 
Toynbee questioned the West’s capacity to meet these new challenges with 
innovative responses. He identifies the middle classes as a crucial agent in the 
generation of the West’s growth:
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...this Western middle class - this tiny minority - is the leaven that in 
recent times has leavened the lump and has thereby created the 
modem world. (Toynbee, 1958a:30)j7
One of his concerns was that this creative minority was increasingly less able to 
fulfil this role, the regimentation and pressures such as taxation sapping the energy 
and creativity from this class. The question Toynbee poses was could the West 
survive without this creative minority? (Mason, 1958:64).
Thus for Toynbee, power as technical capacity is, only one measure of a 
civilisation’s strength; mental and spiritual capacity are also crucial. He viewed 
Western power as unprecedented, but not inexhaustible, the West needing to draw 
more deeply on spiritual sources of power if it was to survive. Whilst power is an 
important feature of the West, its superiority to other civilisations is not described 
as a permanent condition. Toynbee was convinced that non-Westem civilisations 
would ultimately reassert their influence, restoring an equilibrium of power to the 
cultural world order (Toynbee, 1958a:87, 142-3).
Institutions
Toynbee was more inclined to discuss the central institutions of the West rather 
than the norms which underlay these institutions. He identifies two core sets of 
institutions as the foundations of the strength of the West; the sovereign secular 
state and parliamentary representation. Both are taken as demonstrating the West’s 
capacity to innovate in response to challenges. As such, they are viewed as 
fundamentally parochial rather than universal institutions in that they evolved as 
responses to the challenges of particular eras.
Toynbee distinguishes the modem state which emerged in Western Europe as a 
community united on the basis of language rather than religion, and defined 
territorially (A Study:2/\51). The roots of this form of political community lie in 
the demise of imperial and papal transnational authority in Western Christendom 
(A Study: 1/350), and the subsequent rise of the Renaissance city state based on the
j7 In fact, he argues that modern Western society is essentially middle class: ‘Western communities 
had become ‘modem’ as soon as they produced a bourgeoisie capable of becoming the predominant 
element in society (A Study:2/185).
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resuscitation of its Hellenic predecessor and the rejuvenation of Roman law. 
Within the secular state, Toynbee further traces the evolution of the concept of 
constitutional government. Again, the Renaissance is perceived as central. Here 
Toynbee argues that Renaissance administrative efficiency fused with feudal 
institutions to establish institutions of parliamentary representation which 
themselves became the wellspring of political authority. It was a tradition which 
was widely imitated, as was the institution of the sovereign state:
...as the nineteenth century passed into the twentieth, all the peoples 
of the Earth became possessed of an ambition to clothe their 
political nakedness with parliamentary fig-leaves. (A Study. 1/238)
From the parliamentary concept stemmed modem democracy. He further links
political and economic evolution of the West by arguing that democracy provided a
propitious social setting for the invention of industrialism. Democracy and
industrialism are treated as initially positive forces which helped to dismantle
barriers between peoples and instigate growth/9
Throughout his discussion, Toynbee stressed the parochialism or relativity of these 
institutions, warning against the reification of ideas and institutions such as the 
state and parliamentary democracy. Again, whilst these institutions are seen as 
critical elements of the West’s growth, Toynbee identifies within them the seeds of 
destruction. His first concern was that these territorially-based institutions were no 
longer capable of representing the contemporary political constituencies. The 
structure of parliament, he argues, is an assembly of representatives of local 
constituencies derived from a time when ‘the geographical group was also the
38
Toynbee points out that the revival of the Code of Justinian in Eastern Christendom of the ninth 
century was originally aimed at underpinning a resuscitated Roman Empire. The rejuvenation of 
Roman Law in Renaissance Italy of the eleventh century did not assist the revival of the Empire but 
of the older Hellenic institution of the sovereign, independent, parochial state. He further argues that 
the enlistment of the new breed of civil lawyers into the administrations of the states was one of the 
causes of the progressive victory of the state over alternative forms of political organisation that 
may have emerged from Western Christendom (A Study:2/246).
39 For instance, Toynbee argues that during the free trade era, industrialism had been a unifying 
force, helping to break down barriers between smaller, parochial units in the interests of greater 
trade efficiency and profit (A Study: 1/288). It is interesting to note that modernism was also in 
essence associated with Western society in Toynbee’s work where modem society and Western 
society often appear to be synonymous.
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natural unit of political organisation.’ However, the impact of industrialisation was 
such that
...[t]oday the link of the locality has lost its significance for political 
as well as other purposes. ...The true constituency has ceased to be 
local and become occupational. (A Study: 1/323)
Most striking is Toynbee’s criticism of the role of the state in modem world
politics. He felt that the state, married with the forces of democracy and
industrialism, gave birth to the ideology of nationalism which he viewed as an
agent of strife and destruction:
Democracy collided with the institution of parochial (or local) 
sovereignty; and the importation of the new driving forces of 
Democracy and Industrialism into the old machine of the parochial 
state has generated the twin enormities of political and economic 
nationalism. (A Study: 1/285)
Nationalism bred conflict and militarism. The impact of industrialism and 
nationalism, he argues, intensified conflicts to the level of total war engulfing 
whole national communities. Nationalism reintroduced the element of fanaticism 
into war which had receded with the conclusion of the wars of religion. 
Industrialisation fed nationalism and, in addition, armed combatants with ever 
more destructive weapons (A Study:2J313). The state, now preoccupied with this 
ideology, has become the subject of strife rather than an agent of growth.
Underlying Toynbee’s criticism of the state and parliamentary representation was 
his belief that these were not universal institutions but institutional responses to 
particular challenges. The West was deluded by its own success into complacency, 
or what Toynbee calls ‘the nemesis of creativity’ which had contributed to the 
breakdown of other civilisations. Successful institutions of the past are reified, 
even idolised, but may be inadequate to innovatively meet the new challenges, 
consequently leading to a failure of self-determination (A Study: 1/317-26). 
Toynbee believed the post-modern West had reified the ‘parochial state’ and 
parliament (A Study: 1/322):
40 Toynbee cited the wars of the French Revolution being the first modern war (A Study: 1/284).
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Midway through the twentieth century of the Christian Era the 
Western society was manifestly given over to the worship of a 
number of idols; but, among these, one stood out above the rest, 
namely the worship of the parochial state. (.A Study.2/312)
For Toynbee, this was ‘a terrifying portent’ since the worship of the nation-state 
was producing the type of fratricidal conflict which had tom apart at least fourteen 
of the twenty-one civilisations on record (.A Study.2ß\2). Therefore, the nation­
state was perceived as the source rather than the solution to the ills of the twentieth 
century:
We shall not expect to see salvation come from the historic national 
states of Western Europe, where every political thought and feeling 
is bound up with a parochial sovereignty which is the recognised 
symbol of a glorious past. (A Study: 1/318-9)
Indeed, he advises that to survive as a civilisation, the West needs to adapt and
change some of the very institutions which to m any represented the core of the
West. These institutions had allowed the West to meet challenges and optimise its
own position but were not themselves sacred tenets, immune to revision. Like
Spengler, Toynbee saw Western institutions as transient and evolving. However,
Toynbee’s West has the capacity to be more proactive than Spengler’s, by
moulding, rather than simply being subject to, the processes of change.
The Normative Dimension
Although spiritual strength and innovation are critical dimensions to Toynbee’s 
West, he does not discuss the underlying norms of the West in any great depth. 
Whilst he does not confine the West to any one set of ideas or traditions, 
democracy is represented as a central force in the West’s political growth. 
However, Toynbee does not present democracy as a normative ideal, in fact his 
support for it is qualified, perhaps reflecting his classical education and a 
conservative attitude to the people’s role in politics.41 As McNeill points out,
41 Toynbee was seen by some commentators as reactionary for his comments on democracy and 
parliamentarianism. His concept of a creative minority can be interpreted as an elitist view of 
politics, echoing Spengler’s faith in government through a leading minority or aristocracy. 
Stromberg argues that Toynbee’s belief in the need for leadership via the creative minority is not 
necessarily anti-democratic, since the acceptance by the people of their leadership is crucial to 
Toynbee’s theory.
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Toynbee suspected that democracies had a tendency to become militant: ‘Western 
states (including the United States) become more chauvinistic as and when their 
governments become more democratic’ (McNeill, 1989:218) 42 Furthermore, he 
was concerned that democratic institutions and ideas transferred to new 
environments had proved vulnerable to manipulation by ideological or demagogic 
forces (Stromberg, 1972:79).
Toynbee did not present the West as constituted solely by the political tradition of 
democracy. His history acknowledges that it inherited the tradition of tyranny as 
well as democracy from its Hellenic ancestors, the Renaissance giving birth to the 
absolutist monarchies of Europe as well as constitutional governments. He traces 
the legacy of this more despotic form of government to the absolutist monarchies 
of Austria, France and Prussia, further linking this more authoritarian tradition with 
the evolution of totalitarian regimes in Europe in the twentieth century Toynbee 
also acknowledges communism as a Western political tradition, despite its central 
proponents, the Soviet Union, being non-Westem and using communism to 
challenge the West.44 Viewing communism, like nationalism, liberalism and 
fascism, as secular ideologies that had arisen in the modem West as religious 
substitutes, Toynbee lays the foundation for his later thesis that the West will only 
achieve true fulfilment through a return to Christianity (A Study.2/148).
However, despite Toynbee’s reservations about secular liberal democracy and 
acknowledgment of the existence of various political traditions in the West, his 
work as a whole indicates that he believed the liberal tradition spoke most fully to 
the norms of the West. These norms are identified in his later writings as 
opposition to tyranny and support of a ‘free world’. In discussions of Russia and 
the West, for instance, Russia is characterised as a society resigned to a tradition of
42 Letter to A.E. Eurich, 15 August 1952. Quoted in McNeill(1989:218). This theory presents an 
interesting contrast to the popular theory that democracies tend to be more peaceable. He is also 
quoted as suggesting that an oligarchy with a sense of enlightened self-interest or a benevolent 
dictatorship offer the least bad forms of government.
He also points out that the political institutions of the absolutist state had also been communicated 
to Medieval Western Christendom by the Eastern Orthodox Christendom through the agent of the 
eleventh century Norman state of Apulia and Sicily (A Study:2/200).
44 Toynbee describes it as the Eastern Orthodox Christian universal state in Western dress adopted 
for convenience and disguise.
139
autocracy. In contrast, ‘[t]he great majority of the people of the West feel that 
tyranny is an intolerable social evil’ which had been put down at ‘fearful cost’ 
when it had arisen within the West in the form of fascism and national socialism:
We feel the same detestation and distrust of it in its Russian form, 
whether this calls itself Czarism or Communism. We do not want to 
see this Russian brand of tyranny spread; and we are particularly 
concerned about the danger to Western ideals of liberty. (Toynbee, 
1958b:239)45
Thus, while Toynbee did not see the essence of the West contained in any one 
institution or political tradition, he demonstrated an underlying belief in the West 
as a liberal culture which struggled against tyranny.
Interaction Between the West and Non-West
Both Toynbee’s philosophy of civilisations and concepts of the defining features of 
the West were a major influence on how he read the course of interaction between 
the West and non-West in world history. Toynbee believed history should be broad 
and holistic. In order to understand one component or element, one must 
understand its relationship to the whole. He was not interested in the uniqueness of 
peoples, observed one commentator, ‘it is the universal and the uniform which 
fascinate him’; patterns have paramountcy over detail (Fitzsimons, 1961:147). This 
comment, if a little harsh, does highlight the interest which Toynbee displayed in 
the interconnection and patterns of history. He found contemporary history too 
parochial and incapable of seeing the vital broader context; too narrowly focused 
on small units such as the nation state rather than societies or civilisations.
Whilst acknowledging that all historians tend to interpret history through the 
framework of their own society,46 Toynbee was highly critical of the Westem-
43 However, Toynbee was criticised for his treatment of the Soviet Union. Some felt his portrayed 
the Soviet Union as the victim of an aggressive West, others were offended by his portrayal of 
communism as a spiritual force, a Western heresy engaged in a spiritual battle with the West. See 
McNeill(1989:223) and Mason( 1958:40-3) for an outline of criticisms of Toynbee’s treatment of 
the Soviet Union.
46 Toynbee relies upon the words of Herbert Butterfield to make this point: ‘The men of a given 
generation are generally unaware of the degree to which they envisage their contemporary history 
within an assumed framework, ranging events into certain shapes or running them into certain 
moulds which are sometimes adopted almost as in a day-dream. They may be sublimely unconscious 
of the way their minds are constricted by their routine formulation of the story ... Amongst
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centric focus of his contemporaries which presented a distorted view of the history 
of both the West and its fellow civilisations. In contrast, Toynbee sought to 
highlight how recent and even unexpected the West’s ascendancy was. The West, 
he argues, had failed to achieve what its expansion had forced other societies to do; 
to transcend the parochialism of its own history and appreciate the 
interconnectedness of histories (Toynbee, 1958a:80-5). He further argues that the 
worldwide success of Western civilisation in the material sphere has fed 
misconceptions of the ‘unity of history’ involving the assumption that there is only 
one ‘river of civilisation’, the West’s. He disputes the concept of a single, 
progressive history of mankind in the secular context, arguing that this was a result 
of Western ‘cultural chauvinism’. He traces this parochial perception of history to 
three sources: an egocentric illusion in which Westerner’s perceive themselves to 
be a chosen people;47 a perception of the East as unchanging and increasingly left 
behind by the West; and what Toynbee called ‘the illusion of progress’ (A 
Study 131-9). The urge to revolt against ‘a current late modem Western 
convention of identifying the Western society’s history with ‘History’ writ large’ 
had prompted him to write A Study of History (A Study:2l303). In this study, 
Western civilisation is examined in the context of the genesis, growth and decline 
of other civilisations: the West becomes a representative rather than the focus of 
the historical processes.
However, despite his criticism of the excessive focus modem Western historians 
place upon the importance of their own society, Toynbee was not totally immune 
from the tendency himself. Toynbee saw the West as one of many civilisations, but 
also as set apart from its predecessors by the physical and technical extent of its 
growth and influence:
historians, as in other fields, the blindest of all the blind are those who are unable to examine their 
own presuppositions, and blithely imagine therefore that they do not possess any’ (A Study.2/266).
47 See also ‘The Unification of the World’ where he discusses the egocentric perspectives of other 
civilisations: ‘Every one of them was convinced that it was the only civilised society in the world, 
and that the rest of mankind were barbarians, untouchables, or infidels’. However, he noted that 
other societies had been shocked out of their parochial perception of themselves as uniquely 
civilised societies by the impact of the West. He observed that, ironically, the West alone 
maintained its parochial perception of its own civilisation constituting a ‘Chosen people’ (Toynbee, 
1958a:70, 77).
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...the expansion of Western society and the radiation of Western 
culture had brought all other extant civilisations and all extant 
primitive societies within a world encompassing Westernising 
ambit. (A Study:2/304)
Although Toynbee did not view the outcome of Western expansion as uniformly 
positive, he recognised the scale of its achievement as unprecedented. Its centrality 
in the cultural and political world order was further enhanced for Toynbee by the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons:
Thus a now ubiquitous Western society held the fate of all Mankind 
in its hands at a moment when the West’s own fate lay on the 
finger-tip of one man in Moscow and one man in Washington who, 
by pressing a button, could detonate an atom-bomb. (A Study:2/306)
Therefore, Toynbee continued the tradition of perceiving the world as essentially
divided between the West and the non-West.
Conscious of history’s role in moulding a society’s perception of the past, present 
and future, Toynbee sought to adjust his own society’s unbalanced focus on its own 
importance in the greater schema of things, yet he was unable to escape 
preoccupation with the role of the West. However, his history7 provides a more 
complex picture of the West and of its relationship to other civilisations which 
shows the West in a unusual light: from his perspective, what might have seemed 
merely a difficult phase of Western history, once placed in the context of 
civilisational growth and degeneration, can be seen as a potentially fatal course. 
We find in Toynbee a conception of the West which is not one of unstoppable 
progress but potential disaster for the West and all mankind.
Toynbee understood history as evolutionary in the sense that it involved 
civilisations growing through meeting internal and external challenges. 
Civilisational interaction is depicted as a major component of such challenges. The 
interaction between the West and non-West plays a significant role in shaping 
modem world history; Toynbee’s West both shapes and is shaped through 
civilisational encounters. He saw the West as ‘apparented’ by Hellenic civilisation, 
but no neat direct line of cultural continuity is drawn to connect them. Instead, 
there is the trauma of the stagnation and collapse of Hellenic society signalled in
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the West by the collapse of the Roman Empire.48 The ‘agents’ which transmitted 
the legacy of Hellenic civilisation to the West were the Christian church and, later, 
the Renaissance movement.49
Toynbee’s West is affiliated to Hellenic civilisation, but it is not purely a product 
of Hellenism. It is conceptualised as a civilisation of its own creation, stimulated 
by responses to the challenge of the physical environment and its encounters with 
other societies. These included the medieval West’s encounters with Islamic 
civilisation, with the Eastern Roman Empire, and its response to assaults from 
‘pagan barbarian’ tribes who pressured Western Christendom from the north-east. 
The medieval West was not necessarily the stronger or more dominant force in 
these clashes, but Toynbee implied that its identity was shaped and directed by all 
these encounters. In the modem era, however, the West is portrayed as shifting 
from the recipient to the provider of challenges.
Toynbee’s conception of history presents civilisations in a stage of growth putting 
pressure on those in decline. In Eurasia, he saw the West as the only civilisation in 
a stage of growth from twelfth century onward.50 He argues that encounters 
between civilisations lead to cumulative changes within the weaker civilisation (.A
48 Toynbee dates the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West to 378 A.D. with the ‘catastrophe at 
Adrianople’ (A Study:2/274). This marked the death of Hellenic civilisation in the West. Toynbee 
implies that this civilisation had long been in decline. In his essay ‘Graeco-Roman Civilisation’ 
(1958a) he attributes its breakdown to a failure to establish an international political order to replace 
the old political anarchy of the sovereign, independent city states. Such an order, eventually 
established under Pax Romana, came too late. This order persisted for four centuries, but in his 
essay ‘The World of the Greeks and Romans’, Toynbee depicted it as one which became a spiritual 
vacuum, collapsing eventually from the pressure of the new spiritual movements within and external 
attack on its frontiers (Toynbee, 1958b).
49 Toynbee described the Renaissance as an encounter between a grown-up civilisation and the 
‘ghost’ of its long dead parent (A Study.2/242). He noted that that the West had the advantage of 
receiving Hellenic culture in the provinces of art and literature through the medium of a live 
civilisation, ie. through contacts with Byzantine scholars (A Study:2/241). Classical philosophy and 
mathematics were retrieved via Arabic translations. It is also interesting to note his observation. tV'ab 
philosophical works of Hellenic culture such as Aristotle were available to the West in the sixth 
century, but that in this earlier period, comprehension was beyond Western Christian thinkers. This 
implies that the ‘dark ages’ of the West were as much a loss of the ability to comprehend as a loss of 
the material elements of Hellenic culture (A Study:2/253).
50 Western Christendom had been stimulated by its encounters with other civilisations. These other 
civilisations were beginning to decline, a process furthered by the challenges which the West then 
proceeded to present. Toynbee argued that all the non-Western civilisations alive had broken down 
internally before they were broken in upon by the West (A Study: 1/245, 265-72).
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Study:2l226). This is illustrated by the processes of Westernisation, where the 
modem West overwhelmed those older yet weaker cultures. In some cases this led 
to the extermination of the non-West culture, as in Middle America (A 
Study:2/I19). Other responses to the West varied between rejection and 
assimilation. Toynbee viewed attempts at outright rejection of the pervasive West 
as largely futile. He notes that attempts to borrow selectively from Western culture 
also proved futile, since the borrowing of one element of Western culture 
inevitably led to much broader Western influences, as had been the experience of 
Turkey under Sultan ‘Abd-al Hamid II (Toynbee, 1958b:250).51 Toynbee judged 
the most successful strategy was to embrace Westernisation as had occurred in 
Turkey under Kamal Attaturk, in Japan, and in Russia under Peter the Great (A 
Study:2/227). In fact, Toynbee interprets the subsequent growth of communism in 
Russia as a serious attempt to challenge the West through the adoption of Western 
techniques and ideology (A Study:2/153).52 Therefore, even the greatest challenge 
to the West is perceived as in some respects, a product of Westernisation.5J
At the same time, Toynbee was scathing in his comments on the impact of Western 
institutions and ideas, such as the nation-state and industrialisation, on non- 
Westem societies. He was particularly critical of the impact of nationalism. Here, 
he describes previously heterogeneous communities as riven apart by institutions 
devised in the essentially homogeneous West, primarily through the force of 
escalating linguistic nationalism. Toynbee argues that the nation-state is a natural 
product of the social milieu of Western Europe where different linguistic 
communities are distributed into fairly clear cut homogeneous blocks.34 This social 
structure was a ‘patchwork quilt’ of communities. In contrast, Eastern Europe, 
Southwest Asia, India and Malaya comprise a multitude of linguistic communities 
woven into interdependent societies, divided, as in the case of the Ottoman empire,
51 See in particular Toynbee’s discussion in ‘Encounters with the Modem Western 
Civilisation’(1958a), A Study(2/151-188) and his essays in The World and the West (1958b).
32 See also ‘The Psychology of Encounter’ in 1958b.
33 Communism was perceived not just as a technical but also a spiritual challenge to the West, a 
battle for the leadership of the hearts and minds of humanity (Toynbee, 1958a:30-1).
54 This could, of course, be regarded as a rather sweeping generalisation to apply to the diverse 
communities of Western Europe.
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on occupational rather than geographic criteria. Toynbee compared such 
societies to a shot silk robe, closely interwoven and interdependent (Toynbee, 
1958b:281-3). Efforts to construct nation-states in areas previously organised into 
heterogenous communities frequently spelt disaster. In the Ottoman Empire of the 
nineteenth century, for instance, he argues that few communities had a population 
even approximately homogeneous in linguistic nationality or possessed the 
rudiments of statehood (A Study:2/l51-9). In the east of Europe, he describes the 
‘deadly feuds’ inspired by the ‘evil spirit of Linguistic Nationalism’ which divided 
the peoples of Poland-Lithuania in the nineteenth century. He continues, noting the 
‘baneful effects’ of a Western ideology of nationalism’ on communities in India 
and Palestine when radiated into the social environment in which geographically 
intermingled communities had previously managed to live together (A 
Study:2/223)55
Toynbee further laments the negative impact of the import of economic ideas, such 
as the ‘demoralising’ impact of Western industrialism on Southeast Asia (A 
Study:2/223). He was sceptical about the success of the transfer of institutions of 
parliamentary representation and unenthusiastic about the promotion of self- 
determination.36 At the heart of this analysis is the assumption of the difficulties of 
cultural commensurability with Toynbee arguing that the transfer of ideas out of 
their indigenous context into new ones is inherently dangerous. A force which may 
have a positive impact in one context may be destructive in another:
...a culture-element which has been harmless or beneficial in the 
body- social in which it is at home is apt to-produce novel and 
devastating effects in an alien body into which it has intruded ....
‘One man’s meat is another man’s poison’. (A Study:2l222)
35 See also ‘Islam and the West’ (1958b:255) on the division of India.
36 For instance, he laments, ‘the recent Continental offspring of the ancient insular institution of 
parliamentary government had proved a sickly brood, incompetent to bring political salvation to the 
non-British majority of the living generation of mankind, and incapable of holding their own against 
a war-begotten plague of dictatorships’ (A Study:ll323). As Brewin(1992:l 17) points out, Toynbee 
was firmly opposed to the idea of the ‘self-determined republic as the unit of history’, valuing order 
over liberty where self-determination could lead to conflict. This is somewhat ironic given that self- 
determination is a quality which in the spiritual arena he saw as essential to a civilisation, but 
consistent with his critical attitude to nationalism.
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Therefore, civilisational interaction between the West and non-West is treated as a 
critical factor in modem world history. The West was seen as uniting the world on 
the political and economic but not the cultural plane:
In the struggle for existence the West has driven its contemporaries 
to the wall and entangled them in the meshes of its economic and 
political ascendancy, but it has not yet disarmed them of their 
distinctive cultures. Hard pressed though they are, they can still call 
their souls their own. (A Study: 1/8)
The non-West has been shaped by the West’s presence and ideas, but the 
relationship is depicted as largely an unhappy one, with the non-West unable to 
successfully resist or absorb Western culture. Whilst uniting the world at one level, 
at another, the West had exacerbated global divisions through the spread of its 
ideas and institutions. At the same time the West’s ascendancy was perceived by 
Toynbee to be relatively recent when viewed in the broad scope of history, and 
likely to be transient. Despite arguing that Western influence had permeated and 
shaped all other cultures, he anticipated the return to a cultural equilibrium in this 
now unified world, with the West eventually resuming a more modest position 
(Toynbee, 1958a: 143.) Yet the ‘scaffolding’ of this unified world is built upon a 
framework of Western technological culture. On the one hand Toynbee denies the 
unification of the world at a cultural level, but on the other he suggests that the 
histories of cultures would become increasingly interwoven in this global society 
(Toynbee, 1958a:84-5).
This is an unresolved tension in Toynbee’s work. On one hand, he argues that the 
West has influenced and altered all extant civilisations, irretrievably moulding the 
structures of an increasingly interdependent cultural world order, while retaining 
the capacity to shape or destroy the future of humanity. On the other, he suggests 
that the West itself is undergoing severe internal and external challenges and is 
likely to return to a less powerful position in a more balanced world order. The role 
of the West in the future cultural world order is somewhat unclear, as is the degree 
of cultural interdependence Toynbee anticipates from future interaction.
146
Conclusion
Toynbee’s concept of the West is deeply embedded in a complex and sophisticated 
framework of assumptions about the nature of the cultural world order. This 
complexity is not without significant tensions, both in regard to the cultural world 
order, and to the role of the West. For instance, each civilisation is seen as evolving 
through its own unique responses to challenges. At the same time, Toynbee 
identifies patterns of growth and breakdown to which civilisations conform. There 
are also tensions in Toynbee’s changing attitude to religion. Whilst he continues to 
see the rise and fall of civilisations within a broadly cyclical framework, he came to 
view the evolution of religion as a progressive force. As McNeill points out, this 
creates a tension with regard to whether priority is to be accorded to civilisations or 
religions, to a cyclical or progressive philosophy of history (McNeill, 1989:227). 
Finally, there are tensions in the priority which he affords the West. He condemned 
the Western-centric focus of contemporary history but himself became preoccupied 
with the centrality of the West to world history.
These tensions arise in part from the lengthy period of time over which Toynbee’s 
work was produced; A Study, for instance, was written over a thirty year period. 
His focus and preoccupations changed over time as the world which he observed 
changed. For instance, in the 1930s, Toynbee was deeply influenced by the 
negative impact which the transfer of Western ideas such as nationalism were 
having on contemporary world politics. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
Toynbee’s concern with nationalism is perhaps superseded by that of nuclear war, 
and the threat posed to the West, and the world, by the Soviet Union.
Despite these tensions, there are also important points of continuity in Toynbee’s 
work. He retains throughout a focus on civilisations rather than states as the central 
driving force of human history. He maintains an interest in the pattem of 
civilisational evolution, offset by the capacity of individual civilisations to 
influence their fate. As with Spengler, Toynbee places his discussion of the West in 
a broader civilisational context, providing a distinctive perspective on the history 
and role of the West. In comparing the West’s history to those of other 
civilisations, Toynbee, like Spengler, portrays the West as exceptional but still
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consistent with the patterns of growth established by other civilisations, suggesting 
that the course of Western development is finite and under challenge. A further 
parallel with Spengler lies in Toynbee’s perception of serious challenges to the 
West emanating from within; these include threats from technology; from the 
hubris which accompanies achievement; and from the parochialism bred by the 
West becoming accustomed to unchallenged ascendancy. Finally, both authors 
identify important challenges developing from the non-West. However, writing 
later than Spengler and in the context of the Cold War, the central challenge which 
Toynbee identifies is that of the Soviet Union. However, on the whole, Toynbee 
treats the impact of the West on the world as unidirectional, with the non-West 
suffering more from the impact of the West than vice-versa.
Therefore, there are interesting parallels between Spengler and Toynbee in their 
contextualisation and interpretation of the cultural world order and the West. 
However, there are also significant differences. In Toynbee’s cultural world order, 
encounters between civilisations are not incidental; they are formative influences 
which can strengthen or weaken a civilisation. Civilisations consequently become a 
part of each others’ history more clearly in Toynbee’s work than in Spengler’s. 
This is evident in Toynbee’s discussion of the important relationship between 
Hellenic and Western civilisations. Secondly, whereas Spengler implies that the 
decline of the West, if protracted, is inevitable, Toynbee appears to hold out some 
hope for deliverance. This lies in part in the suggestion that the West might achieve 
salvation through rediscovering spiritual inspiration. Furthermore, he suggests 
salvation and progress, could be achieved, not just for the West, but for humanity.
Ultimately, there is some irony in Toynbee’s focus on the West, despite his 
resentment of the Euro-centricity of contemporary history. His perception of the 
centrality of the West to the world is evident. It stems in part from the sheer scale 
of Western power; in part from polarisation of politics in the Cold War and the 
global consequences of nuclear confrontation. However, Toynbee also places the 
West at the centre of the world through his discussion of the West’s establishment 
of a global framework. This appears to be largely a technical and institutional 
framework, rather than a cultural or normative one. This implies that the West has 
established an enduring framework for interaction amongst civilisations. In this
~N
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there are interesting foreshadowings of the concept of an international society 
found in the work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull discussed in the next chapter. 
It suggests that, whilst the cultural world order remains a pluralist one, the West 
has achieved a unique position, a form of universality in the political world order, 
which will persist even should the West’s retreat be ^status of a ‘normal’ as 
opposed to a dominant civilisation. Ultimately. Toynbee’s work suggests a cultural 
world order in which interaction between civilisations varies in nature, but forms a 
critical context for political evolution and interaction. It suggests that the West will 
remain a important component of this interaction, if not as a dominant force, then 
through the universal influence of its technical and political culture; but whether it 
will be a constructive or destructive force is unclear.
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Chapter Five
Internationalising the West: The Conception of the West in 
the Work of the ‘International Society’ School
The legacy of a broad historical and philosophical approach to international 
relations found in Arnold Toynbee’s work resonates in the work of the ‘English 
School’ . 1 Writing in the Cold War era, these scholars are characterised by their 
interest in the generation of international society. Their work seeks to explain the 
evolution of the rules and institutions of the modem states-system. Theoretically, 
their work is perceived as seeking a via media between the pure power politics of 
realism and the idealism of liberalism. They conceptualise modem international 
society as an outgrowth of Western civilisation, and interwoven with the political 
development of the European states-system. Their conception of international 
society is inextricably linked to the Western political experience. These authors 
have a multi-civilisational conception of the cultural world order, but perceive the 
West to be the central, formative influence shaping modem civilisational 
interaction through the structures of international society. This chapter investigates 
the extent to which the West is perceived as forming a universal civilisation in this 
context.
The chapter focuses primarily on the works of two authors, Martin Wight and 
Hedley Bull, whose work significantly developed the concept of international 
society. It also draws on the contributions of Adam Watson. Whilst each was
1 For an excellent discussion of the history and composition of the ‘English School’, see Timothy 
Dunne’s Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School’ (1998, forthcoming). 
Dunne locates the birth of this school in the British Committee on the Theory of International 
Politics which was based at Cambridge and met from 1959-1984. It was funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The committee was first chaired by the historian Herbert Butterfield, then Martin 
Wight, followed by Adam Watson and finally Hedley Bull (Butterfield & Wight, 1966: Preface; 
Watson, 1992:2).
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distinctive in style and focus, all were committed to investigating international 
society as a central structure of international relations. These authors worked in 
association with one another, particularly in the context of the British Committee 
on the Theory of International Politics. Wight, who has been described as the 
intellectual architect of the English school (Dunne, forthcoming), was a seminal 
influence on Bull and Watson. Their work addresses the question posed by Wight: 
what is international society? Bull’s discussions of international society were 
developed within the trialectical framework of traditions of Western thought which 
Wight outlined (Wight, 1991). Watson’s work on the evolution of international 
society (Bull & Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992) further developed Wight’s analysis 
in Systems of States (1977).
Unlike Spengler and Toynbee, the exploration of civilisations was not the first 
priority of these authors. However, important assumptions with regard to 
civilisational interaction underlie their work. Similarly, although they do not set out 
to define the West, we can draw from their work assumptions as to the boundaries 
and nature of this civilisational identity. A number of works are considered. 
However the discussion does not attempt to examine all their themes, but focuses 
on concepts of international society, and of culture and civilisations in the context 
of international society raised in these collections.
The Era and Influences.
The work of these authors was influenced by the shared experience of working in 
the British intellectual community of the post-World War II era, and demonstrates 
common historical and philosophical interests. Martin Wight (1913-72) was an 
Oxford-trained historian. For most of his career, he was a teacher at the 
Department of International Relations, L.S.E. (1947-61) and then a Professor of 
History and Dean of European Studies at the University of Sussex (1961-1972). 
Often characterised as a perfectionist, Wight published relatively little while alive, 
many of his works being published posthumously. However, the original version of
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Power Politics was published by Chatham House in 1946.“ In 1958 he joined the 
newly established British Committee. Many of Wight’s key essays were produced 
under the auspices of this group including ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ 
and ‘Western Values in International Relations?’ (Butterfield & Wight, 1966), and 
the essays collected in the volume Systems of States (1977). Many of Wight’s ideas 
were developed and conveyed through his lectures to students, an edited collection 
which was published in International Theory: The Three Traditions (1991). In 
these, Wight outlined three traditions which are key components of Western 
thought; the realist, rationalist and the revolutionary traditions. The rationalist 
tradition is perceived as a tradition of prudence and moderation standing between 
the extremes of the pursuit of power and idealism which characterise the traditions 
of realism and revolution respectively. It is a tradition of thought central to the 
concept of international society (Wight, 1991:7-25)7
Hedley Bull( 1932-85), by contrast, was a prolific writer. Bom and raised in 
Australia, he graduated from Sydney University with a degree in History and 
Philosophy, then travelled to England in 1953 to study politics at Oxford 
University. He too joined the Department of International Relations at L.S.E. His 
career spanned teaching positions at L.S.E., a professorship of International 
Relations in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National 
University( 1967-77) and the Montague Burton Chair of International Relations at 
Oxford University(1977-85).2 *4 Bull wrote widely on international relations, foreign 
policy, strategic studies, arms control and international law. This chapter will focus 
on those works in which he discussed the foundations of international society,
9
2 The original, shorter version was published as one of the institute’s ‘Looking forward’ Pamphlets. 
Wight was preparing an updated and expanded version of this work. A revised edition was 
published in 1979 after his death edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad.
J Wight treated these three traditions as a way of classifying ideas. They are not treated as 
incommensurable paradigms (Dunne, forthcoming; Griffiths, 1992). Wight saw all three traditions 
dynamically interwoven in the tapestry of Western civilisation. He was reluctant to identify himself 
with any one of these traditions, finding elements of all three within himself (Wight, 1987:227; 
1991). Whilst Wight’s earlier works, such as Power Politics, appear closely aligned with the realist 
tradition, his later work on international society and on the role of Western values suggest a growing 
tendency towards the rationalist tradition (Dunne, forthcoming).
4 Bull also held Visiting Professorships at Columbia University, New York (1970-1) and Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, New Delhi (1974-5). In addition, in 1965, he was also appointed Director of the 
Arms Control Research Unit in the British Foreign Office, a position he held until 1977.
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drawing on essays produced under the auspices of the British Committee; and on 
The Anarchical Society, his best known contribution to International Relations 
theory (1977). In his later work, Bull was beginning to explore more fully the 
relationship of the West to the non-Westem world and issues of justice in world 
politics. The Expansion of International Society (Bull & Watson, 1984) and Justice 
in International Relations (1984c) are important sources for this discussion. Adam 
Watson (1914-), a former British diplomat and academic, worked with Wight and 
Bull in the British Committee and collaborated with Bull in producing The 
Expansion of International Society.3 In 1992, he developed some of the themes of 
that volume in his monograph The Evolution of International Society.
These three authors knew and worked with each other in the development of ideas 
of international society. Wight was Bull’s intellectual mentor. Bull was profoundly 
influenced by Wight’s lectures at L.S.E. which he attended, and through their work 
together in the British Committee (Bull, 1966a; 1977b:28; Dunne, forthcoming). 
Watson cites Systems of States and The Anarchical Society as two significant 
influences to which he is indebted, and views his own work as a continuation of 
Wight’s (Watson, 1992:3). The work of each of these authors is therefore distinct, 
but intertwined. They shared important influences and formulated their ideas 
within a similar historical and intellectual framework.
One crucial element of their common intellectual framework was their perception 
of international law as a basic element of international society. This perception 
echoes the ideas of the seventeenth century international lawyers who developed 
the concept of a community of states, governed by law.5 6 They were viewed as 
foundational thinkers by Wight and Bull and their thinking is a central element of 
Wight’s rationalist tradition. Hugo Grotius is particularly influential in the writings 
of Wight and Bull, Bull suggesting that the rationalist tradition in Western thought 
should be described as the Grotian tradition (Bull, 1966a; Dunne, forthcoming).
5 The Expansion o f International Society is a collection of essays which was the culmination of the 
later work of the British Committee (Dunne, forthcoming).
6 These include Suarez, Gentili, Pufendorf, Vitoria and Hugo Grotius (Wight, 1991:15, 37-40; Bull, 
1977a:28-32). Bull describes the classical international lawyers as arguably the most important body 
of systematic theoretical writing on the theory of international relations (Bull, 1972b:49).
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Grotius’ work provided a secular rationalist basis for international law, a secular, 
universal moral order based on the rights and duties of states replacing the 
crumbling theocratic order (Cutler, 1991).7 Wight saw Grotius’ doctrine of the 
sociability of states as an important articulation of the idea that the state of nature 
could be social, as well as conflictual, thus providing the foundations for 
international society based on agreement rather than enforcement of a 
transcendental authority (Wight, 1991:38).
This interest in the maintenance of order was shared by contemporary scholars with 
whom Wight and Bull worked, such as Charles Manning, head of the Department 
of International Relations at L.S.E., and the historian Herbert Butterfield. Manning 
was interested in the states-system as a society governed by international law. He 
saw in the co-existence of states in the absence of central government evidence of 
the existence of some form of order (James, 1973:vii).8 This order was maintained 
through mediums such as international law, diplomacy and the use of force. Whilst 
Wight and Manning were quite distinctive in their approach to the study and 
teaching of international relations, they shared an interest in the nature of 
international society and in international law as one of its foundational elements.9
Where Manning was interested to explore international relations within the realm 
of the social sciences, Butterfield’s interest in international relations was firmly 
rooted in the historical tradition. Wight has been described as Butterfield’s ‘closest
7 A. Claire Cutler argues that Grotius provided a normative framework for the emerging states- 
system, attempting the first comprehensive treatise on international law based on state sovereignty 
(Cutler, 1991:44-7). Cutler goes on to outline important distinctions between the thinking of Grotius 
and of Bull and Wight who tend more towards positive rather than natural law foundations. She 
describes them as neo-Grotians. Vollerthun, however, questions the accuracy of including Grotius in 
the via media thinkers. She argues that Grotius does not view international politics as taking place 
within an international society. Whilst his writings acknowledge the existence of a law of nature and 
of a volitional law of nations, he fails to establish the existence of a society of states (Vollerthun, 
1992:160-237).
s Manning has been described as a holistic thinker, conceptualising world society as an 
interconnected whole, with states as part of an overall system (Banks, 1973:197). Jones observes 
that this ‘holistic’ approach to international relations remains central to the work of the ‘English 
school’ for whom, he claims, Manning is ‘a principal source of inspiration’ (Jones, 1981:3).
9 In The Nature o f International Society (1962) Manning outlines his ideas of order and society. In 
contrast to Wight, and in many ways, Bull, he was keen to develop International Relations as a 
social science.
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academic partner in intellectual history’ (Coll, 1985:xiii).10 Like Wight, 
Butterfield’s reading of history was informed by his realism and his Christianity. 
His Christian pessimism suggested that man could not achieve salvation on earth 
and could therefore never achieve the permanent reform of the international system 
to eliminate strife.* 11 He was therefore more interested in managing than abolishing 
conflict (Coll, 1985:6) . He was conscious of the ubiquity of power and violence 
in international politics but also believed that a sense of order existed. He described 
international order as ‘a system of international relations in which conflict among 
member states was generally regulated and limited to protect every state against the 
loss of its independence’(Coll, 1985:5). Butterfield feared the totalitarianism that 
might be spawned by the centralisation of political authority in a single world state. 
He was therefore very much part of the philosophical via media which Wight 
describes.
The methodological approaches of these scholars also signals the influence of the 
intellectual traditions in which their scholarship evolved. Wight sought to 
understand events, structures and institutions through comparisons and precedents 
in history. In his early career, Wight was very much influenced by the work of 
Arnold Toynbee and his commitment to the study of universal history, even though 
he did not range as widely as Toynbee (Bull, 1977b:2).lj Wight had a particular 
interest in European history from 1492. His analysis of international affairs focuses 
largely on this field and on classical history. Wight saw history as a way of
10 Butterfield was one of the chief instigators of the British Committee.
11 See Coll(1985:73-7) for a brief discussion of Christian pessimism and history in Butterfield. 
There are significant parallels between his views of history and politics and those of Wight. 
Butterfield was a critic of the liberal progressive tradition and the underlying self-righteousness 
which this tradition implied (Dunne, forthcoming). He believed man should leam from the patterns 
of recurrence which history demonstrated. However, he also suggested that the evil innate in man 
and politics could be mitigated by, for instance, institutions. Dunne also reveals a sense of the 
potential for moral learning, and therefore implicitly some sense of progress in Butterfield’s work.
12 In their introduction to the volume of essays Diplomatic Investigations, Butterfield & Wight state 
that their underlying aim is: ‘to clarify the principles of prudence and moral obligation which have 
held the international society of states together throughout history and still hold it together’ 
(Butterfield & Wight, 1966:13).
Ij Wight worked with Toynbee at Chatham House (1936-8, 1946-9) on both the Survey o f 
International Affairs and A Study o f History. Both shared an interest in Christianity and sacred 
history.
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understanding the human predicament, a ‘prophetic drama’ (Bull, 1977b:3). 
However, as Bull remarks, Wight did not treat history as a storehouse of precedents 
that can be discovered and applied as maxims of statecraft to contemporary 
political issues.14 Instead, he sought to transcend specific problems to identify 
patterns of ideas underlying the historical process (Dunne, forthcoming).
Bull also valued history in the study of international relations (Bull, 1972a:256; 
1972b:31-3). No doubt his respect for historical analysis was enhanced by Wight’s 
influence. However, his own approach has been described as philosophical ‘[i]n its 
emphasis on the general premises, and the systematic discussion of the more 
general aspects of a topic, placing it in a broad intellectual context’ (Richardson, 
1990:179).15 Richardson notes that Bull’s approach reflects the influence of John 
Anderson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney (1927-1958). 
Anderson was renowned for his championship of critical thinking, free thought and 
questioning of authority (Kamenka, 1986:223-8; Miller, 1990a:2). We can see 
Anderson’s influence in Bull’s lucid, rigorous and logical approach to critical 
analysis.16
A feature of the work of Wight and Bull is the moral and normative focus.17 In 
this, they were reacting to existing trends in International Relations theory. Both 
were sceptical of the ‘idealist’ perspective. Bull criticises the early ‘idealist’ 
theorists for their innocence, their facile optimism and their narrow morality which 
showed no awareness of the moral dilemmas of international politics (Bull, 
1972b:36); but both were also critical of the realists for their exclusion of 
consideration of moral issues from their analysis.18 Wight’s approach to
14 In fact he attacked this as a methodological gimmick prominent in the writings of realists such as 
Carr and Morgenthau (Bull, 1991 :xx).
15 See Bull’s discussion of Wight where he notes: ‘Theoretical inquiry into International Relations 
is therefore philosophical in character. It does not lead to cumulative knowledge after the manner of 
natural science’ (Bull, 1991:xxi).
16 See Richardson( 1990:176) for a discussion of Anderson’s influence. Bull acknowledged that 
Anderson profoundly shaped his outlook (Bull, 1977a:x).
17 Bull (1977b: 17) notes Wight’s work is distinguished by its emphasis on norms and values. 
Hoffmann notes Bull’s interest in the moral basis of international society. He also notes Bull’s 
rejection of the idea of value free inquiry (Hoffmann, 1990:19-22).
1S Bull also criticises the realists for their fixed appeal to permanent laws and patterns which could 
not explain the drastic changes which had recently occurred in international life (Bull, 1972b:39).
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International Relations evolved in part out of dissatisfaction with the methodology 
employed by realists such as Carr and Morgenthau. In their introduction to the 
essays of the British Committee, Butterfield and Wight remarked that in contrast to 
its American counterpart, British International Relations had shown itself ‘more 
concerned with the historical than the contemporary, with the normative than the 
scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with principles than 
policy’ (Butterfield & Wight, 1966:12). This approach is characteristic of the 
‘English school’. It stood in marked contrast to intellectual trends within 
International Relations in the post-World War II period in the United States where 
behaviouralism dominated the development of the discipline as a ‘social 
science’.19 Unlike the behaviouralists, Wight sought to rediscover rather than 
reject the literature of the past (Bull, 1991 :xi).
Bull engaged vigorously and critically with the behaviouralist school, most notably 
in his debate with Morton Kaplan where he defended the employment of the 
classical methods of history and philosophy over the quantitative analysis of the 
new social scientists.20 The historical and philosophical approach of the English 
school contributes to an understanding of the contemporary period within a 
capacious historical context. This approach critically underlies the broader 
interpretation of the West and the pluralist conception of civilisation found in the 
work of the international society authors.
See Bull’s critique of Carr in his essay ‘The Twenty Years Crisis Thirty Years On’ (1969). See also 
Bull(1972b:39), Bull & Holbraad(1979:18), Richardson( 1990:146), Dunne(forthcoming).
19 Wight has been variously criticised and defended for his failure to engage with the new scientific 
approach. However, Bull argued that Wight had simply no point of contact with a school of inquiry 
which he viewed as anti-historical and anti-philosophical and thus of limited capacity to provide 
guidance to man’s dilemmas in world politics (Bull & Holbraad, 1979:20-1; Bull, 1991 :xi). Michael 
Howard described Wight’s approach in these terms: ‘For him, International Relations did not 
consist of a succession of problems to be solved in conformity with an overarching theory. Rather, 
like the whole of human life, it was a predicament: one to be intelligently analysed, where possible 
to be mitigated, but if necessary to be endured - and the more easily mitigated and endured if it 
could be understood’ (Quoted in Coll, 1985:151).
20 See ‘International Theory : A Case for a Classical Approach’ (1966c). For examples of criticism 
of Wight and Bull’s methodology see Jones(1981) and Nicholson(1981). Bull & Holbraad defend 
Wight with the argument that engagement in the contemporary methodological debates would have 
distracted Wight from his main purpose of inquiry in International Relations (Bull & Holbraad:21).
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These scholars were influenced not only by their intellectual but also their 
historical environment. As noted, their work demonstrates disillusionment with the 
idealist theories of the early twentieth century. The crises of the 1930s and the 
inability of the League of Nations to contain aggression discredited those who 
envisaged the construction of an international system where all conflict could be 
contained (Bull, 1977b:3). Despite being a pacifist and conscientious objector 
during World War II, Wight was pessimistic about what he saw as the realities of 
power and the inevitability of the recurrence of conflict.21 This was in part due to 
Wight’s Christian pessimism and scepticism about the possibility of achieving 
progress in the secular world (Bull, 1991 :xvi). The expansion of revolutionary 
states, such as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, may have also reinforced their 
belief in the benefits of a pluralist international system over the single world state, 
which both noted as potentially totalitarian or tyrannical (Wight, 1979:81-94; Bull, 
1966b:49-50).
Both Wight and Bull, then, were acutely conscious of the role of power politics in 
international relations, both past and present. However, despite the experiences of 
the 1930s, World War II and the Cold War, they did not adopt a purely realist 
reading of these events. Their perception of power politics was mediated by a 
concern for ethics and values, and an interest in the limits which states imposed on 
their behaviour through international law and institutions. It was also mediated by 
their historical and philosophical approach to the study of international relations. 
This provided a certain breadth to their work and a certain ‘distance’ from the 
contemporary. Their conception of international relations exceeds the Cold War 
environment in which it was written. All discuss the Cold War within a broad 
historical context. Wight, for instance, pointed to conflicts of the past which 
mirrored contemporary tensions (Wight, 1979:90; Bull & Holbraad, 1979:9; Bull, 
1977b:7). Both Bull and Watson analyse its power relations from the perspective of 
the traditional concept of the balance of power and view the Cold War as a conflict 
occurring within the context of international society (Bull, 1977a:259; Watson
21 Wight’s realism is demonstrated in his Power Politics, first published soon after the War in 1946, 
his realist ‘turn’ growing out of the failure of the League (Dunne; forthcoming).
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1992:292-4).22 Similarly, the conception of the West which emerges from the work 
of these authors draws deeply on historical antecedents. The West is not just 
considered to be a construct of the Cold War, but an identity which emerges from 
the intellectual, institutional and physical expansion of medieval Europe.
The broader perspective may also have been influenced by the location of these 
authors in post-war England. Britain’s international perspective was not limited to 
the bi-polar relationship between East and West as defined by the Cold War, but 
involved broader global concerns. Its colonial history had produced a lengthy 
historical relationship and consequent awareness of the world outside Europe and 
the United States. This consciousness was heightened by the processes of 
decolonisation. The 1950s was the era in which the empire was dismantled and the 
Commonwealth founded (Miller, 1990a:4). Hoffmann notes Bull’s increasing 
disillusionment with the superpowers in the 1970s and 1980s and increased 
attachment to the role Europe could play in international politics. This was in part 
due to the link which Europe had established with the Third World through its 
colonial past (Hoffmann, 1990:36).2j
An awareness of international relations as something whose focus exceeded Europe 
and the European states-system is most evident in the work of Bull and Watson.24 
This awareness may have derived from Bull’s life and work outside of Europe, in 
Australia. It was also stimulated by Bull’s contact with non-Westem colleagues 
and by travel, particularly trips made to India and to China.25 These trips 
heightened Bull’s awareness of the complexity, dynamism and difference of the
“ Wheeler & Dunne note that during the detente era, Bull invested the superpowers with the 
responsibility of managing international society. In particular, it was their duty to promote 
international order. He became increasingly disillusioned with their inability to fulfil such a 
responsibility, due to the depth of ideological antipathy. This disillusionment, they argue, qualified 
Bull’s support for a pluralist, and strengthened his interest in a more solidarist conception of 
international society (Wheeler & Dunne, 1996).
2j Coral Bell has also remarked upon Bull’s increasing commitment to Europe. Conversation, 1996, 
ANU.
24 In fact, Bull repeatedly criticises Wight for his more narrow Euro-centric approach and Western- 
centric assumptions (Bull & Holbraad, 1979:12; Bull, 1991 :xxii).
25 Bull travelled to China and India in the early 1970s. He taught for a period at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in Delhi in 1974-5. Bull’s perspective was also influenced by his contact with academic 
colleagues such as Sisir Gupta at ANU, and Ali Mazrui whom Bull met whilst he was a visiting 
fellow at Princeton in 1964 (Holbraad, 1990:190).
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non-Westem world and stimulated his investigations into the relationship between 
the two within the international system. These themes are pursued in the Expansion 
of International Society (Bull & Watson, 1984). His moral concerns brought a 
heightened interest in justice in the international system which he was beginning to 
explore in Justice in International Relations{ 1984c).
The concepts and assumptions which Wight, Bull and Watson brought to their 
study of international relations shaped the way in which they conceptualised the 
West as a formative influence in contemporary international relations, and 
provided the basis for their assumptions about civilisational interaction.
Conceptions of Civilisation
The conception of cultural world order found in this literature recognises a plurality 
of civilisations: Western civilisation is not perceived as synonymous with 
civilisation in general, and various forms of civilisational interaction are 
acknowledged as occurring throughout history. Bull and Watson, for instance, note 
the operation of economic contacts and negotiations of written agreements between 
the traders and rulers of different societies and civilisations (Bull & Watson, 
1984:4-5).26 However, the level of global interaction achieved under the auspices 
of the Western political system is treated as unprecedented:27
What is chiefly responsible for the emergence of a degree of 
interaction among political systems in all of the continents of the 
world, sufficient to make it possible for us to speak of a world 
political system, has been the expansion of the European states- 
system all over the globe, and its transformation into a states-system 
of global dimensions. (Bull, 1977a:20-l)
Furthermore, the West is treated as providing not only a global political system, but 
also the foundations for a global international society. These authors acknowledge 
preceding international societies; but these are viewed as not occurring on the same
26 They acknowledged the existence of ‘elaborate civilisations’, as distinguished from ‘less 
developed cultures’ (Bull & Watson, 1984:2. Watson 1992:13).
27 Wight, Bull and Watson all note the importance of cultural and/or civilisational foundations to 
the development of international society. However, none provide a clear definition or distinction of 
these terms. We might deduce that a civilisation is taken to be a broadly-based community which 
has reached a certain level of technical, political and intellectual development.
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scale or complexity as the Western-based international society which had become 
established at a global rather than just a regional level (Bull & Watson, 1984:4- 
6 ) .28
What, then, is the distinction between an international system and an international 
society? In Wight’s work, no clear distinction is made between the two. In fact, 
Wight uses the terms interchangeably.“ A states-system, he notes, is taken to
? 30comprise “ sovereign states’, political authorities which recognise no superior.’
In defining a states-system, he combines the criteria that states should have more or 
less permanent relations with one another, with a second; that a system should 
comprise several contiguous states resembling each other in manners, religion and 
degree of social improvement and sharing reciprocity of interests. Wight’s 
definition of an international society shares with the international system the 
qualities of comprising sovereign states engaged in habitual intercourse, but it is 
more firmly rooted historically in Europe. In ‘Western Values in International 
Relations’ Wight defines international society as,
[Hjabitual intercourse of independent communities, beginning in the 
Christendom of Western Europe and gradually extending 
throughout the world. It is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the 
conscious maintenance of the balance of power to preserve the 
independence of the member communities; in the regular operations 
of international law, whose binding force is accepted over a wide 
though politically unimportant range of subjects; in economic, 
social and technical interdependence and the functional international 
institutions established latterly to regulate it. All these presuppose 
an international social consciousness, a world-wide community 
sentiment. (1966a:96-7)
28 In the Anarchical Society, Bull cites the classical Greek state, the international system of the 
Hellenic kingdoms, the systems of China during the period of the Warring States and of ancient 
India as constituting international societies (Bull, 1977a: 15-6).
29 In Power Politics, Wight notes that international society has been variously called the family of 
nations, the states-systems, the society of states, the international community (Wight, 1979:105).
30 Wight distinguishes between these systems and suzerain systems, where a suzerain power is the 
sole legitimate authority or secondary state-systems, and imperial systems (1977:23-5).
11 He cites the Hellenic-Hellenistic and the Chinese(771 BC-221 AD) in addition to the Western 
states-system as clear examples of a states-system.
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Hedley Bull clearly distinguishes between a states-system and a society of states. A 
system is formed where ‘states are in regular contact with one another, and where 
in addition there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behaviour of 
each a necessary element in the calculations of the other’ (Bull, 1977a: 10). Contact 
and a degree of interdependence are therefore criteria for a system. However, a 
society of states exists
...when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 
to one another, and share in the working of common institutions.
(1977a: 13)
While his definition of a system is based on contact and is in essence empirical, his 
definition of a society extends beyond common interests to common assumptions 
and values which help shape institutions/2 Bull separates the two forms of 
community which Wight conflates. Bull’s definition of a society is less obviously, 
but still firmly rooted in the historical development of the Western states-system. It 
reflects the model established in Europe, and mirrored by only a few other 
communities in history. Watson retains Bull’s distinction between a system and 
society. Whilst he accepts, all systems have rules, he suggests a society will also 
have certain unwritten codes of conduct, values, and non-contractual assumptions 
(1992:312).
Thus, each of these authors emphasises the role of common norms and 
assumptions as a foundation for international society. Further, they assume that 
these derive from a common culture or civilisational base. Wight remarks, ‘we 
must assume that a states-system will not come into being without a degree of 
cultural unity among its members’, noting that the three states-systems taken as
j2 As Dunne notes, Bull’s pluralist view of international society rested on the perception of a 
common good, such as the provision of order. Bull’s early work suggests that order was provided by 
a pluralist international society in which there was a consensus on certain norms such as sovereignty 
and non-intervention. This plurality combined with limited consensus permits co-existence amongst 
heterogeneous communities. Dunne suggests that Bull began to move towards a solidarist 
conception of international society when he perceived that the pluralism was no longer providing 
order in situations of cultural and ideological heterogeneity. See Dunne(forthcoming), Wheeler & 
Dunne(1996) and Brown(1995) for a discussion of pluralism and solidarism in Bull’s work.
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paradigms all arose within a single culture (1 9 7 7 :3 3 ).Bull is more concise: ‘A 
common feature of these historical international societies is that they were all 
founded upon a common culture or civilisation or at least some elements of such a 
civilisation’(1977a:16). A common civilisation facilitates the working of 
international society in making for easier communication and better understanding 
between states, thus assisting the evolution of common rules and institutions. It is 
also assumed to reinforce the sense of common interests that impels states to accept 
common rules and institutions with a sense of common values (Bull, 1977a: 16). 
Watson is also emphatic in linking civilisations with the common codes of 
conduct, assumptions and values that underlie an international society. These 
derived ‘from a common civilisation which was dominant in the society, and which 
communities belonging to other civilisations could not be expected to understand 
or practise’ (Watson, 1992:312).34 He argues, for instance, that one factor which 
inhibited the admission of the Ottoman empire into European international society 
was its ‘alien’ civilisation which did not share European principles and 
assumptions in areas such as international law /5 In contrast, the new states of the
Vollerthun notes that Wight, whilst observing the importance of cultural unity in the 
establishment of a states-system, goes on to note the degree of internal cultural differentiation which 
has occurred in the Western states-system and the existence of three traditions in Western thought 
(Vollerthun, 1992:14). How does Wight reconcile these opinions? Elsewhere, Wight observes that 
the existence of ideological conflict does not necessarily disprove the notion of international 
society, given that it is often followed by ideological accommodation (Wight, 1966a:98). Thus, 
Wight does not assume that ideological divisions negate the cultural unity of a society. Further, he 
notes that despite the occurrence and recurrence of different traditions of thought in the West, there 
is one, the constitutionalist tradition, which is particularly representative of Western values (Wight, 
1966a:91).
j4 In his work on the ‘standard of civilisation’ Gong notes the formation of expectations and shared 
precepts which over time become implicit in relations, such as the rules of conduct which evolved 
between European states. Only with the onset of intense interaction with countries that were 
unfamiliar with European codes of conduct did the need arise to explicitly articulate the codes and 
unspoken assumptions that underlay them. These, he argues, were articulated through the concept of 
a ‘standard of civilisation’ (Gong, 1984:36-8).
j5 Whilst it played a significant role in the European international system, the Ottoman empire was 
not admitted to the inner circle of international society until 1856, after the Crimean War (Watson, 
1992:216-7). Watson goes on to conflate or confuse his distinctions by arguing that the Ottomans 
and Europeans formed a looser international society, sharing some common rules in their relations 
and working common institutions. See also Thomas Naff(1984) on the changing relationship 
between the Ottoman and European societies.
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Americas found ready acceptance in European international society, given their
36essentially European cultures and forms of government (Bull, 1984a: 122).
This analysis of international society therefore treats civilisational homogeneity as 
a significant element in the constitution of international society. It implies that the 
formation of international societies have been intra rather than inter-civilisational 
processes, occurring within rather than between civilisations. European 
international society was formed amongst states of what we commonly call the 
West; Europe and colonies in which European culture predominated. However, the 
expansion of European international society to a global international society saw 
the creation of a society that was multicultural in composition. The ‘admission’ of 
the Ottoman empire to international society was followed by that of Japan and 
China, all non-Christian, non-Westem civilisations. The global international 
society is therefore distinct in having a significant inter-civilisational dimension to 
it.
This raises the question of the position of the West in this society. At one level, 
Bull and Watson saw global international society as increasingly a synthesis of the 
various civilisations within it. However, at another level, they, like Wight, assume 
a priority for the West within global international society in a hierarchy of 
civilisations. In some respects, the globalisation of international society constitutes 
the universalisation of the West, or at least significant elements of that civilisation.
37The cultural unity of this society is seen to derive from the culture of modernity.
j6 Barry Buzan(1993) argues that an international society can develop as a civilisational 
community, a Gemeinschaft, stemming from a sense of common sentiment, experience and identity; 
or as a functional community, a Gesellschaft, a community constructed without pre-existing cultural 
bonds through, for instance, the processes of intense interaction. Buzan suggests that Wight’s 
conception of international society leans towards the Gemeinschaft model with Bull leaning towards 
the functional, Gesellschaft line. Bull, he suggests, neglects to discuss common identity as an 
element of international society. Buzan’s analysis appears to neglect Bull’s comments with regard to 
the significance of pre-existing cultural links to the foundation of international society. However, 
Buzan’s identification of the two sources of international society is useful in understanding how the 
homogeneous European international society could expand to form a heterogeneous international 
society.
j7 See James Mayall on the ‘imperative of modernisation’ which has generated transnational ideas. 
According to Mayall, the widespread modernising mythology includes the spread of shared 
positions and aspirations that regulate participation in international society and include national self- 
determination as the basis of legitimate authority; a secular and materialist approach to social and 
economic affairs; a belief and desire for technological advance; and an ethical position which is 
notionally egalitarian (1978:133).
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For Bull modernity implies the presence of a common language and a common 
scientific understanding of the world which is itself an outgrowth of Western 
culture (Bull, 1977a:39, 317). While he did not assume that modernisation led to 
homogenisation, it inevitably affected the societies it touched, Bull noting that even 
those who have revolted against the dominance of the West often supported 
modernisation and development (1984c:22; Shapcott, 1994:62). He implies the 
possibility of a cosmopolitan global culture developing, in spite of the Western 
cultural origins of the contemporary culture (Bull, 1977a:317).38 However, he also 
implies that the culture of modernity as it stands is inadequate to continue to 
provide a genuinely cosmopolitan culture for future international society. His 
comments suggest that it is an elite culture, weakened by its lack of a common 
moral culture. This helps explain Bull’s suggestion that the development of a future 
cosmopolitan culture may need to incorporate non-Westem elements to provide the 
foundations for a genuinely universal society (1977a:317).
The authors of the international society school, then, recognise a plurality of 
civilisations and international societies in recorded histories, but allocate a 
privileged position to the West in that Western international society supplies the 
essential criteria for judging other international societies. This is most obvious in 
Wight who discusses international society as primarily the community constructed 
out of the Western states-system. All of the authors attribute significance to 
cultural or civilisational homogeneity in the formation of a society. The few other 
international societies identified had been essentially intra-civilisational.39 The 
global international society prevailing today is distinguished by its inter- 
civilisational character. However, within this multi-civilisational entity, the West 
maintains a privileged position as the civilisation which shaped the initial 
assumptions and institutions of the society. This suggests a major unresolved 
tension in this literature since it suggests that contemporary international society is
As Shapcott(1994) notes, Bull identifies emerging common concerns, such as nuclear war and 
global environmental and population problems, that could form the basis for discussion on the 
notion of ‘world common goods’, founded on an interest in the needs of human society as a whole 
(Bull, 1984c: 14).
Although Watson describes Hellenic culture as a synthesis between Greek, Persian, Jewish and 
other near eastern elements (Watson, 1992:97).
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simultaneously multi-civilisational and a construct of Western civilisation. 
Consequently, the extent to which other civilisations are subordinate to a broader 
Western civilisational context is unclear.
The Boundaries of the West in the ‘International Society’ School
The West is conceptualised by these authors as the community which evolved out 
of European society, with the terms Western and European often used 
interchangeably.40 However, with the expansion of a European into a global 
international society, the West is perceived as retaining a distinct identity within 
the broader community. We now turn to examine the boundaries that the 
international society authors perceived as marking the West.
Territory
The geography of the West in this literature is primarily constituted by Europe and 
territories in which European culture dominates. Three salient features of the 
geographical boundaries of the West can be identified. The territory of the West is 
linked to that of Western Christendom; it is linked to the evolution of the territorial 
sovereign state in Europe; and finally, the territory of the West is not viewed as 
static but as undergoing radical expansion.
The initial territorial expansion of the West is perceived as occurring under the 
auspices of religion. Watson maps the expansionary thrust of Latin Christendom, 
south and west against Islam; south-eastward toward the Holy Land, Syria and 
ultimately the Byzantine empire; and eastward into the south and east of the Baltic 
and towards Russia. Like Toynbee, he nominates the drive against Islam as the 
most significant in creating the momentum which drove Europeans overseas 
(Watson, 1984a: 13-4). Furthermore, the expansion of the Castilians into the ‘New 
World’ saw the incorporation of these territories, administratively and conceptually 
into Christendom (Watson, 1984a: 18-9).
40 Wight speaks mainly of the ‘Western states-system’ which developed in Europe. The West and 
European international society, as described by Bull and Watson, appear to be one and the same 
thing.
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The territorial growth of the West is also viewed as a function of the expansion of 
the evolving European states, particularly the leading maritime, colonial powers in 
their quest for trade and power 41 Significantly, as in Toynbee’s work, a distinction 
is drawn between the expansion of the range of contacts which the West 
established, and the incorporation of new territories into the community of the 
West. Contact was not immediately equated with incorporation. Watson, for 
instance, notes that Portugal and the Netherlands interacted with powerful 
civilisations and societies in Asia, effectively becoming incorporated into the Asian 
regional systems rather than vice versa. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
relationship which Europeans established with the territories in the Americas 
which were incorporated first into the European system and subsequently into an 
expanded European international society. This is perhaps the first major expansion 
of the West as a community into non-European territories (Watson, 1984a: 18; 
1992:219). As Watson notes, this expansion was facilitated by the physical and 
cultural links that were maintained between Europe and these territories:42
What really and decisively made the settler states of the Americas 
consider themselves, and be considered, members of the European 
family was that they were all states on the European model, 
inhabited or dominated by people of European culture and descent. 
(Watson, 1992:268)
Bull treats the new American states as agents for the spread of the Western system 
(Bull, 1984b:218). The winning of independence by the United States and Spanish- 
American colonies marked the expansion of the originally European society of 
states beyond the geographical frontiers of Europe. Presumably, other white 
European colonies such as Australia and New Zealand were also seen as 
incorporated into the West by virtue of their cultural links. Therefore, a synergy can 
be seen in this analysis between the territorial expansion of the European society of
41 These included Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal. The core of the West is 
described by Wight as growing from Italy, to Western Europe, then Europe finally incorporating 
the members of the League of Nations, with ex-colonial states on the periphery of the system 
(Wight, 1977:42).
42 These included immigration, trade and defence providing links which reinforced the shared 
culture and civilisation (Watson, 1992:220).
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States and of the West. These territories remain the core of the West within the 
expanded, global international society.
The territorial conception of the West in this literature focuses on Western Europe 
and its colonies. Russia’s relationship to the West is a problematic one. At points, 
it is discussed as a key member of the society of European states, at others, as 
constituting a different and distinct society. Both Bull and Watson note the 
important role which European expansion and influences played in Russian 
imperial expansion, establishing her as one of the five great sovereigns of the 
society of European states (Bull & Watson, 1984:218; Watson, 1992:225-6).
Yet there remains a sense that Russia is culturally distinct from the West. For Bull,
Russia ... has always been perceived in Europe as semi-Asiatic in 
character, a perception confirmed by the ambivalence in Russia’s 
own mind as to whether it belongs to the West or not (Bull, 
1984b:218).
This ambiguity is heightened by the oppositional role which the Soviet Union 
played to the West during the Cold War. The ideological constitution of East and 
West which characterised the Cold War is implicitly linked in this literature to an 
antecedent sense of differentiation. Watson parallels the Soviet imperial structure 
with the Byzantine oikoumene which was partly overlaid, but not lost during the 
era of Westernisation in Russia 4j Wight even suggests that the Communist system 
constituted an alternative international society (Wight, 199 T50).44 The ideological 
tensions of the Cold War therefore strengthened the sense of the West as 
territorially focused on Europe and its major colonial offshoots in international 
society analysis.
The territorial boundaries of the West are therefore viewed as arising out of the 
frontiers of Christendom but expanding under the influence of the Crusades, then 
of expansion by the European states. However, incorporation into the West is not 
seen as a function just of physical contact, but of a shared culture.
Watson describes the Byzantine oikoumene as a Christian society, but one quite distinct from that 
of Latin Christendom (Watson, 1992:107-11).
44 In contrast however, Watson argued the confrontation of the Cold War occurred within the 
context of the global international society (1992:293).
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Religion
As in Toynbee’s conception of the West, religion in the form of Christianity is 
discussed in this literature as the foundation from which the Western states-system 
emerged. European international society is seen as founded on the fragmentation of 
the unity Christendom45 The international society authors detail three ways in 
which religion in the shape of Christianity helped to define the boundaries of the 
West. The West inherited from Christendom a sense of community and 
differentiation from the outside; it absorbed certain qualities such as universalism 
which were seen as shaping its character; and the fragmentation of Christendom 
provided the political basis for the secular states-system.46
The West is viewed as inheriting from Christendom crucial elements of its 
civilisational identity, including a sense of community within and differentiation 
from those outside. Bull discusses the development of a concept of Christian 
international society by the natural law thinkers such as Vittoria, Gentile, Grotius 
and Pufendorf. They believed that a special relationship existed between the 
Christian states. Stemming from this sense of community was a sense of 
demarcation. As in Toynbee’s conception of the West, this is traced from the 
distinction between respublica Christiana governed by the law which applied 
between Christian princes and states; and the broader human community, which the 
natural law theorists saw as governed by the principles of universal natural law 
(Bull, 1977a:29-30; Wight, 1977:125-8).47 This demarcation is crucial to the 
concept shared by all three authors of an exclusively Western community of states 
which applied different standards, assumptions and expectations of conduct to 
those outside the community. These authors identify the Islamic communities 
which bordered Christendom as the principal external challenge. Wight observes
45 Mayall has argued that the Treaty of Westphalia marked an acceptance by the European princes 
that ‘ultimate values’, meaning religion, should not be a cause of war (Mayall, 1978:139).
46 Christendom is discussed as a medieval hierarchical society which did not constitute a society of 
states but was linked by strong cultural forces. Wight notes that the distribution of power within this 
community eventually gave birth to conceptions such as the ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ (Wight 
1977:27).
47 Although the international society thinkers of the fifteenth century are distinguished from their 
universalist contemporaries who posited a unified community of mankind in the church (Bull 
1977a:27; Cutler, 1991).
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that this society was regarded by Christendom as ‘a historical, even an 
eschatological, embodiment of evil’ (1977:120). The Turk came to be identified as 
the anti-Christ, the sense of threat providing a point of common cause to an 
otherwise beleaguered and fragmented Europe.
This sense of differentiation which arose in the religious context was carried into 
the expansion of the Western states-system, according to Bull and Watson:
When Europeans embarked upon their historic expansion they did 
so with a set of assumptions about relations with non-Europeans and 
non-Christian peoples inherited from medieval Latin Christendom 
and ultimately the Ancient World. (Bull & Watson, 1984:5)
For instance, Watson surmises that the exclusion of the Ottomans from European
international society was based at least in part on the fact that they were not
Christians (Watson, 1992:216-8). No such religious barriers excluded the
American colonists from the West (Bull, 1984a: 122).
In addition to a sense of community, Wight argues that the Western states-system 
inherited its sense of universalism and missionary spirit from its theocratic 
ancestor. These qualities contributed to the dynamic, expansionary identity of the 
West. They were expressed in the Christian context in the Papacy, whose claim to 
world monarchy Wight describes as the earliest version of the assertion of 
European superiority. The Crusaders and the missionaries that proselytised in the 
medieval world, he suggests, were the forerunners of the conquistadors and 
gunboats (1977:119).48
Nonetheless, one of the defining features of the identity of the Western states- 
system was its secular nature. The states-system was founded with establishment of 
new grounds for the legitimacy of the ruler, and with the positing of universal 
natural law to replace the community of Christendom and papal authority.49 Yet
48 Wight goes on to note that the lofty language of the Monroe Doctrine echoes ideas of the right of 
peaceful penetration into the infidel world and the right of interference to protect Christians or 
rectify misgovemment.
49 Note Wight’s discussion of the criteria for legitimacy coming to rest first on prescription but 
subsequently on self-determination (Wight, 1977:157-62). Legitimacy is defined as ‘the collective 
judgement of international society about the rightful membership of the family of nations; how 
sovereignty may be transferred; and how state succession is to be regulated’. Until the French
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the formative influence of Christendom cannot be forgotten. Wight reminds us that 
prior to Westphalia, the system was effectively shaped by the doctrinal conflicts of 
the sixteenth century. Thus, in the international society analysis, even though the 
Western states-system is characterised as primarily a secular system, the society to 
which it gave birth was perceived as strongly influenced by its religious antecedent 
in its assumptions about, and attitudes to other civilisations.
Race
Although religion plays an important role in these conceptions of the West, an 
equally important role is played by race. It is implicit from the outset that race is 
one of the formative boundaries of the West in the context of the international 
society analysis. However, it becomes more pronounced in their discussion of the 
expansion of the West from the nineteenth century onward.
Race appears to have little or no role in the theoretical construction of international 
society; in practice, the racial divide in international society is quite evident 
(Vincent, 1984a). European international society was predominantly white. The 
West as European international society, even as it expanded to the Americas in the 
eighteenth century, remained primarily racially homogeneous. Bull notes that the 
admission of the Americas to European international society was facilitated by the 
common European race and culture of the colonists. He also notes that the United 
States remained fundamentally aligned with European policies of racial 
exclusiveness in its denial of equal rights to blacks, its colonial expansion and 
treatment of indigenous peoples (Bull, 1984b:218).50 It is only with its expansion 
in the nineteenth century, with the inclusion first of the Ottoman Empire and then 
of the Japanese, that international society becomes multi-racial.
There is, then, a perception in this literature that race implicitly contributed to the 
boundaries defining European international society; but there is also the perception
Revolution, the principle of international legitimacy was dynastic; subsequently it became popular 
(Wight, 1977:153).
30 Bull reminds us that the European settlers in America expanded this culture at the expense of the 
indigenous peoples, and that the rights of man proclaimed in the American revolutions were not in 
practice extended to peoples other than those of the European race (Bull, 1984a: 122).
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that as European international society expanded into a global community, race 
continued to differentiate West from non-West within the community. Both Bull 
and Watson remark on an emergent sense of civilisational hierarchy and European 
cultural superiority which accompanied the expansion of European power and 
influence in the nineteenth century (Watson, 1984a:27; Bull, 1984a: 125). This was 
reflected in the legal relationship between West and non-Westem states:
With the important partial exception of Japan, those racially and 
culturally non-European states that enjoyed formal independence 
laboured under the stigma of inferior status: unequal treaties, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, denial of racial equality (Bull,
1984a: 125).
Thus, the distinction between West and non-West is perpetuated within the global 
international society, a boundary drawn in part on racial grounds continuing what 
was effectively a dual system. For Bull, dismantlement of this system only really 
began after the Second World War with the major drive towards decolonisation.
It is with the discussion of the role of the non-West in international society, 
particularly in Bull’s discussion of the ‘Revolt against the West’, that we see most 
clearly the operation of a racial boundary within international society, 
differentiating West from non-West. Watson comments on the resentment towards 
the racial and cultural superiority presumed by the ‘white man’ that was expressed 
within the decolonisation and Non-Aligned movements (Watson, 1992:297). Bull 
highlights the fight for racial equality, in particular opposition to the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, as one of the defining themes of the ‘Revolt against the 
West’ which undermined the existing order:51
The old Western-dominated international order was associated with 
the privileged position of the white race: the international society of 
states was at first exclusively, and even in its last days principally, 
one of white states; non-white peoples everywhere, whether as 
minority communities within these white states, as majority 
communities ruled by minorities of whites, or as independent
51 See also Bull’s (1982:265) discussion of the West’s position with regard to South Africa in which 
he suggests that the South African situation presented a microcosm of the West’s relationship with 
the non-Westem world. In both cases, a privileged minority faced coming to terms with the non­
white people who form the majority of the worlds population.
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peoples dominated by white powers, suffered the stigma of inferior 
status. (Bull, 1984b:221)
The revolt against white supremacism is acknowledged to have had profound 
consequences for the Western world and for international society. Here, then, the 
boundary of race in international society, differentiating the West from the non- 
West, is addressed specifically and acknowledged as significant. “ It becomes most 
explicit in discussions of demands for recognition of equality by non-white 
communities in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century. The boundaries 
which the politics of race construct are, perhaps, more clearly described in the 
international society conception of the West than in that of Spengler or Toynbee.
Power
Power is an important dimension of the West’s identity for the international society 
school. The technical and economic capacity of the West is recognised as 
translating into dominance of the international system, enhancing the West’s ability 
to shape that system and society. The West’s power is seen to stem from the 
dynamism of European culture (Watson, 1984a: 16). Thomas Naff highlights some 
of its central qualities in contrasting the late eighteenth century7 Ottoman empire to 
the increasingly strong European powers:
The Ottoman’s concept of their state as an Asian-based land empire 
that grew by warfare against infidels remained entrenched, however 
myopic. On the other hand, in the preceding two centuries, several 
European nations had acquired overseas dominions through 
exploration, colonisation, and commercial expansion; had 
developed a secular rational outlook which promoted scientific 
discovery; and had produced technological industrial and 
agricultural revolutions, together with a new, more flexible 
economic system - and all of those achievements were linked with 
the rise of strong centralised monarchies. (Naff, 1984:151)5°
32 Bull however did not idealise the politics of post-colonial societies, arguing that liberation did not 
lead automatically to liberal, democratic political societies. He also notes, for instance, that Western 
values have been subject to different interpretations in non-Western societies. For instance, the 
value of racial equality advocated in relations between whites and non-whites has often not been 
applied by developing countries to their domestic situations where racism is often practised against 
minorities (Bull, 1982; 1984c:8).
5j Elsewhere in The Expansion o f International Society, other contributors, including Michael 
Howard(1984) and Patrick 0 ’Brien(1984), consider the military and economic factors in European 
power. Howard stresses the role of factors such as professional military forces and advances in
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The economic and technical capacity of the West provides the foundation of its 
political power. Whilst Wight discusses the West primarily as a political system, he 
notes that commerce established the framework around which the political system 
grew.54 Bull and Watson echo Toynbee in noting that European technical capacity 
produced the technological and economic unification of the globe, followed by 
European-dominated political unification in the nineteenth century (Bull & 
Watson, 1984:2). Bull, in particular, highlights the significance of technological 
advances that led to growth in communications, enhancing global integration (Bull, 
1977a:273).55
The role of power as a feature of the West becomes more pronounced in this 
analysis as the impact of the Industrial Revolution is assessed (Watson, 1984a:27). 
Bull and Watson link the subsequent increased economic and military power with a 
change in attitude towards non-Westem peoples. They link this consciousness of 
power to a growing sense of civilisational hierarchy, distinguishing the West from 
other civilisations. In this, they suggest that in the earlier period of European 
expansion there had been some loose sense of equality with other civilisations 
(Bull & Watson, 1984:5). However, in the nineteenth century, this gave way to 
notions of European superiority:
Europeans and Asians alike had long regarded preliterate peoples as 
primitive but redeemable if civilised; now many Europeans came to 
regard civilised Asians as decadent. In their eyes modem civilisation 
was synonymous with European ways and standards, which it was 
their duty and their interest to spread in order to make the world a 
better and a safer place. (Watson, 1984a:27)
The change in relationship, they argue, was demonstrated in the increased direct
involvement of the West in the non-West.36 In the nineteenth century, European
weaponry in facilitating European power. Subsequently, the development of other technical skills, 
such as mapping, and medical knowledge, and developments in transport and metallurgy helped to 
maintain the technical superiority of the West over other civilisations.
54 ‘Commerce has cast a nimbus of activity and connexions round the political system, prefiguring 
as it were the next stage of its outward growth, whether that came about through colonial expansion 
or the admission of peripheral states to membership’ (Wight, 1977:33).
25 However, he further notes that a ‘shrinking globe’ brought new sources of tension.
36 In the Americas, Europeans continued to dominate indigenous peoples and exercise what was a 
European culture (Watson, 1984b: 127). In eighteenth century Asia, relations between West and
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powers became more active participants in the direct affairs of colonies, and 
imperial rivalry heightened, leading, for instance, to the colonial partitioning of 
Africa.57 Therefore, in this period, the West is increasingly demarcated by power 
as expressed through imperialism and dominance of the evolving international 
system. This analysis portrays imperialism and overwhelming power as crucial 
elements of the West’s identity, expressed and legitimised through the idea of a 
civilisational hierarchy.
However, the conceptualisation of power found in this literature is not limited to 
material capacity. A critical dimension of the West’s power for Bull was its 
command of intellectual and cultural authority, and of the rules and institutions of 
the international society, which facilitated the moulding of that society to mirror 
Western institutions and values (Bull, 1984b:217).
In the twentieth century, this domination of international society was weakened. 
The European states were challenged by the rise of new powers; by the destruction 
caused by World War I; the instability of the interwar period; and by the 
decolonisation process which gathered momentum in the wake of World War II 
(Watson, 1992:278).58 Yet Bull and Watson suggest that whilst the West’s, and 
particularly Europe’s, dominance of international society diminished in the sense of 
willingness to directly engage in the affairs of other societies, it retained the 
capacity to influence the norms and institutions of the international society.59
non-West were effectively looser and in some cases more egalitarian, with the rights and status of 
non-European rulers accepted in treaties and agreements.
57 For instance, there was increased direct activity by the British in India, and the extension of direct 
Dutch rule in Indonesia and French in Indochina. The European exercise of power in Asia and 
Africa had been largely indirect: European influence was, in many cases, exercised through the 
enterprises of private companies; for example, the British in India and the Dutch in Indonesia 
(Watson, 1984a:27-9).
3S Bull cites five factors which brought about the collapse of the old Western-dominated order. 
These include the psychological and spiritual awakening of the African and Asian people; the 
weakening of the will of the Western powers to maintain their position of dominance; the impact of 
the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise the of Soviet Union as a major power, and the creation of a 
more general equilibrium of power in the system which this brought about; and the transformation 
of the legal and moral climate of international relations in which the Third World groupings have 
played an important part (Bull, 1984b:224-7).
59 As Watson points out, the West also retained a great deal of structural power. For instance, he 
draws our attention to Western dominance in the increasingly integrated global economy as
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The international society authors therefore see power as an important aspect of the 
West’s identity. It is expressed as technical and economic capacity but also through 
political dominance of the international system and the ability to establish key 
norms for the conduct of international affairs.60 Wight’s work and the earlier work 
of Bull has been criticised for omitting an economic dimension to their study of 
international society (Jones, 1981:2; Bull & Holbraad; 1979:16; Miller, 1990b:71- 
4). As noted above, their work entails important assumptions about economic and 
material capacity critically underlying the political and legal power of the West. 
However, the economic dimension of the West is not systematically explored in 
this literature. Bull’s later work does demonstrate a greater interest in the 
significance of economic factors, 61 as do Watson’s references to the structural 
power which the West maintains through its influence in international economic 
regimes; but overall, the conception of the West found in these authors focuses 
more intensely on political and legal structures, than economic capacity.
Norms
The importance attached to norms and institutions in the international society 
school’s conception of the West has been signalled above. They are perceived to be 
critical elements in generating a community’s sense of identity, helping to define it 
by establishing the common assumptions, values and structures. These were seen to 
be generated from a common civilisational or cultural base. Western norms and 
institutions are viewed as deeply integrated into the norms and institutions of 
international society. This perspective is distinguished from those of Spengler and 
Toynbee in seeing globalised Western norms and institutions not as a superficial 
super-structure, but deeply integrated into a framework of trans-civilisational 
interaction.
demonstrated by the influence of groups such as the G7, Western influence in institutions such as 
the IMF and World Bank, and control of aid and investment funds (Watson, 1992:304-5).
60 The significance of power to these authors’ conceptions of the West makes the neglect of 
consideration of capitalism in the work of Wight and Bull even more marked.
61 His discussions of the significance of calls for distributive justice (1984c) and his concerns with 
regard to the potential impact of growing protectionism (1983) indicate that he considered economic 
power and stability to be key facets of international order.
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While Wight demonstrates a sense of the synergy between international society as a 
via media and the constitutionalist tendencies in Western political thinking (Wight, 
1966a), Bull and Watson explore the integration of Western values into 
contemporary international society more systematically. Global international 
society is narrated by Bull as deriving from a European international society, itself 
derived from Christian international society (Bull, 1977a:27-33). As the society 
expanded, certain shared values and assumptions relating to the conduct of 
international affairs acquired wider acceptance. Bull is emphatic in arguing that the 
conscious acceptance of these norms is a crucial element in transforming the 
Western-based system into a global society. Even though there has been a revolt 
against Western dominance in the twentieth century, this occurred within the 
context of international society, accepting the basic rules and institutions of that 
society (Bull, 1984a: 124).62
Wight provides perhaps the clearest articulation of some of the Western values also
found in international society. In his essay ‘Western Values in International
Relations’ he discusses qualities often identified with the West; these include
of
freedom and self-fulfilment of the individual. He considers the correlation^Westem 
values with qualities such as tolerance, self-analysis and the scientific outlook 
(Wight, 1966a:89). He also identifies a persistent and recurrent pattern of ideas 
which are specially representative of Western values. One is the ‘explicit 
connection with the political philosophy of constitutional government.’ The second 
is the quality of what he calls the via media, the adoption of policies of moderation 
and prudence, the ‘juste milieu between definable extremes’ (Wight, 1966a:91). 
For Wight this pattern of thought describes the Whig or ‘constitutional’ tradition of 
diplomacy.6^  Ultimately, only within the context of this tradition can international
62 Bull argues: ‘The non-European or non-Westem majority of states in the world today, which 
played little role in shaping the foundations of the international society to which they now belong, 
have sought naturally and properly to modify it so that it will reflect their own special interests. It 
should not be overlooked, however, that by seeking a place in this society they have given their 
consent to its basic rules and institutions’(Bull, 1984a: 124).
6j Wight argues that this tradition is exemplified in the works of Western statesmen, political 
philosophers and jurists including Suarez, Grotius, Locke, Montesquieu, Burke, Tocqueville and 
Churchill (Wight, 1966a:90).
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society be conceptualised as a real and meaningful entity.64 Therefore, Wight’s 
conception of international society effectively occurs within the context of this 
‘rationalist’ tradition which Wight describes as specially representative of Western 
values. Western values are thus inextricably linked with his conception of 
international society.
Bull also identified key values and norms which are characteristic of the West, but 
have been exported to non-Westem societies. Central to his earlier work are the 
norms which underpin order in first European, then global international society. 
These include sovereignty and recognition amongst states, norms which facilitate 
cooperation and co-existence in an essentially anarchic international order (Bull, 
1977a; Wight, 1977).65 Bull’s later work demonstrates a growing interest in norms 
relating to the difficult issue of justice, including racial and economic equality, 
self-determination, and freedom from intellectual and cultural domination 
(1984c:2-5). His interest was in part stimulated by the challenges which demands 
for justice from the developing world were presenting to the current international 
order. However, he maintained that the norms being used to challenge Western 
ascendancy of that order and achieve equality within international society had 
themselves been absorbed from the West (Bull, 1984c:5). His analysis suggests 
that Western norms which had distinguished and effectively discriminated against 
the non-West are now being used to reduce the privileged position of the West in 
international society.
Institutions
For this school, institutions are the structures through which a society expresses 
common values and pursues common interests.66 Like the norms of international
64 Wight argues that the realist tradition views international society as a fiction and the 
revolutionists view it only as a precursor for a cosmopolis, a world community of mankind. See 
Wight (1991:30-49).
63 Bull states that the Grotian concept of international society, to which he subscribes, sees states as 
‘bound not only by rules of prudence and expediency but also by the imperatives of morality and 
law’. These imperatives enjoin ‘acceptance of the requirements of co-existence and cooperation in 
the society of states’ (1977a:27).
66 Bull defines institutions as ‘a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of 
common goals’ (1977a:74).
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society, the institutions are founded upon those of European international society, 
therefore of the West (Bull & Watson, 1984:2). The basis of contemporary 
international society is the broader acceptance by non-Westem communities of 
these institutions as the central channels for the conduct of international affairs. 
Bull emphasises the degree to which Western domination of the system was 
expressed through the rules and institutions of international society: The 
international legal rules, moreover, were not only made by the Europeans or 
Western powers, they were also in substantial measure; made for them’ (Bull, 
1984b:217).67 The norms of sovereignty, equality and reciprocity central to the 
Western state-system were upheld by the rules and institutions of international law, 
through the operation of the treaty, conference and diplomatic systems. The most 
central of these were and are the institutions of the sovereign state and of 
international law. Also important are a diplomatic system and a balance of 
power.68
The State
The territorial state is seen as the principal political institution of the West and its 
international society (Bull, 1977a:71; Watson, 1992:168). Bull defines states as 
‘independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and 
asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a 
particular segment of the human population’. Sovereignty in this context implies 
supremacy over all other authorities within the community and independence from 
all outside authorities. Sovereignty thus has both an internal and external 
dimension (Bull, 1977a:8). Since no state recognises an external authority, all 
states share at least a technical equality, meaning the system comprises equal 
political communities (Wight, 1977:23; Bull & Watson, 1984:6-7). The position of 
states in the system is not constituted or legitimised by a supreme authority but by
67 Under these rules, Bull included the laws of state sovereignty, treaty law and rules on the use of 
force.
68 The list of central institutions identified by Bull and Wight varies a little from text to text. These 
four are most consistently identified as core institutions. In The Anarchical Society, Bull also adds 
the conventions of war. See Wight(1966a; 1979), Bull(1977a:13).
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by the reciprocal recognition of other states.69 Therefore governance of the society 
derives from the compliance of the members with rules and the conduct of relations 
through consensual institutions (Bull, 1977a:34).70
This quality of sovereign, equal states is seen as the central element of the Western 
states-system, distinguishing it from most earlier systems.71 It is also a defining 
feature of the international society established first in Europe, then on a global 
basis.
International Law
Both Wight and Bull maintain that the existence of international law is one of the 
distinctive, if not unique, features of European and now global international society 
(Wight, 1977:51; Bull, 1977a: 142).72 The rules of the European, then global 
society of states were defined in the principles of international law. Wight saw in 
international law evidence of the existence of international society (1979:107). The 
evolution of international law as they described it draws both on the idea of a 
universal moral law inherited from Christendom, and from the law which evolved 
from the practices of states.7" What is significant is that both traditions from which 
international law is drawn have their roots in Western political evolution.
69 Timothy Dunne has observed that both Bull and Wight conceptualise international society as a 
social construction. The practices of states effectively produce and reproduce the structure of 
international society: ‘The sovereign state is the constitutive community of international society, one 
whose obedience to the norms of the society of states both reaffirms the identity of the sovereign 
state and reconstitutes the structure of international society’ (Dunne, 1995:379).
70 This does not exclude the element of force, as Bull points out and the concept of the balance of 
power acknowledges.
71 The authors acknowledge that a system of equal, sovereign states was not unprecedented. Wight 
points out that the Greek city states and the Hellenistic kingdoms also constituted a society through 
claims and recognition of sovereignty. Bull & Watson also acknowledge the society formed by the 
Chinese states during the ‘period of warring states’ (Wight, 1977:23; Bull & Watson, 1984:6).
72 The development of international law was not unique to Western-based international society, but 
the global scope of this law was unprecedented. Bull also distinguishes international law from other 
normative codes suggesting that the central rules of international society have the status of law, 
rather than just of morality. In addition, there is the sense that a strong, authoritative definition of 
the meaning of the rules exists (1977a: 142).
7j Both authors emphasise the significance of international law as customary law which applies to 
the relations between states (Wight, 1979:108; Bull, 1977a:68). See A. Claire Cutler for a 
discussion of Wight’s and Bull’s concepts of positive and natural law (1991:59).
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These authors see international law defining the rules applied within and outside 
the community of international society. In this they draw upon the natural law 
thinkers and Grotius in particular. Although the natural law theorists argued that a 
legal community of mankind existed to which universal natural law applied, they 
still recognised a distinct community within, the community of Christendom. This 
inner circle was bound by the law of Christ (Wight, 1977:128; Bull, 1984a: 119). 
Wight and Bull saw a continuation of this dualistic system European dealings with 
the non-Westem world where different rules and obligations were applied.74 Wight 
argues that diplomatic practice recognised the dual nature of the international 
system, drawing what he calls the ‘lines of amity’, outside of which the rules of
75international law did not apply to the activities and competition of Europeans.
Bull argued that a decline of natural law thinking in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries enhanced the West’s sense of differentiation which it had inherited from 
Christendom. Focusing their thinking on international society as a society of 
sovereign states, legal theorists recognised that as states, these political 
communities had certain rights and obligations. Entities that did not satisfy the 
criteria could not be members. In effect, this excluded many non-Westem 
communities such as the Islamic emirates and Oriental kingdoms:
By the nineteenth century the orthodox doctrine of the positivist 
international lawyers was that international society was a European 
association, to which non-European states could be admitted only if 
and when they met a standard of civilisation laid down by the 
Europeans. (Bull, 1977a:34)76
74 Wight and Bull discuss the debates with regard to the rights of non-Christians and non-Europeans 
under the auspices of natural law. Both point out that those such as Vitoria seeking to extend 
benefits of the protection of rights which natural law bestowed also served to justify the exposure of 
these peoples to commercial and diplomatic intercourse, often against their will (Bull, 1984a: 120; 
Wight, 1991:71).
75 Wight dates its commencement at the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559 (1977:125).
76 Elsewhere, Bull argues that an actual international society came to replace a theoretical one when 
the European states began to perceive common interests in structures of cooperation and 
coexistence, tacitly expressed through common rules and institutions. A law defining a code of 
conduct between states, based on the practices of states, came to replace the theoretical doctrine of 
natural law. Bull observes that developments such as the exchange of diplomatic representatives; the 
adoption of common legal practices; and engagement in multilateral conferences were all crucial to 
this process (Bull, 1984a: 120).
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In order to achieve admission to international society, non-European powers were 
required to conform to European standards of structure and conduct, articulated 
through international law and popularly described as the ‘standard of civilisation’ 
(Watson, 1992:273).77 The West’s acceptance of the achievement of these 
standards by non-Westem powers marks the expansion of the European to global 
international society. Thus, international law became the agent which legitimised 
and internationalised the rules and institutions of the Western states-system under 
the banner of the ‘standard of civilisation’.79 The institutions of the sovereign state 
and international law are perhaps the most central Western institutions which 
provided the foundations of international society. They helped to define the identity 
of the West, but also to internationalise that identity.
Diplomacy
Whilst all civilisations have known the use of ambassadors, for the international 
society authors the diplomatic system was the internationalisation of a distinctive 
Western institution critical to the functioning of international society. The practice 
of establishing permanent resident embassies is a Western European invention 
which Wight argues marks the development of the modem Western states-system 
out of medieval Christendom, extending to Asia, and then the world in the 
nineteenth century (1979:113).80
77 Bull notes that by the early twentieth century, legal doctrine came to insist that political entities 
were entitled to recognition as sovereign states if they met the formal criteria for statehood, ie. there 
must be a government, a territory, a population, and a capacity to enter into international relations or 
fulfil legal obligations (Bull, 1984a: 121). See Gong(1984) for the evolution of the concept and 
articulation of the ‘standard’ in association with the evolution of international law amongst Western 
legal publicists of the nineteenth century.
78 Bull lists the representation of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Paris (1856) and the 
attendance of the United States and Mexico, in addition to China, Japan, Persia and Siam at the 
Hague Conference as signalling the process of expansion (Bull, 1984a: 123).
79 Keal has described international law as ‘both a universalising discourse and a form of cultural 
imperialism that defined the normative foundations for the society of states created by the expansion 
of Europe .... International law reflects the normative order of the European states that made it’. 
However, non-Europeans were expected to conform. He further argues that international law 
distinguished between civilised and uncivilised non-Europeans, with Europeans holding a special 
moral duty to confer the ‘benefits’ of civilisation on non-Europeans. Effectively, the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ took on an increasingly juridicial character (Keal, 1995:194; Gong, 1984:5).
80 Bull considers the emergence of the diplomatic system to be very much an enlightenment 
phenomenon, the ambassador a representative of the rational and reasoning actor driven by interest 
rather than passion (Bull, 1977a: 169-72).
182
Balance of Power
A fourth significant international institution of the West identified by this 
school is the balance of power. It is again perceived to derive from Western 
antecedents. For Wight, the balance of power was a sophisticated central device for 
the defence of common interest in the states-system (1966c: 149). Watson discusses 
the institution as a flexible device first developed in the Italian states-system to 
counteract hegemony (Watson, 1992:198-202). Bull describes the institution as a 
consciously maintained rather than a natural or automatic mechanism for the 
preservation of order which flourished in the eighteenth century European states- 
system (Bull, 1977a: 106-12). The expansion of Europe is seen to extend this 
mechanism to manage European competition overseas (Watson, 1984a:26).81 The 
concept remained current in the wider international society, despite its being
discredited in the post-World War I period, and the rise of international
82organisations developed to manage the international order (Bull, 1977a:40).
The state, international law, diplomacy and the balance of power are treated by this 
perspective as central institutions which established the procedures of the European 
society of states, and subsequently became foundations for the global international 
society. They can also be seen as parts of the West’s identity which became 
internationalised. While ‘objective’ boundaries such as territory, and race appear to 
continue to distinguish the West as a distinct identity, certain of the normative and 
institutional dimensions of the West’s identity appear more flexible. These are the 
elements of the West which spread and became internationalised through the 
structures of international society. As for Spengler and Toynbee, norms and 
institutions form a critical dimension of this conception of the West. However, the 
norms and institutions identified appear more firmly embedded in the modem 
states-system than in the preceding conceptions.
81 Watson notes that, initially, colonies were regarded as extensions of their governing states rather 
than independent actors within the balance. This altered as the colonies began to perceive that they 
held different interests and began to move towards independence (Watson, 1984b: 135).
S2 Wight was disparaging of such efforts. He saw the alternatives to the balance of power as 
universal anarchy or universal dominion, neither of which he welcomed (1979:184).
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Interaction Between the West and Non-West
This chapter has noted that the international society authors have a pluralist 
concept of civilisations. Their conception of the West, however, is of a unique 
civilisational identity expanding on an unprecedented scale to establish a trans- 
civilisational system and subsequently, a global, multi-civilisational society. 
Within this society, the West appears to retain a unique and influential position. Do 
these perspectives perceive the West as eventually absorbing other civilisations, or 
is its position seen as one of only temporary dominance? It will be argued that in 
one sense, the dominance of the West exercised through the expansion of 
international society is perceived as a hegemony in the process of being challenged; 
but in another, aspects of the West’s identity are assumed to have been 
universalised, exercising a progressive influence over the broader history of 
mankind.
The evolution of the Western states-system and the expansion of international 
society appear closely interwoven in these discussions, making it difficult at times 
to separate the identity of the West from that of the international society. 
Distinctive qualities of the West appear to shape the international society. Some of 
these appear to be unique: while other societies had a sense of law, none applied it 
on such an extensive scale, ranging across multiple regional boundaries (Bull & 
Watson, 1984:6). Similarly, no other society had extended to encompass the whole 
globe, whereas the Western state system provides ‘the present structure of the 
political organisation of mankind’ (Bull, 1977a:295).
However, this is not simply a story of the West shaping the world. In Bull’s 
analysis, the evolution of the West and of the international society it formed are 
interdependent. Bull suggests that the evolution of the European system of 
interstate relations and the global expansion of Europe were simultaneous and 
interactive processes. For instance, the idea of states with equal rights did not fully 
evolve until the eighteenth century. The establishment of many diplomatic 
practices, such as resident embassies, only took place with the onset of European 
expansion. International organisations did not really evolve until the late nineteenth 
century (Bull & Watson, 1984:6). The relationship of the West to non-West during
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this evolution underwent major changes. The emergent sense of civilisational 
hierarchy is perceived to have displaced relations of loose equality with other 
civilisations, helping to rationalise the West’s dominance of those civilisations. In 
this analysis, the West’s overwhelming power acts as a crucial element in defining 
the identity of the West with respect to other civilisations. This interaction helped 
to shape the civilisational identity of the West. Therefore, in contrast to Spengler’s 
conception, interaction is not merely incidental, but constitutive of the West.
A clear distinction is made in the analysis of Bull and Watson between the 
expansion of the Western system and the expansion of the Western society of 
states. The system expanded through increased interaction between Europeans and 
other peoples, involving both incorporation and dom ination.T he expansion of 
the society implied the admission of new states into a community of technical 
equals. Although the boundaries of race or religion initially delineated Europeans 
from others, the technical criteria of the nineteenth century became standards of 
behaviour and governance, standards based on Western norms and institutions. 
However, difference was perceived in the now culturally loaded context of 
civilisation.
It is here that the inter-civilisational dimension of the expansion of international 
society becomes more explicit. In his essay ‘The Theory of Mankind’ (1991), 
Wight analyses the different attitudes of his three traditions to other cultures.84 
They range from the eradication or subjugation of the other civilisation to 
cultivation and tuition, or assimilation. All entailed a sense of the superiority of 
Western civilisation. All three attitudes are evident in the history of European 
contacts with non-European peoples. The international society analysis implies the 
eventual predominance of the rationalist approach, with a period of tutelage leading 
to the absorption of new communities into international society; but how complete
8j For instance, in his discussion of native sovereignty, Keal observes that in the course of the 
nineteenth century, attitudes to non-Western peoples shifted from some measure of recognition of 
their rights to virtual rejection on the grounds that only civilised peoples had rights (Keal, 
1995:201) .
84 Wight’s interest in the clash between imperial civilisations and their territories may have been 
stimulated by his work on colonial constitutions with Margery Perham at Oxford University during 
World War II (Dunne, forthcoming).
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was this incorporation? While the expansion of European international society as 
defined by Bull was synonymous with the expansion of the West as a coherent 
identity, the growth of global international society is not equated with the West’s 
becoming a universal culture. The preceding discussion suggests these authors 
sensed the persistence of boundaries and hierarchies within international society. 
While the creation of a global, multi-civilisational international society saw the 
West become a society within the broader society, the West appears to retain a 
distinct and privileged position.
According to Bull and Watson, the expansion of global international society 
brought about the dilution of Western control of international society. However, 
both note the use of Western norms and ideas by non-Westemers in their resistance 
to Western domination of the society.83 The state, for instance, became a central 
mechanism for achieving political and legal independence, recognition and 
equality.86 Bull stresses that the ‘Revolt against the West’ did not seek to 
overthrow the institutions of international society, but to obtain equality and 
independence of participation in this society (Bull, 1984a: 124). His analysis 
presents peoples seeking equality and liberty within a society based originally on 
Western culture, not emancipation from this society. He is, then, describing the 
effective globalisation of key elements of Western political culture. Whilst the 
West no longer directly controls international society, other communities are 
perceived as functioning in the context of Western civilisation. This suggests a
83 Bull argues that the decolonising countries of the Third World were concerned with not only 
rejecting but also learning from the West (1984c:22). The Third World’s demands for equality and 
justice, argues Bull, took Western moral premises as their points of departure (1984c:5). He and 
Watson point to the commitment of the anti-colonial movements to the ideas of modernisation or 
development. Watson also discusses the importance which Westernised elites played in the drive to 
separate and independent statehood for Asia, Africa and Oceania (Bull, 1984c:22; Watson, 
1984a:31).
86 Bull believed this stemmed from the experiences which Third World societies had of being 
without the clout or credibility of being a state (1984c:7, 27).
87 ‘[B]y organising themselves as modem states, by accepting the conventions of Western 
diplomacy, by participating in the international legal system and by assuming a leading role in the 
shaping of the international organisations that have proliferated since the Second World War, [the 
non-Western countries] have demonstrated their adherence to the international society and to 
cooperation in the working of its institutions not only in their relations with the Western states, but 
also in relation to each other’ (Bull 1984c:33).
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universalisation of Western civilisation, or more precisely, some features of it, 
through the channels of norms and institutions.
These authors concur that the normative consensus on which the global 
international society is based was founded on Western values. At the same time, 
Bull and Watson’s work demonstrates a consciousness of the society’s increasing 
heterogeneity and complexity, and concern for its impact on maintenance of 
normative consensus. As Dunne(forthcoming) observes, Bull’s reading of the 
consequences of this heterogeneity for international order oscillates between 
optimism and pessimism.
Bull feared that core Western values were beginning to be challenged. As non- 
Westem peoples became stronger, there was a greater inclination to adopt a 
rhetoric which set these values aside. A ‘deep divide’ now existed between the 
Western powers and the Third World on normative issues suggesting the threat of 
breakdown of consensus about common norms and values crucial to the cohesion 
of international society (1984b:224-8; 1984c).88 In addition to contemplating a 
redistribution of wealth within the system, both Bull and Watson imply that it may 
be necessary to incorporate elements of other civilisations into the norms of 
international society in order to maintain the cohesion of a truly universal society 
(Bull, 1977a:315-7; 1984c; Watson, 1992:308).89 Therefore, both the cohesion and 
the West’s institutional and normative hegemony of international society were
8S Although Bull suggested that the developing world drew on Western values in pursuit of their 
own goals, he did not suggest there was consensus on how those values should be interpreted. He 
cites the challenges of statism, the lack of regard for the individual shown in some self- 
determination movements, the use of force, the lack of racial equality practised in some domestic 
environments, and different interpretations of economic justice as challenges which divided the 
developed and developing world (1984c:6-ll).
89 Dunne(forthcoming) suggests that, in part, this was justified by Bull on instrumentalist grounds: it 
was in the West’s interests to strengthen justice in world politics in order to maintain order. But 
elsewhere, his discussion indicates that Bull’s increasing disillusionment with the pluralist system’s 
ability to provide a just moral order, this undermining the essential moral value of the society. In the 
Hagey Lectures, Bull is obviously grappling with the difficult problems of the tension between the 
goals of justice and order. Here, he notes that unlike the realist or revolutionary perspectives, the 
rationalist or liberal perspective privileges neither order nor justice, but sees order as ‘best 
preserved by meeting demands for justice’ and justice ‘best realised in a context of order’ 
(1984c: 18). While he does not clearly commit himself to any of these perspectives, the concerns that 
he voices with regard to the political and moral implications of demands for justice, and the West’s 
need to accommodate them, suggests that he favoured the middle way.
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conceived by Bull as under threat from the multi-civilisational character of 
international society
However, at another, more optimistic level there remains some sense of the West 
a* a universal force in the processes of international society, and a faith in Western- 
shaped international society providing a useful forum for civilisational interaction. 
While Bull acknowledges that the Western states-system is not the only possible 
form of universal political organisation, he suggests it is the only one which has 
succeeded in achieving a durable, global political system, providing the present 
political structure for mankind, ‘and the common interest and values that underlie 
it’. In spite of its weaknesses and inadequacies, it is ‘the principal expression of 
human unity or solidarity that exists at the present time’(Bull, 1977a: 21, 259, 
295).90
Universalist overtones surface in Bull’s discussion of international society. While 
there is not a strong thread of progressive history in Bull’s work - he was anxious 
not to portray international politics as inevitably tied to the states-system alone or 
to the dominance of European culture - he does imply that development and 
progress have been linked to the expansion of the European system. The emergence 
of sovereign states, the rise of national consciousness and the adaptation of society 
to modem science, technology and economy are treated as universal rather than 
unique historical processes. The ‘revolt against the West’ is viewed as part of a 
broader forward movement towards human development (Bull, 1984c:23, 34). 
There is, therefore, an implicit linkage between the expansion of Western 
civilisation and the broader development of man.91
Wight, in contrast, saw international relations ultimately as an arena of ‘recurrence 
and repetition’ which was incompatible with progressivist theories (1966b:26).
90 As Bull notes, this system had survived challenges such as World War II and the Cold War. In 
their introduction to The Expansion o f International Society, Bull & Watson argue that in asserting 
the importance of the West’s achieving the present political structure which has united the world, it 
is not their perspective which is being Euro-centric, but the historical record (Bull & Watson, 
1984:2).
91 In the Hagey Lectures, for instance, he discusses national liberation movements of the non- 
Westem world as echoing those of nineteenth century Europe and the West, suggesting that these 
peoples are going through similar processes of adaptation and development (Bull, 1984c:7).
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However, despite his pessimistic belief that conflict and war were recurrent 
features of the international system, he does admit limited possibilities for change, 
as is demonstrated by his faith in the existence of international society as a set of 
institutions and norms which can help to modify international conflict (Wight, 
1966a:98). International society permits managing, though not radically altering, 
the system as Wight sees it. In the conclusion to the original version of Power 
Politics, he observed: ‘Powers will continue to seek security without reference to 
justice and to pursue their vital interests irrespective of common interests, but in 
the fraction that they may be deflected lies the difference between the jungle and 
the traditions of Europe’(Quoted in Dunne, forthcoming). This remark hints at a 
sliver of hope that politics can rise above the law of the jungle; but furthermore, 
that this hope resides in the traditions of the West. Wight’s analysis implies that 
Western values are deeply integrated with international society and therefore 
deeply integrated with the current and future developments of world politics.
In the work of Bull and of Wight, the universalisation of the West through its 
norms and institutions appears deeper and more subtle than domination exercised 
by military, political or even economic power. This suggests that interaction 
consists of more than the West buffeting or overwhelming other civilisations, as for 
Spengler, and more complex than the relationships suggested by Toynbee. This 
perspective suggests that certain norms and values of the West have been 
integrated into the institutions of the international society, achieving a form of 
universalisation. Moreover, while the West is not portrayed as the only civilisation, 
it is portrayed as establishing normative and even, in the work of Bull, 
developmental criteria for modem humanity.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the international society authors have a pluralist view 
of the cultural world which acknowledges the interaction of multiple civilisations 
in both past and present world politics. While it conceptualises the West as a 
distinct civilisation in this context, it simultaneously sees it as the foundation of a 
universal community.
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These authors share with Spengler and Toynbee a broad, historical perspective, 
although they focus more strongly on the emergence of the Western states-system. 
Like Toynbee, their conception of the West acknowledges important foundations in 
Christendom, particularly in the concept of community and the legal structures 
derived from this foundation. While religion is discussed as an important formative 
force, race and power emerge in the discussion of the nineteenth century as 
increasingly important distinguishing marks of the West. The intensification of 
interaction with other civilisations appears to coincide with a growing sense of 
differentiation, particularly in the realms of race and power. Race appears to blend 
with power to create a sense of civilisational hierarchy, expressed in the Western- 
based ‘standard of civilisation’. The legacy of these boundaries provides a 
continuing sense of differentiation, but, paradoxically perhaps, this literature 
suggests that certain norms and institutions which distinguished the West in the 
‘standard of civilisation’ have become intrinsic to the structures of international 
society. In a sense, they have become the agents of the universalisation of the West. 
At this level, the West has become a global civilisation.
In this, there are parallels with the concept of the West found in Toynbee’s work. 
As for Toynbee, interaction is considered more than incidental to a civilisation’s 
growth. For Bull in particular, interaction critically contributes to the constitution 
of the West; the West and international society evolving interdependently.
Like Toynbee, the international society authors perceive the West to be unifying 
the world through its technological capacity and dynamic nature. However, these 
authors go further than Toynbee in suggesting that the West has provided the 
normative and institutional framework of modem world politics. Through the 
structures of international society, the West has created a single, global political 
system and the context within which all civilisations function and interact. These 
scholars, however, do not argue that international society has created civilisational 
homogeneity. Within the context of international society, the identity of the West 
remains distinct. There is, therefore, an unresolved tension in this literature 
between the perception of the West as a universal civilisation, and as one actor in a 
multi-civilisational world order. Wight’s work in particular implies an intrinsic link 
between Western values, the via media in international relations, and the
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construction of international society. Bull’s demonstrates concerns for the 
challenges posed by cultural heterogeneity and the need for a redistribution of 
power and wealth to maintain the cohesion of international society; yet he also 
suggests that the West’s experiences illustrate a universal process of development, 
and that its institutions provide the foundations for international order and the 
dominant context of modem civilisational interaction. At one level, therefore, this 
is a conception of the West as a hegemon under challenge; at another, it retains a 
unique position as a universal civilisation in the contemporary world order.
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Chapter Six
History ’s End? Francis Fukuyama 's Conception of the West
In 1989, the American political analyst, Francis Fukuyama, heralded the end of the 
Cold War by declaring the victory of the liberal West over the communist East. He 
characterised the Cold War as an epic battle between two ideologies to determine 
the direction of man’s evolution through the course of modernity. The West’s 
victory represented the conclusion of this ideological evolution and, in this sense, 
the ‘end of history’. While this particular thesis is highly distinctive, the concept of 
the West embedded in it illustrates broader trends in American liberal thought in 
the late twentieth century. These provide important insights into assumptions about 
the West and the cultural world order which can be found in this significant 
perspective. They are assumptions which stand in marked contrast to those of 
earlier authors such as Spengler and Toynbee in their faith in science and 
optimistic belief in human progress. The image of cultural world order which we 
find in Fukuyama comprises different cultures, but presents humanity as a whole 
engaged in a single, civilising process of development and modernisation. His 
assumptions about culture and civilisation are influenced by his belief in human 
progress, and his concept of civilisational interaction linked to levels of 
development and modernisation.
This chapter focuses principally on the concept of the West articulated in 
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis first outlined in a short article, ‘The End of 
History?’, in the American journal The National Interest (Fukuyama, 1989) and 
later developed in his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992). The 
discussion will also refer to Fukuyama’s later work on culture and economics, 
Trust (1995b). In the ‘end of history’ thesis, Fukuyama presents the West as a 
civilisational identity at the forefront of the civilising process. It provides not just a 
technical or normative framework for modem civilisational interaction, as
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suggested by Toynbee and the international society school, but also the ideological 
model for human development. Fukuyama differs from Spengler and even Toynbee 
in his optimism regarding the transfer of ideas from the West to other cultures. 
Furthermore, whereas, Spengler’s concept of the West focuses on German culture 
as the heart of this civilisational identity, Fukuyama draws his model of the West 
from the ideals and institutions of the United States. Unlike Spengler, Toynbee and 
Bull, he appears confident that the West is no longer challenged by forces in the 
non-West, but like them, he demonstrates concerns with regard to challenges to 
Western cohesion from within. While this qualifies his confidence in the West and 
its future, there is overall a strong sense of the triumph of the American way.
Fukuyama’s Era and Influences
Fukuyama’s thesis blends the influences of European philosophy with an analysis 
of the tumultuous post-Cold War world to produce a distinctive contribution to the 
debate on the role of the West in world politics. Whilst Fukuyama is an American 
of Japanese decent, his work is infused with the traditions of European philosophy. 
Raised in New York, he studied political philosophy at Cornell University with 
Allan Bloom and in Paris under the post-structuralist Jacques Derrida. He obtained 
his Ph.D. in Political Science (National Security Studies) from Harvard University 
and subsequently worked with the RAND corporation where his early publications 
chiefly related to Third World ‘states of socialist orientation’.
At the time of publishing his ‘End of History’ article, Fukuyama was Deputy 
Director of the United States State Department’s policy planning staff. Its 
publication coincided with the installation of the Bush administration and it was 
seen by some as representing the administration’s views. This was a tumultuous 
time in world affairs with communism crumbling in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. The pressure of economic and military competition had encouraged the 
instigation of new policies in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, such as moves towards 
reductions in military forces, which eased tensions with the United States. It also 
meant that the Soviet Union was increasingly unwilling to underwrite socialist 
regimes in the Eastern bloc. In 1989-90, reformist pressures ultimately undermined 
communist regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and
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East Germany, with the breaking down of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 providing a 
graphic illustration of the radical changes underway (Held, 1993a). Fukuyama’s 
thesis anticipated the final stages of the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Outside 
Europe, popular pressure for reform climaxed in the Chinese Government 
crackdown of June 1989 on protesters in Tianan Men Square. The shifts in 
international strategic thinking facilitated moves towards resolving the seemingly 
intractable Cambodian conflict. Capitalism was booming in East Asia and finding 
new adherents in Latin America.
Fukuyama’s proclamation of the victory of liberal democracy found a broad and 
attentive audience. His essay expressed the emergent euphoria evident particularly 
in the United States. The development of the essay into a book allowed Fukuyama 
to explore in more depth the ideas and philosophical foundations of his thesis and 
to defend it against critics from all political spectrums. Although the book retains a 
belief in the victory of the West over its ideological rivals, the sense of triumph 
becomes more muted, elaborating upon suggestions of a sense of foreboding in the 
1989 essay. This foreshadows a shift in the winds of optimism of the mid 1990s. 
The collapse of communist regimes and the victory of the Gulf War in 1991 had 
suggested to some the creation of a New World Order of liberal democracy guided 
by American leadership, promising the fulfilment of Fukuyama’s predictions. This 
optimism was shaken by growing instability in former socialist countries1 and the 
debacle of the United States-led UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia. 1992 
also saw the United States shaken by riots in Los Angeles following the Rodney 
King trial. In Europe there was escalating tension emanating from new right 
movements whose anger was aimed particularly at new immigrants. While 
Fukuyama had anticipated the continuation of conflict and the resurgence of 
nationalism, such events clouded, though did not obscure, the broader sense of 
triumph.
1 Conflicts broke out in Georgia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan. Czechoslovakia underwent a divorce, 
bloody wars broke out in the former Yugoslavia, first between Serbian and Croatian forces, then 
within the state of Bosnia- Herzegovina. In Russia, Gorbachev was finally undermined by a hard­
line coup. Its defeat confirmed the rise of Yeltsin.
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Intellectually, Fukuyama’s article illustrates a trend of optimism prevalent in the 
late 1980s which contrasted to the ‘declinist’ trend stimulated by the setbacks of 
the 1970s.2 The article was ‘propitious’ both in articulating the American sense of 
triumph, and helping to explain the radical changes that were occurring (Knutsen, 
1991:79). Held suggests that Fukuyama provided a sophisticated justification of the 
conservative policies of Western governments of the 1980s, such as those of the 
Thatcher and Reagan, celebrating the victory of the market and small government 
(Held, 1993a:257). Turning the focus inward, Fukuyama sought to define what 
liberalism stood for in the absence of its communist antithesis (Smith, 1994:2). 
However, his argument that the end of the Cold War represents the ideological 
victory of liberal democracy was disputed and provoked extensive debate. For 
instance, to the left his ideological legitimisation of the conservatives represented a 
tactic to prematurely close down ideological debate in the face of the Soviet 
Union’s demise, marginalising alternative voices.3 Sardar(1992) places 
Fukuyama’s thesis in a broader Western tradition of totalising history, subjecting 
the history and experience of all to that of the West.
The sense of triumphalism which characterised debate on international affairs in 
the United States of the late 1980s contrasted with the tone of discussion of social 
cohesion. Problems such as crime, drug abuse, welfare rights and race relations 
helped to generate a broader debate on American values, one aspect of which is the 
debate over multiculturalism. In 1987, one of Fukuyama’s mentors, Allan Bloom, 
published The Closing of the American Mind in which he criticised the dominance 
of cultural relativism and upheld the importance of core Enlightenment values of 
truth, inquiry and natural rights as crucial elements of the American education 
system and the American way of life. In the context of this debate, it is interesting
2 These include the outcome of the Vietnam war, the oil crisis and the trade deficit with Japan. Paul 
Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers (1988) might be seen as a classic statement of the 
more pessimistic attitude of the 1970s to mid 1980s (Held, 1993a:254). See Huntington (1989:3) for 
a discussion of the optimistic spirit of ‘endism’ demonstrated in the ‘end of history’ thesis.
3 Miliband(1992) and Peet(1993a:74) suggest Fukuyama is foreclosing the ideological debate by 
proclaiming the victory of liberal democracy without considering other ideological systems such as 
social democracy, or whether the success of liberal democracy is a localised phenomenon. From 
another perspective, Huntington questions the viability of universalising democracy as an ideology, 
raising doubts over the likelihood of democracies being established in the republics of the former 
Soviet Union (1995b: 150).
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to note that Fukuyama presents an image of the West which is homogeneous, 
essentially middle class and built around the ideals of the American constitution 
and its founding fathers.
The meaning of Fukuyama’s thesis has been widely debated. In this discussion, it 
will be considered as a celebration of the triumph of the Western political system 
and ideals in the battle for the soul and direction of modernity. In this sense, 
Fukuyama represents a particularly American, liberal concept of the West in the 
late twentieth century. However, it is not without its antecedents. It draws on 
nineteenth century intellectual traditions of universal history, on theories of 
modernisation and development from political science, and on a American tradition 
of political idealism.
Fukuyama can be placed within a tradition of authors who seek to use history to 
provide a sense of place and purpose for humanity (Rosenberg, 1989:309). Like 
Spengler and Toynbee, he is interested in the processes of history, but in contrast to 
them, he is concerned primarily with the triumph rather than the decline of the 
West. Furthermore, his historical focus is largely limited to the modem era. 
Fukuyama places himself firmly in a tradition of linear and progressive history, 
along with his intellectual mentors, Hegel and Kojeve 4 He draws from these 
authors a sense that the material world is shaped by the ideas of man. History 
becomes the evolution of the human consciousness and ideas, moving towards a 
final stage of absolute consciousness (Peet, 1993a:66; Smith, 1994:11). This places 
Fukuyama in the modem, humanist, rationalist tradition which views the world as 
something not given by God, but shaped and produced by man (Bums, 1994:x). 
Fukuyama celebrates the triumph of the Western idea, a victory achieved through 
the medium of ideas, rather than military power (Knutsen, 1991:79). Fukuyama’s 
reading and use of both Hegel and Kojeve is variously applauded and disputed.5
4 Alexander Kojeve was a French-Russian philosopher who taught at the Ecole Practique des 
Hautes Etudes in Paris in the 1930s. It is Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel, as preserved in the 
Introduction to the reading o f Hegel (1969) on which Fukuyama essentially bases his thesis. 
Fukuyama was introduced to Kojeve’s work by Alan Bloom.
3 Anderson suggests that Fukuyama marries Hegel’s liberalism with Kojeve’s ‘sense of centrality of 
hedonism to modem consumption’, and the transitory nature of the national state (1992:332). Critics 
of Fukuyama’s reading of Hegel include McCarney(1993), on the differences between the early and 
later Hegel, Knutsen(1991) as a critique of Fukuyama’s understanding of Hegel, and Peet( 1993a;
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As Anderson observes, he borrows selectively from both to create his own, 
distinctive interpretation of history (Anderson, 1992:332). This discussion will not 
engage in a critical assessment of Fukuyama’s interpretation of these scholars, but 
notes the lessons which he has taken from them in constructing his own concepts 
of history and of the West.
Fukuyama also acknowledges his debt to the work of Plato, in forming his 
conception of the human psyche, and De Tocqueville, whom he draws on for his 
reading of the role of community and emergence of democracy in the United 
States.* 6 Finally, like Spengler, Fukuyama was influenced by Nietzsche in his 
insights into the potential tensions between liberty and equality within liberal 
democracy. Fukuyama is impressed by Nietzsche’s psychological insight that 
bourgeois society will ultimately produce a resurgence of individuals who seek 
exceptionalness rather than equality. The blend of ideas from both Hegel and 
Nietzsche is interesting, given their different perspectives on the historical process. 
Hegel held a progressive, if dialectical view of history in contrast to Nietzsche’s 
commitment to a cyclical view. The tension inherent in these two positions 
emerges in Fukuyama’s final inability to totally commit to the idea that history has 
ended.7
Despite flirtations with Nietzsche, Fukuyama stands solidly within the liberal 
intellectual tradition. As Gourevitch( 1994:118) notes, Fukuyama blends Anglo- 
Saxon liberalism with German idealism. Whilst he is critical of the rational 
materialism which he argues characterises the work of Hobbes and Locke, one 
cannot ignore their importance to the liberal ideas which underpin Fukuyama’s 
thesis and conception of the West. Within the American intellectual tradition, 
Fukuyama articulates the political idealism and commitment to democracy and
1993b). His employment of Kojeve is applauded by Gourevitch(1994) and criticised by
Lawler(1994). Whilst Knutsen dismisses him as Stalinist, Peet( 1993a) seeks to rescue Kojeve from
Fukuyama’s more conservative reading.
6 Fukuyama suggests that his notion of thymos or spiritedness can be traced back to Plato’s tripartite 
division of the soul (Fukuyama, 1992:163).
7 Some commentators view Fukuyama’s interpretation of Hegel on the end of history as inaccurate. 
For Peet, history never finally ends since it always remains a dialectical process (Peet, 1993a:72). 
Fuller describes Fukuyama’s resolution of history as ‘dialectics without tears’(Fuller, 1989:93).
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capitalism which characterised Woodrow Wilson and F.D. Roosevelt (Farrenkopf, 
1995). This is demonstrated in his faith in the institutions of liberalism and 
democracy as embodied in the American way of life, and his belief in the universal 
applicability of these ideas to create a more peaceful and prosperous world. His 
optimism consciously reflects the faith in progress, and in science and the spread of 
democracy which he finds in nineteenth century Europe and the United States 
(1992:4).
Fukuyama’s faith in progress and development also echoes the works of Western, 
particularly postwar American, political scientists. Parallels have been noted 
between his thesis and the work of Daniel Bell(1960) concerning the impact of 
modernisation on ‘the end of ideology’ (Knutsen, 1991:78; Held, 1993a:255), but 
there is a different quality to Fukuyama’s argument. Bell’s argument is premised 
on an assumption that the pull of nineteenth century ideologies has been exhausted, 
not that one has been victorious over the other. He implies the convergence of the 
West with socialism in the institutions of the welfare state. For Bell, ideologies 
have lost their power to rouse people, leading to ‘the end of ideology’.8 Both 
authors, however, convey a sense of the ennui that they believe accompanies the 
end of ideological confrontation.
Further parallels exist between Fukuyama’s work and development theorists, such 
as Gabriel Almond, who viewed modernisation as a process of development 
towards institutions established in the advanced industrial societies of North 
America and Western Europe. The problems of industrial society, it was suggested, 
had effectively been controlled and were being resolved within the structures of 
this model (Higgott, 1983:16).9 Fukuyama’s thesis also echoes theories of
8 Bell also differs from Fukuyama in arguing that the new ideologies appearing in Asia and Africa 
were distinctly different from those which had arisen in nineteenth century Europe. The old 
ideologies, he argues, were universalistic, humanistic, fashioned by intellectuals and driven by 
forces such as social equality and freedom. He saw the new ideologies of Asia and Africa as mass 
ideologies which were parochial and instrumental, driven by economic development and national 
power (Bell, 1960:373). For Fukuyama, the forces of nationalism and ideology being experienced in 
the developing world were similar to those experienced by the West in itJprocess of development.
9 See Higgott(1983) and Cruise 0 ’Brien(1972) for a discussion of political evolution of 
modernisation theory. Both emphasise the role of the United States Social Science Research 
Committee on Comparative Politics, first under the chairmanship of Gabriel Almond, then of Lucien 
Pye in the study of political development. Scholars who contributed to the debate on modernisation
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convergence which assumed that industrialisation and urbanisation gave rise to 
similar political institutions; and that industrialisation ultimately gave rise to 
affluence and mass consumption (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1965:10).10 While 
Fukuyama does not trace the direct link between the processes of economic and 
political liberalisation suggested by these earlier theorists, he shares their faith in 
industrialisation as a key process which uniformly transforms and homogenises 
human societies. Therefore, Fukuyama’s work can be located within a tradition of 
teleological development found in American political science.
Drawing on these varied traditions, Fukuyama produces a thesis which not only 
seeks to explain the meaning of the end of the Cold War, but it also carves out and 
rationalises a special role for the West in the world and in the future development 
of human civilisation.
Conceptions of Civilisation
Fukuyama’s conception of the West is embedded in a broader vision of universal 
history of which the central tenet is progress. He is concerned less with the details 
of civilisational interaction than with the broader march of development throughout 
the human community. The ‘end of history’ thesis is dominated by a belief in the 
existence of a universal and evolving community of mankind, with the West 
viewed as being at the forefront of this evolution.
Fukuyama uses the term civilisation in a variety of contexts, often associating it 
with terms such as Western, modem, middle class or consumer. He does not 
engage in a detailed discussion of comparative civilisations, except to compare the 
way in which Western liberal democracy and Soviet communism have sought to 
shape civilisation (1992:35). Despite the plurality of his use of the term, 
Fukuyama’s thesis is premised on the idea of human civilisation on a progressive 
course, providing a strong underlying sense of a civilising process. His thesis is
include Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Daniel Lemer, Samuel Huntington, Lucien Pye, Walt 
Rostow and Sidney Verba.
10 Both factors were anticipated as undermining the role of ideology in political systems and 
encouraging political pluralism in the communist system. For a discussion of a variety of theories of 
convergence prevalent in the post-Stalinist era see Meyer(1970).
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strongly influenced by a belief in the potential for further homogenisation of 
human societies, fostered by science and technology which, Fukuyama argues, 
inescapably link all of mankind today (1992:88); the accumulation of knowledge 
allowing mankind to progressively achieve greater control over his environment.11 
His optimism and faith in progress consciously recalls that of nineteenth century 
Europe. This optimism was grounded in faith that science would emancipate 
humanity from poverty and disease, belief in the spread of rational self-government 
in the form of democracy, and confidence that the spread of trade would make war 
obsolete. This faith in progress, shattered by the traumas of the wars and 
depression of the twentieth century, is rejuvenated by Fukuyama as he applauds the 
death of authoritarianism.12
Fukuyama’s progressive vision of human civilisation is firmly based in a concept 
of history which is dialectical and finite. Whilst he acknowledges that History is 
subject to waves and setbacks, its broad course is directional (1995a). There is 
notably no sense of reversal of the overall progress of human civilisation. His 
concept of History is crucial to comprehending his ideas of civilisation and 
civilisational interaction. In marked contrast to Spengler, he defines History as ‘a 
single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of 
all peoples in all times’ (1992:xii). Drawing deeply on the ideas of Hegel and Kant, 
Fukuyama grounds his theories in the belief that all human behaviour is rooted in a 
prior state of consciousness (Gourevitch, 1994:112). Mankind evolves dialectically 
through different stages of consciousness, finally achieving a rational form of 
society, expressed in the state. Ideas shape the material world, therefore History is 
treated as mankind’s ideological evolution (1989:4-6).lj
Fukuyama suggests History is driven by fundamental human needs: the satisfaction 
of rational and material desires, and the need for recognition, or respect for the
11 Fukuyama consistently uses gendered language, referring always to the role and of man and his 
needs.
12 ‘As we reach the 1990s,’ he argues ‘the world as a whole has not revealed new evils, but has 
gotten better in certain, distinct ways’ (1992:12).
13 Ideology is broadly defined as encompassing religious, cultural and moral habits as well a 
political beliefs (1989:5).
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dignity of each human being. These needs become the engines of History, 
stimulating processes expressed in political and ideological systems and 
movements. The first of these processes, the quest for the satisfaction of material 
needs, is fulfilled by application of natural science which represents cumulative 
knowledge with regard to the control of nature, turned to the productive 
requirements of mankind (1992:72-73). Science provides a concrete expression of 
mankind’s capacity to shape the material environment through the application of 
ideas. The central role which Fukuyama attributes to science in his thinking places 
him firmly in the traditions of the Western Enlightenment. The unfolding of 
modem science provides for him a directional ‘Mechanism’ for explaining many 
aspects of historical development. It both satisfies material needs, through making 
possible ‘the limitless accumulation of wealth’ and, through technology and 
industrialisation, serves to homogenise human society: ‘All countries undergoing 
economic modernisation must increasingly resemble one another’ (1992:xiv).14 
This suggests strong parallels with the modernisation literature of the 1950s. 
Fukuyama argues further that the most efficient organisation of man’s productive 
capacity is Western capitalism, since other forms of industrialisation have proved 
inadequate (1992:xv), societies will ultimately converge with, or submerge into the 
Western model of development. In this there are again echoes of the convergence 
theorists of the 1950s.15
Insightfully, Fukuyama observes that whilst the recognition of material needs is 
significant, it is not a sufficient explanation of human motivation. It portrays 
humans as primarily selfish individuals driven by rational calculation of self- 
interest, omitting mans ‘moral dimension’, the aspect of human character that is 
driven by the quest for prestige (1992:161). This provides Fukuyama’s second 
central process of History, the quest for recognition. For him, the drive for
14 The homogenising process is linked by Fukuyama to industrialisation which rationalises 
organised labour, encourages urbanisation, increases the centralisation of the state, and weakens 
traditional forms of community, replacing these with modem bureaucratic forms of organisation 
( 1992:77).
15 For Fukuyama, the emphasis on satisfying material needs is a quality which particularly 
characterises what he describes as ‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberalism; the schools of thought deriving from 
the works of Hobbes and Locke in particular. It is, of course, also a central tenet to Marxist 
thinking.
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recognition provides a richer understanding of the historical process through 
providing a deeper understanding of human motivation (1992:144). Basing his 
analysis on Hegel’s parable Master-Slave relationship, he argues that the desire to 
be recognised as a human being, with a certain dignity and worth, is essential to all 
humans. Lack of recognition provides an impulse towards historical progress 
(1992:192).16 Fukuyama equates this with the part of the soul Plato called thymos, 
the spiritedness which underlies the emotions of pride, self-esteem, shame.17 He 
identifies two forms of thymos: isothymia which is equated with the quest for 
recognition as an equal; and megalothymia, the quest for recognition as superior 
(1992:182). Drawing on Kojeve’s influence, Fukuyama identifies the struggle for 
recognition as the central dynamic of the historical process. Most interestingly, 
Fukuyama interprets political and ideological movements such as religions, 
imperialism, nationalism, as part of a broader process of the quest for recognition. 
All are presented as the product of thymos.
Fukuyama’s conception of History is crucial to understanding the assumptions 
about the structure and dynamics of the cultural world order which we can deduce 
from his work. In Fukuyama’s conception of History, humanity’s ideological 
evolution is part of a quest for the most satisfying society which contains no 
fundamental internal contradictions and constitutes the end of man’s dialectical, 
ideological evolution. This social ideal is represented by the universal, 
homogenous state which provides equal recognition to all individuals. For Hegel,
16 The initial division between master and slave was based on the warrior ethos, the masters who 
were willing to risk their lives, and the slave who were not (1992:147-8). Fukuyama cites Hegel as 
arguing that the relationship between master and slave is dissatisfying for both; the master is not 
recognised by one whom he considers an equal; the slave is not recognised as one of equal dignity 
and worth. For the slave, growing self-awareness achieved through work and education leads to 
reflection on his own condition and the conception of the idea of freedom. The slave achieves 
freedom on attaining an absolute sense of knowledge and self-consciousness. The historical process 
is propelled by the movement towards this absolute self-consciousness. It climaxed in the French 
Revolution, based on the principles of liberty and equality, the foundations of the liberal democratic 
state. This was the battle in which the slave ultimately liberated himself from the master. For this 
reason, Hegel proclaimed the Battle of Jena(1806) as the end of History (1992:64, 192-8). A 
number of commentators argue that Hegel was more conservative in his assessment of the 
consequences of the French Revolution in his later years (McCamey, 1993:52, Farrenkopf, 
1995:70).
17 In the Republic, Plato analysed the soul as comprising three parts: the desiring part; the reasoning 
part; and the spirited part, thymos (Fukuyama, 1992:xvi). As with the other sources on whom he 
draws, Fukuyama has been criticised for his reading of Plato (Halliday 1992:93).
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the ideological evolution of humanity was completed in the victory of the ideals of 
the French and American revolutions. For Kojeve, they were achieved in the states 
of Western Europe post-World War II, and in ‘the American way of life’ 
(1989:5). For Fukuyama, the end of history was achieved in the victory of 
Western liberal democracy and the defeat of rival ideologies in the Cold War. This 
allows him to interpret the end of the Cold War as ‘the end of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of human government’ (1989:4). Fukuyama portrays the Cold War as a 
competition between two rival modem systems or ideologies to determine the 
direction and systemic shape of human civilisation, progressing along the course of 
modernisation. From this perspective, the Cold War becomes a battle for 
modernity.
Fukuyama therefore suggests that the West provides a universal and satisfying 
model of society. However, inequalities and dissatisfaction continue to exist in the 
West, particularly with regard to issues such as race and distribution of wealth. 
This forces Fukuyama to concede that no regime, including liberal democracy, is 
perfect, fully satisfying all parts of all men simultaneously (1992:337). Therefore,
[w]hat is emerging victorious ... is not so much liberal practice, as 
the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, 
there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a 
position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle 
of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people. (1992:45)
This points to two important qualifications of the thesis. First, the concession that it
is the idea, rather than the implementation of liberal democracy which has been
victorious. This equates with Fukuyama’s focus on history as the evolution of
ideology. Secondly, he concedes that the West is not perfect.19 Nevertheless,
Fukuyama’s thesis implies that the West stands at the vanguard of human
18 Anderson points out that this was something of a late development for Kojeve. In his earlier 
writing of the 1940s, Kojeve placed his confidence in the Soviet state as ‘the advanced guard’ of 
history and envisaged the end of history lying in the Socialist Empire (Anderson, 1992:321). This is 
why commentators such as Knutsen charge that Kojeve was a Stalinist.
19 There is a sense that the durability of the Western idea is central to its victory with communism in 
the battle for modernity. That is, whilst imperfect, liberal democracy appears as the last combatant 
left standing at the end of the battle.
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civilisation. The West represents the furthest point of ideological development, its 
norms and institutions not just a product of a particular culture or region, but 
representative of cosmopolitan ‘truths’ about the nature of man.
However, Fukuyama’s confidence in the West as representing the end of the 
history is accompanied by some unsettling qualifications. Perhaps his most 
surprising qualification comes when his 1992 book concludes on a note of 
uncertainty regarding man’s future ideological evolution. This indicates a retreat 
from Fukuyama’s Kojevian advocacy of the liberal democratic state as the most 
satisfying of all systems and without fundamental contradictions. Fukuyama 
reiterates the argument that, in comparison to the historical alternatives, liberal 
democracy remains the most satisfactory form of regime, yet this does not remove 
the doubts raised about the durability and cohesion of the liberal democratic 
system. Rather it undermines his contention that the West constitutes the end of 
history.
There are strong teleological dimensions to this thesis. It is implied that norms and 
institutions will develop along an established form. Furthermore, Fukuyama states 
that future interaction will be influenced by the stage of development that societies 
have reached (1992:276). Civilisational interaction is dominated by a sense of a 
civilising process. However, before considering the nature of interaction between 
the West and non-West, we should establish the boundaries which circumscribe 
Fukuyama’s West.
The Boundaries of Fukuyama’s West
Although Fukuyama’s thesis contains significant assumptions about territory, race 
and religion, his concept of the West is founded principally on the evolution of
20 Comparing the progress of mankind to a wagon train winding across the prairie, he concludes that 
the evidence concerning the direction of the wagons remain provisionally inconclusive: ‘Nor can we 
in the final analysis know, provided the majority of wagons reach the same town, whether their 
occupants, having looked around a bit at their surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set 
their eyes on a new and more distant journey’ (1992:339).
21 Fukuyama suggests that interaction will be influenced by whether states and societies are still 
embroiled in the processes of ‘history’, or have developed sufficiently to have reached ‘post­
history’. This will be discussed further below in the context of the West and its interaction with the 
non-West.
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certain forms of development and governance. These underpin his perception of the 
boundaries defining the West.
Territory
Fukuyama is less concerned with a society’s relationship to land or territory than 
Spengler, and less interested in its relationship to the environment than Toynbee. 
His conception of the West is grounded more on forms of governance and levels of 
development than on territory. However, his discussion of the West is located in, 
though not confined to, a territorial heartland of the United States and Western 
Europe. These territories form ‘the original beachhead’ from which liberal 
democracy has made significant inroads in areas of the world with differing 
political, religious and cultural traditions (1992:50).
Fukuyama’s West is more clearly focused on the United States than are the 
preceding conceptions discussed; its institutions and practices appearing to present 
the ultimate expressions of capitalism and liberal democracy in the universal 
homogeneous state.22 The Western European states also form an important 
component of Fukuyama’s West, but due to their systems of governance rather than 
their location. For instance, the authoritarian nature of regimes operating in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece until the early 1970s lead Fukuyama to treat these states as 
marginal to the West, until incorporated into the ‘mainstream’ of Western 
democratic development (1992:13).2j The states of Eastern Europe are excluded 
from Fukuyama’s West during the Cold War due to their socialist regimes. In 
contrast to Wight and Bull, there is little ambiguity in Fukuyama’s work about the 
Soviet Union’s relationship to the West. Its communist system not only placed it 
firmly outside of the West, but constitutes the prime antithesis to the West. One 
senses, however, that in the post-Cold War environment, he sees opportunities for
22 See, for example, Fukuyama’s discussion of the American entrepreneurial system, the US 
electoral system in relation to managing thymos, or the United States constitution as an expression 
of Lockean liberalism (1992:187, 315-8).
23 Fukuyama also points to the difficulties which states such as France and Germany had in adapting 
their centralised and autocratic structures to the liberal democratic structures of the modem West. 
1992:212)
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peoples from the more developed former communist states to move into the 
normative and institutional realm of Western liberal democracy.
The territories of Asia have a more ambiguous relationship with the West. Whilst 
states such as China and North Korea are automatically seen as apart from the West 
due to their communist regimes,24 the developing states of East Asia are initially 
treated as a part of the victorious West due to their successful adoption of 
economic liberalism and progress towards more democratic political structures 
(1989:10, 1992:14).25 However, deeper consideration of cultural and political 
features of these societies sees Fukuyama painting East Asia as a region which 
differs from, and challenges, the West (1992:238-44).
Fukuyama’s West also maintains an ambiguous relationship with Latin America 
which appears to teeter on the fringe. This is due not to its location but its failure to 
achieve economic development in a free capitalist economy, and to the prevalence 
of dictatorial regimes until the mid 1970s. Despite Fukuyama’s optimism regarding 
political and economic reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s, this region remain on 
the margins of his West, still immersed in ‘history’. This again demonstrates the 
significance which Fukuyama attaches to governance rather than location in his 
geographic conception of the West.
Religion
Fukuyama’s discussion of religion is neither extensive nor profound. The limited 
focus of his historical interest means he is less interested in exploring the roots of 
the West in Christendom than are Wight and Bull. However, Fukuyama does link 
the emergence of the universal, homogenous state which characterises the West 
with Christianity as an ideology. He suggests Christianity was an important
24 Fukuyama views the liberalisation of the economy in China as radically altering its status from 
that of a leading alternative ideological system, a ‘beacon to illiberal forces’, to that of a straight 
forward authoritarian regime (1989:11; 1992:34).
25 The suggestion that these regimes are becoming more democratic is scorned by some 
commentators, such as Sardar. For Sardar, such suggestions illustrate the limited, Western-centric 
nature of Fukuyama’s vision of the world (1992:500).
26 See Fukuyama(1992:13-4) for discussion of the political transformation of Latin America and 
Fukuyama( 1992:41, 103-6) for discussion of the economic changes.
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precursor of the ideology of universal equality subsequently articulated in the 
French and American Revolutions and therefore foreshadows the ideology of
27recognition in the Western liberal democratic state.
Fukuyama also treats religion as a socio-economic factor when he notes that the 
work ethic of Protestant societies of Europe and the United States facilitated the 
growth of capitalism in the West. He does not dwell on the distinctions between 
Protestant and Catholic societies, but implies Protestant cultures assume 
democratic structures more rapidly, due to their work ethic and their modernisation
9Qof society through the privatisation of religion (1992:216).
The most significant aspect of Fukuyama’s discussion of religion is his perception 
of religion as a pre-modem quest for satisfying forms of recognition, and 
consequently, as a source of conflict (1992:259, 288). As a basis for community, he 
argues religion can be exclusive, therefore irrational and a barrier to the 
achievement of ‘full’, meaning unqualified, recognition. Part of the ideological 
evolution of the West was the secularisation of society, by which Fukuyama means 
the removal of religion from the public and political sphere to the private, with the 
conclusion of the wars of religion (1989:14)7° Religion, Fukuyama argues, was 
‘defanged’ allowing the West to achieve a more rational basis of social recognition 
(1992:260): ‘liberalism vanquished religion in Europe’ (1992:271). Elsewhere, he 
notes that religion may provide part of the cultural context which inhibits or
27 Fukuyama uses Hegel and Kojeve to argue that Christianity was a ‘slave ideology’ which 
conceptualised some form of the universal equality amongst human beings. It was a penultimate 
ideology given the equality it envisaged did not occur in this life but the next. The completion of the 
slave’s quest for self-consciousness and emancipation was achieved through the secularisation of 
this ideology, the conceptualisation of equality in this life, achieved via the French and American 
Revolutions of the eighteenth century (1992:196).
28 In contrast, he observes the fatalism of Hindu society’s sanctioning of poverty and social 
immobility as a barrier to economic progress (1992:226-8).
29 Fukuyama relies upon Samuel Huntington’s analysis on the question of the relationship between 
Catholicism and democratisation of the 1970s. He notes that Catholicism was presumed to present 
an insuperable barrier to democratisation, particularly in Spain, Portugal and Latin America, but that 
ultimately, this has not been the case (1992:374, fn.8). Unlike Huntington in The Third Wave, 
Fukuyama does not explore in any depth the linkage between Catholicism and the spread of 
democratisation in these regions.
Fukuyama argues the ‘privatisation’ of religion was achieved by Protestantism. He contrasts 
Christianity’s position in the West to other religions which are ‘totalistic’ seeking to regulate both 
the private and the public sphere, ie. Islam and Orthodox Judaism (1992: 216).
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facilitates development. This implies that societies which are dominated in the 
public sphere by religion are less ideologically developed in Fukuyama’s eyes. This 
is evident in his discussion of Islamist movements which Fukuyama dismisses as a 
reaction, rather than a challenge, to Western values. This reaction, he argues, 
emanates from societies which have failed to fully assimilate or resist the influence 
of the West (1992:237). Therefore, for Fukuyama, it is the containment of religion 
as much as its practice that distinguishes the West from other societies.
Race
Like religion, race is not a major element defining Fukuyama’s West. Racial 
politics are treated as an element of political evolution; ethnicity and nationalism as 
earlier forms of the struggle for political recognition based on the groups quest for 
recognition.31 As with religion, he argues race in the form of ethnicity or 
nationality can constitute a barrier to democratisation and to the achievement of a 
rational, universal society since it does not recognise universal human dignity but 
only the dignity for the group (1992:214, 266).32 A rational society, such as liberal 
democracy, is based on the moral value of citizens regardless of their race.'3 
Therefore, overcoming racial or ethnic tensions within a community is a function 
of its ideological evolution. He implies that the development of the liberal 
democratic state in the West was a product of containing ethnic or national strife.
Fukuyama treats ethnic and national identification as similar forces, but views 
national identification as a function of economic and political modernisation/4 
Nationalism is described as a transient rather than a permanent or natural source of
Jl As such, like religious ideology, it has stimulated war and conflict over the centuries.
j2 He notes that nationalism is a specifically modem phenomenon which replaces relationships of 
lordship and bondage with mutual and equal recognition, but it is not fully rational since it extends 
recognition only to those of a certain racial or ethnic group (1992:266-8).
j3 However, he acknowledges that there must be some degree of homogeneity for a stable 
democracy to develop. In a state too deeply divided on ethnic grounds, democracy can aggravate 
rather than help overcome tensions (1992:119, 216).
j4 Nationalism is explained as a function of the elimination of old social divisions, such as kin, tribe 
and sect, under the pressure of labour mobility caused by modernisation of industrialising societies. 
He stresses the recentness and contingency of nationalism as a phenomenon
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identification; as a passion that is pronounced in the early stages of modernisation, 
prior to popular acquisition of a national identity and political freedom:
...for national groups whose identity is more secure and of longer 
standing, the nation as a source of thymotic identification appears to 
decline. (1992:270)35
This evolution, he argues, has taken place in the West where the state bestows 
rights and recognition regardless of race or ethnicity. Moved by the devastation of 
two major wars Europe, in the form of the European Union, has moved past the 
peak of ‘ultranationalism’ represented in fascist Italy and Germany. European 
nationalism has been redefined, defanged and channelled out of politics and into 
culture (1992:270-1). In contrast, he suggests America has been unique in the 
degree to which peoples of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds have been 
assimilated into a society ‘without sharply defined social classes or long-standing 
ethnic and national divisions’ (1992:118).
Fukuyama’s confidence in the degree to which racial and ethnic divisions in the 
West have been overcome by the liberal democratic state may carry weight in 
principle, but in practice is problematic given the persistence of social and 
economic inequalities in the heartland of the West, whether this concerns blacks in 
America or immigrant communities in Europe. His views seem all the more 
remarkable given their publication in the year major race riots shook Los Angeles. 
Fukuyama dismisses persistent racial divisions in the United States as a cultural 
problem, the legacy of pre-modem conditions such as slavery and racism, rather 
than the system of liberal democracy itself (1989:9; 1992:118). However, we are 
left with a disquieting feeling that the homogeneity and equality of the West which 
Fukuyama celebrates is less than authentic.
Power
Theodore Von Laue argues that the most crucial flaw of Fukuyama’s arguments is 
his blindness to the centrality of power (1994:26). Fukuyama undoubtedly seeks to
Thus Fukuyama does not dismiss the continued existence of nationalism in world politics, but 
argues that it will characterise societies less politically developed than the West, such as the newly 
emancipated and developing states of the former Eastern Bloc, and the states of the Third World 
( 1992:272-5).
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demonstrate that the pursuit of power is not the only force which drives mankind/6 
However, his concept of the ‘victory of the Western idea’ is premised on the 
perception of a contest between the West and the socialist East in which the West 
proved the stronger. The power of the West is consistently measured against that of 
the rival socialist system. In many respects, the ‘end of history’ thesis is a 
celebration of a Western, and primarily an American, triumph in both the material 
and the spiritual fields. This victory is described as deriving from the viability of 
the West’s economic and political systems which may be described as the central 
sources of the power of the West as conceptualised by Fukuyama.
Fukuyama argues that although Western capitalism is not the only path to 
modernisation, it is the most viable. The centrally planned economies of the 
Eastern bloc, despite achieving rapid industrialisation in the post-war period, 
proved too cumbersome and insufficiently innovative to compete effectively in the 
more complex and dynamic post-industrial age. In contrast, mechanisms such as 
the pricing system and freedom of thought facilitate innovation and allow capitalist 
economies to satisfy the material needs of societies to an extent that the communist 
economies markedly failed to do (1992:93). Furthermore, he argues that market 
economies provide not only a model for developed states, but for the world, 
becoming the preferred model of development for societies still undergoing 
‘modernisation’. In this context, he contrasts the failure of alternative models of 
development, such as the socialist model and the dependencia strategies of Latin 
America, with the success of the capitalist systems adopted by the late developers 
in East Asia (1992:98, 103).
Fukuyama discusses capitalism primarily as a model of development rather than as 
a form of power in itself. The Western economic model empowers the West in its 
capacity to satisfy the desire for material accumulation, but it also places the West 
at the forefront of the economic evolution of human civilisation, having outshone 
rival models of development. This leads Fukuyama to foresee the creation of a 
universal, consumer culture based on liberal principles, ‘the ultimate victory of the
j6 See, for instance, his discussion of realism (1992: 245-53).
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VCR’ in a celebration of material and consumer culture which resonates with 
American triumphalism (1992:108).37
A second source of Western power lies in its ability to satisfy and contain the 
demands of thymos - the desire for recognition. Liberal democracy is described by 
Fukuyama as a system which satisfies isothymia by providing equal recognition for 
all citizens in a universal state (1992:201-3). However, he also argues that the 
liberal West has succeeded in containing megalothymia, the desire to be recognised 
as superior, channelling this desire away from outlets such as religious and 
nationalist war and into fields such as commerce and representative politics.38 
Fukuyama illustrates this point by drawing examples from the American 
constitutional and political experience, again highlighting the American as the 
archetypal Western system (1992:187, 316). Once again, the strength of the West is 
enhanced through contrasts with the failure of communist regimes to satisfy their 
populations’ needs for dignity and recognition (1992:xix, 166-70, 177-80).
Despite it being a discussion of the end of the Cold War, the issue of military 
power is only briefly considered in this thesis, with only passing references to the 
role of military power in the rise and victory of the West. Fukuyama also dwells
j7 In fact, Fukuyama suggests that the Western consumer culture is one already widely aspired to 
around the globe, even if not yet fully achieved in all societies (1989:3; 1992:108). However, 
despite the undoubted and rapid spread of Western consumer culture in the form of products, 
technologies and images to many parts of the globe, enormous social and economic discrepancies 
remain (Held 1993a:258; Munroe, 1993:262; Peet, 1993a:73). The wealth inequalities between the 
developed and advanced industrial societies, or as Held describes it, the West and the Third World, 
are growing rather than shrinking. As Farrenkopf points out, if capitalist growth in the post-Cold 
War international economic order slows, the attraction of the Western capitalist model may begin to 
pale for many developing countries. Even within Fukuyama’s terms of reference, this would 
seriously impede the democratisation process, since he acknowledges that economic modernisation 
and homogenisation are crucial to democratisation (1992:235).
38 He again draws a contrast between a Lockean and a Hegelian position in this debate, identifying 
himself with the Hegelian which acknowledges, not only the need for self-preservation and to 
provide material satisfaction, but gives greater weight to the need to satisfy the need for human 
dignity, the need for recognition, than do Hobbes or Locke. The Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberalism 
is depicted by Fukuyama as seeing thymos as a dangerous quality which encourages conflict 
(1992:155-8) and which it seeks to suppress under rational desire and the urge for material 
accumulation. Fukuyama feels this is unrealistic since it fails to satisfy the need for recognition. His 
explanation of the success of the American system is in its ability to satisfy both needs, containing 
the dangerous overbearing elements of thymos and channelling them into productive areas 
(1992:185, 192-198, 203, 315-19).
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only briefly on European imperialism. Imperialism is not discussed as a vehicle 
through which the liberal democratic traditions of the West were exported to the 
rest of the world; rather, it is treated as another manifestation of the struggle for 
recognition, in this case the urge to dominate at a macro-level, and as a symptom of 
an earlier phase of development of the West.40 Drawing on Joseph Schumpeter, 
Fukuyama suggests that imperialism was an atavism, a holdover from an earlier 
stage of human social evolution, a symptom of the incomplete sublimation of 
megalothymia into economic activity, and the product of nationalism. Through this, 
he seeks to explain the perpetuation of imperialism long after Europeans had 
discovered the principles of liberty and equality for themselves 41 Furthermore, 
Fukuyama appears confident that imperialism is an aspect of politics that loses its 
legitimacy with the spread of liberal democracy 42 Like religion and nationalism, it 
is portrayed as an aspect of political development, a phase through which the West 
has passed. He spends little time considering the material impact of this experience 
on the formation of the West, failing to investigate the relationship between 
economic activity and imperial expansion. There is also no consideration of United 
States’ expansion in this discussion. Fukuyama does not consider whether the 
spread of Western institutions and ideas which he celebrates could be considered as 
a form of imperialism (Peet, 1993a:72). Consequently, Fukuyama fails to
j9 He notes, for instance, that modern science provided an incentive towards military modernisation 
(1992:73); and also that the defeat of the Soviet system in the Cold War was not marked by any 
significant military victory, but changes in social and economic structures which signalled the 
collapse of ^authoritarian power structures. The communist power collapsed from a lack of 
legitimacy, not military defeat (1992:258).
40 He diagnoses imperialism as a manifestation of the lordship-bondage relationship applied at the 
international level; a further manifestation of the battle for prestige. The desire of the master for 
recognition, rather than the nature of the states-system is seen as the cause of war, with the master in 
this case being the aristocratic classes. Therefore the abolition of the class distinction and 
consequently of the aristocracy through liberal democracy should eventually abolish imperialism 
(1992:245,259).
41 Therefore, he recognises it constituted a failure of the Europeans to universalise the concepts of 
rights realised in the French Revolution (1992:265, 267).
42 He notes: ‘But among each other, liberal democracies manifest little distrust or interest in mutual 
domination. They share with one another principles of universal equality and rights, and therefore 
have no grounds on which to contest each other’s legitimacy ... The argument then is not so much 
that liberal democracy constrains man’s natural instincts for aggression and violence, but that it has 
fundamentally transformed the instincts themselves and eliminated the motive for imperialism’ 
(1992:263).
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investigate a central aspect of the West’s power, the shaping and control of 
international norms and institutions described by Bull as the structures of 
international society. This may be due to Fukuyama’s perception of these norms 
and institutions as universal rather than an aspect of Western power. In this respect, 
Fukuyama’s conception of the West lacks the sophistication of Bull’s. For 
Fukuyama, the power of the West emanates from the strength and viability of its 
economic and political systems. It is power which expands through emulation and 
competition rather than subjugation; it is a largely benevolent conceptualisation of 
the power of the West.
Norms
Although Fukuyama does not specifically investigate norms and institutions as 
elements of the West’s power, they are central to his conception of this community. 
Core norms include equality, individualism, freedom and reciprocal recognition, 
encapsulating the ideals of the French and American Revolutions. They are 
perceived as closely linked to techniques for satisfying society’s need for 
recognition and are therefore central to the perception of the moral progress 
achieved by the West.
The central norm of Fukuyama’s Western liberal democracy is equality; a society 
which recognises the equality of all individuals is the end point of Fukuyama’s 
Hegelian vision. He sees Western societies as based on the rational recognition of 
all citizens as equal in rights, opportunities and obligations, regardless of race, 
religion or any other qualification. In practice, Western societies do not always 
meet these ideals. Inequalities based, for instance, on race, wealth or gender persist. 
Fukuyama argues that these are not due to substantial contradictions within liberal 
democracy, but to its imperfect implementation. He seeks to sweep away 
arguments about existing and inherent inequalities attributing them to factors such 
as talent, the economically necessary division of labour, and to culture Once
43 He also seeks to rebut criticism from the left that capitalism is inherently a system based on the 
unequal distribution of power. Fukuyama suggests that it is in capitalism’s interest to attack 
conventional social relationships based on privilege replacing these with stratifications based on 
skill and education (1992:290). For a discussion of capitalism as a system which sustains inequities 
see Rustin( 1992:99), and Hurrell & Woods(1995) for a critical discussion of assumptions about 
globalisation and the reduction of inequalities.
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again, he presents an image of a cohesive and homogeneous West, allowing his 
thesis to retain theoretical cohesion. However, this tends to mask existing 
differences and their sources.
One of Fukuyama’s difficulties is in reconciling the norm of equality with the 
competing demands of norm of liberty. He fears recognition granted by a fully 
egalitarian society would involve no sense of genuine merit and therefore prove 
ultimately worthless. Fukuyama concurs with Nietzsche that every society needs 
some element of megalothymia, the drive for exceptionalness, in order to remain 
efficient, dynamic and creative (1992:315).44 Although he seeks to resolve this 
tension between equality and liberty by arguing that the West, particularly 
American society, channels the drive for liberty and recognition into politics, 
economics, even sport, he still concedes that the need for struggle and challenge 
persists in all societies, including the West (1992:330).
Fukuyama also lends some weight to concerns of critics from the right that a truly 
democratic society would mean a tolerant society, but the extreme relativism of a 
tolerant society could lead to moral atrophy. He obviously fears the mediocrity and 
the onset of ennui which the peace and prosperity of ‘post-history’ could bring 
(1992:305-12). These tensions raise questions which Fukuyama does not fully 
resolve as to how final and satisfying Western society is. He argues that Western 
liberal democracy represents the end of history in large part because it contains no 
significant internal contradictions, yet cannot dispel the contradictory pull of these 
two core values.
This discussion draws us to Fukuyama’s second key normative component of the 
West, that of freedom: ‘The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal 
insofar as it recognises and protects through a system of law man’s universal right 
to freedom’(1989:5). He describes his conception of freedom as Hegelian, seeing it 
not just as freedom from constraints, but freedom to make moral choice 
(1992:149) 45 Freedom distinguishes and strengthens the West in Fukuyama’s
44 In expounding on the criticism of the right and considering the potential problems which extreme 
equality might breed, Fukuyama draws deeply on Nietzsche’s work and influence.
43 Once again, Fukuyama argues he is distinguishing a Hobbes-Lockean position from a Hegelian. 
His argument throughout is that the analysis of liberal democracy we can derive from Hobbes and
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opinion, since lack of freedom constrains innovative thought and hobbles 
development.46 Thus for him, freedom is both a moral and material good.
Fukuyama’s vision of the freedom enjoyed by the individual in the West is 
qualified by the reality that Western societies balance the needs and desires of the 
individual with those of the community. As Von Laue comments, people living in 
the liberal democracies of the advanced industrial countries are the most subtly 
regimented social order in all human experience (1994:29).47 This brings us to a 
third key normative component of Fukuyama’s West, the status of the individual. 
As Held comments, for Fukuyama, the individual is ‘sacrosanct’ (1993a:272). It is 
the central component of his political philosophy. The individual’s drive for 
recognition is identified as one of the central processes of history. The universal, 
rational state which represents the end of history is one which grants equal 
recognition to all individuals on the grounds of their status as human beings. The 
motivation of the individual underlies both capitalism and democracy (Fukuyama, 
1992:xvi-xx, 42; Rustin, 1992:97).
The importance which Fukuyama attaches to the status of the individual is 
accentuated by his concern with the communitarian focus of Asian societies where 
the stronger emphasis placed on group identity could inhibit the operation of
Locke is limited in that it elevates self-preservation and material accumulation, over the drive for 
recognition. Within the drive for recognition is the desire for prestige which he suggests was seen by 
Hobbes as the source of war. However, Fukuyama argues that it also underlies the capacity of the 
individual to rise above narrow self-interest to sacrifice themselves for the public good. Therefore, it 
also lies at the root of courage and public-spiritedness. The drive for recognition is accorded much 
greater importance in Hegel’s philosophy, according to Fukuyama. Consequently, he argues that 
Hegel’s conception of man’s nature entails a moral dimension which the Hobbes-Lockean 
conception lacks, a moral dimension, viewed as the motor driving the dialectical process of history 
(1992:161). Some would feel that this as a rather harsh representation of the ethical dimension of 
Locke’s work.
46 Totalitarian systems, he suggests, seek to totally control the lives of their citizens, crushing civil 
society (1992:24).
47 Knutsen suggests Fukuyama’s understanding of freedom is not Hegelian. His reading of Hegel 
suggests that, for Hegel, ‘freedom’ ties the freedom of the individual with the standards of the state, 
implying the subjugation of the individual to the state: ‘An individual is free only when he is an 
obedient citizen of a state with laws dictated by Reason; he is free only insofar as his private will 
coincides with his duty to the state. In this claim, critics of Hegel see not liberal democracy but the 
totalitarian state’ (Knutsen, 1991:81). He argues that Fukuyama’s concept of freedom is in the 
liberal tradition, being ‘the absence of state restraint on individual actions’ (Knutsen, 1991:81). 
However, Fukuyama does appear to see freedom as entailing more than freedom from restraint, 
entailing elements of mutual recognition between citizens, and between citizens and the state.
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democracy.48 The ‘paternalistic authoritarianism’ of some Asian societies is 
viewed as distinguishing Asia from the West at the political and normative level 
(1992:238-42)49 However, elsewhere Fukuyama stresses the importance of 
community to maintaining a healthy liberal democracy. In both The End of History 
and even more emphatically in Trust, he acknowledges that democratic, and 
particularly American, society relies upon a strong communitarian tradition 
(1992:326, 1995b:50, 279). He demonstrates concern with an excess of extreme 
rights-centred individualism in contemporary American society, throwing out the 
balance between individualism and communitarianism (1992:292-96; 1995b:277- 
81, 313-18; 1995d:31). While a central plank of his thesis is that the rational 
recognition by the state of the individual is the most satisfying basis for society, he 
qualifies this by acknowledging that recognition by the state can be cold and 
impersonal (1992:323). In this context, community becomes an important 
mediating element between the individual and the state, providing a significant 
source of recognition in itself, and acting as a source of moral values. Fukuyama 
can neither rationalise nor dismiss it. He struggles with the notion that 
communitarianism is an important element of moral community which is under 
attack from the atomisation of liberal economic principles and moral relativism 
that accompanies the democratic principle of equality:
Liberal democracies, in other words, are not self sufficient: the 
community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a 
source different from liberalism itself.(1992:326)
Therefore, Fukuyama’s West relies heavily upon the norm of individualism which
distinguishes it from other societies, but which is qualified by the continuing
importance of community. To survive, Western liberal democracy needs to support
both individualism and community. Yet there is a tension between these two norms
48 In ‘Confucianism and Democracy’, he suggests that this difference in attitude to the individual 
stems from the idea of a transcendent morality which enables the individual to repudiate all forms of 
social obligation, from the family to the state. This concept, he argues, derives from Christianity, but 
is retained in modem liberalism in the concept of underlying human nature as a basis of right 
(Fukuyama, 1995d:29-30).
49 In the End o f History^ 1992), Fukuyama finds it useful to compare and contrast large trends in 
Western and Asian cultures as wholes. In Trust{ 1995b), however, Fukuyama works to dispel the 
monolithic image of regional cultures, pointing out parallels between societies from Asia and 
Europe, and differences between societies within these regions.
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since community naturally constrains individualism. He does not resolve this 
tension which is one that prevails in American liberal thought and American 
society. A high priority is placed on the independence and freedom of the 
individual, but the impact of the decline of community is also desperately feared.
Institutions
There are important institutional features bounding Fukuyama’s West. The liberal 
state is its central institution. He sees the state driven not simply by the pursuit of 
power, but also by the quest for legitimacy. The states of the West achieve 
legitimacy through liberalism and democracy which satisfy the population’s 
material and spiritual needs.50 They extend recognition to their citizens through 
popular sovereignty and the rule of law, and protect the individual’s right to 
material accumulation. Fukuyama’s sense of recognition is twofold. First, the 
citizens of the state reciprocally recognise each other; secondly, the citizens and the 
state recognise each other, in the granting of rights and in the obeying of laws 
(1992:200, 203).51
His discussion represents the Western state as liberal in both the political and 
economic sense. Economic liberalism is defined as ‘the recognition of the right of 
free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property and 
markets’ (1992:44). In the economic sense then, liberalism and the West are 
equated with capitalist economics.52 Political liberalism is defined as ‘a rule of law
50 Legitimacy is described as a relative concept that exists in people’s subjective perceptions. 
Therefore, the criteria is not the same for each regime. It can stem from a variety of sources, 
including ideology or personal loyalty; but all regimes ‘capable of effective action must be based on 
some principle of legitimacy’. Legitimacy is crucial even to the most unjust or bloody regime. In an 
authoritarian regime, legitimacy may be achieved through the acknowledgment of powerful elites, 
through personal loyalty, or ideology. Fukuyama argues, for instance, that Nazism based its claim to 
legitimacy on racial ideology, demonstrated through the mechanism of struggle and war. Therefore 
its failure in war undermined its legitimacy (1992:15-7).
31 Once again on this point, Fukuyama distinguishes the liberalism of Hobbes and Locke from that 
of Hegel. The liberal society envisaged by the Anglo-Saxon school, he argues, is a reciprocal and 
equal agreement among citizens not to interfere with each others lives and property. The Hegelian 
liberal society is reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to mutually recognise each other 
(1992:200).
32 As Van Steenbergen notes, Fukuyama’s concept of rights encompasses only civil and political 
rights. He chooses to omit economic and social rights, in that these are not ‘clearly compatible’ with 
other rights like those of property and free economic exchange (Fukuyama, 1992:43, Van 
Steenbergen, 1992:713). Drawing on the work of James Bryce, Fukuyama includes civil rights,
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that recognises certain individual rights or freedoms from government control’ 
(1992:42). Economic and political liberalism are treated as linked, but not in the 
sense of democracy emerging as a function of rational accumulation. Rather, he 
sees modernisation leading to capitalism, demanding a better educated population 
and heightening political consciousness (1992:116). This produces dissatisfaction 
with traditional political structures and demands for participation in the political 
process: ‘The desire for recognition, then, is the missing link between liberal 
economics and liberal politics’ (1992:206). Therefore, the evolution of democracy 
is an aspect of man’s ideological evolution. He defines democracy as ‘the right 
held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is the right of 
all citizens to vote and participate in politics’(1989:5; 1992:43). The liberal state is
53‘democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed’.
The institutions which exemplify his West are American political institutions. The 
United States’ constitution and Declaration of Independence supports both the 
‘pursuit of happiness’ in terms of acquisition of property, and the exercise of 
popular sovereignty and free expression of political views (1992:159, 186). For 
him, the United States and England represent the strongest and longest established 
contemporary democracies. This observation reminds us of the limited historical 
scope of the thesis, given that modem democracies are a fairly recent historical 
phenomenon evolving only in the late eighteenth century.
Interaction Between the West and Non-West
Fukuyama’s perception of the cultural world order is distinguished for the 
preceding authors discussed by the strength of its underlying concept of a linear 
civilising process. Human society is perceived as on a journey of ideological 
revelation, a form of civilising process with the West as the vanguard, and which
rights of exemption of control of the citizen in respect of person and property; religious rights of 
freedom of worship; and political rights, freedom from control in matters that do not effect the 
welfare of the community, including of the press (1992:42).
A number of critics, particularly from the left, are unhappy about Fukuyama’s representation of 
capitalism and democracy as intrinsically linked, suggesting there are alternative constitutions of 
democracy, such as social democracy, which remain viable in the post-Cold War world. Such 
arguments challenge the surety and homogeneity of Fukuyama’s ideological model of the West as 
the only viable institutional model of the post-Cold War order.
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culminates in the system of liberal democracy. The West is the norm, presenting 
the standard which other societies must reach. The anticipated universalisation of 
Western liberal democracy dominates Fukuyama’s understanding of the West’s 
interaction with the non-West.
This concept of civilisational interaction is dominated by the processes of progress 
and modernisation. Fukuyama identifies technological and industrial development 
as leading to social, economic and political homogenisation. In anticipating that 
modernisation induces homogenisation, Fukuyama makes more explicit the 
implicit links between his ideas and those of development theorists of the 1950s 
and 1960s, such as Almond. He notes the ‘remarkable universality of 
modernisation’, observing that the aspiration to economic modernisation is ‘one of 
the most universal characteristics of human society one can imagine’ (Fukuyama, 
1994:245).54 Although his concept of liberalisation is complicated by the 
importance which he attaches to the desire for recognition, he clearly links the 
quest for recognition with economic evolution. Moreover, like the early 
modernisation theorists, Fukuyama assumes that the result of modernisation will be 
development along the lines of the Western liberal democratic model. However, he 
does not take the course of modernisation as predetermined in that he interprets the 
history of the twentieth century as dominated by ideological battles for control of 
the direction of modernity. His discussion of civilisational interaction prior to 1989 
focuses on this battle in the context of the Cold War.
The key challenges to the West prior to 1989 which Fukuyama discusses are rival 
ideologies which sought to present themselves as higher forms of civilisation 
(1992:35). Fascism and communism are described as ideologies that also arose 
from the modernisation process, offering alternative social systems, structures and 
institutions for development. Both are presented as diseases of social development 
rather than ideologies representing particular qualities of Western society, despite 
their both originating within the West. Fascism is rapidly dismissed as a ‘radical 
and deformed outgrowth of nineteenth century imperialism’; an alternative
34 Fukuyama in fact suggests that that scholars were perhaps too hasty in casting off modernisation 
theory (1994:246).
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exploratory route to modernisation, but one that proved a dead end (1989:16).53 
The relationship between the West and the communist East plays a much more 
significant role in Fukuyama’s discussion, but Marxism-Leninism is similarly 
treated as an alternative ‘route’ to the end of history which proved ultimately 
unsatisfactory (1992:133).56 The communist Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
constitute the chief antitheses and rival to Fukuyama’s West. He constantly draws 
the boundaries of the West in contrast to those of the communist world in 
comparisons which rarely favour Marxism-Leninism. Communism’s demise is 
depicted as stemming from both material and spiritual sources, ultimately 
producing a crisis of legitimacy in various communist regimes.57 Fukuyama’s 
discussion of the inflexibility of the Soviet system and economy, leading to its 
inability to compete with the dynamic and more efficient West, again reminds us of
c o
his antecedents from the political science community of the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, Fukuyama suggests not so much the convergence but submergence of the 
Soviet system into the West, due in no small part to the incentives and attractions 
of the West’s consumer culture.
China provides a further defeated rival to the West; again, it is presented as an 
ideological rather than a cultural rival. He suggests that China has also been 
seduced by, and submerged into, the consumer culture with the inevitable long­
term political consequences of gradual homogenisation. Fukuyama argues that
53 He is keen to dismiss this ideology as a terrible mutation, ‘a pathological and extreme condition, 
by which one cannot judge modernity as a whole’. Hence, it is ‘a by product of the modernisation 
process, but not a necessary component of modernity’ (1992:129).
36 The significance of this is that other challenges which might seem to manifest new authoritarian 
challenges can be dismissed by Fukuyama’s thesis as already tried and doomed to failure.
57 Economic failure is described as ‘catalysing rejection of the belief system and exposing the 
weakness of the underlying structure’(1992:29). He highlights a crisis of confidence in the Soviet 
elites of the 1980s (1992:30-1). The Soviet system, he argues, also failed to provide the dignity and 
recognition needed. In this sense, ‘indignation’ is attributed as a major source of discontent, 
facilitating small acts of defiance that accumulated into a revolution leading to a broader rejection of 
that system (1992:177-80).
58 The various ‘convergence theories’ proposed at this time suggested that the Western and Soviet 
systems would eventually evolve similar economic and political systems. For some, this involved 
the West moving towards more socialist forms of organisation. But there also existed a strong 
opinion that economic modernisation would demand the Soviet bloc to move toward more pluralist 
institutions, reducing the role of ideology and the Communist party (Meyer, 1970:320).
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under Deng Xiao Ping, a revolution of real governance occurred. Those familiar 
with China know that:
Marxism and ideological principle have become virtually irrelevant 
as guides to policy, and that bourgeois consumerism has a real 
meaning in that country for the first time since the revolution. 
(1989:11)
Thus, Fukuyama reads the death notice for Marxism-Leninism as a living, 
appealing ideology:
Communism, which had once portrayed itself as a higher and more 
advanced form of civilisation than liberal democracy, would 
henceforth be associated with a high degree of political and 
economic backwardness. While communist power persists in the 
world, it has ceased to reflect a dynamic and appealing idea. 
(1992:35)
Given that communism forms the quintessential ‘other’ in Fukuyama’s 
conceptualisation of the West, it is particularly interesting to note the close 
relationship between Fukuyama’s political ideas and Marxism. As Conor Cruise 
O’Brien points out, both ideologies arose from the Enlightenment, sharing a 
secular emphasis and a common commitment to science and reason.59 Similarly, 
there are strong links between the ideals of Fukuyama and Karl Marx. Both draw 
heavily on Hegel to develop a philosophy which is linear, progressive, premised on 
stages of development strongly focused on material culture and the conquest and 
control of nature, and both posit the ‘end of history’. Huntington goes so far as to 
argue that Fukuyama’s thesis suggests not the disappearance of Marxism, but its 
pervasiveness (Huntington, 1989:9). Similarly, Mestrovic discusses Fukuyama’s 
thesis as a ‘not so subtle revival of Marxism’ for non-Marxist purposes (Mestrovic, 
1994:16).60 However, Fukuyama and Marx differ in their reading of Hegel on the
39 0 ’Brien(1995) argues that liberalism and Marxism represent two essential strands of the 
Enlightenment; one moderate and reformist, the other revolutionary. He traces the evolution of the 
more ‘pragmatic and limited’ strand of Enlightenment thought which developed in England into 
liberalism, and a more radical tradition of thought which evolved in France and provided the 
foundations for first the French Revolution and then Marxism. O’Brien describes this strand as 
‘anti-Christian, utopian, arbitrary and unlimited’. The reformist strand evolved into Anglophone 
liberalism, the more radical was articulated in the French, and subsequently Russian and Chinese 
revolutions.
60 Mestrovic discusses Hegel, Marx and Fukuyama as scholars firmly embedded in the 
Enlightenment traditions, with faith in ‘the victory of grand, modernist, social engineering over
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stability of liberal society. For Marx, a fundamental contradiction remained in 
liberal society between capital and labour, implying that it did not constitute the 
‘end of history’, but the victory of the bourgeoisie. Fukuyama draws his reading of 
Hegel from Kojeve for whom communism did not represent a higher stage than 
liberal democracy: ‘[I]t was part of the same stage of history that would eventually 
universalise the spread of liberty and equality to all parts of the world’ (1992:66).61 
For Fukuyama, the class issue has been resolved in the West in ‘the egalitarianism 
of modem America’(1989:9). Fukuyama rejects suggestions that he is rejuvenating 
a Marxist project, arguing that his book was written as an attack on the economic 
reductionism of Marxism, ‘to recover the richness of human motivation embodied 
in the concept of the struggle for recognition’(1994:255). He emphasises that his 
analysis looks, not only at material sources of human satisfaction, but also at 
thymotic needs. Ultimately, Fukuyama draws the boundaries between himself and
/TO
Marxism by portraying the impact of Marxism on societies as repressive. 
Fukuyama is keen, if not anxious, to distance himself from the Marxist perspective. 
Yet, in some ways, this highlights the degree to which the ideas of these scholars 
parallel one another, accenting the commonalities as much as the differences 
between Marxist and liberal systems of thought. This illustrates that Marxism is 
not alien to, but actually closely integrated with, intellectual traditions of the West.
tradition and culture’. He contrasts their faith in modernity to De Tocqueville’s belief in tradition 
and culture as the source from which democracy emerges. This is interesting given Fukuyama’s use 
of De Tocqueville as a source for his own ideas on the role of community in American democracy 
and society (Mestrovic, 1994:14-6).
61 In 1989 Fukuyama wrote: ‘We are still living with the consequences of Marx’s attempt to 
confront Hegel: ... The total and manifest failure of communism forces us to ask whether Marx’s 
entire experiment was not a 150-year detour and whether we need to reconsider whether Hegel was 
not in fact right in seeing the end of history in the liberal democratic states of the French and 
American Revolutions (1989/90:22). Fukuyama’s attachment to Kojeve’s reading of Hegel as 
opposed to Marx’s seems somewhat ironic given Kojeve’s earlier support of communist society as 
promising the end of history.
62 See also Fukuyama (1989:7) where he ascribes the failure to understand many key historical 
changes, such as the reform movements in China and the Soviet Union, to the mistake of attributing 
material cause to phenomena that are essentially ideal in nature. As suggested above, economic 
reductionism is a charge he also levels at Anglo-Saxon liberalism in arguing that it seeks to 
subordinate the drive for recognition under rational desire (1992:158, 185; 1994:252).
63 For instance, he identifies the ‘sinister’ use of Marxist’s concept of history to support regimes he 
describes as authoritarian and coercive, such as in the Soviet Union and China (1992:69).
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Fukuyama’s East is, in a sense, a closely integrated part of the West. It is, in some 
ways, a mirror of the Western soul.
Fukuyama’s perception of civilisational interaction leads him to see the victory of 
the ‘Western idea’ of liberal democracy as a defining moment in the progress of 
human civilisation. He celebrates the victory of ‘the West’ in ‘the total exhaustion 
of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism’ (1989:3).64 In focusing on 
history as ideological evolution, he demonstrates most clearly the influence of 
Hegelian thinking on his own conceptualisation of civilisational interaction. 
However, despite his interest in the processes of history, Fukuyama’s analysis does 
not provide an in-depth historical perspective. There is little detailed consideration 
of the forms of non-Westem societies which preceded modernisation, nor of the 
actual process by which the system of Western values displaces other 
‘civilisations’, outside of the ‘battle for modernity’, or the Cold War rivalry.
Ultimately, the end of the Cold War did not bring universal peace and stability. The 
triumphalism of 1989 was muted by the stormy international politics of the 1990s. 
Fukuyama, however, remains confident that the liberal democratic West now 
provides the uncontested model of development for human civilisation. He 
continues to argue that the institutions and ideas of the liberal West, whilst not yet 
universally achieved, could not be improved upon (Fukuyama, 1992:46; 1994:241; 
Roth well, 1995). This places the onus on other societies to respond to the West and 
pursue its model of development, implying that interaction between the West and 
non-West will continue on a different plane and be even more markedly 
determined by levels of development.
With the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama views interaction as influenced no longer 
by ideological rivalry, but by a societies’ relationship to ‘history’ and ‘post-history. 
Echoing earlier international legal theorists, and in keeping with the analysis of 
contemporary commentators such as Singer & Wildavsky(1993), Fukuyama’s 
concept of the post-Cold War world is characterised by an image of the world
64 ‘As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and 
socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of 
potentially universal validity: linear democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular 
sovereignty’ (1992:42).
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divided into two zones:63 ‘post-history’ comprises established liberal democracies 
which, Fukuyama argues, form an innately peaceable community of states which 
have reached the end of history and are now more preoccupied with economics 
rather than politics and ideology. While the nation-state would continue as a 
political entity, economic rationalism will reduce tensions and increase 
interdependence. Fukuyama’s prime example of this community is the European 
Union. Here, the ‘death of ideology’ means
...the growing ‘Common Marketization’ of international relations, 
and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between 
states. (Fukuyama, 1989:18)66
In contrast, the ‘historical’ world remains dominated by power politics and riven 
with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts.67 Fukuyama’s ‘post­
history’ is normatively and institutionally synonymous with the West, implying that 
the zone of history and power politics chiefly comprises the non-West. Whilst
z:o
power politics would still influence interaction between the two zones, he 
suggests that the zone of peace will expand globally as more societies evolve to 
reach ‘the end of history’, promising a more peaceful and prosperous world 
(1992.279-80).69 Therefore Fukuyama’s perception of interaction entails 
assumptions drawn from democratic peace theory, that democracies do not fight 
each other and that the spread of democracy consequently promises a more
63 Earlier international legal theorists had envisaged the world as divided between those within the 
civilised normative and legal community of international society and those less civilised societies 
lying outside this community. See chapter Five for further discussion. See also Gong(1984). Singer 
and Wildavsky, like Fukuyama, suggest that the post-Cold War world will be divided into two 
zones, one liberal, prosperous and peaceful, the other characterised by conflict and instability. See 
also Goldgeier & McFaul(1992) and Hurrell & Woods(1995).
66 Fukuyama elaborates that the establishment of a more peaceful society in the West has been 
established by the sublimation of thymos, the source of war (1992:255). It is also due to the spread 
of compassion and tolerance which accompanies the spread of democracies (1992:261).
67 In the ‘historical’ world, the nation-state will continue to be the chief locus of political 
identification (Fukuyama, 1992:276-7).
68 Fukuyama identifies three likely axes of interaction and conflict; oil; immigration and ‘world 
order questions’ such as regulation of technological proliferation and environmental interests 
(1992:277-8).
69 This, then, is an added incentive to speed up the establishment of liberal democracies, in other 
words to enhance the Westernisation process.
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peaceful world.70 His theory demonstrates substantial faith in the continued 
stability of liberal democracies, and their capacity to spread effectively and 
universally. His argument dismisses the significance of conflicts which continue in 
the heartland of the ‘post-history’ West, such as tensions in Ireland or Spain, by 
proposing that large-scale conflicts between states disappear in the liberal, 
democratic zone of peace. However, these instances of conflict suggest that even in 
the West, ‘history’ has been incompletely played ou t/1
Fukuyama shows tremendous commitment to the capacity of the Western idea to 
expand globally. In contrast to Bull, he anticipates and expects rather than explores 
in detail the mechanism of this expansion. For Farrenkopf, Fukuyama’s faith in the 
spread of liberalism and capitalism are one aspect of his political idealism 
(1995:74). For Sardar, they demonstrate a narrow perspective which assumes the 
primacy of Western models and ideas, even in the non-West, Sardar places 
Fukuyama in a tradition of writers ‘who have laboured to appropriate non-Westem 
histories and place Western civilisation at the apex of human achievement (Sardar, 
1992:498). Fukuyama’s historical perspective is undoubtedly Western-focused. As 
noted above, the ‘end of history’ gives little consideration to the details and 
conditions of non-Westem societies other than communist societies. This leads to 
Fukuyama’s much commented upon remark that for his purposes,
...it matters very little what strange thoughts occur to people in
Albania or Burkino Faso, for we are interested in what one could in
some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind.
(1989:9)
He clearly sees the direction of the flow of major ideologies as moving from the 
First to the Third World, from the West to the ‘Rest’ (1989/90:24).
/0 Fukuyama’s assumptions about democratic peace also demonstrate a belief in the interaction of 
capitalism and democracy as the foundation of democracy which can also be found in the work of 
authors such as Joseph Schumpeter, as discussed by Michael Doyle (Doyle, 1986).
71 Fukuyama’s democratic peace theory also depends heavily on his assessment of the sources of 
conflict. For instance, Held notes his neglect of systemic sources of conflict and schism 
(1993b:295).
72 Sardar argues Fukuyama gives non-Western cultures three choices: they can disappear, be 
subdued by military technology or embrace consumerism 1(1992:499).
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Fukuyama’s discussion of interaction is at a theoretical level acultural, as is his 
discussion of interaction at the ideological level. Political movements driven by 
religious, ethnic or nationalist sentiments of ideologies are therefore not viewed by 
Fukuyama as major challenges to the civilising process, but temporary features of 
societies still evolving through ‘history’. The existence of such movements does 
not determine, but does condition interaction between the West and non-West. For 
instance, he does not see Islamic fundamentalism as a major challenge to the West, 
since it does not have a universalist appeal (1989/90:26). This discussion gives 
little consideration to the impact of Islam on societies in which it is a powerful and 
spreading forced Nationalism is treated as a more serious threat to stability, but 
not to the long-term and overall appeal and spread of liberal ideas. For instance, 
nationalism in the societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is
...a necessary concomitant to spreading democratisation, as national 
and ethnic groups long denied a voice express themselves in favour 
of sovereignty and independent existence. (1992:272)
Nationalism is therefore treated as a political movement found in countries still
developing their political identities, mirroring an evolutionary phase through which
the West has already proceeded (1992:269-75). In this sense, nationalist
movements do not present new challenges to the West, or represent alternative
systems, but reconstitute challenges already met.
However, Fukuyama’s position regarding the impact of cultural diversity on the 
progress of the Western idea exhibits important tensions. Having dismissed Islam 
and nationalism, the most significant challenge to the universalisation of the West 
which he identifies is the paternalistic authoritarian regimes of East Asia. Although 
these regimes are capitalist and nominally democratic, Fukuyama is concerned that 
the strong group identification which these societies derive from their culture 
represses individualism and may seriously undermine the institutions of liberal 
democracy as understood in the West (1992:238). Furthermore, the economic 
success experienced by these societies in the early and mid 1990s could prompt 
rejection of the Western model. Although he argues that the process of systemic
7j One might consider, for instance, its growing impact on the social and political life of Africa, 
Southeast Asia and, perhaps, on urban populations in the United States and Europe.
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evolution has ended with liberal democracy and market-based capitalism, 
signalling the persistence of cultural, but not institutional differences (1995c: 103), 
he elsewhere suggests that the success of development in East Asia and the 
perceived decline in American living standards reduces the likelihood that Asian 
societies would converge upon the American model of liberal democracy 
(1995d:30-l). This appears to suggest alternative models for development, ones in 
which there is a different balance between individualism and communitarianism 
(1995d:33). What are the consequences of this challenge for the homogenisation of 
the Western idea which Fukuyama anticipates follows economic modernisation? A 
rejection could have serious implications for his thesis. It could be viewed as a 
short term set back to the universalisation of the West, or could present a more 
fundamental challenge by providing an alternative model of development, implying 
the Western idea was not universal (McCamey, 1993:47). The tension in 
Fukuyama’s position is exacerbated by the fact that, although he establishes the 
ideal of universal and homogenous recognition as the highest form of governance, 
he recognises that it is not totally satisfying for the individual citizen. While 
Fukuyama argues that the paternalistic authoritarian societies of Asia cannot offer a 
universal model of governance, he acknowledges that important elements of group 
identification for which he criticises these societies, the appeal of community, can 
be found even in Western society.
The ambiguities in Fukuyama’s position on culture are compounded by the fact 
that, although he argues that modernisation encourages homogenisation regardless 
of the pre-existing culture, he also concedes that pre-existing cultures can facilitate 
or inhibit the establishment of capitalism and democracy.74 Fukuyama sees the 
liberal democratic state as an institution which is central, but not unique to the 
West.75 On the contrary, he argues that a liberal revolution is occurring worldwide, 
implying the democratic state is a universal institutional model (1992:50).
74 Recall, for instance, Fukuyama’s discussion of the importance of the work ethic in establishing 
capitalism in Europe and Asia (1992:227).
75 5x5It is interesting to note that here he is critical of Weber’s account of modem democracyAarising 
out of the specific conditions of the Occidental city: ‘The fact that democracy took off because it 
was the most rational possible political system and ‘fit’ a broader human personality shared across 
cultures is not seriously considered’ (Fukuyama, 1992:220).
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Fukuyama seeks to demonstrate that barriers to democracy, such as religion, ethnic 
consciousness or unequal social structures, characterise societies at a certain level 
of development rather than* permanently antithetical to the system (1992:215-8). 
Democracy is presented as part of the common evolutionary direction of humanity, 
regardless of culture.76 However, this assertion is qualified by Fukuyama’s 
attention to cultural conditions that facilitate or inhibit the development of stable 
democracy. In this context, he cites examples from Europe where in spite of the 
pre-existing culture, democracy experienced difficulties in becoming established; 
and examples outside of the traditional Western heartland, such as India, where 
democracy became established in spite of a pre-existing culture which did not 
favour democracy (1992:221). On the one hand, Fukuyama argues that the liberal 
democratic state over-rides and homogenises pre-existing forms of community. Yet 
on the other, he suggests that pre-modem forms of association can facilitate the 
establishment of liberal democratic structures, and are even vital to protecting these 
institutions:77
Successful political modernisation thus requires the preservation of 
something pre-modem within its framework of rights and 
constitutional arrangements, the survival of peoples and the 
incomplete victory of states. (1992:222)
These qualifications suggest Fukuyama concedes that culture is a significant 
element in the spread of democracy, and imply the development of liberal 
democracy is most likely in societies similar to the European-based cultures from 
which it emerged. These questions suggest a tension between Fukuyama’s 
teleological view of development in which other cultures are submerged into the 
West by the ‘civilising process’, and his recognition of the importance of existing 
cultures in facilitating the ‘civilising process’.
Furthermore, he acknowledges resistance to homogenisation at the level of cultural 
identities:
76 See, for instance, ‘Confucianism and Democracy’ where, in noting that Confucianism does not 
present a major barrier to democracy, Fukuyama again argues that democracy is linked with the 
processes of modernisation (Fukuyama, 1995d).
77 Furthermore, he argues that a successful liberal democracy must establish an irrational pride in its 
democratic culture to bind the community to this culture (1992:215).
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While the forms of acceptable economic and political organisation 
have been growing steadily fewer in number over the past hundred 
years, the possible interpretations of the surviving forms, capitalism 
and liberal democracy, continue to be varied. This suggests that 
even as ideological differences between states fade into the 
background, important differences between states will remain, 
shifted however to the plane of culture and economics. (1992:244)
In his subsequent work Trust (1995b), Fukuyama further acknowledges the
salience of culture in the modem world. However, he distinguishes himself from
Huntington, arguing that cultural difference does not necessarily lead to conflict
(1995b:6). Fukuyama explores the relationship between culture and economics,
suggesting culture influences the character and industrial structure of societies. The
key cultural characteristic that he identifies is the level of social capital, or trust,
which exists in a society. The degree to which the society is based upon open and
mutual trust influences the nature and structure of economic development.
However, this analysis is based on a discussion of national rather than broad
civilisational cultures. In fact, Fukuyama attempts to eradicate such simplified
notions as a single Asian culture. Whilst Asian societies share common cultural
characteristics, he argues there is no single Asian model of development or unified
challenge to the West (Fukuyama, 1995c:97).7S However, he continues to assume
that the institutional models of Western liberal democracy define the parameters
within which all societies will evolve.79 In Trust, Fukuyama addresses cultural
differentiation, but maintains that it will not inhibit institutional and, presumably,
ideological convergence towards a liberal political and economic system.
Consequently, the impression remains of a single civilising process with ‘the West’
at its forefront.
In part, Fukuyama’s problems arise from seeking to represent the Western idea as a 
universal and homogenising process. Yet his analysis gives rise to uncertainty as to 
whether Asian societies present a reinterpretation or a substantial deviation from
78 He argues Japan has more in common with Germany and the United States as communitarian, 
‘high-trust’ societies in comparison to the family orientated ‘low-trust’ societies such as China, Italy 
and France.
79 Institution building, he argues, has reached a ‘dead-end’ with the establishment of liberal 
democratic political institutions and capitalist economic structures throughout the developed world 
(1995c: 102).
229
the Western model. This raises the question of whether Fukuyama can sustain his 
concept of a single civilising process, or if there is space for a plurality of 
civilisational projects, a theory which might acknowledge a greater role for culture 
and diversity.
Conclusion
Despite these problems, Fukuyama’s thesis is important since he articulates an 
important and powerful conception of the West and its role in the post-Cold War 
world - a voice of liberal idealism, to some, a voice of Western neo-imperialism to 
others. His conception is shaped by his focus on the United States, which serves as 
his paramount model of the West. His thesis is premised on a conception of 
cultural world order in which humanity is perceived as a community journeying 
through a process of ideological evolution. The West appears not as one among 
many civilisations, but as an ideology at the forefront of a civilising process. He 
clearly perceives interaction in the post-Cold War world to be shaped by the levels 
of ideological evolution and development of different societies.
Fukuyama’s predominantly optimistic concept of the West stands in stark contrast 
to the bleak, declinist image which Spengler invokes in his reading of late 
modernity. They stand as polar opposites with respect to Fukuyama’s belief in 
human progress, his faith in science, his focus on the United States as the heartland 
of the West in contrast to Spengler’s focus on Germany, and in Fukuyama’s 
positive assessment of the norms and institutions of the liberal democratic state. 
Whereas Fukuyama sees these as the culmination of man’s ideological evolution, 
Spengler regards them as marking the West’s gradual decline. Fukuyama's 
optimism about the spread of liberal democracy also stands in contrast to 
Toynbee’s scepticism about the successful transfer of norms and institutions across 
cultures.
At one level, Toynbee and the international society scholars, like Fukuyama, regard 
the West as a universalised entity. However, in viewing the West as the theoretical 
model towards which other societies are evolving, Fukuyama’s West provides 
more than a technical or normative framework for modem civilisational 
interaction. Furthermore, unlike Bull, Fukuyama does not ground his analysis on
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the global normative and institutional power of the West, but on its ideological 
ascendancy in the battle for modernity. Its appeal is deemed to be universal, 
irrespective of culture, given that culture is ultimately subsumed by modernity.
However, problems within this thesis undermine confidence in Fukuyama’s 
conception of civilisation as a singular process. His concept of the West is an 
idealised one. It is largely portrayed as homogenous and united with little 
consideration given to the serious differences and inequalities that exist. 
Ultimately, Fukuyama seems uncertain whether liberal democracy can sustain 
itself, given inner tensions relating to core elements of the Western ideology, such 
as the relationship between the individual and community, and the balance between 
liberty and equality.80 This casts doubt on Fukuyama’s assertion that Western 
liberal democratic society is one which contains no major contradictions. Finally, 
the thesis implies the relevance of Western models to other societies with 
insufficient exploration of the complexities of non-Westem societies. Fukuyama’s 
discussion of Asian development, however, suggests that other models of 
development may be emerging. The extent to which these merely adapt or 
undermine the Western model is uncertain. This raises important questions as to 
whether civilisational interaction leads to greater convergence or differentiation in 
the cultural world order. The overall thrust of Fukuyama’s thesis is to suggest 
convergence along the Western model. This is an argument which is strongly 
disputed by the next author to be considered, Samuel Huntington.
80 These concerns are also expressed in voices of contemporary American liberals reflecting on 
challenges to their society today. Consider, for instance, recent debates over issues such as welfare 
and gun ownership.
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Chapter Seven
Civilisations in Conflict: Samuel Huntington’s Conception
of the West
Published in the American journal, Foreign Affairs in 1993, Samuel Huntington’s 
‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ had a resounding impact on intellectual and political 
communities worldwide. It was described by some commentators as the ‘X’ article 
of the 1990s, with reference to George Kennan’s path breaking Foreign Affairs 
article of 1947 (Kennan, 1947). The essay projected issues of civilisation and 
identity to the fore of the study of contemporary world politics, arguing that 
cultural identities are becoming the organising principle of international relations:
Spurred by modernisation, global politics is being reconfigured 
along cultural lines ....Cultural communities are replacing Cold War 
blocs, and the fault lines between civilisations are becoming the 
central lines of conflict in politics. (1996a: 125)
In the light of this reconfiguration, Huntington advises the West to abandon its
universalist pretensions, and recognise the realities and threats of a multicultural
world, threats which include a hostile Islamic and resurgent Asian civilisations. It
should consolidate its own power and solidarity and refrain from undue
interference in other civilisations.
Huntington’s article has been influential, in part because it provides a radical and 
controversial reading of post-Cold War world politics. It has stimulated a range of 
responses debating the role of civilisations, and of the West in particular, in world 
politics. The article’s impact was enhanced by the influence and respect which its 
author commands, particularly in the United States. This chapter will focus on the 
publications in which he discusses the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, primarily his 
1993 essay and his subsequent book The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking 
of World Order (1996a) and the debate which it generated. The debate itself helps
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to elucidate key factors in the conceptions of the West and world order which 
Huntington represents.1 2 The discussion will also refer to Huntington’s related 
publications on topics such as modernisation and democratisation.
Within Huntington’s somewhat pessimistic reading of the future of world politics 
lies a conception of the West which rejects Fukuyama’s assumptions of 
universality and harkens back to the visions of Toynbee, and even Spengler, of the 
West as a powerful community under threat of decline. Although his analysis lacks 
the complexity of Toynbee’s perception of civilisational interaction, Huntington 
seems to share his sense that the West has an opportunity to regroup and redeem its 
power, though not necessarily its dominance of world politics.
Huntington’s Era and Influences
Throughout his career, Samuel P. Huntington (1927-) has been a provocative 
commentator working at the heart of the American East Coast academic and policy 
community. Bom in New York city, he studied Political Science at the universities 
of Yale (B.A. 1946), Chicago (M.A. 1948) and then Harvard (Ph.D. 1951) where 
he has spent the greater part of his academic career. In addition to teaching and 
research, Huntington has acted as an adviser to government, serving as coordinator 
of security planning of the National Security Council from 1977 to 1978. His ideas 
on strategic and military affairs are highly regarded in the policy community/ At
1 There are some changes between the original article and the book. As David Welch(1997) notes, 
the *?’ disappears from the title of the book, the thesis becoming less speculative. In some respects, 
the book provides a more nuanced and detailed discussion, as Huntington responds to three years of 
commentary and criticism. However, the thesis itself is not moderated. If anything, it becomes more 
critical of the West’s current position and more definite in its prescriptions and predictions 
(Hassner, 1996/7).
2 Huntington also held appointments at the Brookings Institute, Washington D.C. (1952-3), 
Columbia University, New York (1958-63) and was a visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford 
University England in 1973. He has held several research affiliations, joining the influential Social 
Science Research Council (Committee on Comparative Politics) in 1967. He is a Fellow of the 
American Academy, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and of the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, to name but a few affiliations. Huntington’s writings span American politics, 
civil-military relations, political development and democratisation
J Huntington was a fairly contentious figure in this field. During the Vietnam War, he was one of the 
proponents of counterinsurgency principles, his ideas were viewed as influential in policies such as 
aerial bombardment and the strategic hamlets programme. His work and opinions were highly 
regarded in security circles, but disliked by liberals. See 0 ’Brien(1972), Putnam(1986).
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the time of publishing ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’, he was Eaton Professor of the 
Science of Government and Director of the influential, conservative Olin Institute 
for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. A less well known author may not have 
received as much attention or evoked so much reaction.
Huntington commenced his career in political science during the high point of 
modernisation and development theory in the 1950s. His work both demonstrates 
the impact of these ideas and develops a critical perspective on them. The late 
1960s were a time of upheaval for the United States with the escalation of the war 
in Vietnam and of civil disorder at home diminishing the optimism which had 
characterised the 1950s. In the political science community, the instability of many 
post-colonial societies undermined optimism concerning the processes of 
modernisation and development. Huntington became critical of assumptions that 
modernisation was inevitably a positive force that led to development in the 
manner of Western society (Huntington, 1971), noting that the spread of modem 
Western forces often led to instability, even ‘decay’ in developing countries.4 
These concerns are reflected in Huntington’s work of the late 1960s which focused 
on the conditions for the establishment of order, stability and institutions for 
governance, and where he declared that it was not the form, but the degree of 
government that distinguished countries (Huntington, 1968:1). Huntington’s 
interest in order and change resonate throughout the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis.
Another feature of the ‘clash’ thesis is Huntington’s cautious pessimism. In the late 
1980s, he trod the intellectual middle ground between the declinism of authors 
such as Paul Kennedy(1988) and the triumphalism with which Francis Fukuyama 
greeted the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 1988; Fukuyama, 1989). Intimating 
views later developed in the ‘clash’ thesis, Huntington warned of complacency 
which the end of the Cold War could induce; of the end of a certain form of
4 This occurred particularly when rates of mass participation exceeded the establishment of solid 
institutions for governance (Huntington, 1965). Putnam suggests that since quite early in his career, 
Huntington demonstrated a deep concern with not just the creation, but the successful defence of 
existing liberal institutions. These concerns developed in the context of the Cold War, but continued 
to be demonstrated in his observations of post-colonial societies, and of the upheaval in American 
society in the 1960s and 1970s (Putnam, 1986).
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stability which the Cold War had enforced; and of the emergence of new forms of 
conflict (Huntington, 1989).3 *5
The politics of the early 1990s appeared to vindicate Huntington’s pessimism, with 
a range of regional conflicts which form an important context for his thesis. Russia 
suffered political instability with the demise of Gorbachev and the rise of Yeltsin, 
and pro-democratic, pro-nationalist and pro-communist forces battling for 
influence and support. Conflicts erupted in the former Soviet republics of 
Moldovia, Tadjikistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The collapse of Yugoslavia 
escalated into an increasingly cruel war in Bosnia from which the chilling term 
‘ethnic cleansing’ emerged to rekindle memories of the worst forms of ethnic and 
racial intolerance. In India, the Ayodhya mosque was destroyed in December 1992. 
Western involvement in the Gulf soured with the United States’ bombing of 
Baghdad; and at the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference, differences between 
Western and non-Westem governments became more evident. Racial and ethnic 
identity were increasingly perceived as issues of significance, with many of these 
disputes involving different ethnic communities. Racial tensions and violence 
became more prominent in Europe, particularly in Germany and France, and in the 
United States, which had been rocked by the 1992 Los Angeles riots.
Meanwhile, experiences in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in Somalia 
and Bosnia in the early 1990s shook confidence in assertive multilateralism and the 
United States’ willingness and capacity to lead at ‘the uni-polar moment’. Charles 
Maynes(1995) identifies a shift in attitude in some sectors of United States society 
away from the triumphal sense of America standing at the forefront of a ‘new 
world order’ towards a ‘new pessimism’. Locating it alongside works by Robert 
Kaplan(1994), Matthew Connolly & Paul Kennedy(1994), and John Mearsheimer, 
Maynes describes Huntington’s 1993 article as one of the foremost expressions of
3 In 1989, Huntington like Fukuyama was engaged in a study of the spread of democracies from the
mid-1970s and culminating in 1989. Huntington’s analysis was presented in The Third 
Wave(1991b). Like Fukuyama, he fundamentally welcomed the spread of democracies. However,
his analysis suggested that this was not an unrelenting wave but part of a series of waves. Each wave 
was followed by a reverse wave (1991b: 13). Fukuyama’s pattern of democratisation does not 
contain such a clear concept of reversal. This again demonstrates Huntington’s caution and perhaps 
pessimism.
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this sense of uncertainty and foreboding. Some International Relations scholars 
drew attention to the changing nature of security, identifying new sources of 
tension and instability in regional politics such as migration, resource depletion and 
weapons proliferation.6 7 John Mearsheimer(1990), for instance, warned of the 
instability which nuclear proliferation could produce in a multi-polar world. Basic 
to Mearsheimer’s argument is the sense that the Cold War contained regional 
conflicts in a bi-polar structure in which the rival superpowers policed their spheres 
of influence and maintained an equilibrium of power and order. The end of the 
Cold War loosened these structures, weakening incentives and, in Russia’s case, 
the means for the former superpowers to exercise authority and restraining 
influence.
American reaction to the changed global environment was also influenced by 
debates about domestic problems. Concerns with regard to social and economic 
problems including drugs, crime, unemployment, deficits and the impact of 
immigration were becoming more prominent. Books such as Arthur Schlesinger’s 
The Disuniting of America(l99l) and James Davison Hunter’s Culture Wars( 1991) 
focused attention on the impact of multiculturalism and the polarisation of social 
values on the cohesion of contemporary American society. These debates all 
involved the distribution of resources and opportunities in American society.
Huntington’s thesis, like Fukuyama’s, attempts to understand and explain this post-
o
Cold War world. Albert Weeks notes that Huntington, in focusing on the broad 
civilisational canvas, returns to the precedents of Arnold Toynbee, Oswald 
Spengler and Quincy Wright who explored international affairs at the macrocosmic
6 See, for example, Barry Buzan(1991) for a measured discussion of some of these issues, including 
the possibility of tensions arising from clashes of civilisational identity.
7 In the American 1992 Presidential election, whilst George Bush sought to reap the rewards of his 
successes as a proactive foreign policy President and victor of the Gulf War, Bill Clinton, in his 
successful campaign, pledged his attention to domestic affairs. The minor candidate, Pat Buchanan 
went further advocating, in a neo-isolationist tone, the withdrawal of the United States from 
substantial involvement in overseas ventures.
s Ahluwalia & Meyer cuttingly describe the International Relations community at this point as a 
‘floundering congregation ... moving restlessly from one post-modernist church to another trying to 
find a new faith to fill the vacuum left behind by the collapse of the old-time religion which used to 
be served up in the Church of the Latter-day Cold War’(1994:21).
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level.9 The recession of the ‘macro’ school of thought in International Relations 
and the predominance of the ‘microcosmic’ level of analysis of interstate relations 
coincided with the evolution of the Cold War, an international system whose 
political rigidities were reflected in the rigidity of the models in International 
Relations thought. The conclusion of the Cold War has seen a return to the 
‘macrocosmic’ perspective, with scholars forced out of their rigid modes of 
thinking into contemplating in greater depth the complexities of global politics 
from broader geographical and temporal perspectives. While Huntington’s work 
lacks the depth of historical analysis found in his predecessor, his thesis also 
explores these broader perspectives through the lens of civilisations.
Like Spengler, Huntington’s focus on this broader perspective is one tinged with 
pessimism rather than optimism. As noted above, it represents a reaction to the end 
of a form of stability the Cold War was perceived to provide with the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat. The existence of an enemy can enhance the 
cohesion of the group. Losing an enemy can undermine a group’s sense of identity 
(Bigo, 1994:14). Huntington has himself observed that the United States has 
always defined itself in antithesis to someone, be that European monarchy, 
imperialism or communism. In the post-Cold War environment he asks: ‘How will 
we know who we are if we don’t know who we are against?’ (Huntington, 
1993c:37).10 Such comments support the contention that Huntington's thesis 
creates a new ‘other’ within a dichotomised ‘us’ and ‘them’ framework of thinking. 
This perception is enhanced by Huntington’s identification of Islamic and 
Confucian civilisations as major threats to the West. In this context, it has been 
argued that Huntington perpetuates an Orientalist conceptualisation of the world 
(Ahluwalia & Meyer, 1994; Maswood, 1994).
Discussions of Huntington’s Orientalist tendencies draw attention to a further 
important dimension of the context in which his thesis was proposed, the
9 Weeks notes that in the 1950s, a vigorous debate took place between the macro-scholars and the 
micro-scholars, such as Morgenthau, Herz and Aron about the proper methodological focus of 
International Relations. Weeks argues that Huntington's resurrection of this debate is due, in part, to 
the failure of globalism to take root (1993:24).
10 Huntington further comments: ‘It is human to hate. For self-definition and motivation people 
need enemies’ (1996a: 130).
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resurgence of growth and power in Asia. This is highlighted by commentators such
as Kishore Mahbubani and Chandra Muzaffar. Huntington’s article can be seen as
a response to an earlier essay by Mahbubani which coined the phrase The West
and the rest’ (Mahbubani, 1992). Mahbubani suggests that the West is failing to
come to terms with the shift in the balance of civilisational power away from the
small populations of the West to the developing world. In Huntington’s thesis, he
sees the West as a civilisation living under ‘siege mentality’, failing to
acknowledge the internal sources of its troubles, seeking instead external enemies
(Mahbubani, 1993c).11 Muzaffar(1994) similarly alleges that Huntington’s article
reflects Western fears of the challenges presented particularly by the new
dynamism of East Asia in the early 1990s. In some sense, therefore, Huntington’s
argument was stimulated by a more assertive presentation of non-Westem values
12and needs by representatives from regions such as Southeast Asia.
The ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis is one which was proposed by a widely respected 
if controversial author with a long-standing interest in the conditions for order in 
political systems. It was produced at a time of great flux and uncertainty. In part, its 
aim was to explain these changes, but in many ways, the thesis contributed to the 
sense of insecurity generated by them. The thesis is not just a scholarly 
commentary, but a highly political analysis with a strong prescriptive purpose; to 
advise on the role which the West should play in the post-Cold War world shaped 
by civilisational interaction.
Conceptions of Civilisation
Civilisations are central to Huntington’s vision of the post-Cold War world. Like 
Toynbee, he argues, ‘[t]he broader reaches of human history have been the history 
of civilisations’ (1993a:24). He defines civilisations as cultural identities; the
11 Mahbubani argues that the West is the cause of its own downfall, firstly in failing to come to 
terms with the shifting balance of power between the developed and developing world, and secondly 
due to the ‘hubris’ of Western society, promoting, for instance, individual freedom to the detriment 
of the broader interests of the integrity and health of the community (1993c; 1994). See also Jin 
Junhui(1995).
12 Other prominent contributors to the ‘Asian values’ debate include former Singapore Prime 
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad bin Mahathir and Bilahari Kausikan 
from the Singaporean Foreign Ministry.
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highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity, short 
of distinction from other species (1993a:24; 1996a:43). Huntington’s civilisations 
are long-lived, but mortal; and vary in size and composition (1996a:43). He 
focuses on interaction between eight major civilisations Western, Sinic, Japanese, 
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and ‘possibly African’.
The most important feature of Huntington’s definition is that it is pluralist; he 
acknowledges several civilisations coexisting at any one time rather than focusing 
on civilisation as a single entity or linear process.14 He acknowledges that 
civilisations blend and overlap, but maintains that the lines between them, whilst 
seldom sharp, are real. Finally, Huntington’s defines civilisations as dynamic; 
civilisations rise and fall, divide and merge, their identities are redefined 
(1993a:24; 1996a:43-4). This acknowledgment seems at odds with the overall tone 
of his thesis which paints a picture of deeply riven, irreconcilable fissures and fault 
lines of culture. What is consistent in this thesis is the belief that no universal 
world civilisation exists. Unlike Fukuyama, Huntington does not anticipate the 
convergence of humanity into a homogenised culture of late modernity:
For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilisation, but 
instead a world of different civilisations, each of which will have to 
learn to coexist with the others. (1993a:49)
Huntington places enormous importance on civilisational interaction in the post-
Cold War world. He suggests that civilisational interaction has gone through three
phases; the first, prior to 1500 A.D., was one of intermittent interaction amongst
geographically distant communities; the second, post-1500 A.D., featured the
unidirectional expansion of Western civilisation and its dominance of other
civilisations; the third is the current phase in which civilisational interaction is
sustained and multi-directional (1996a:48-55). Its significance, he suggests, will be
13 Anglophone Caribbean is cited as a small civilisation. Islamic civilisation is analysed as 
comprising Arab, Turk and Malay subdivisions. Latin America is discussed as a separate civilisation 
in Huntington’s 1993 article, but recognised as an offspring of the West in his 1996 book. 
Huntington’s selection of civilisations and criteria used has been widely discussed and criticised. 
See for instance Kirkpatrick(1993), Ahluwalia and Meyer(1994:22, fn.l), Voll(1994), Welch(1997).
14 Huntington acknowledges the concept of Civilisation in the singular as a standard of progress, but 
chooses to focus on civilisations in the plural in this thesis (1996a:41).
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enhanced in post-Cold War international politics, given that civilisational identity 
is replacing ideology as the fundamental source of conflict:
The fault lines between civilisations are replacing the political and 
ideological boundaries of the Cold War as flash points for crisis and 
bloodshed ... The ‘Velvet Curtain’ of culture has replaced the Iron 
Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. 
(1993a:29, 31)
Although the world will continue to comprise ‘overlapping groupings of states’, 
these will be based now on civilisational identities rather than common ideological 
beliefs (1993b: 191; 1996a: 125-30), suggesting the state will effectively become an 
agent of civilisational identity.
Although Huntington highlights civilisational interaction, he focuses almost 
exclusively on interaction as conflict. He places civilisational interaction into the 
context of the history of strife in the modem world, progressing from conflicts 
between princes to conflict between nations, followed by the battle of ideologies. 
He cites only a few examples of civilisations not engaged in strife, one being the 
‘Confucian-Islamic connection’, a relationship represented as a conspiracy against 
the West.15
The source of conflict for Huntington is difference: the lines between civilisations, 
particularly those drawn by culture and religion, are considered to form lines of 
basic and often immutable difference, becoming more prominent in the post-Cold 
War world. For Huntington, increased interactions ‘intensify civilisational 
consciousness and awareness of differences between civilisations and 
commonalities within civilisations.’ This in turn ‘invigorates differences and 
animosities’ (1993a:25-6).16 Technology is making the world smaller, placing
15 The ‘Confucian-Islamic’ connection refers primarily to relations between Islamic states, such as 
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya and others, and China and North Korea. Huntington is particularly 
concerned with arms transfers between these states (1996a: 188).
16 Huntington’s analytical approach can be criticised from a number of angles. Although he 
observes the existence of ethnic, racial or religious differences in certain conflicts, he actually tells 
us little about the causes of conflict - conflicts whose origins are often rooted firmly in economic or 
political issues. The link established between cause and effect is not well established. In a number of 
the conflicts which Huntington discusses, such as the Gulf and Balkan Wars, the rhetoric of 
civilisational rallying has been used; but his analysis of these conflicts has been roundly criticised as 
largely swallowing the rhetoric of the conflicts which has cloaked the very real power interests of 
the main protagonists (Pfaff, 1993b; Camroux, 1996; Hassner, 1996/7). As Camroux warns, such
240
civilisations in greater relative proximity thus accentuating their sense of 
difference; whilst modernisation is accentuating alienation and anomie, 
weakening the authority of the nation-state and facilitating the growth of religious 
identity (1996a:76). The immutability of ethnic and religious identities further 
accentuates, difference whilst the indigenisation of non-Westem elites is causing 
them to turn away from Westernisation (1993a:26-7; 1996a:9). Meanwhile, the 
growth of economic regionalism is contributing to the cohesiveness of various 
civilisational groups, or what he later calls ‘kin-country solidarity’ (1993a:28; 
1996a: 102-20). Although he acknowledges that cross-civilisational alliances will 
continue, he anticipates that these will be weakened as cultural identity gains in 
importance (1996a: 128). The most successful alliances and communities, he 
suggests, are those based on a common culture (1996a: 130-5).18
Despite acknowledging that ‘[differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and 
conflict does not necessarily mean violence’(1993a:25), Huntington gives little 
consideration to any form of interaction other than conflict. This allows little space 
for consideration of how civilisational identities may reach across frontiers to 
shape values, norms and ideas, or how the interaction of civilisations can also 
produce positive and dynamic effects. There is only a fleeting sense of similarities, 
shared concerns or perspectives between civilisations (Huntington, 1996a:318-21; 
Muzaffar, 1994:11; McNeill, 1997b).19
rhetoric can add a certain legitimacy to what would otherwise appear as a push for power or 
territory (1996:740). This makes it increasingly important to distinguish between the rhetoric of 
conflict and the reality of the causes of such struggles. The distance between cultures can be further 
exacerbated if difference is equated with inequality and inferiority (Rubinstein & Crocker, 
1994:120). Huntington does not overtly describe any other civilisation as inferior, but he does paint 
them as distinctly threatening and prioritises the protection of the values and interests of the West. 
In part, this derives from Huntington playing the role of both analyst and advocate at the one time.
17 This is an argument which is reminiscent of Kenneth Waltz’s critique of interdependence theory 
(Waltz, 1970). Huntington further emphasises this point in his ‘Response’ (1993b: 192).
18 Again, it should be noted that Huntington’s discussion is sweeping and generalised. Whilst in his 
1996 book he does select instances from modern history to illustrate his points, he does not provide 
a systematic discussion of the evolving impact of modernisation in the context of this thesis.
19 Huntington acknowledges the potential for peaceful contacts, but does not explore these in any 
depth, focusing instead on how a common culture facilitates cooperation. See for example 
(1996a: 130-35). For a study of civilisational interaction which lends greater weight to the role of 
‘creative engagement’ see McNeill(1991; 1997b) or the work of Fernand Braudel. As 
McNeill( 1997b) notes, there will always be tension in interaction, but this tension may be creative
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As Alker notes, one of the causes of this confrontational focus is that Huntington’s 
analysis lacks a sense of a broader level of human interaction and identification 
described in Bull’s international society. Huntington’s essay, Alker argues, 
attempts to decapitate civilisation at the global level since it
...virtually ignores global political, technological and economic 
developments, their global/civilisational implications, and their 
dialectic with more local cultural unities. (Alker, 1995:553)
In fact, Huntington treats the global level of interaction as involving an elite
culture, the ‘Davos Culture’ rather than one which encompasses humanity in an
international society.20 He does not totally ignore the dialectics of global
developments with local cultures, but focuses primarily on their role in
accentuating difference (1996a:67, 76). Rather than including creative engagement
or exploring the implications of international society, Huntington focuses on
establishing irreconcilable difference in his conceptualisation of inter-civilisational
relations and the West.21
In his belief that increased interaction invigorates difference and animosities, 
Huntington rejects the view that technology and communication are forces which 
will reduce difference and conflict in the world.22 The process of modernisation, 
he argues, produces a new consciousness of identity which can result in conflict 
(1968:37-9). His views here are consistent with his earlier work on modernisation 
in which he argued that transitional societies are more unstable and violent than 
either traditional or modernised. In the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis he continues to 
emphasise that modernisation and increased interaction does not produce 
homogeneity, but sustains and ultimately accentuates civilisational identity and 
assertiveness, exacerbating cultural differences (1996a:67, 78).
rather than consistently destructive. See also Puchala(1997) for further discussion of other forms of 
civilisational encounter in a broader historical context.
20 Huntington derives this phrase from the annual meeting of politicians, financiers, intellectuals and 
journalists who participate in the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (1996a:57).
21 Rojas de Ferro(1996) views Huntington’s focus on irreconcilable difference and conflict less as a 
tactic and more as a function of his political realism under pressure from the condition of post­
modernity.
22 See for example Bartley(1993)
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The main conflicts which Huntington foresees in the post-Cold War world are 
those on the ‘fault-lines’ between civilisations. ‘Fault line’ wars are characterised 
as protracted, difficult to resolve, religiously charged and susceptible to escalation 
and internationalisation through ‘kin-country’ rallying (1996a:252-54). Although 
he acknowledges that conflicts will occur within civilisations, he assumes that 
these will be less intense and less likely to spread (1993a:38). This is a remarkable 
assumption given the intensity of many civil wars, and of intra-Westem conflicts 
during the course of the twentieth century.This suggests an assumed cohesion to 
the West, and to other civilisations, underlying Huntington’s thesis which becomes 
a central component in his forecast for future world politics.
Finally, Huntington perceives that a certain degree of order will be maintained in 
the post-Cold War world through the exercise of influence by ‘core states’ within 
civilisations. ‘Core states’ are the most powerful and culturally central states within 
a civilisation. The role envisaged for them is strongly reminiscent of that of great 
powers in a classical realist analysis of nation-state politics. Core states provide 
leadership, authority and discipline within a civilisation, attributes which are 
legitimised by their cultural commonality with less powerful states.24 ‘A world in 
which core states play a leading or dominating role’ acknowledges Huntington ‘is a 
sphere-of-influence world’ (1996a: 156). This suggests that the structure of world 
order he envisages has some parallels with the preceding one.
In this thesis, Huntington demonstrates clear concerns with the loss of the Cold 
War’s ‘long peace’, and the violence and instability that may evolve in a world of 
cultural confrontation.23 As in his earlier work, he maintains a strong interest in the 
conditions for the maintenance of order in the political system. However, his 
primary concern is with the interaction between the West and non-West in this 
environment. ‘The central axis of world politics in the future’ he anticipates, ‘is
23 See Welch( 1997:206) on the incidence of conflicts within civilisations.
24 Huntington suggests that a civilisation may have a number of core states, the West for instance 
historically looking to both the United States and a Franco-German core. Alternatively, it may have 
no core state. This can pose severe problems inhibiting order within a civilisation and its capacity to 
negotiate with other civilisations which both weakens its position and threatens the order of other 
civilisations. This, he suggests, is one of the difficulties of Islamic civilisation (1996a: 135, 177).
25 See also Huntington( 1989; 1995b).
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likely to be ... the conflict between ‘the West and the Rest” (1993a:41). Having 
discussed the historical and intellectual context into which this thesis was bom, we 
now turn to a more in-depth analysis of the conception of the West a which it 
emerges.
The Boundaries of Huntington’s West
Commenting on Huntington’s original 1993 essay, Fouad Ajami notes that the 
West itself remains unexamined in Huntington’s essay (Ajami, 1993:3, fn.l). In a 
sense, the composition of the West is taken for granted. However, we can deduce 
from Huntington’s discussion thesis important conceptual assumptions about the 
boundaries and nature of the West
Territory
Huntington has a strong sense of the physical location of the West, and a strong 
territorial conception of the ‘fault lines’ between civilisations. However, his 
concept of civilisations is built upon culture rather than location. ‘Divorced from 
culture, propinquity does not yield commonality and may foster just the reverse’ 
(1996a: 130). Huntington’s West has two main territorial subdivisions; Europe and 
North America (1996a:46). A graphic illustration of his territorial conception of the 
West is the division which he marks between western and eastern Europe. Using 
the perimeter of Western Christendom in 1500 A.D., Huntington maps a boundary' 
running from Finland and the Baltic states, through Transylvania into the Balkans 
which sunders the former Yugoslavia, placing Croatia and Slovenia on the Western 
side of the divide (1996a: 158). This physical division is based on shared histories, 
cultures and religions which differentiate the peoples of these lands. It marginalises 
Greece, placing this society in the eastern Slavic-Orthodox civilisation (Voll, 
1994).27 Poland, and Czechoslovakia, part of the Cold War East, in contrast, lie 
firmly in the Western ambit. On the territorial margins of Huntington’s West are
26 Huntington( 1996a) does provide some insight into the key qualities of his West, but still lacks an 
in-depth analysis of the complexities of this civilisation.
27 Huntington argues that Classical Greece was an important source of Western civilisation, but that 
modern Greece an Orthodox community, and therefore an anomaly in Western organisations 
(1996a: 162).
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‘tom countries’ such as Turkey and Mexico, whose leadership seek to join the 
West, but whose ambitions are constricted by their differing history, cultures and 
traditions (1993a:42; 1996a: 139-54).28
Japan maintains a curious relationship with Huntington’s West. Lying territorially 
outside the West, it is treated as a distinct civilisation (1993a:28).29 Huntington 
regards Japan as clearly modernised, but not necessarily Westernised, yet he 
suggests it is an ‘associate member’ of the West (1993a:45). Therefore, although 
Huntington’s concept of the West exhibits a territorial cohesion based around 
Western Europe and North America, its foundations lie not in the objective 
attributes of geography, but in the histories, religions and cultures of the societies 
in these territories/0
Religion
For Huntington, religion is a ‘central defining characteristic of civilisations’ 
(1996a:47). ‘Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and 
what they will fight and die for’ (1993b: 194). He suggests that the major 
civilisations are associated with major religions, although he does not clearly 
define the point at which religious and civilisational identity become
o  i
synonymous. However, religion is treated as a powerful transnational force 
capable of motivating and mobilising people (1996a:66). Religion is recognised to 
be a force which can unite peoples, but which also creates intractable barriers. Its 
revitalisation in response to the pressures of modernisation, he suggests, reinforces
2S Russia is also viewed as a tom country, distinguished from the West not only by its ideology 
during the Cold War, but by its history and traditions in the post-Cold War environment. Yet its 
culture and society has been deeply influenced by Westernisation since the time of Peter the Great.
29 As is noted below, as Huntington moves on to discuss economic challenges to the West, Japan 
emerges more clearly as a distinct and rival civilisation.
J° Huntington includes Australia and New Zealand as members of the Western community, but 
discusses Australia as a ‘tom’ country’ due to its efforts to develop a closer relationship with Asia 
(1996a: 151-4).
jl Many of the civilisations he discusses are identified by their religions rather than their location. 
For instance, Islamic civilisation is defined primarily through the member societies sharing a 
common religion, allowing Malay societies to be linked to Arab and Turkic. Similarly, the 
Confucian philosophy is seen to bind together many of the societies of Asia. In his discussion of the 
‘kin-country’ syndrome, Huntington speaks of religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren supporting 
one another (1993a:36). Obviously not all three relationships are necessary for a society to regard 
another as kin as in, for example, the Islamic cases cited.
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perceptions of cultural difference (1996a:28, 97, 267). Huntington surveys a 
worrisome list of inter-religious conflicts in Africa, the Caucuses, Balkans, and in 
the Indian sub-continent which suggest that religion provides a perfect site for the 
establishment of irreconcilable opposites/2
Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and 
exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half- 
Arab ... It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim. 
(1993a:27)
Predictably, then, religion plays an important part in defining Huntington’s West, 
although he does not identify the West primarily through its religious affiliation, as 
he does with Islamic or Hindu civilisations/^ However, Western Christianity 
provides for him ‘historically the single most important characteristic of Western 
civilisation’ (1996a:70). Historically, it provides a sense of community in addition 
to constructing the boundary marking Western Christendom from Orthodox and 
Muslim communities (1993a:30; 1996a:70), boundaries which continue to define 
for Huntington the community of the W est/4
In earlier work, Huntington explored links between religion and the democratic
o  c
institutions of the West. Although rejecting the idea that culture presents an 
irrevocable barrier to democratic progress, he has suggested that other faiths and 
philosophies, such as Confucianism, present obstacles to the spread and
j2 As Ghassan Salame points out, this is a tactic which is useful to the more fundamental on both 
sides of the spectrum. ‘Islamists, too, would like fellow Muslims to believe that Islam is really too 
self-contained to adjust to modernity or democracy. It is high time to denounce the implicit alliance 
between the old guard Western orientalists and the new wave local Islamists on the ill-defined 
presumed uniqueness of Islam’ (Salame, 1993:33). Hence, both parties tacitly reinforce each other’s 
position by reaffirming their sense of threat. Arnold Toynbee commented that a similar strategy was 
employed effectively by both sides during the Cold War. See Toynbee ‘The Present Point in 
History’ (1958a:21).
Huntington argues that the identification of the West with a compass point rather than with a 
specific location or religion lifts it out of its historical, geographical and cultural context (1996a:47). 
This accentuates the sense of the West as unique.
j4He even suggests that identification with Western Christendom could be used to provide a 
criterion for entry into the European Union, an institution at the core of the West.
3:5 Huntington argues that historically Protestantism and democracy were linked, the first democratic 
impulse coming from the Puritan revolution. Protestantism favoured democracy by stressing 
individual conscience; through the democratic organisation of Protestant churches; and through its 
encouragement of economic enterprise. This close equation of Protestantism and democracy stands 
in contrast to Spengler’s view of the West as quintessential^ expressed through Catholicism 
(Huntington, 1991a:30).
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interpretation of democratic institutions/6 Huntington presents Islam as presenting 
fewer barriers to democracy, with the central exception of its rejection of the 
separation of the religious and the political community. In highlighting the lack 
of separation between religion and politics in Islam, we see the significance of the 
secular nature of the state in Huntington’s conceptualisation of the West. Hence, 
the West, Western Christianity and democracy are inextricably woven in 
Huntington’s conception of the West.
Huntington’s focus on Christianity as a foundation of the West evokes an image of 
religious homogeneity, yet historically, Christianity itself has been a source of 
conflict within the West, as demonstrated by the wars of religion. Furthermore, the
38West remains, and is becoming increasingly, religiously heterogeneous. 
However, Huntington’s key contention is that Christian concepts, values and 
practices pervade Western civilisation.
Perhaps the most significant way is in which religion forms a boundary to 
Huntington’s West is that its chief antitheses are civilisations conceived primarily 
in religious terms; Islam and Confucianism. Fundamentalist religion, particularly 
fundamentalist Islam, is one of Huntington’s chief concerns (Ahluwalia & Meyer 
1994:23). Fundamentalism is treated as a reaction to modernisation, perceived as
39continuing pre-modem rivalry and enmity between Islam and the Christian West.
36 For instance, he notes that Confucian societies have been traditionally inhospitable to democracy 
lacking a tradition of rights against the state; emphasising harmony and cooperation over 
competition and disagreement; the maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy; a philosophy 
which defined politics in terms of morality and provided no legitimate grounds for limiting power 
(1991a:36). Confucian-based authorities, in China and Singapore both championed ‘new 
authoritarianism’ and proved hostile to Christianity. Huntington goes on to speculate that the growth 
of Christianity in South Korea in the 1980s was a major force in bringing about the transition to 
democracy in 1987/8 (1991a:39).
j7 This means all policy must inherently flow from religious doctrine, contradicting the premises of 
democratic politics in which policy flows from the people (199la:40).
jS As Voll(1994) points out, the West has always been religiously diverse including Protestant, 
Catholic and Jewish communities. This diversity is enhanced by the growth of non-Christian faiths 
in Europe and the United States through immigration and conversion.
The observation that Islam is a reaction to modernisation leads Stjepan Mestrovic to identify 
fundamentalism as an anti-modern rather than a post-modern force. As Alker notes, religious 
fundamentalism in seventeenth century Europe was associated with the secularising, modernisation 
process. Nationalism, civic religions and atheistic civil religions, such as positivism and 
communism, were also reactions to the disintegrative impact of modernisation. Ironically 
reinvigoration of religious and ethnic identities is a further response to modernisation (Alker, 
private correspondence).
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Whilst the West may have moved on from Christendom, its enemy remains the 
traditional, pre-modem foe of Islam. Hence, the secular and modem West is 
constructed in antithesis to pre-modem religiously defined civilisations.
Race
The distinction drawn by Huntington between race and ethnicity is not always 
clear. He describes race as a division based on peoples’ physical characteristics, in 
contrast to civilisation which is based on cultural characteristics and clearly states 
that the cultural distinctions are the most critical. However, he also acknowledges 
the importance of family and blood lines as an element of identity and difference 
(1996a: 126):
As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are
likely to see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation existing between
themselves and people of different ethnicity and religion.
(1993a:29)
With the demise of ideology, such forms of identification will become more 
pronounced, argues Huntington: ‘With the decline of the need for external unity, 
internal differences reassert themselves’ (Huntington, 1995b: 144-5). Ethnicity 
appears to become compounded with civilisation, with major ethnic conflicts 
discussed as occurring on the fault lines between civilisations. These include 
pointing to the collapse of multi-ethnic states and empires, such as Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union, and the bitter disputes between Armenians and Azeris in 
Azerbaijan. Ethnicity, along with religion, appears to act as a major signifier of 
civilisational identity in his discussion (1996a:42).
The growth of ethnic identification and the proximity of peoples of different ethnic 
identities present, Huntington suggests, the threat of violence and internal attack on 
the West’s cohesion. He does not definitively describe the West in racial terms but 
his work implies that it is based on European peoples, its cultural foundations 
firmly rooted in European and Judeo-Christian traditions. This perception is 
emphasised by the threats which he identifies as emanating from immigration and 
multiculturalism. Huntington does not appear to be opposed to immigration in 
principle. In fact, he acknowledges it as a potential source of strength and energy 
for the West (1988:89; 1996a:304). However, in the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis,
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he expresses strong concerns about the West becoming swamped by migrants from 
the non-West; Muslim migrants in the case of Europe, and Hispanic and Asian in 
the United States40 In particular, he questions the capacity of the West to 
assimilate the latest wave of migrants leading to the prospect of Europe and 
America becoming ‘cleft societies’, containing more than one civilisation 
(1996a:204-6). Again, civilisational divisions here are framed in terms of ethnic 
and racial differences.41 This conveys a sense of homogeneity under threat which 
is compounded in his mind by the politics of multiculturalism in the United States 
supporting the distinctness of different ethnic groups, rather than encouraging their 
assimilation (1996a:305). The sense of threat from these sources seem as ominous 
as the external threat posed by the alleged Confucian-Islamic conspiracy. Although 
the basis of such social tensions for Huntington may be based on different cultural 
values rather than physical attributes, it is manifested, or at least described, along 
the lines of ethnicity.
Power
Power features prominently in Huntington’s consideration of the contemporary 
West. He distinguishes between ‘hard power’, based on economic and military 
capabilities; and ‘soft power’ relating to the influence of culture and ideology. Soft 
power, he suggests, is only power when based on hard power (1996a:92). He is 
direct in acknowledging the significance of both to the West’s interaction with 
other civilisations. The post-Cold War West is described as at the very peak of its 
power, but simultaneously in a process of retreat or decline, a process to which he 
wishes to alert the West (1996a:302-8).
40 Westerners, he suggests, fear invasion, not by armies and tanks, but by peoples of different 
languages and beliefs (1996a:200). Huntington even raises the spectre of the West, in this case the 
United States, as subject to physical threat from potential Mexican revanchist sentiments and 
demographic growth (1996a:206).
41 See, for instance, the map of the United States entitled ‘The United States: A Cleft Country?’ 
(1996a:205) which describes the projected percentage of population which will be black, Asian, 
Native American or Hispanic by the year 2020.
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As in earlier work, Huntington emphasises the multifaceted nature of the West’s 
power42 presenting it as an unrivalled military power which largely directs global 
political issues and is dominant in international economic affairs, Japan providing 
the only perceived economic challenge (1993a:39; 1996a:81) It also exercises 
power through its influence over international institutions such as the UN Security 
Council and the International Monetary Fund from which the West obtains a 
degree of global legitimacy for the pursuit of its own interests:
The West in effect is using international institutions, military power 
and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain 
Western pre-dominance, protect Western interests and promote 
Western political and economic values. (1993a:40)
In acknowledging the importance of institutional power, Huntington shares
something with Hedley Bull. However, despite noting this level of interaction, he
rejects the existence of a developed, global international society (Alker,
1995:552).44 Huntington’s reluctance to acknowledge an international society may
stem in part from his political realism in which the anarchy of the international
system is not moderated by a supra-national form of community; and in part from
his pessimism as to the depth of West’s ‘soft’ power, Huntington viewing the
penetration of Western ideas and values into the rest of the world as ‘superficial’
(1993a:40).
Although Western power is recognised as at its peak,Usalso seen to be in retreat. 
Exhausted by the Cold War, Huntington suggests both the West’s capacity and will 
to dominate is gradually receding as other civilisations experience economic 
growth and a revival of cultural assertiveness (1996a:82-91, 102-9):
European colonialism is over; American hegemony is receding. The 
erosion of Western culture follows, as indigenous, historically
42 See, for instance, Huntington(1988) where his discussion of the declinist argument highlights the 
range of American domestic resources and structural power.
4j Although Huntington does see a further challenge emerging from the economies of East Asia and 
China.
44 Although Huntington acknowledges the existence of a developed international system, based on 
the institutions and practices of European international society, he suggests that the system lacks the 
common culture necessary to form a genuine international society as defined by Hedley Bull. The 
common culture which does exist in contemporary international politics, he argues, does so only at 
an elite level (1996a:54, 58).
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rooted mores, languages, beliefs and institutions reassert 
themselves. (1993b: 192)
This analysis seems at odds with his earlier criticism of the prophets of United 
States declinism (Huntington, 1988), but in keeping with the mood of pessimism 
which permeates the ‘clash of civilisation’ thesis. There are strong echoes of 
Spengler and Toynbee in the sense of the West’s dominance and power being 
transient phenomena on the cusp of a gradual decline.
The West’s decline is exacerbated, in Huntington’s analysis, by the inclination of 
the post-Cold War West to divest itself of power, particularly military power, 
whilst potential rivals, such as Confucian and Islamic states, improve their capacity 
(1993a:47; 1996a: 186-92). In 1989, Huntington warned of the complacency that 
the ‘end of history’ argument could breed, placing the West off-guard and ill 
prepared for new military threats (Huntington, 1989). These fears are reiterated and 
expanded in the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis in an effort to lobby for moderation 
in the reduction of military capabilities, and for the maintenance of Western 
military superiority in East and Southwest Asia (1993a:49)4:5 This led to the 
observations that the true aim of this thesis is to provide a rationale for maintaining 
military budgets in the face of pressure for the reduction of defence spending in the 
United States (Muzaffar, 1994:13).
Huntington’s treatment of Western imperial power is brief, but interesting, with 
colonial and imperial expansion accepted as a central feature of the rise of the West 
(1996a:50-2). Expansion is viewed as a natural consequence of rapid economic and 
industrial growth,46 but the dominance of the West is treated as remarkable given 
its scale. Huntington acknowledges the West’s capacity to expand was based on
43 Huntington’s main concerns here appear to be with arms proliferation involving China and North 
Korea in East Asia, with states such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq in the south west, and with Libya and 
Algeria in North Africa. He notes arms control as one method by which the West is seeking to 
control the expansion of military capabilities of non-Western powers. This suggests that arms 
control is a further example of the West promoting its own interests under the guise of international 
norms. The countering response from the non-West is to argue that they too have a right to acquire 
and deploy weapons for their security, implying that the normative tack can backfire. Huntington 
notes the United States’ shift from a policy of non-proliferation to one of counter-proliferation 
(Huntington, 1993a:46; 1996a: 192).
46 Huntington’s argument suggests that all major powers engaged in expansion and imperialism 
following the years of rapid industrial and economic growth (1996a:229).
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social, institutional, political and technological developments, but argues it was 
also facilitated by the superiority of Western military organisation and capacity: 
‘The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion ... 
but rather by its superiority in applying organised violence’ (1996a:51). Therefore, 
the expansion of the West is viewed as based on hard power. The decline in 
imperial power appears to coincide with the commencement of a broader decline.47 
However, this is not just perceived as a function of external challenge, but also of 
internal factors, such as decline in economic productivity and social 
disintegration.48 Here again, Huntington’s concerns echo those of Spengler who 
also feared that the West was being weakened by economic competition and social 
decline.
Huntington does not delve into the history and meaning of Western imperialism in 
the manner of Edward Said; but he is conscious of, and interested in, the legacy of 
imperialism; both in the illusion of universality and omnipotence which he 
suggests it gave to the West; and of the resentment it generated in other 
civilisations. This is implicit in Huntington’s discussion of the human rights 
debate, particularly in Asia (1996a: 192-8); and percolates throughout his 
discussion of the relationship between Islam and the West
Huntington touches only lightly upon the source of the West’s economic power. 
Despite identifying free markets as a central Western concept, he admits little 
discussion of economic power structures, and does not specifically discuss the 
phenomenon of global capitalism.49 This lack of attention to the economic 
dimensions of power is a characteristic which can be identified elsewhere in the 
work of American neo-realists.30 This may in part stem from Huntington’s
47 Although he does recognise a shift from a traditional territorially-based imperialism when Europe 
formed the core of the West, to a transnational form of imperialism under the United States’ 
hegemony of the West (1996a:83).
48 Huntington lists a range of concerns which include drug abuse; illegitimacy and the breakdown of 
family; the decline of the work ethic; and of commitment to American intellectual traditions 
(1996a:82, 304).
49 For commentators such as Jin Junhui, this is a weakness of the thesis. Jin argues that the thesis’ 
focus on cultural politics neglects the uneven levels of economic development that distinguish 
countries and will continue to be an important force in world politics (Jin Junhui, 1995:12).
30 Although elsewhere, Huntington has engaged in debate on the economic dimensions of the 
Untied States’ power. See Huntington(1988).
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scepticism as to the depth of globalisation of Western institutions and ideas; or 
from an unwillingness to equate the expansion of capitalism with the continued 
expansion of Western power, in the light of the distinctions he draws between 
modernisation and Westernisation, and his perception of the retreat of Western 
power.
Power is, then, a central component of Huntington’s West; both in terms of 
capabilities, and of institutional power. The power of the West to project its 
cultural and normative ideas is intimately linked to it power in terms of economic 
and military capabilities. His thesis is, however, strongly pessimistic about the 
West retaining this power. It is almost as if the thesis is proposed to combat 
complacency and retreat which Huntington feels would further undermine the 
power of the West, and the United States in particular.
Norms
Common values and beliefs lie at the very heart of Huntington’s conception of 
civilisations, providing the foundations for cohesion, but also a significant source 
of conflict between civilisations. The crucial distinctions between human groups, 
he suggests, concern their values, beliefs, institutions and structures (1993a:25; 
1996a:42).
In his earlier work, Huntington had observed the importance of political culture, 
defined as ideas, values, attitudes and expectations dominant in a society 
(1971:317). Similarly, in the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, Huntington turns to 
norms, and the institutions that these generate, to distinguish the West from other 
civilisations. The norms he identifies as distinguishing the West include 
individualism, ‘a distinguishing mark of the West among twentieth century 
civilisations’ (1996a:71).51 It is underwritten by the principles of liberty and 
equality which are exercised through the processes and institutions of the rule of 
law, providing the basis for constitutionalism and individual rights; and by the 
existence of social pluralism, which has limited absolutism (1996a:71). Democracy
31 In contrast he suggests, Islamic and Asian societies place a greater priority on the collectivity 
(1996a: 108,214).
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and secularism are also critical components of Huntington’s West (1993a:40; 
1996a:69-72).52 These norms also form the foundations of the ‘American Creed’, 
the civic ethos which forms the core of American cultural identity for Huntington 
(1996a:305).
Two critical assumptions which are central to Huntington’s prescriptions for the 
West arise from these cultural values. Firstly, the persistence of these values is 
perceived as unique to the West, distinguishing it from other civilisations 
(1996a:311). Secondly, since they help define the West, their integrity must be 
protected if the cohesion of the West’s identity is to be maintained.
Huntington suggests that core Western norms have little resonance in other 
civilisations: ‘[T]he values that are most important in the West are the least 
important worldwide’. In this, Huntington rejects any suggestion that the West 
provides a universal normative framework. On the contrary, he argues that the 
spread of Western cultural values was a consequence of the colonial and imperial 
expansion of the West, ‘culture almost always follows power’ (1996a:91). 
Therefore, a retreat of Western power implies a retreat of Western norms. He goes 
on to note that attempts to propagate Western norms have been a source of conflict. 
This further highlights the importance of norms in defining his conception of the 
West and its interaction with the non-West.54 His thesis entails a strong sense of 
the incommensurability of norms across civilisations; and an assumption of their 
commensurability within civilisations illustrated by his concepts such as 
‘civilisational rallying’ and the ‘kin-country -syndrome’.
The importance Huntington attaches to cultural norms in defining the West is 
further highlighted by his concerns with immigration and multiculturalism. The 
unity of the United States, he argues, rests on the bedrock of European culture and
52 Huntington guardedly argues that these qualities are not unique to the West, nor have they always 
been upheld in the West; but they consistently and persistently reoccur within this community. The 
combination of these qualities, he argues, is what makes the West distinct (1996a:72). However, 
whilst suggesting that the West is unique in applying the rule of law, he argues that one feature of 
the Islamic resurgence is the replacement of Western law with Islamic law (1996a: 115-6). He does 
not discuss how the rule of law in Islam differs to that of Western law.
5j Quoted from Harry Triandis, The New York Times, 25/12/1990 (Huntington, 1993a:41).
54 The question of interaction will be discussed further in the final section of this paper.
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political democracy, on the ‘American Creed’. Previous migrants were absorbed 
because they embraced these norms. His concern with contemporary migration and 
ethnic diversity is that the lack of assimilation of migrant and minority cultures 
threatens the normative cohesion of American society (1993b: 190; 1996a:304). 
Huntington accuses multiculturalists of further undermining Western cohesion by 
challenging Western norms, highlighting in particular the substituting of the rights 
of the individual with the rights of the group (1996a:306). Multiculturalism he 
argues threatens to ‘de-Westemise’ the United States, and presents the prospect of 
a ‘clash of civilisations’ within the United States, between the multiculturalists and 
the defenders of Western civilisation.53 A key assumption here is that maintaining 
the cohesion of the United States is critical to maintaining the cohesion of the 
West. It is not so much the multi-ethnic or multi-racial composition of American 
society per se which concerns Huntington, but the threat of normative 
heterogeneity. This leads Huntington to strongly invoke the West, and the United 
States in particular, to protect and preserve those distinctive values and institutions 
which are unique to the West (1996a:311).
Institutions
In his earlier work, Huntington attached great importance to the role of institutions 
in political systems, arguing that the degree and complexity of institutions indicate 
the true level of political development in a given society (1965).56 Huntington 
outlines several distinct institutions which evolved in the West but have little 
resonance in other civilisations. They encompass political democracy and a strong 
tradition of representative institutions; a free market economy; and the secular, 
constitutional state governed by the rule of law. Not only do these institutions
55 Here, Huntington is drawing in the analysis of James Kurth who shares Huntington’s fear of the 
impact of multiculturalism. Kurth further associates this with the damaging impact of other 
contemporary political and social theoretical trends, such as feminism and post-modernism, on the 
cohesion of American societies (Kurth, 1994).
56 In his analysis of modernisation, it was the degree of institutionalisation, rather than the level of 
popular participation which influenced the degree of order that a government maintained in that 
society (1965; 1968:8-12, 28). Although, as Kurth(1994:7) has noted, discussion of political 
institutions are virtually absent from Huntington’s discussion of the ‘clash of civilisations’, which is 
perhaps surprising given the focus placed on institutions in his earlier work.
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distinguish the West; their incommensurability with other cultures, he suggests, 
means that efforts to spread them can be provocative.
This is most vividly illustrated by his discussion of democracy, perhaps the core 
institution of Huntington’s West.57 He sees democratic institutions as a vital part 
of the West’s, and particularly the United States identity, defining that society’s 
raison d ’etre:
The United States is the premier democratic country of the modem 
world, and its identity as a nation is inseparable from its 
commitment to liberal and democratic institutions. Other nations 
may fundamentally change their political systems and continue their 
existence as nations. The United States does not have that option.
(1991 b:28-9)58
Huntington does not argue that democracy is the only form of government that will 
provide order, but is unequivocal in his belief that it is the best form of government 
when applied in the right circumstances, given that it protects personal rights, 
provides an environment which promotes economic growth and enhances 
international peace (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1965; Pei, 1991:70; Huntington, 
1991b).39 However in contrast to Fukuyama’s clear confidence in the capacity of 
democracy to become a universal institution, Huntington’s work is ambiguous on
37 Like Fukuyama, Huntington adopts a minimalist and procedural definition of democracy as 
involving the selection of the most powerful collective of decision makers through periodic 
elections in which the candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult 
population is eligible to vote (Huntington, 1991b:7). Both omit from their definition the 
philosophical underpinnings and the stipulations of rights, or some of the norms and values inherent 
in democracy. Yet it is these aspects of democracy which we see prioritised by, for instance, 
activists such as Chandra Muzaffar(1993) and Aung San Suu Kyi(1995). As Peter Van Ness has 
remarked, if we take democracy defined in a minimalist procedural way, this can facilitate a broad 
range of regimes defining themselves as democratic who may minimise other aspect of democracy 
found in the philosophical underpinnings, such as the priority on the individual
58 Huntington actively supports the spread of democracy, viewing it as the best form of government. 
He also tends to support ‘democratic peace theory’ (1991b:29), although he qualifies this support by 
noting Edward Mansfield & Jack Snyder’s suggestion that states in the process of democratisation, 
are more likely to be aggressive and war prone (Huntington, 1996b:6). This resonates with his own 
observations that societies in transition of modernisation are likely to be less stable and more prone 
to violence (Huntington, 1968).
59 Huntington recognised that the communist system provided governance and order (Brzezinski & 
Huntington, 1965; Huntington 1968:8). He also acknowledges that ‘new authoritarianism’ found in 
East Asia has succeeded in providing ‘economic prosperity, social order and general well being’. 
However, in the long term, their capacity to provide good government over a sustained period of 
time is inhibited by their lack of the institutions of self-reform (1996a: 12). See also Pei(1991) for a 
further discussion on the advantages and short-comings of authoritarianism.
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its capacity to spread globally. In his study of the wave of democratisation from the 
mid-1970s to late-1980s, Huntington concludes that democracy evolved most 
easily from the culture and history of Western Europe (199lb:298-9). He also notes 
a coincidence of democratic institutions with Western culture and values, including 
Western Christianity:
Almost all the remaining non-democracies in the world are either 
poor, non-Westem or both. Their democratisation is not impossible,
... but it is likely to be more difficult. (1996b:5)
He attributes, for instance, the failure of democratisation in Muslim societies in
part to the ‘inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal
concepts (1996a: 114). These observations imply that, in practice, culture presents
serious obstacles to democratisation. However, he suggests elsewhere that,
theoretically, the barriers which culture presents to democratisation are
surmountable. As a dynamic force, culture can adapt and change to new
circumstances. The central factors which would facilitate the growth of democracy
were economic growth and political leadership:60
[Economic development should create the conditions for the 
progressive replacement of authoritarian political systems by 
democratic ones. Time is on the side of democracy. (Huntington,
199 lb:316)
There is here an implicit sense of historicism in Huntington’s analysis of the spread 
of democracy (Munroe, 1994:218).
In the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, Huntington appears more circumspect with 
regard to the universalising of democratic institutions. Here Huntington argues that 
democracy is a distinct product of Western culture. Where modem democratic 
governments have occurred outside of the West, he argues, they have been the 
product of Western colonialism or imposition (1993a:41). The spread of 
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s he attributes to the efforts of non-Westem 
societies to emulate the West in order to achieve its success. This produced the
60 Like Fukuyama, Huntington stresses the importance of political leadership in the development of 
democracy. He argues that democratisation was often elite driven, not simply evolving out of 
favourable conditions, but occurring where political leaders ‘willing to take the risk of democracy 
made it happen’ (199 lb: 108).
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impression of a global democratic revolution which was reinforced by the collapse 
of communism. However, as the power of the West declines, so to does the appeal 
of its values and institutions. Huntington argues that consequently the appeal of 
democracy is waning as other, increasingly dynamic, civilisations look to their own 
traditions for political institutions and legitimacy (1996a:93, 193, 224-5).
Huntington compounds his pessimistic analysis of the prospects for the spread of 
this Western institution by arguing that attempts to promote democracy can lead to 
the strengthening of anti-Western forces. In some respects, this argument echoes 
Toynbee’s scepticism of the export of Western institutions to non-Westem 
environments. Democratisation, argues Huntington, can promote communalism 
and ethnic conflict, creating the ‘democracy paradox’ of facilitating the 
empowerment of anti-Western and even anti-democratic groups (1993a:32; 
1996b:6): ‘Democratisation conflicts with Westernisation, and democracy is 
inherently a parochialising not a cosmopolitanising process.61 Huntington’s 
concern reiterates that also expressed by Fukuyama that the promotion of 
democratic institutions in divided societies can exacerbate rather than heal 
divisions. In Huntington’s analysis, the divisions of culture appear to play a strong 
role, setting up a ‘West versus the Rest’ scenario not really contemplated by 
Fukuyama.62
Huntington has in the past acknowledged structural weaknesses, particularly in the 
American democratic system, which derive from the subordination of the polity to 
society, inhibiting formulation of long-range goals and restricting political
61 Huntington suggests this possibility arises most directly with Islamic fundamentalist groups, 
drawing on the experience Algeria in 1992 (1996a:94)
62 For Mahbubani, it is the democratic institutions which characterise the West which are also a 
source of its current problems. Mahbubani argues that democratic institutions induce gridlock and 
inhibit political leadership, thus the ability of the West to respond to the new challenges of the later 
twentieth century. It inhibits the West from dealing with the serious social and economic problems 
(Mahbubani, 1993c: 14). See also Goldsworthy( 1994:7-8). In many respects, Mahbubani’s analysis 
shares much with that of Huntington’s. Both see radical change under way, both see Western culture 
in retreat, both place a great priority on good governance, accepting that in the interim this may 
require authoritarian government, both see economic development as fundamental to political 
development and both recognise a weakness in the United States political system deriving from its 
pluralism and diffusion of authority, the checks and balances system. Where they differ is in their 
prescriptions for the West and the extent to which the West’s difficulties arise from internal tensions 
rather than external threats.
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leadership.6' In the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, he demonstrates concern for the 
decline of contemporary Western institutions, but these concerns relate to their 
dilution in a more heterogeneous environment rather than inherent structural flaws.
Institutions, and the norms upon which they are based, form a crucial element to 
the Huntington’s concept of the West. In contrast to Wight, Bull and Fukuyama, 
Huntington’s pessimism with regard to the commensurability of norms between 
civilisations compromises the West’s ability to provide a universal normative and 
institutional framework. However, there is little doubt that he values these 
institutions as providing the best form of governance, and is keen to see them 
preserved.
Interaction Between the West and Non-West
Analysis of the boundaries of Huntington’s West brings to the fore issues of 
Western interaction with the non-West. Fukuyama’s thesis implies that, in the 
long-term, interaction will lead to convergence of the West and non-West. In 
contrast, Huntington suggests that increased interaction will increase the sense of 
differentiation between these societies. His thesis is premised on viewing the West 
as one of a number of contemporary civilisations, not the leading representative of 
a broader human civilisation, categorically rejecting suggestions that mankind 
forms one community: ‘History has not ended. The world is not one. Civilisations 
unite and divide humankind’ (1993b: 194).
The concept of difference, so crucial to his concept of ‘civilisations’, is also critical 
to Huntington’s perception of civilisational interaction. Cultural difference is seen 
to foster conflict, interaction is portrayed as primarily conflictual in the past and 
forecast as primarily conflictual in the future. The main axis of difference and 
conflict which he identifies is the post-Cold War world is ‘the West versus the 
Rest’, anticipating: ‘[t]he dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from 
the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness’ 
(1996a: 183).
6j He saw this as deriving from the system’s evolving from a community which had a history of 
diversity, pluralism and suspicion of central control (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1965:409, 422).
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Huntington does not discuss in depth the nature of the West’s relationship with the 
non-West in the past, other than to indicate that Western dominance meant intra- 
civilisational interaction within the West determined the course of world politics. 
Until recently, he suggests, non-Westem civilisations were merely the objects of 
history, not its movers or shapers. The decline of Western dominance has led to a 
more complex, multi-directional flow of interaction:
With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its 
Western phase, and its center-piece becomes the interaction between 
the West and non-Westem civilisations and among non-Westem 
civilisations. (1993a:23)
Therefore, despite observing that relations between civilisations have always 
formed the broader reaches of human history, Huntington implies that international 
politics until recently has been devoid of inter-civilisational relations given its 
focus on intra-Westem relations.04 Unlike in Toynbee’s work, we receive little 
sense of the course of world history outside of the history of the West, and 
primarily the modem West at that.
One important source of conflict between the West and other civilisations 
identified is struggles for power (1993a:40). Huntington suggests interaction has 
been further aggravated by the tendency of the West to promote its ideas as 
universal (1996a: 183). In the late twentieth century, he argues, the concept of a 
universal civilisation helps justify Western cultural domination of other societies 
(1996a:66), but ‘[w]hat is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest’ 
(1996a: 184). Huntington presents the spread of Western culture as superficial and a 
function of Western power rather than a demonstration of universal progress 
(1996a:58). Western universalism is consequently perceived as false and 
provocative:
...the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and 
liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military pre­
dominance and to advance its economic interests engender 
countering responses from other civilisations. (1993a:29)
64 This perception is also evident in the Western-centric focus of the discipline International 
Relations to date.
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Huntington further characterises Western universalism as immoral and dangerous. 
It is immoral since culture follows power; therefore a universal culture would 
require a universal power, implying the reinstigation of imperialism. It is 
dangerous, he suggests, since it would lead to a major inter-civilisational war, in 
which the West could well be defeated (1996a:310-1).
Consequently, unlike more liberal commentators, Huntington firmly rejects the 
idea that the end of the Cold War will produce the universalisation of liberal 
democracy, or broad cultural homogenisation through increased communications 
and modernisation65 For Huntington, this argument suffers from the ‘single 
alternative fallacy’ in failing to acknowledge the persistence of other secular and 
religious challenges to Western liberal democracy (1993b: 191; 1996a:66). 
Although acknowledging the West as the sources of modernisation, he rejects the 
equation of modernisation with Westernisation as ‘a totally false identification’ 
(1996a:69, 310):
The presumption of Westerners that other peoples who modernise 
must become ‘like us’ is a bit of Western arrogance that in itself 
illustrates the clash of civilisations. (1993b: 192)
These observations echo his earlier rejection of modernisation was a homogenising
process which implied uni-linear progress. Modernised societies, he argued, would
not necessarily seek to adopt Western values and institutions.66 In the ‘clash of
civilisations’ thesis, he again argues that although modem societies have
commonalities, they remain culturally distinct. He goes further, suggesting that
modernisation can accentuate such differences; through increasing contact; through
63 It is interesting to note the importance Huntington attaches to the changing relationship between 
the West and non-Westem elites. Huntington has always attached importance to the role of elites in 
influencing the direction of change in political structures and in providing leadership (1968; 1991b; 
1996a:94). In the contemporary world, he notes the increasing ‘indigenisation’ of these elites; their 
turning away from, rather than towards, identification with Western culture (1993a:27).
66 Huntington described most writers on modernisation as characterising modernisation as 
revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, homogenising, irreversible and progressive. 
Many of these assumptions he challenged. He was particularly critical of the failure of 
modernisation theory to produce a model of Western society, ‘meaning late twentieth century 
Western European and North American society’, which could be compared and contrasted with the 
model of modem society. ‘Implicitly, the two are assumed to be virtually identical. Modem society 
has been Western society writ abstractly and polysyllabically. But to non-modem, non-Westem 
society, the process of modernisation and Westernisation may appear to be very different 
indeed’(1971:295).
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the confidence generated by prosperity; and by creating the need for stronger local 
identities to respond to the social problems caused by modernisation (1996a:78). 
These views distinguish Huntington as clearly from contemporary liberals as his 
views on political development differentiated him from certain modernisation 
theorists in the 1970s. They also highlight the significance of the cultures, 
structures and histories of different civilisations in forthcoming international 
relations, and significantly complicating relations between West and non-West.
Although Huntington identifies West/non-West interaction as a central axis of 
world politics, and a potentially volatile one, he does not represent the West’s 
relationship with all societies of the non-West as identical, nor the non-West as 
homogeneous. However, his thesis presents the non-West as largely reacting to the 
challenges of modernisation and Westernisation presented to it by the West. The 
non-West is given three options: rejection of the West, an option dismissed as 
unviable in today’s deeply interconnected world; ‘Kemalism’ or ‘band-wagoning’, 
attempts to embrace Western values and join the West; and reformism or 
‘balancing’ the West, in other words, efforts ‘to modernise but not to Westernise’ 
(1993a:41; 1996a:72-4). This analysis places countries that wish to ‘band-wagon’ 
in a difficult position. ‘Joining the West’ suggests not only modernisation, but also 
the adoption of Western values and institutions, producing ‘tom 
countries’(1993a:42). In the context of this discussion, the most interesting ‘tom- 
country’ is undoubtedly Russia. As the Soviet Union, Russia constituted the 
quintessential East in the context of the Cold War. In 1989, Huntington was slow 
to accept that communism was truly defeated (1989:5); he is even more cautious 
about dismissing Russia as a threat to the West. Russia for him remains a great 
power. Whereas Fukuyama sees the end of the Cold War as leading to the 
convergence of the systems of Russia and the West, Huntington sees them as
67 The revolt against the West, he observes, was originally legitimated by a recourse to Western 
values, when the West was the dominant power, ‘it is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of 
non-Western values’ (1996a:93).
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becoming more distinct. For Huntington, the Marxism of the Soviet Union
/: o
provided a point of commonality between Russia and the West:
The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was 
between ideologies which, despite their major differences, were 
both modem and secular and ostensibly shared ultimate goals of 
freedom, equality and material well-being. A Western democrat 
could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would 
be impossible for him to do that with a Russian Orthodox 
Nationalist. (1996a: 142)
Huntington’s analysis pivots on the perception of traditional Russia as a member of 
a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilisation. Therefore, he sees the post-Cold War 
Russia as a tom country, riven by a resurgence of the debate on whether its identity 
belongs to the Slavic east or to the West. Consequently, a swing towards 
traditionalism suggests to Huntington a potentially more conflictual and distant 
relationship between Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era (1996a: 142-4).
However, Huntington anticipates the greatest challenge to the West coming not 
from Russia, but from other civilisations that have responded to the West through 
‘reformist’ policies, seeking to modernise, but not Westernise; not to join but to 
compete with the West through internal development and cooperation with other 
non-Westem powers (1993a:45; 1996a:74). Japan might appear the most obvious 
example of such a society, but as noted above, Japan is tolerated as an ‘associate 
member’ of the West; a rival, but not a conspirator. The ‘reformist’ category 
includes instead members of the ‘Confucian-Islamic connection’, perceived as the 
West’s most serious rivals, challenging Western interests, values and power 
through their dynamism and their sense of cultural superiority (1996a: 102). He 
anticipates growing hostility, and the strengthening of an emergent alliance 
between key states within these civilisations, identifying as areas of likely tension 
weapons proliferation, human rights, and immigration (1996a: 185-207, 239).
Islam is presented as a long-standing enemy of the West and the site of the next 
cultural confrontation. It is represented as an inherently violent civilisation: 
‘Islam’, argues Huntington, ‘has bloody borders’(1993a:35; 1996a:254-8). He
68 In Brzezinski & Huntington(1965), Huntington notes that the similarities between the Soviet 
Union and United States are often overlooked.
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focuses predominantly on Islam interacting with other civilisations in conflict 
rather than in peaceful interchange 69 His broad brush treatment of the history of 
Islam’s relationship with the West is striking. It sweeps across thirteen hundred 
years of history to provide a neat, linear continuum between the Crusades, the 
resistance to European colonialism and the Gulf War, only briefly touching upon 
nuances or contextual details which might illuminate the complexities of the 
relationship between these close civilisational cousins. As Muzaffar notes, there 
have been constructive and cooperative dimensions to the relationship between the 
West and Islam.70 However, there is little sense of affinity in Huntington’s reading 
of history. Instead, the relationship is presented as one in which Islam poses a 
continual and growing threat to the West, a relationship of long-standing rivalry 
and hostility, based upon theological differences, further aggravated by qualities 
such as monotheism, universalism and evangelical natures shared by both cultures. 
The rivalry of the past is for Huntington further stimulated by a resurgence of Islam 
in the late twentieth century, a resurgence viewed as a product of, and an effort to 
come to terms with, modernisation stimulated by the West (1996a: 116). Although 
Huntington identifies its causes in social mobilisation and population growth, the 
impact of this resurgence, he suggests, has been to feed conflict which has 
manifested itself in a quasi-war between Islam and the West in progress since 1980 
(1996a:216).
Huntington's representation of Islam is widely criticised as providing an extremist 
and undifferentiated image of Islamic civilisation, exaggerating the degree to which 
‘fundamentalist’ forces represent Islamic societies, underestimating the degree of 
disunity in the Muslim world, and overestimating the strength of the position of 
Muslim communities in many of the conflicts cited.71 Huntington does discuss
69 Chandra Muzaffar accuses Huntington of being an ‘Islam baiter’ who has failed to acknowledge 
that in many instances the ‘Islamic threat’ is, in fact, the struggle of Islamic groups and individuals 
to free their communities from continued Western domination. See also Rubinstein & 
Crocker( 1994) and Farley(1994) who discuss social, economic and historical factors contributing to 
the rise of the popularity of Islamists groups.
70 For instance, Islam provided the foundations for the growth of mathematics, the sciences, 
architecture and agriculture in medieval Europe (Muzaffar, 1994:11).
71 See for instance, Ajami(1993:5), Kirkpatrick( 1993:23), Camroux( 1996:741). Mahbubani argues 
that Huntington fails to acknowledge that in many situations it is Muslim communities who are in 
the weaker position: ‘[i]n all conflicts between the Muslims and pro-Western forces the Muslims
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divisions within Islam, suggesting that its lack of political cohesion is a source of 
instability; but he goes on to argue that conflict with the West, such as during the 
Gulf War, can provide a focus for unity within Islam replenishing the perception of 
Islam as a threat (1996a: 174-8, 248-252). This is further enhanced by his 
suggestion that Islam’s hostility to the West is not limited to fundamentalists, but 
can be found in many sectors of Muslim societies (1996a:214).
Syed Javed Maswood parallels Huntington’s monolithic depiction of Islam with 
the monolithic depiction of the communist movement in American Cold War 
scholarship. The myth of the monolithic enemy, he suggests, facilitates Western 
unity and heightens vigilance. For Maswood, Huntington’s argument demonstrates 
the continuance of the Orientalist mind set in the late twentieth century, which
...refuses to understand the diversity within Islam for the 
convenience of simple explanation ... It is Orientalist scholarship 
that has invested Islam both with an internal unity and an external 
political ambition. (Maswood, 1994:19)72
As Ahluwalia & Meyer note, this construction of an identity juxtaposed to an 
essentialised ‘other’ is a feature of International Relations and particularly Realist 
discourse (1994:25). In this context Huntington’s analysis of civilisational 
interaction continues the preoccupation of the discipline with Western concerns, 
within an established framework of assumptions about the nature of interaction, 
rather than introducing radically new perspectives on a multicultural system of 
world politics.
What distinguishes Huntington’s discussion of the Islamic threat is his tying it to a 
conspiratorial connection with Confucian civilisations (Bigo, 1994:12). The 
Confucian challenge to the West is evident to Huntington in a number of areas, one 
of the most concrete being arms transfers between China and the Middle East, 
particularly, Iran and Pakistan (1993a:47), which for Huntington evidence ‘an 
extraordinary level of commitment and cooperation between these countries’
are losing, and losing badly, whether they be Azeris, Palestinians, Iraqis, Iranians or Bosnian 
Muslims’ (Mahbubani, 1993c: 12).
72 Maswood(1994) argues that the fundamentalist movement has emerged with the political task of 
reforming Muslim society. It is essentially a reaction to Westernisation, though not modernisation, 
which Muslims fundamentalists distinguish between.
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(1996a: 190). Evidence for this conspiracy is regarded by many critics as 
somewhat thin. As Goldsworthy notes, Huntington’s argument mystifies what 
might otherwise be regarded as self-interested transactions of states in the name of 
cultural alliance (Goldsworthy, 1994:7).74 However, for Huntington, this is one 
aspect of the broader challenge which China and Asia presents to the West. China 
is perceived as in the course of resuming its traditional role of hegemon in East 
Asia, evolving economically and militarily into a power of unprecedented size 
(1996a: 169-74, 230).75 Interaction between China and the West, he observes, is 
becoming increasingly antagonistic as China, and Asia in general, becomes 
increasingly assertive and less inclined to accept Western values, leadership or 
direction (1996a:222).76
Muzaffar interprets Huntington’s warnings as ‘yet another attempt to curb the rise 
of yet another non-Westem economic competitor’ (Muzaffar, 1994:15).77 Fearing 
the challenges presented by the new dynamism of East Asia in the early and mid 
1990s, Huntington, he suggests, is seeking ‘to preserve, protect and perpetuate 
Western dominance’ by conjuring up spectres such as the Confucian-Islamic 
connection (Muzaffar, 1994:13). Huntington’s goal here, he argues, is to persuade 
the United States that it should not reduce its military capability by presenting 
Islam and Asia as direct physical threats demanding readiness and cohesion of the 
West.
73 For Huntington, what makes this different to a conventional arms race is that whilst one side is 
seeking to increase its arms, the other side, the West, is seeking to limit rather than balance the 
opposition’s arms. This tactic of preventing arms build up whilst simultaneously reducing its own 
arms capabilities is a matter of some concern to a strategist like Huntington who has maintained a 
long-held interest in the military dimensions of power.
74 Similarly, Muzaffar notes Western states and companies trade widely across the world, including 
with Islamic countries, yet these deals are not taken as evidence of cultural alliances. Muzaffar 
points out that most Muslim countries buy their arms from the United States rather than China. He 
also notes that Chinese support for Muslim states in international forums on issues such as Bosnia 
and Israel was not forthcoming (1994:14).
75 China, he suggests, has the potential to become ‘the biggest player in human history’ 
(1996a:231).
76 For Huntington, a prime example of this is the human rights debate and, in particular, the course 
of the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights where Asian states clearly articulated a distinct 
perspective (1996a: 192-8).
77 Mahbubani and Muzaffar both present the West and its tradition of dominance as the root cause 
of global conflict (Mahbubani, 1992:70, Muzaffar, 1994)'
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Muzaffar’s criticism’s were written in response to Huntington’s original 1993 
essay. His concerns appear to be bom out by the 1996 book where Huntington 
acknowledges more fully the challenge he sees emanating from Asia; its rapid 
economic growth producing a shift in the balance of power between Asia and the 
West bringing to the fore fundamental differences between Asian and American 
values (1996a: 103, 225). Huntington is conscious of the pride and confidence this 
growth has engendered, noting arguments that this growth is founded on the 
strengths of Asian and Confucian rather than Western values (1996a: 107-9). This 
permits him to depict Asia’s challenge to the West as cultural and civilisational, as 
well as economic.78
As Huntington’s vision of interaction between the West and non-West develops, 
the political character of his thesis becomes increasingly evident. The thesis 
provides not just a scholarly analysis of world politics, but explicit prescriptions for 
containing inter-civilisational conflict and minimising threats to the West and the 
United States. This advice is based on a perception of the cultural world order 
premised on civilisational spheres of influence. He advises consolidation of 
civilisational identity at home and non-interference abroad: ‘Those who do not 
recognise fundamental divides ... are doomed to be frustrated by them’ 
(1996a:309). In essence, Huntington recommends universalism at home and 
multiculturalism abroad, reversing what he perceives as the current United States’ 
policies of multiculturalism at home, and universalism abroad.
This has major implications for his perception of the West. Huntington calls upon 
the West to consolidate its own identity, resisting domestic multiculturalism and 
strengthening traditional cultural ties in foreign policy by, for instance, 
rejuvenating the Atlantic Alliance. The maintenance of Western unity, he argues, is 
essential to slowing its decline in world affairs (1996a:307-8): Tn the clash of 
civilisations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately’
78 Elsewhere, Huntington has discussed the challenge presented by other Confucian states, such as 
Singapore, and to a lesser extent, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, to Western interpretations of 
democracy (1991b; 1996b). In The Third Wave, Huntington considered the way in which the 
‘dominant party system’ in East Asia had produced government blocks so powerful as to exclude 
the remaining opposition parties from government (1991b:304).
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(1996a:321). Equally significantly, he advises that the United States and the West 
in general abstain from interfering in other cultures to promote Western values and 
norms. The abstention of core states from interference in other civilisations is one 
of Huntington’s key rules for peace in a multi-civilisational world (1996a:316). 
This implies some measure of withdrawal by the West in recognition of the new 
balance of power, and has enormous implications for the normative foundations of 
interaction in the international system.79
However, Huntington aims not so much at sanctioning the West’s retreat, but at 
enhancing and even renewing the West’s power. In his 1993 essay, he suggests that 
in the short term, the West should pursue a policy
...to support in other civilisations groups sympathetic to Western 
values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that 
reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote 
the involvement of the non-Westem states in those institutions. 
(1993a:49)
Given his analysis of the problems of transferring Western values and concepts, 
this would appear to be a provocative and not necessarily productive set of policies.
Huntington’s prescription for the West’s interaction with other civilisations are a 
blend of co-option, cooperation, and containment; co-option in encouraging the 
‘Westernisation’ of Latin-America; cooperation in seeking to improve relations 
with civilisations he perceive as less hostile, such as Japan and Russia; and 
containment of Sinic and Islamic civilisations through restraining their military 
development. But in addition, he recommends the maintenance of Western 
technical and military superiority over other civilisations, despite having 
acknowledged that such policies could be provocative (1993a:29; 1996a:312). His 
recommendations are clearly aimed at retaining the West as a powerful, if more 
contained, actor in world affairs.
Huntington somewhat belatedly suggests that in addition to containment and co­
option, the West should strive to achieve a better understanding of the perceptions 
and interests of other civilisations, to identify commonalities between cultures
79 See McNeill( 1997b) for a discussion of the ‘bunker mentality’ which he believes Huntington 
demonstrates in this thesis.
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(1996a:318-21); but the overall tone of his thesis is pessimistic. He notes, for 
instance, that the conclusion of other great twentieth century conflicts, the First and 
Second World Wars, were greeted with euphoric expectations of a more peaceful 
world. These expectations were shattered by new conflicts:
Now, six years after the collapse of European communism, our 
euphoric moment has passed, and we too have become sadder and 
wiser. A single dominating ideological conflict has given way to a 
multiplicity of ethnic conflicts, the stability of a bipolar world to the 
confusion and instability of a multi-polar and multi-civilisational 
world, and the potential horror of global nuclear war to the daily 
horror of ethnic cleansing. (1996b:4)
Elsewhere, Huntington argued that in the late 1980s, the United States reached the 
zenith of a wave of declinism, the fifth since 1950. However, each of these waves 
helped to generate counteraction to prevent the shrinkage of American power 
(1988:94-6). It seems that Huntington himself is helping to generate a sixth wave 
of declinism, warning of the retreat not just of American, but also of Western 
power in response to external and internal forces. Perhaps this is similarly intended 
to generate a reaction to consolidate the power and identity of the West in the face 
of perceived challenges.
As noted, Huntington’s thesis reflects a wave of pessimism in the American and 
European intellectual communities in the early 1990s, signalling disillusionment 
with the post-Cold War world. In ‘The Coming Anarchy’, referred to earlier, 
Robert Kaplan(1994) also painted a picture of rising tensions, conflict and 
challenges to modem political institutions and structures. However, Kaplan 
explores a range of forces, such as population growth, migration and ecological 
degradation, which contribute to social dislocation and the collapse of authority 
structures, particularly in post-colonial states. Huntington’s analysis is more 
narrowly focused. Although he recognises the pressures which modernisation place 
on local and global politics, he concludes that instability primarily derives from 
differences, accentuated by proximity. The West should therefore support those 
that resemble it and reduce the effectiveness of those that threaten it. Hence 
Huntington’s main recommendation for meeting the challenges of the late 
twentieth century is a policy of containment, both internally and externally. 
Huntington’s thesis may have more in common with Kennan’s ‘X’ article than its
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radical analysis of a fluid post-war situation and the spectacular impact which it 
has made on intellectual and policy communities.
Conclusion
Huntington presents the contemporary world as one in flux stimulated by the 
release of the constraints of the Cold War, and by the pressures of modernisation, a 
force which he long ago identified as volatile and destabilising. In contrast to more 
liberal authors such as Fukuyama, Huntington chooses to concentrate on the forces 
of fragmentation rather than those of unification in the contemporary world. In this 
context, his concept of civilisations and of the West directly challenges liberal 
concepts which see the West as a universal civilisation. Instead, Huntington 
presents a pluralist conception of civilisations within which the West is unique, 
possibly even superior, but categorically not universal (1996a:311). In this, 
Huntington finds common ground with Spengler and, to some extent with 
Toynbee. However, his argument lacks the depth of historical analysis found in his 
predecessors. Whilst Huntington’s discussion is littered with references to the 
modem histories of a variety of peoples and states, the thesis lacks a considered 
historical discussion of important issues, such as the impact of modernisation or 
relations between Islamic and Western peoples. Furthermore, unlike Spengler and 
Toynbee, Huntington does not locate the history of the West in a broader world 
history since world history is treated as Western history until the current era.
Huntington suggests that his thesis on civilisational interaction offers a new 
paradigm to understand the cultural world order (1993b). However, his hypotheses 
have a familiar ring of a civilisational ‘war of all against all’. In his ‘new’ 
paradigm, the significant units of the international system may be civilisations 
rather than states, but the structure of the international system continues to be 
defined primarily by conflict between self-regarding units. His world view is 
informed by the concept of power politics leading to a vision of the world 
dominated by conflict, and the assumption that power continues to be contested in 
an anarchical environment.80 In effect, Huntington’s thesis seeks to capture the
80 There is a danger that the expectation of conflict can contribute to the generation of conflict. 
Furthermore, the focus on the irreconcilability of civilisations, rather than on their techniques for
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concept of inter-civilisational relations and co-opt it into neo-realism, casting some 
doubt on the novelty of the paradigm.
Bigo(1994) describes Huntington as part of a community of analysts and 
commentators whose positions were premised upon the sense of insecurity which 
characterised the Cold War. ‘Orphaned’ by the events of 1989-90, this community 
benefits from the generation of a renewed sense of insecurity; related, for instance, 
to drugs, immigration and disease. Whilst these threats are primarily perceived as 
arising from the outside, from the South rather than the East, they appear
Q 1
instrumental in generating decay and fragmentation within. The generation of 
insecurity is therefore presented as a tactic of adjustment to the new global 
conditions. Huntington’s thesis appears as one engaged in ‘looking for enemies’,82 
replacing the West’s old adversary, the Soviet Union, with a new one to sustain the 
traditional structures of international relations as perceived by conflict theorists. 
While defining civilisations as dynamic, interactive entities, he portrays them as 
immutable communities whose differences are compounded and confirmed by 
conflict on the local and global levels. While briefly he appeals for understanding 
and toleration among cultures, the thrust of his thesis advocates the promotion and 
protection of Western values. We sense that Huntington is seeking to shake the 
West, and particularly the United States, out of complacency. This is achieved by 
portraying it as under imminent threat from an external enemy, the Confucian- 
Islamic connection; and an internal enemy, the loss of Western normative 
homogeneity. The constitution of enemies is therefore a critical element in 
Huntington’s conception of the West.
coexistence, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If this is permitted to happen, there is a danger 
of smothering the insights that this branch of research may offer us by focusing on one, largely 
negative aspect of inter-civilisational interaction.
81 Hence minority groups, immigrants, criminals become associated with an external threat and 
something of an alien within. These new forms of threats combine regional conflict, religious 
fundamentalism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drugs and immigration. Bigo observes 
that, for once, this was a discourse which began in Europe and was exported to the United States. 
Regis Debray writing in 1989, he notes, anticipates Huntington in his warnings that NATO has 
neglected its southern flank (Bigo, 1994:10).
82 This is a phrase used by Dr. Peter Van Ness in conversations with regard^the Huntington essay.
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A central element of Huntington’s discussion is how the West should cope with the 
new cultural world order. Huntington represents the West as a major power, on the 
cusp of decline, threatened with disintegration within and diminution without. 
Spengler and Toynbee demonstrated similar concerns. Like Toynbee, Huntington 
warns his community of potential degeneration, but suggests that the West has the 
capacity to avoid this. This contrasts with the presentations of Spengler and of 
Fukuyama which, whilst differing in their tone and readings of the future, leave a 
strong sense of the West swept along by the forces of history, rather than as an 
agent determining history’s course.
Huntington has a well-developed sense of territorial links, and of ethnic and 
religious affinities as characterising cultures; but the critical factors which 
distinguish civilisations for him are norms and values. In this respect, he portrays 
the West as a resilient culture which, although heterogeneous, has been strong 
enough to absorb incoming cultures. This quality is perceived by Huntington as 
under threat in the era of late modernity. Issues such as racial and cultural 
integration present a much stronger sense of threat to the cohesion of Huntington’s 
West than they do in Fukuyama’s.
Huntington obviously values the norms and institutions of Western society as the 
best, if not the only, way to provide order and governance. However, like Toynbee, 
he is extremely sceptical of the feasibility and desirability of transferring norms and 
institutions across cultures. However, whereas Toynbee was concerned about the 
destructive impact of Western norms and institutions on non-Westem society, 
Huntington tends to focus on how such transfers feed tensions between the West 
and non-West, empowering anti-Western forces. He focuses primarily on the 
West’s security and interests. His scepticism with regard to the transfer of norms 
and institutions derives from his sense of civilisations as ultimately distinguished 
by a unique blend of norms and values, and by his sense of the West as unique 
rather than universal. Like Bull, Huntington acknowledges the normative and 
institutional dimensions of Western power; but although he recognises that the 
West has exercised global power and influence, he ties this firmly to its capacity to 
project military and economic power, rather than seeing the West as constructing a 
lasting, universal normative framework for global political interaction.
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The implications of Huntington’s thesis and the prescriptions which it entails are 
substantial. Expectations of cross-cultural cooperation are not eliminated but are 
substantially weakened. The thesis suggests a system in which order is maintained 
through an ethos of non-intervention which substantially undermines the concept of 
an evolving cosmopolitan framework, replacing this with an ethos of cultural 
relativism. Huntington’s work suggests that the West needs to consolidate its own 
identity and prepare to defend this in an anarchical world of inter-civilisational 
power politics, rather than seeing itself engaged in processes of progress or cultural 
convergence through globalisation as suggested in Fukuyama. As in Toynbee and 
Bull, this entails acknowledging the diminution of Western power in the face of the 
resurgence of non-Westem civilisations. How the West continues to promote its 
own interests and project power, yet maintain a policy of non-intervention is 
unclear, but it does imply a policy of constructive interaction, particularly amongst 
the core states of particular civilisations.
Huntington’s thesis has been criticised for its reduction of complex events and 
patterns to a simple but ominous structure. Yet as David Welch(1997) notes, part 
of the power and appeal of Huntington’s analysis of civilisational interaction lies in 
its bold simplicity and consequent accessibility as a tool to understand a complex 
environment. Yet this is also where its weaknesses lie since the thesis reduces the 
complexities of world politics and civilisational interaction to the dynamics of 
cultural rivalry and suspicion.
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Chapter Eight
The Occident and its Significant ‘Other’: Edward Said’s
West
Some of the most vigorous debate in recent decades on the relationship between 
the West and non-West has been stimulated by ideas produced not in the 
disciplines of history or political science, but in literary criticism. Although his 
major works focus primarily on the analysis of literary texts, Edward Said’s work 
is deeply informed by, and engaged in commenting upon, the dynamics of political 
and cultural interaction in world politics, and the relationship of the West to the 
non-West. His book Orientalism(1978) was one of the founding texts of post­
colonial studies, a movement which through the examination of literature, art and 
history provides a critical reassessment of the West’s interaction with the non-West 
from the perspective of the non-West. His perspective is a critical one which draws 
deeply from influences outside, as well as within, the West.
The conception of the West which he presents is complex and operates at two 
levels. On the first level, Said represents how the West saw itself, drawing on a 
range of literature from Europe and the United States. On the second, he provides 
his own critical representation of the West which portrays it primarily as an 
imperialist entity. This dual approach, which reflects upon how the West constmcts 
in own identity, contrasts with the preceding authors.
Key themes in Said’s constitution of the West further distinguish it. Firstly, as 
noted above, Said focuses strongly on the West as an imperialist entity. Of the 
preceding authors, only Bull, and to a more limited extent Wight, reflect in any 
depth on this dimension. However, empire stands at the very heart of Said’s 
modem West (1993:10-2). For him, ‘the principle of domination and resistance 
based on the division between the West and the rest of the world ... runs like a
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fissure throughout’ (1993:60). Empire is not viewed simply as a form of political 
or economic association, constituted by elites, but as a system which penetrates all 
levels of the metropole and the colonies. Its durability is supported by its 
reconstitution at all levels of society and by popular acceptance in the metropole of 
the necessity of empire. Secondly, Said suggests that knowledge and information 
are central elements of Western power. Whilst all the preceding authors recognised 
intellectual and technical capacity as critical features of the West, again, only Bull 
reflects more deeply on the significance of knowledge structures to the West’s 
interaction in the cultural world order. Said goes deeper again, to consider the role 
and deployment of knowledge in constituting the West. Thirdly, in his conception 
of civilisational interaction, Said occupies a position between the universalist 
assumptions of Fukuyama and the segregated and incommensurable vision of 
civilisations found in Huntington and Spengler. He believes in cultural pluralism, 
but has an underlying sense of a shared humanity which can often be obscured by 
cultural differentiation. There are some parallels here with the concepts of cultural 
world order found in Toynbee and, again, in the international society authors. 
Said’s cultures are plural, but interactive, dynamic and constantly in the process of 
reconstitution. His work raises questions about how we recognise the plurality of 
cultures without obscuring this human community. Finally, Said presents the West 
as an identity developed and represented in antithesis, to the East or the Orient.
This discussion draws primarily on two of his most significant works, 
Orientalism(l91S) and Culture and Imperialism{\993) both of which are deeply 
concerned about the politics of representation. In Orientalism, he discusses the 
creation and reiteration of the Orient in Western scholarly and institutional texts of 
the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This theme is developed in 
Culture and Imperialism in discussing relations between the ‘metropolitan’ West 
and it overseas territories. In both works, Said argues that essentialised 
representations of the non-West reinforced the West’s sense of its own identity as a 
superior culture. In Orientalism, Said deals almost exclusively with the West’s 
representations of Arab peoples. In Culture and Imperialism, his discussion ranges 
the globe, considering literature and art which represents peoples from India, 
Africa, Ireland, the Caribbean and Asia.
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In a 1995 review of Orientalism, Said described the intention of this work as a 
‘multicultural critique of power using knowledge to advance itself’, arguing that 
this is a work which is anti-essentialist in its discussions of cultures and 
civilisations (1995:4). That is to say, Said strives to dissect the images of cultures 
as organic, homogenous, natural entities in order to reveal the way in which images 
of one’s own and of other cultures are constructed through the deployment of 
representations and of knowledge.
Said’s Era and Influences
Said’s background provides a strong basis for an interest in inter-civilisational 
relations and the role of the West. He was bom in west Jerusalem in 1935, but left 
Palestine for Egypt in 1947 as it became engulfed in the war which followed the 
withdrawal of the British mandate. He completed his secondary education in the 
United States and subsequently studied English and History at Princeton, receiving 
a doctorate from Harvard University in Comparative Literature. He then became a 
university teacher of Comparative Literature, and currently holds a chair at 
Columbia University, New York. Said did not return to Palestine/Israel until 
1992.1
Although Said grew up in a relatively affluent and secure home and has pursued a 
successful career in the United States, a sense of exile permeates his work. The 
displacement experienced by Said and the Palestinian people in general critically 
shapes his perceptions of power and of geography.2 Although an Anglican who has 
lived most of his life in the West, there is little sense that his identity as a Christian 
has mitigated his sense of displacement. In fact, his discussion of his background 
heightens the sense of Palestine as a location which was/is integral to Christianity, 
Judaism, and Islam, challenging automatic associations of Christianity with the 
West. There is little sense of Said feeling an outsider within the predominantly
1 Said did travel to the Middle East region between 1967 and 1992, but not to Israel due to 
restrictions likely to arise from his own political affiliations (Hovsepian, 1992; Said, 1994a).
2 For an account of Said’s sense of displacement, see ‘Return to Palestine-Israel’ in Said(1994a) 
and Said’s text in his collaboration with photographer Jean Mohr in After the Last Sky (Said, 
1985b). See also Hovsepian( 1992:7) on how this experience undermined his sense of the ‘stability 
of geography and the continuity of land’.
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Islamic Palestinian community. However, ultimately, it is not his religious identity, 
but Said’s identity as a secular scholar which is most significant for him; 
secularism providing a ‘space for discussion’ uninhibited by essentialisations of 
theological identities (1994b:24). He is critical of essentialised images of Islamic 
society often found in Western literature and commentary, but also critical of 
equally reductionist Islamist perspectives (1995:3).
Said is a renowned advocate of the Arab and Palestinian positions in the 
international and American communities, representing a voice often silenced or 
discredited in the United States (Thomas, 1994:26-7). He has written extensively 
on Palestine, Middle East politics and American foreign policy, and demonstrates a 
strong personal identification with the plight of Arab, and particularly Palestinian, 
peoples.* 3 His own consciousness of being an ‘Oriental’ goes back to his youth in 
Palestine and Egypt, to the heady atmosphere of post-war independence, of Arab 
nationalism and the experience of Nasserism (Said, 1985a: 15-6). Since the 1960s, 
the Middle East region has undergone the upheavals of war and revolution, 
becoming a focus of both regional and global conflicts. These can be linked both to 
the processes of decolonisation and construction of post-colonial societies, 4 and to 
the Cold War. During the 1970s, the Oil Crisis, the Iranian Revolution and the 
resurgence of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ enhanced in the West a sense of Islamic 
societies as different and threatening. As Turner notes, it was in this atmosphere of 
regional and global conflict that the debate about Orientalism arose (Turner, 
1989:630).
Said’s writings range from literature and philology across anthropology and 
philosophy to history and politics. They exhibit a fusion of intellectual interests and 
political commentary drawn from his own experiences and the influence of radical 
developments in the intellectual environment. The post-war era saw the 
development of, for instance, feminism, neo-Marxism, social protest movements,
J His personal involvement in the politics of the region include his membership of the Palestinian 
National Council (1977-1991) on which he sat as an independent intellectual, and consultant to the
UN International Conference on the Question of Palestine (1983). Said has never been a member of
any political party. For discussion of his role in the P.N.C. see Hovsepian(1992).
4 Although in Palestine’s case, Said would no doubt argue that the most pressing feature of post-war 
politics was the imposition of a new form of colonialism by Israel.
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and post-structuralism. Said’s work demonstrates the influence of these discursive 
developments, but has also itself been a major stimulus to the development of 
critical thinking. As Radhakrishnan(1994) notes, Said’s work reflects complexity: 
he cannot be regarded as simply a Palestinian activist or conversely as a Professor 
of Literature; his agenda is more complex. Similarly, he is not simply a 
Foucauldian nor a Gramscian, but draws on an intricate variety of influences. For 
instance, Said’s sense of geography is influenced by his own experience of 
displacement, and the inadequacy of conventional geography to express the 
experiences of the dispossessed; but is also influenced by the ‘spatialisation of 
cultural and social theory’ found in Gramsci and Foucault.3 *
A second instance of the fusion of influences is Said’s interest in concepts of 
power; this is influenced both by his experience of Middle East politics, and by 
Michel Foucault (Said, 1978:3). He shares with Foucault interests in the links 
between power, knowledge and representation; in discourse; and in the impact of 
location on scholars and authors. Like Foucault, Said highlights the political 
character of knowledge (Thomas, 1994:24). Foucault’s method ‘dethrones’ the 
primacy of the ‘knowing subject’, so central to much of Western thinking, arguing 
instead that knowledge of the object is always contextual (Dalby, 1980:492).6 7
Similarly Said argues that the individual author is influenced and constrained by 
the discourses through which knowledge is received and expressed (Said, 1978:92- 
4; 1983; Clifford, 1988). Said is also influenced by Foucault, and indirectly 
Nietzsche, in the genealogical methodology he employs in Orientalism and Culture 
and Imperialism (Clifford, 1988:266). Both works discuss the degree to which 
individual texts are products of an established discourse within influential social
n
and political contexts.
3 On the map of modernity, notes Gregory, ‘territory connotes what Foucault would call a 
juridipolitical field’. It is no accident, he suggests, that Said’s writing about Palestine is shot through
with references to, and images of, partition and enclosure that mimic Foucault (Gregory, 1995:452).
Gramsci, argues Gregory, is also a major, but spectral influence on Culture and Imperialism in 
which Said repeatedly refers to the importance of spatial concepts and mapping to empire 
(1995:467).
6 For a critical discussion of Said’s Foucauldian method, see for example, Garre(1995:315).
7 Orientalism traces the discourse of Orientalism through a variety of texts, placing these texts 
within historical and intellectual contexts; similarly, Culture and Imperialism seeks to demonstrate
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Said’s ideas of power are also influenced by Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.8 
Hegemony is an important dimension of the West’s power for Said, providing 
consensus on Western superiority within the West, and a facility for maintaining 
that power overseas in the post-colonial era. Like Huntington, Said challenges 
assumptions that Western cultural hegemony is a natural evolution of a universal 
culture, suggesting instead that it projects Western values, ideas and culture under 
the guise of universalism.
Yet although Said challenges Western cultural hegemony, he also rejects 
suggestions that an authentic non-Westem culture can be posited in contrast to the 
negative representations produced by Western culture. His rejection of essentialism 
and the construction of rigid cultural categories draws deeply on liberal humanist 
concepts which form an important part of European thought. As Clifford notes, 
although a radical critic of Western cultural traditions, Said derives most of his 
standards from these traditions (Clifford, 1988:275). Said’s humanist ideas 
distinguish him from Foucault and are problematic for some critics who view 
humanism as an intellectual and ethical dimension of Western colonialism 
(Clifford, 1988; Young, 1990).9 Despite this, Said clearly associates himself with a 
belief in ‘a common humanity’,10 maintaining a sense of a shared human reality 
which is complex and heterodox, but often obscured by essentialised and 
monolithic representations of cultures (Said, 1993:377; 1995:3). Said's work seeks 
to traverse cultural barriers, such as those between Orient and West, and dismantle, 
not reinforce, cultural monoliths and essentialisations. For Said, cultures are 
interdependent interactive, and non-exclusive, ‘Beethoven’ he notes, ‘belongs as
the embeddedness of the power structures of imperialism in the culture and the subconsciousness of 
the West.
8 Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is interpreted by Said as the operation of culture within civil 
society where the influence of ideas, of institutions and of persons works through consent rather 
than domination (Said, 1978:6-7).
9 Young(1990) notes that for some, humanism actually masks the assimilation of the human self 
with European values. Humanism constructs boundaries based on the marginalisation or creation of 
the ‘non-human’, the savage, the barbarian - implicitly, those who had not been assimilated by the 
West. Young points to the integral role of European colonialism in the construction of the identity 
of the West and as the universal prototype for other human societies.
10 A belief for which, Rogers notes, he provides no philosophical defence (Rogers, 1992:519).
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much to the West Indians as he does to Germans, since his music is now part of the 
human heritage’ (Said, 1993:xxviii).
Said’s humanism is also evident in his commitment to the goals of emancipation 
and enlightenment, goals which he stresses remain a high priority to the peoples of 
the developing world (1994b).11 Said wants to sustain the ‘liberating energies 
released by the great decolonising resistance movements, and the mass uprisings of 
the 1980s’ (1993:401). He fears these liberating energies could be strangled by 
narrow or chauvinist forms of nationalism, or ‘nativism’, which themselves 
reinforce the divisions imposed by nineteenth century Western imperialism. For 
Said, whilst the development of national consciousness is the necessary first stage 
of anti-imperialism, true liberation requires movement onward from national to 
social consciousness (1993:276, 323),12 rejecting nationalist separatism and 
triumphalism in favour of seeking a community among cultures and peoples: This 
community is the real human liberation portended by the resistance to imperialism’ 
(1993:262). Without such a transformation, national consciousness can produce 
fundamentalism and despotism rather than liberation (1993:277, 323). Thus, 
although Said draws on the influence of critics of the Enlightenment, he himself 
retains a commitment to humanism, enlightenment, and emancipation.13
11 He notes that while in the West, intellectual currents such as post-modernism, post-structuralism 
and post-Marxism are concerned with the ‘end of modernity’, in the Arab and Islamic world, many 
‘are still concerned with modernity itself, still far from exhausted, still a major challenge in a culture 
dominated by turath (heritage) and orthodoxy (Said, 1993:399). He suggests that the secular 
intellectual has an important role in continuing to promote these aims (1994b).
12 See his discussion of Fanon (1993:323-6). Note also his obvious admiration for the scholars 
Curtius and Auerbach: ‘These thinkers took nationalism to be a transitory, finally secondary matter: 
what mattered far more was the concert of peoples and spirits that transcended the shabby political 
realm of bureaucracy, armies, customs barriers, and xenophobia.’ Out of this ‘catholic’ and 
European tradition emerged the transnational study of comparative literature, Said’s own chosen 
field (Said, 1993:51).
lj For instance, he draws on one of the great humanist scholars, Vico, in his discussion of history as 
made by man. Said’s humanism has been criticised or queried by some such as Young(1990) who 
point to the associations between humanism and European imperialism, and Clifford who suggests 
that Said is himself presenting a grand totality in the form of a presumed human culture (Clifford, 
1988:274). In contrast, Rogers criticises Young for finding Said ‘guilty by association’ with 
hegemonic Western culture. Humanism, he suggests, has always been an ambiguous discourse on 
human rights (Rogers, 1992:520). For others, it is yet a further demonstration of his complexity. 
Thomas’ comments suggest that Said’s humanism reminds us of the variety within all cultures rather 
than implying a uniform universalism (Thomas, 1994:24).
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Said’s references to the common heritage of humanity imply a sense of an 
evolutionary human culture in which he draws on the influence of the British critic, 
Raymond Williams (Said, 1993:xxxi; 1990). Williams, a ‘cultural materialist’, was 
one of the main inspirations for Orientalism (Gregory, 1995:466).14 Said draws on 
Williams’ notion of ‘structures of feeling’ in developing his own sense of the 
connections between the literature and art of the West and its broader imperial 
culture in Culture and Imperialism. Said engages the influence of both Williams 
and Foucault in exploring the relationship between the West and those over whom 
it exercised empire and hegemony. However, he criticised both for their Euro­
centrism (Said, 1988:9; 1990). Said’s own work exceeds that of these influential 
figures in its geographic and cultural scope.15
As noted above, Said, displaced from Palestine, came of age during the era of 
decolonisation. In some respects, his work is an aspect of this broader process of 
dismantling empire. One of the consequences of imperialism is to deprive the 
colonised of the right to represent themselves. His work on Palestine is in part an 
effort to return to the Palestinian people the right to tell their own story and 
represent themselves (Said, 1985b; Arac, 1994:13). Said was influenced by earlier 
post-colonial writers such as Anwer Abdel Malek, C.L.R. James, Frantz Fanon and 
particularly the Subaltern Studies group who revolutionised Indian historiography 
(Said, 1985a; 1995).16 The post-colonial studies movement, which they and he 
helped to generate, challenges Western history and scholarship:
14 Williams had a strong interest in the links between culture and society. ‘Culture’, he argued in 
1958, ‘is ordinary’. Every society has its own purposes, and meanings which are expressed in 
institutions, arts and learning. However, he also believed in the existence of a general human culture 
which gradually evolved, although not necessarily towards any point of perfection (Williams, 1958; 
1961:43, 53). As a literary critic, Williams ‘rooted’ his observation of literature in the life of the 
broader society in which the artist lived, connecting literary texts and ‘the lived life of knowable 
social groups’ (Said, 1990:82). See Young(1990:88-9) for a brief discussion of cultural materialism.
13 Clifford argues that Said goes beyond Foucault in seeking to extend his concept of discourse into 
the area of cultural constructions, looking at ways in which the cultural order is defined externally 
with respect to the exotic ‘other’, thus expanding on Foucault’s ethnocentric focus on European 
thought (Clifford, 1988:264-5).
16 In Culture and Imperialism, Said identifies three topics emerging from ‘decolonising cultural 
resistance’: the insistence on the right to see the community’s history as a whole; the idea of 
resistance being an alternative way of conceiving human history rather than merely a reaction to 
imperialism; and the pull away from nationalism to a more integrative view of human community 
and liberation (1993:259-61). He also discusses the evolution within post-colonial writing from the 
earlier writers who felt comfortable in identifying with the Western cultural traditions and the
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Not only is the European presence in Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia routinely interrogated to disclose the construction and 
constriction of other subjects, empire and colonialism are 
increasingly seen placed at the very center of Europe’s constitution. 
(Prakash, 1995:205)
Prakash notes that post-colonialism is part of a discursive shift which casts doubts 
on the idea of subjects and origins authorised by Western humanism, and 
highlights the hierarchical identities and knowledge instituted by binary 
oppositions. In this respect, there is convergence between post-colonial criticism 
and post-structuralist interrogation of the universal subject (Prakash, 1995:205). 
However, as noted above, Said goes only so far along the post-structuralist road. 
His work demonstrates a certain disillusionment with abstractness of some post­
modernist writing (Said, 1993; 1994b). For him, post-colonialism is crucially 
distinguished from post-modernism by its continued commitment to the goals of 
emancipation and enlightenment (Said, 1995:6), goals, he argues, that the West, 
has failed to live up to because of its imperialism. Said wants to turn the ‘artificial 
sentinel’ of Western humanism into real humanism, a consciousness of social and 
political needs which is colour blind and has no regard for the divisions constructed 
by imperialism (Said, 1993:324-5). As Driver observes, Said is post-modern in the 
sense that he is critical of ‘the worldly role of the humanities’. However, ‘his 
insistence on the need to make political choices provides a powerful counterpoint 
to current drifts within post-modernist writing’ (Driver, 1992:37).
The blend of Said’s personal experiences and intellectual influences have 
contributed to a perspective which is fervently anti-imperialist, but simultaneously 
committed to the humanist goals of enlightenment and emancipation. Said 
therefore straddles the boundaries between West and non-West, modem and post­
modern. In many respects, this reflects the way his life and work straddles 
boundaries, of faiths, of cultures, of locations, of disciplines. Most of his life has 
been spent in the United States, the heartland of ‘the West’, a multicultural society 
founded on immigrant communities. Said’s main standards and intellectual
methodology of grand narratives of emancipation, to the later post-independence writers who focus 
more on analysing and deconstructing the rhetoric, ideas and symbols of imperial power rather than 
on its history (1993:288-316).
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influences are drawn from European literature and philosophy (Clifford, 
1988:275).17 Yet in many respects, he still writes as an exile. He is both inside and 
outside ‘the West’, representing and presenting perspectives frequently not 
associated with the West. Consequently, Said brings a healthy, but for many 
disturbing, complexity to the West.
Civilisations, Cultures and Interaction
Said’s conception of civilisations is pluralist, but underwritten by a belief in a 
broader community of humanity. Although he does not define civilisations 
explicitly, and speaks more often of culture than civilisation, his work implies a 
deep concern for the course of civilisational interaction, and for West/non-West 
interaction in particular. His understanding of the significance of culture is linked 
to his understanding of the role which representations play in society:
We live of course in a world not only of commodities but also of 
representations, and representations - their production, circulation, 
history, and interpretation - are the very element of culture. (Said, 
1993:66)
Like Williams, his analysis focuses methodologically on ‘documentary’ culture, 
that is literature and the arts. Williams stressed the interconnectedness of all 
categories of culture; documentary, social, ideal (Williams, 1961:41-7). Similarly, 
Said relates literature and the arts to the broader social and political trends of the 
society. This has produced the criticism that his work focuses too narrowly on 
‘high culture’ (Young, 1990:133).18 However, he seeks to justify this focus by 
demonstrating not only the connectedness between culture and its political and 
social context, but also the function which ‘high culture’ fulfils in reinforcing the 
‘structures of feeling’ underlying political and social structures.19 Culture is for
17 At the same time, we should note that Said rejects suggestions that resistance to imperialism was 
led exclusively by Western ideas of freedom. What he seeks to highlight here is the importance of 
what he calls ‘reserves’ in Indian and Arab culture which had always resisted Western colonial rule 
(1993:240).
18 Clifford criticises Said for failing to present a developed theory of culture as a differentiating 
ensemble rather than simply hegemonic and disciplinary (Clifford, 1988:263).
19 This is particularly evident in Culture and Imperialism.
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Said a source of identity, a ‘theatre where various political and ideological causes 
engage one another’ (Said, 1993:xiii-iv).
Said does not view cultures as spontaneous, but as social constructions (1993:408). 
Furthermore, they are selective constructions produced by particular 
representations of self and other.20 The tendency to think of cultures as 
homogeneous, he suggests, obscures this selectivity. Furthermore, erroneous 
acceptance of particular representations or traditions as authentic often 
marginalises others.21 In fact, Said argues:
No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or 
Muslim, or American are no more than starting-points, which if 
followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly left 
behind. (1993:407)
In contrast, he sees cultures as ‘hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily 
differentiated, and unmonolithic’ (1993:xxix):
Culture is never just a matter of ownership, of borrowing and 
lending with absolute debtors and creditors, but rather 
appropriations, common experiences, and interdependencies of all 
kinds, among different cultures. This is a universal norm. 
(1993:261-2)
Therefore, although Said’s view of cultures and civilisations is a pluralist one, his 
pluralism is less segregated than Huntington’s or Spengler’s.
Said’s conception of cultures is also dynamic in that he perceives them as 
constantly in the process of reconstitution, influenced by contemporary needs. As 
he notes, the development and maintenance of culture requires the existence of an 
alter ego:
The construction of identity ... involves establishing opposites and 
‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous
20 Here, Said draws on the work of Martin Bemal(1987) and Eric Hobsbawm & Terence 
Ranger(1983) on the ‘invention’ of traditions and history, either through writing out certain aspects 
of history which do not fit the authorised history, or through projecting the image or power of 
certain traditions backwards in order to enhance their legitimacy (Said, 1993:16).
21 See, for instance, his discussion of the authorising and reproduction of the American identity in 
foreign policy (Said, 1993:393).
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interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from ‘us’.
Each age and society recreates its ‘others’. (1995:3)22
James Carrier describes this as a contextual or dialectical definition: ‘To tell what a
thing is, you place it in terms of something else’.2j There is an inherent danger that
the relativity of this perception of difference can be lost from view; the model
becoming detached from the dialectic, distinguishing characteristics becoming
defining characteristics, and the sense of difference becoming absolute in the light
of essentialised representations of the other (Carrier, 1992).24 Said’s conception of
the West critically investigates the employment of dialectical definition. The West
is conceived of as generating its self-image in antithesis to colonial peoples. In
Orientalism, for instance, he notes that shared experiences of history, politics,
economics are qualified by the belief that ‘Islam is Islam and the Orient is the
Orient’ (1978:107). All emotions and experiences ‘are necessarily subordinate to
the sheer, unadorned, and persistent fact of being an Arab’ (1978:230).
His criticism of practices of differentiation focuses not on the formation of cultural 
identities, but on the tendencies to venerate our own cultures at the expense of 
respect for others (1993:21) and to essentialise cultural identities:
...identity does not necessarily imply an ontologically given and 
eternally determined stability, or uniqueness, or irreducible 
character, or privileged status as something total and complete in 
and of itself. (1993:382)
Clifford notes in Said, as in Foucault, ‘a restless suspicion of totality’ (Clifford, 
1988:273; Foucault, 1976).25 This underlies Said’s discomfort with procedures
22 This leads Said to comment that the role of the cultural intellectual is not to accept the politics of 
identity as given, but ‘to show how all representations are constructed, for what purpose, by whom 
and with what components’ (1993:380).
2j Here Carrier quotes Kenneth Burke (Carrier, 1995:2).
24 Carrier has noted that twin and opposing characterisations of the modem West and societies in 
other times and places are a common feature of Western anthropology and sociology, being found in 
the work of Marx, Dürkheim and Levi-Strauss, to cite a few examples (1995:3). In the context of the 
essentialisation of cultural models, this has produced an image of the West as characterised by, for 
instance, individualism, rationality, organic solidarity, and progressivism (Carrier, 1995:4-5).
23 He argues that the human experience is ‘finely textured, dense and accessible’, but accessible 
through studying intertwined histories and overlapping spaces rather than through grand systems or 
ahistorical theories which tend to freeze highly contested orthodox or institutional versions of 
history into official identities. See Said( 1993:377).
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which create and enclose entities such as culture or ‘the Orient’. As Clifford notes, 
Said suggests that
...the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, 
radically ‘different’ inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of 
some religion, culture or racial essence proper to that geographical 
space is equally a highly debatable idea, (quoted in Clifford, 
1988:274)
Clifford, however, also criticises Said for himself resorting to ‘alternate totalities’ 
in positing humanist cosmopolitan essences and human common denominators 
(Clifford, 1988:274). This suggests a certain tension within Said’s position. There 
is resentment at Western cultural hegemony which rejects the plurality of equal 
cultures. Simultaneously, there is resistance to cultural reductionism which 
produces stereotypical images of the other. Said wants to emancipate the non-West 
from the stereotypes of weakness and inferiority which facilitated Western control 
and power of colonised peoples. However, he does not want to emancipate the 
popular imagination from Western cultural imperialism only to deliver it into the 
‘tyranny’ of an equally essentialised sense of homogeneous and authentic 
traditions.
In rejecting Western cultural hegemony presented in the West’s self­
representations, Said challenges assumptions that civilisational interaction occurs 
within a framework of an authentic civilisational hierarchy, or necessarily leads to 
convergence with the most powerful culture. However, his rejection of cultural 
essentialism also challenges assumptions that civilisations interact in a framework 
of segregated and hostile communities. He directly challenges the assumption that 
difference means hostility. His aim in Orientalism, he has argued,
...was not so much to dissipate difference itself ... but to challenge 
the notion that difference implies hostility, a frozen reified set of 
opposed essences, and a whole adversarial knowledge built out of 
those things. (1995:6)
26 As Turner( 1989:629) and Carrier(1992) note, differentiation and even essentialism are practices 
of identity formation which are not necessarily unique to modem Western society: ‘After all, to put 
a name on something is to identify its key characteristics and therefore essentialise it’ (Carrier, 
1992:207). Carrier also demonstrates that the West has also been subject to essentialisation, both by 
itself and by non-Westerners seeking to define their own identity in antithesis to the West. See, for 
instance, Said’s discussion of America’s official image of itself (1993:380-1).
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He appears to seek a middle way between perceiving civilisational interaction as 
hierarchical or convergent, as suggested by Fukuyama, and as segregated and 
hostile, as suggested by Huntington. This presents two important challenges which 
Said articulates in Orientalism. Firstly, how does one represent other cultures? 
(1978:325). Secondly:
Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be 
genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, 
traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences 
humanely? (1978:45)27
The Boundaries of Said’s West
Said’s work accentuates the existence of contending perspectives on the framework 
of cultural world order. It also suggests that the texts which set out these 
perspectives not only reflect but help to constitute these frameworks. His work 
critically reflects on how the West perceived itself projected through its images of 
the non-West. The self-image which he describes encompasses a strongly 
hierarchical sense of cultural world order which privileges the West’s position, 
viewing the non-Westem civilisations as dead or decaying and therefore in need of 
restoration by the West, the prime representative of modem civilisation (1978:7, 
87, 99). This is an image which Said implicitly critiques in his own more 
egalitarian conception of cultural world order and the West.
Territory
Said’s conception of the West is strongly influenced by his perception of territory 
as land imbued with political meaning. His writings demonstrate a strong interest 
in, and radical sense of, geography and space which he calls ‘imaginary 
geography’. This challenges concepts of geography as a science which is neutral 
and apolitical and accentuates its relationship to knowledge and power. Geography 
and boundaries are understood not simply as empirical givens but through the 
meaning attributed to a particular space or location (1978:54-5; 1994b:21). This
27 Said’s question is really how do we represent other cultures fairly, respectfully and equally. In a 
1994 article, Said suggest that the best course is that of open-mindedness and enlightenment, to 
achieve ‘small emancipations through learning’ (1994b:24).
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meaning may be influenced by the exercise of power. Therefore, in Said’s work, 
inscriptions of territory become overtly associated with the distribution of power.
29
A strong sense of spatiality is particularly noticeable in Culture and Imperialism 
which includes frequent references to locating, mapping and the utility of space, 
particularly the space of empire.30 Imperialism is described as ‘an act of 
geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, 
charted and finally brought under control’ (1993:271). The geographical 
underpinnings of empire underlie its social space: ‘The actual geographical 
possession of land is what empire in the final analysis is all about’ (Said, 1993:93).
Said’s conception of the territory of the West is shaped by his interest in the 
political and intellectual dimensions of space. We receive a stronger sense of the 
meaning of locations than of the boundaries of a specific territory. The West is 
primarily constituted by imperial Europe and the United States; his analyses focus 
on the texts and experiences of Britain, France and the United States, although his 
territorial conception of the West is not limited to them. However, these countries 
play for him a leading role in generating material, ideas and representations of the 
Orient (1978:17).31 Their ideas are discussed as the ideas of the West. Said’s map
28 For instance, for Said, the land which was once his home has become an alien place. The Palestine 
into which he was born effectively no longer exists, it is now the territory of Israel. This was a 
change effected not by cultural evolution, but by the exercise of power. See Said’s essay ‘Return to 
Palestine-IsraeT in Said( 1994a). In this, he describes a profound sense of alienation and 
displacement both personally - for instance, in seeing his former home occupied by another 
community - and at the level of the Palestinian people living in Israel and the West Bank or abroad. 
As Rogers( 1992:520-1) notes, Said writes from a sense of displacement, of homelessness.
29 As a displaced Palestinian, Said’s own life experiences are reflected in a sense of geography 
which is problematised, denaturalised. In After the Last Sky, for instance, Said is described as 
arguing for ‘a space for representation that deploys hybrid, broken, fragmentary forms to reinscribe 
a Palestinian presence on the map’ (Gregory, 1995:451; Said, 1985b).
30 For instance, in discussing Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park, Said comments on the existence of ‘a 
hierarchy of spaces by which the metropolitan centre and, gradually, the metropolitan economy are 
seen as dependent upon an overseas system of territorial control, economic exploitation, and a 
socio-cultural vision; without these stability and prosperity at home - ‘home’ being a word with 
extremely potent resonances - would not be possible’ (1993:69).
31 This is due, in part, to the depth and extent of their involvement in the Middle East region. In 
Orientalism, Said was criticised by other scholars for his failure to include the works of scholars 
from other European countries, particularly Germany, and from Russia (Kerr, 1980; Lewis, 1993). 
However, Said has discounted such criticisms as trivial (Said, 1985b: 14). German scholars, he 
argues, lacked the sustained national interests in the Orient which Said identifies in Anglo-French
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of the West in this respect is as much an intellectual as a territorial map. Ideas 
imbue space with meaning and support the construction of boundaries between 
territories.
The non-West plays an important role in mapping the location of the West in 
Said’s analyses. In Orientalism, the East helps to provide the location of the West 
with meaning. His work traces associations which gathered around the notion of 
the Orient in the literature of classical Greece, identifying a bold sense of division 
between East and West in the work of authors such as Aeschylus and even Homer. 
He selects texts which present Asia as defeated and distant in contrast to a 
powerful and articulate West, or an Orient which threatens the values and stability 
of the West (1978:55-7). These are motifs of the Orient which Said points to 
throughout his work. They provide the geographical location of the West with a 
meaning and a sense of difference, which are confirmed through their reiteration 
(Said, 1978:201). The Orient is a location, he suggests, which was always familiar, 
but different to the West; always like the West in some respects, but consistently 
represented as lying outside the boundaries of that community (1978:67). In this 
respect, the Orient is perceived as marking a significant boundary of the West.
As in all other authors discussed, there emerges from both Orientalism and Culture 
and Imperialism a sense that the geographic expansion of the West was facilitated 
by Western technology, reducing the distance between the West and other 
civilisations. However, Said does not suggest that this has brought about 
convergence between East and West. Rather it is perceived as accentuating the 
sense of separation between European and non-European peoples. For instance, he 
describes the Suez Canal (1869) as ‘dragging’ the Orient into the West’s 
geographical ambit and making it part of one world’ (1978:92). The Orient is 
brought into the West’s geographical sphere, but not as an equal. Rather it was 
‘penetrated, worked over, taken hold of’, formerly alien space was domesticated 
into colonial space (Said, 1978:211; Driver, 1992:30).
and later American authors. Although he acknowledges their contributions to scholarship, he argues 
they worked within a Weltanschauung established by French and British predecessors (Said/Lewis, 
1982) .
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Religion
Said has clearly and repeatedly identified himself as a secular scholar. However, 
this does not lead him to underestimate the powerful role which religion plays as a 
marker of identity. However, unlike Spengler, he focuses on religion as an agent of 
differentiation rather than as an institution which bestowed specific values or 
qualities on Western civilisation. The central axis of difference which defines the 
West for him is that between Christianity and Islam. His remarks reveal more about 
how the history and tradition of this conflict helped define the West than about the 
moral and institutional characteristics which Christianity contributed to the West.
Like Wight and Huntington, Said’s account of the West’s attitude towards Islam is 
one steeped in a sense of confrontation rather than coexistence. It acknowledges the 
threat felt by Christian Europe as Islam expanded through Asia, North Africa and 
Europe between the seventh and seventeenth centuries:
Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolise terror, devastation, the 
demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. For Europe, Islam was a 
lasting trauma. ... [I]n time, European civilisation incorporated that 
peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and vices, as 
something woven into the fabric of life. (1978:59)
This suggests that on the one hand, the encounter with Islam was internalised by
the West, coming to represent a broad sense of disruption and danger. However,
Said also suggests that the West strengthened its self-image by diminutive
representations of Islam; that the West ‘domesticated’ Islam through its
representations of that faith. For example, Islam was often represented by
Orientalist scholarship as a form of heresy, the prophet Mohammed as an imposter
(1978:62-6).j2 This suggests that the West’s sense of its own identity was
enhanced by its perception of Oriental people as both threatening and inferior in the
religious context. Assumptions of threat and degeneracy innate in Islam are
prominent in Said’s discussion of the West’s self-image, the proximity of Islam
and Christianity, geographically and spiritually, perceived to produce, not deeper
j2 Said notes that until the eighteenth century, scholars of the Orient were primarily biblical scholars 
(1978:51). For him, these biblical origins left a lasting imprint on this perspective, privileging the 
West as a Christian community whilst Islam remains perceived as a form of cultural effrontery 
(1978:260).
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knowledge or understanding of each other, but essentialised images which
33reinforced the sense of a distinct Western identity.
Whilst acknowledging that Enlightenment though ‘loosened the biblical 
framework’, Said argues that secular modes of thought in the West redeployed 
assumptions of difference and superiority inherited from the religious era (Said, 
1978:121). He argues that the scientific thinking of Europe’s secular age which 
displaced religion continued to project representations of the Orient which further 
legitimised and empowered the West as rational and advanced. Philology, and later 
anthropology, archaeology, and biology served to decipher, to reveal and to 
reconstruct the ancient cultures of the Orient (1978:135-46). In a sense, therefore, 
Said suggests secular science itself became creator or recreator of the Orient, 
perpetuating the perception of a subservient Orient and a superior West. The sense 
of differentiation founded on religious identities thus appears to form a significant 
boundary to Said’s West.
Race
A strong sense of racial distinction permeates Said’s conception of the West. The 
superiority of the white or Aryan races becomes an implicit and often explicit 
feature of the imperialist and Orientalist perspectives he describes. A sense of 
racial difference is presented as part of the common intellectual equipment 
employed by Western scholars and administrators. The sense of race forming a 
boundary of the West is most pronounced in Said’s discussion of nineteenth 
century texts where he identifies assumptions about racial hierarchy in a wide range 
of fields such as anthropology, legal history, utilitarianism, and idealism.34 There 
was, he notes, no significant dissent from the theories of the inferiority of black 
races, and the superiority and unchallenged authority of whites (1993:121). Said 
links the tendency to think in collective generalisations with contemporary ideas of
His work suggests that, over the centuries, it was not knowledge but ignorance of Islam and its 
beliefs that were systematically refined by Orientalists (Said, 1978:62).
34 For instance, in the earlier part of the century, Said identifies philology as one of the core 
disciplines through which the West came to study the Orient. An implicit racism underlay this 
discipline, he argues, with language and race seemingly inextricably tied (1978:99). Said notes that 
with the rise of ethnography in nineteenth century Europe, there is a codification of difference and 
various evolutionary schemes going from primitive to civilised (1993:130).
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racial theory to show how linguistic and racial theories became easily equated with 
biologically-based notions of inequality, and a sense of determinism. This 
suggested unbreachable barriers between different races, nations and civilisations. 
Notions of difference, therefore, overwhelmed common and plural human realities 
(1978:233).35 In this context, race becomes a primary marker of difference, of 
inferiority, or to paraphrase Frantz Fanon, race became an ineradicable sign of 
negative difference in colonial discourses (Cited in Bhabha, 1983:28). For instance, 
Said suggests that the West, examining the world through the Orientalist prism, 
equates the Arab with the weaker or more alien elements of contemporary society, 
the poor, women, the insane (1978:207). The Arab is deprived of equal recognition 
as a fellow human being, and is consistently dehumanised, considered first and 
foremost to be an Arab and only secondly as a human being.
Said represents the racial boundary as not only delineating the West, but also 
serving to rationalise its imperialism. Hence, his work suggests that the West’s 
perception of the weaker Orient, as transmitted through the lens of Orientalism, 
justified the white race’s expansion into the ‘uncivilised’ world (1978:207). This is 
illustrated in Said’s references to Kipling’s vision of the white man’s superiority, 
endowing him with a duty to ‘clean up’ the world (1978:226; 1993:162, 182), or 
Ruskin’s of England’s right and duty to bring governance to wider world, based on 
the purity of its race (1993:123-5). As with territory, it is the meanings and 
assumptions with which skin colour is linked which are significant. These make 
race a boundary of the West and help to justify its domination of the non-West.
Said’s perception of the West as defined by race is not lessened by the rise to 
prominence of the United States in the twentieth century, whose foreign policy he 
regards as informed by racial prejudice towards Asia and towards Arab peoples 
(1993:350). Racist caricatures, he suggests, continue to inform American 
perceptions of Arabs and Islam (1993:364).
35 In addition, ideas such as second order Darwinism, he notes, seemed to ‘accentuate the 
‘scientific’ validity of the division of races into the advanced and backward, or European-Aryan and 
Oriental-African’ (Said, 1978:206).
36 The multi-racial composition of American society does not appear to mitigate this tendency 
towards racial stereotyping in Said’s judgement. His analysis suggests instead that the official sense 
of American identity does not reflect the diversity of its immigrant backgrounds, but selectively
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Power
The boundaries of the West in Said’s work are crucially influenced by his complex 
concept of power which entails both material dimensions, and ideas and 
representations. He emphasises the importance of discourse as a form of power 
through which social reality is constituted. Knowledge and representations not only 
justify power, they underlie and shape the structures and institutions of power 
(1978:12). Although it is informed by consciousness of the West’s political, 
economic and military capacity, Said’s discussion of the West’s power focuses 
primarily on how the deployment of knowledge underwrites and reinforces its 
material power. Imperialism is the discourse which frames the structures and 
institutions of Western power for him.
As with all preceding authors, underlying Said’s references to the West is an 
awareness of the extensive and unprecedented physical power which Europe and 
the United States exercised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There is a 
strong sense of the West relentlessly accumulating and exercising power through 
the establishment of interests in new regions, and through the accumulation of 
peoples in addition to territories (1978:123): ‘No other associated set of colonies in 
history was as large, none so totally dominated, none so unequal in power to the 
Western metropolis’ (1993:6). This produced an imbalance of power which, for 
Said, continues in the twentieth century. The Gulf War, for instance, illustrated for 
him the continued potency of the ideas that great powers had the right to safeguard 
distant interests to the point of military intervention and, ‘that lesser powers were 
also lesser people, with lesser rights, morals and claims’ (1993:41). Like Bull and 
Watson, Said suggests that the imbalance of power supported a sense of 
civilisational hierarchy, with the West at its peak.
Said’s analysis is premised on the view that differentiation and deployment of 
images of other cultures is an exercise of power. Therefore, he depicts the 
imbalance of power between West and non-West during the era of imperialism 
reflected in the construction and deployment of images of colonised people
draws on a simpler, self-image based on the foundation of the pioneering society rather than its 
multicultural heritage (Said, 1993:381).
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(1993:127). Central to this analysis is a consciousness of the link between power 
and the way in which knowledge is produced. For Said, writes Clifford, pure 
scholarship does not exist: ‘Knowledge in his view is inextricably tied to power’ 
(Clifford, 1988:256).37
In both Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, Said traces links between 
knowledge and power in a wide assortment of literature and art, identifying 
undertones of imperialist ideology which are continued in the popular culture of the
o o
later twentieth century West. In these texts, Said identifies ‘structures of attitudes 
and reference’ which encompass views such as racial superiority and Western 
political authority which support and consolidate the West’s material power at the 
cultural level (1993:134)/9 In the contemporary context, he identifies a 
correspondence between the ‘imperialist’ perspectives of influential media- 
managers and official American policy on the non-Westem world.40 Therefore, for
37 As noted above, politics and knowledge are viewed as linked given that knowledge is always 
formed in a political context. Pursuing this theme in Culture and Imperialism, Said argues that 
culture is subject to the political context in which it is produced. Furthermore, scholarship and art 
contribute to the reproduction and authority of this context, and are therefore themselves an aspect 
of power, not merely a reflection of it. Fundamental to this argument is the belief that there is no 
such thing as truly objective scholarship since all authors are subject to the influences of the 
discourse in which they work. For instance, in Culture and Imperialism, Said discusses the 
‘structure of feeling’ within literature which supported and consolidated the expansion of overseas 
empire. The novel, he argues, is an artefact of bourgeois society which fortified, and was fortified 
by, imperialism (1993:84).
jS For some commentators, Said’s work is too political, crossing the boundary between scholarship 
and polemic. Said rejected characterisations of his work as polemical, arguing he sought to 
dismantle such boundaries by demonstrating all scholarship is shaped to some degree by the 
political and social context in which it is formed. See, for instance, Kerr(1980) and Lewis(1993) for 
criticism of Orientalism as political and anti-Western. Said and Lewis subsequently engaged in 
fairly heated exchanges, with Said castigating scholars such Lewis and Daniel Pipes for the political 
character of their analysis of the Middle East which, Said argues, exemplifies modern Orientalism 
(Said/Lewis, 1982; Said, 1985b).
39 See, for instance, his discussion of the way in which Conrad in Heart o f Darkness confirms a 
sense of European, white authority in the way in which he narrates and represents the strangeness of 
Africa (Said, 1993:198-200). Africa’s meaning and history is constituted principally with reference 
to Europe.
40 See Said’s comments on correspondence between the American electronic media and government 
policy, and the significance of the ‘sound-bite’ form of presentation of self and other cultures in this 
context (1993:391).
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Said, scholarship and art contribute to the discourse of imperial power which is a 
defining element of the West.41
Within these discourses, Said identifies the hegemony of ideas which assert 
European superiority. It could be argued that all cultures represent others in a way 
that empowers themselves. What is distinctive about Said’s West is its capacity to 
successfully project its representations and to have these accepted by other peoples 
(1993:120). Like Huntington, Said associates the West’s cultural hegemony with 
the scale, scope and longevity of Western material power (1993:267). However, 
Said’s treatment of the West’s cultural hegemony interweaves culture more deeply 
into the substance of the West’s power than Huntington, for whom cultural power 
is more a manifestation of material capacity. Both, however, agree that the West’s 
cultural hegemony is Euro-centric, Said noting that at the heart of European culture 
during the era of imperial expansion lay ‘an undeterred and unrelenting Euro­
centrism’ (1993:267). For him, this is manifested in the West placing itself at the 
centre of the world, as the source of all significant action. Overseas territories were 
perceived as ‘outlying estates’ to the Western metropole, not communities with an 
independent existence. Consequently, Said sees the West according the non-West 
no significant meaning outside its relationship to the West. Even in many liberal 
Western works, as he argues,
...the source of the world’s significant action and life is the West. ...
In this view, the outlying regions of the world have no life, history, 
or culture to speak of, no independence or integrity worth 
representing without the West. (1993:xxi)42
41 Not all critics have accepted Said’s linkages of scholarship and power, a linkage which 
challenges the sense of objectivity and therefore the integrity of scholarship. In some cases, this has 
led to efforts to debunk Said’s equations. One of the most common criticisms of Orientalism was of 
the linkages which Said made between power and knowledge. For many, this insulted the sense of 
academic integrity and freedom, and misrepresented the field of Oriental studies as a lackey of 
imperialism (Kerr, 1980; Butterworth, 1980; Duncanson, 1980; Lewis, 1993). Garre also argues that 
Said, although usefully establishing the close relationship between Orientalism and imperialism, 
allows for no other possibilities (Garre, 1995:323). As Prakesh notes, the division between Said and 
his critics on these issues highlights a fundamental difference in approach: Said’s conception of 
Orientalism as a discourse, she argues, ‘crosses authoritative writing with political authority; the 
two are mutually enabling rather than oppositional’ (Prakash, 1995:203).
42 Said’s illustrations range from John Stuart Mill (Said, 1993:108) to Andre Gide, from Graham 
Greene to Oliver Stone(1993:xxi). See also his discussion of Camus in which he highlights the 
absence of a sense of Algeria as a society which has a history, an identity outside its relationship 
with France (1993:204-24).
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Fundamental to this process is the sense that the West had the ability and the right 
to articulate the non-West, which could not speak for itself (1978:121,140); or in 
Marx’s words, ‘Sie können sich nicht vertreten sie müssen vertreten werden 
(1978:21).
As Emest Wilson comments, ‘[d]omination like liberation tends to be a total 
phenomenon’ which touches upon all aspects of society (Wilson, 1981:59). For 
Said, the West’s power was also expressed in its ability to reach into all aspects of 
the lives of the dominated society to catalogue, enumerate and define its subjects.43 
These textual and schematic attitudes represent for him a process through which 
the West made the Orient available to it, and in doing this, to domesticate the 
mystery and hostility of the East and Islam (1978:87). The process of knowing the 
Orient was a part of learning to control the Orient (Schaar, 1979:69).44 For 
example, Said discusses the massive Description de VEgypte{ 1809-1828), 
published as part of Napoleon’s project to dominate Egypt. Part of this project, 
argues Said, was to render Egypt completely open, ‘to make it totally accessible to 
European scrutiny’ (1978:83). Furthermore, its purposes were ‘[t]o restore a region 
from its present barbarism to its former classical greatness; to instruct [for its own 
benefit] the Orient in the ways of the modem West’ through the formulation and 
systemisation of knowledge about the region. This would, ‘formulate the Orient, to 
give it shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its 
importance to imperial strategy, and its ‘natural’ role as an appendage of Europe’. 
In describing it in modem Occidental terms, the Orient is lifted from the ‘realms of 
silent obscurity’ and brought into the ‘clarity of modem European science’ 
(1978:86). Processes of representation are therefore shown by Said as empowering 
the West, first in allowing it to articulate the East in the context of a hierarchy of 
cultures dominated by the West. Secondly, they served to highlight the ‘sobriety
Said suggests that this process of articulation was facilitated by the trend in European scholarship 
to classify and collectivise both man and nature into types. Derek Gregory has drawn parallels 
between Said and Foucault’s focus on the accumulation of detail to support division and deployment 
of power (Gregory, 1995:458).
44 In this context, Said’s suggestion that enterprises such as the 1867 Paris International Exhibition 
and Verdi’s opera Aida were mediums through which the world was reconstituted and displayed by 
the West is interesting (Said, 1993:144, 159).
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and rationality of Occidental habits’ contrasted with the ‘bizarre jouissances’ of the 
Orientals (1978:87).45 Thus, Said presents the material power of the West 
supported by, and interwoven with, the power to project cultural representations 
presenting the West as a superior civilisation.
Norms
As the discussion of representation and power suggests, normative qualities feature 
prominently in Said’s conception of the West. He represents the deployment of 
norms by Western discourses as providing the grounds for a hierarchy in 
civilisational interaction. However, Said’s discussion also highlights significant 
tensions between the norms of Western liberal humanism and Western 
imperialism.
The significance which Said attaches to norms in constituting Western self-images 
is evident in both his discussions of Orientalism and imperialism. For instance, he 
describes Orientalism as ‘a family of ideas and a set of unifying values’ (1978:41- 
2). The representations of the Orient which he discusses are loaded with normative 
assumptions which juxtapose inferior East to the West.46 For example, Lord 
Cromer (1908) is cited as characterising Orientals as lethargic, suspicious, liars 
who ‘in everything oppose the clarity, directness, and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon 
race’ (1978:39). Such ‘essential knowledge’, argues Said, reiterated over time 
acquired the status of scientific truth.
His observations suggest that through normative differentiation, the West 
constructed a positive self-image; but he further implies that normative 
differentiation helped justify Western power towards that region. For instance, 
Orientalism perceived the East as irrational.47 In contrast, the West appears
45 Similarly, Said describes the pioneering Orientalist Silvestre de Sacy as seeing himself 
uncovering or bringing to light knowledge of the Orient. ‘Knowledge was essentially the making 
visible of material ... Scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power: it gained for 
its user [and his students)]tool and knowledge which ... had hitherto been lost’ (Said, 1978:127).
46 Said repeatedly refers to the technique of dividing and compartmentalising humanity into binary 
opposites such as Orient and West, usually polarising the distinctions, ‘the Oriental becomes more 
Oriental, the Westerner more Western’ (1978:46).
47 See also Brian Turner’s( 1989) characterisation of Orientalism, identifying four main categories 
or tactics of differentiation, all with a strong normative basis. These encompass viewing Orientalism 
as a theory of despotic power in which despotism stifled social differentiation; as a discourse of
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rational and capable of objective, ordered and scientific thought. The Orient is 
perceived as childlike, implying that the West is more mature and advanced. The 
Orient and Islam are perceived to be depraved, blood-thirsty, deceitful.49 In 
contrast, the West is presented as perceiving itself to be virtuous and capable of 
subjugating emotions. Furthermore, the Orient’s perceived lack of honesty implies 
a limited capacity to exercise the rule of law, producing traditionalist or despotic, 
rather than modem, liberal structures of government. The non-Westem ‘native’ is 
perceived as indolent therefore needing the overlordship of the vigorous Westerner 
(Said, 1978:40; 1993:202-4).50 All of these representations have strong normative 
dimensions which both places the West on the moral high ground and, equally 
significantly, justifies the exercise of Western power over the East on the grounds 
of the East’s moral weakness.
Said also suggests that the West was further empowered through normative 
differentiation in representing the East as not only primitive, but incapable of self- 
driven change (Said, 1978:298):51 ‘The very possibility of development, 
transformation, human movement - in the deepest sense of the word - is denied the 
Orient and the Oriental’ (1978:208).52 As Said notes, change, is often unilaterally 
equated with modernisation, which in the twentieth century in particular, has 
frequently been associated with Westernisation (1978:304). Again, this places the
social change in which the Orient is assumed to be socially stagnant due to the weight of traditional 
authority; Orientalism as a theory of asceticism, with emphasis on the sensuality and sexuality of the 
East leading to indolence in contrast to the asceticism of the West; and Orientalism as a theory of 
discipline and rationality, with rationalisation as a process of cultural change peculiar to the West. 
These broad normative features also appear in Said’s analysis of Orientalism.
48 It might also suggest the adult’s duty to instruct, guide, protect but also discipline the child when 
necessary.
49 See Said’s discussion of Islam (Said, 1978:62) and Said (1978:286-7) for twentieth century 
American representation of this image.
50See also Said’s discussion of S.H. Alatas’ work on the ‘myth of the lazy native’ in Culture and 
Imperialism. Alatas describes how the perceived indolence of the ‘natives’ in the Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific was viewed as a sign of weakness in character and used as a rationale for 
subjugation by European colonists, rather than being interpreted as a form of resistance to colonial 
rule (Said, 1993:307-8).
51 It is worth noting that, in this context, Said is discussing the views of Orientalist scholars from the 
twentieth century as well as the nineteenth.
i2 Said argues this is one of the ‘dogmas’ of Orientalism - to perceive the Orient is eternal, uniform, 
and incapable of defining itself (1978:300-1).
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West in a powerful position. It implies that the Orient can only change or develop 
under the guidance and tuition of the West (1978:253, 298). Even in the work of 
contemporary Oriental scholars, like Bernard Lewis, Said detects the view that the 
Orient can never improve itself or converge with the West until it comes to accept 
the Western way. If Said is correct, this places the East in a difficult position; it 
must come to terms with the West, yet is placed at a permanent disadvantage by its 
perceived lack of capacity to change. This effectively casts the asymmetrical 
relationship between East and West in stone, placing the West in permanent 
ascendancy.
Said’s presentation of a Western self-image which encompasses normative 
differentiation is not limited to the imperial era, nor to Europe. He maintains that 
the perception that the East lacked the capacity for self-driven development 
continues in modem politics to bolster Western claims to global leadership. For 
instance, he locates Henry Kissinger’s conception of the need for more advanced 
societies to construct world order within these structures of thought.5^  He also sees 
it demonstrated in American interventionism, where involvement is justified upon 
moral grounds, as in the Gulf War (1993:357).54
At the same time, he highlights dichotomies in Western norms relating to 
perceptions and treatment of the non-West. These derive primarily from the 
converse pulls of liberal humanism and imperialism. One such dichotomy relates to 
respect for the individual which lies at the heart of Western liberal humanism. For 
many of the authors discussed in previous chapters, the norm of individualism is 
central to the West. Yet, as Frantz Fanon has commented, colonial discourses
5jSaid places Henry Kissinger within an expanded Orientalist tradition, arguing that Kissinger 
considered the world divided between those committed to objective scientific knowledge and 
cultures which have not yet attained this post-Newtonian mode of thought. The duty of post- 
Newtonian societies was to construct a world order in the face of contemporary world turmoil (Said, 
1978:47).
54 Said draws his illustration from modern scholars of Islam such as von Grunebaum (Said, 
1978:298). However, similar opinions have been voiced with respect to other areas of the non-West, 
both in the past and recently. Notions of the East, this time Asia, as incapable of innovation have 
also been common. For instance, amongst the consistent assumptions which Richard Minear(1980) 
identifies in his discussion of Western scholarship on Japan is the belief that Japanese culture lacks 
creativity and originality. In contrast, Western culture is typified by a restless and creative spirit. 
These ideas have been reiterated in discussions of Japan’s role of potential hegemon in the global 
political economy.
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tended to conceive of the ‘native’ as part of a mass, a multitude, effectively 
dehumanising, deindividualising the non-Westemer (Fanon, 1963:43). Said 
similarly implies that the capacity of the West to view the Orient as inferior was 
facilitated by the tendency to always see the Arab as a collective entity (1978:230, 
252), depriving non-Westemers of the quality of individualism which is central to 
the Western normative framework.35
His discussion of the nineteenth century emphasises that Western colonial and 
imperial practices led to the domination rather than the emancipation of non- 
Westem peoples. Although acknowledging some opposition to imperialism within 
Europe, for instance, from the Abolitionists, this is outweighed for him by a more 
powerful pro-imperial culture (1993:201). Acceptance of empire and of racial 
superiority are perceived as components of ‘structures of attitude and reference’ 
underlying Western culture of this period (1993:62):
If there was cultural resistance to the notion of an imperial mission, 
there was not much support for that resistance in the main 
departments of cultural thought. (1993:96)
Furthermore, he suggests that ‘structures of feeling’ which accepted the need for
empire could be found even amongst Western liberals, with Western humanism
accepting and even rationalising colonialism on the basis of ‘the idea of Western
salvation and redemption through its ‘civilising mission” (1993:158), echoing
Kipling’s image of the Indian as a poor creature needing British tutelage to save it
from its own corruption and underdevelopment (1993:202).56 Even progressive
elements of society, such as intellectuals, workers and women’s movements,
argues Said, were penetrated by Euro-centrism and even an enthusiasm for empire
(1993:268). Despite recognising movements in the nineteenth century which
53 Said also points to normative inconsistencies in the politics of the West in the twentieth century, 
citing, for instance, the United States’ record of support for non-democratic regimes (1993:363). He 
is most acutely aware of these in the context of the recent politics of the Middle East, highlighting 
the West’s failure to condemn Israel for its treatment of the Palestinian people, the infringements of 
democracy and human rights which he argues Israel has perpetrated on its Arab community 
(1978:318-9).
56 Modernising movements, such as the educational movements, mitigated the harshness of 
imperialism, but in Said’s view, continued to preserve the division between Westerner and non- 
Westerner (1993:269-70).
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opposed the practices of empire, Said argues that there was little deeper 
questioning of the ontological status of European domination and no overall 
condemnation of imperialism until after uprisings in the imperial domains had 
become too significant to be ignored (1993:289-91). Therefore, Said’s own 
conception of the West presents humanist norms and institutions as not only failing
57to impede, but also co-existing with, imperial processes (1993:97).
One of Said’s key criticisms of the West is its failure to live up to the 
Enlightenment norms of emancipation and equality. In Said’s view, many Western 
cultural theories which aspire to universalism assume and incorporate racial 
inequality, the subordination of inferior cultures, and the acquiescence of those 
who cannot represent themselves (1993:335). He finds hidden imperialist 
assumptions and liberal paternalism in even the most radical of the Western 
intellectual movements. Western Marxism, the Frankfurt School and French 
theoreticians of the mid twentieth century, all are criticised for continuing to 
produce theories which aspire to universality but fail to see their own Euro- 
centricity (Said, 1993:336).58 It is only recently, observes Said, that Westerners 
have realised that what they have to say about history and culture of ‘subordinate’ 
people is challengeable by those people themselves (1993:235). In this context, 
Said shares something with Huntington who is also critical of the West’s false 
universalism. Like Huntington, Said seeks from the West respect for other cultural 
norms. However, he stops short of complete cultural relativism in that he maintains 
a commitment to the underlying liberal humanist goals of equality and 
emancipation, despite the perceived failure of the West to uphold these values.
57 This is a point which troubles Said. In Culture and Imperialism he seeks to investigate how 
ongoing European culture made it possible for an imperial European not to see themselves as 
imperialist. Said qualifies his comments by explaining that this does not mean that he takes 
European culture to lack complexity, but the complexity and diversity in European culture for him 
operates within a broader context of imperialism (1993:97, 196).
58 In this context, Said is a harsh critic of the failure of intellectuals in the United States and the 
West to challenge effectively the norms of the state. He refers to the ‘sense of weightlessness’ of 
cults such as post-modernism, discourse analysis, New Historicism and deconstruction with respect 
to public discourse, leaving debate of the serious crises of today’s world to the media and politicians 
(1993:366-7).
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Said represents the deployment of norms in Western discourses as significant in 
both defining the West’s self-image and providing the grounds for hierarchy in its 
relationship with the non-West. However, he also identifies important dichotomies 
in the norms of Western imperialism and Western liberal humanism, meaning the 
West applied different normative standards to itself and the non-West. This 
normative differentiation, he implies was facilitated by both spatial separation and 
essentialised images of the non-West. Nevertheless, although Said is critical of the 
West’s failure to pursue the normative traditions of liberal humanism in the context 
of the non-West, this does not lead him to dismiss these traditions
Institutions
As with norms, Said’s discussion of the institutions of the West highlights his 
perception of the close relationship between power and representation. Throughout 
Orientalism, he argues the close inter-twining of the ideas of Orientalism and the 
institutions of power; political, economic, and social. Orientalism, he suggests, 
provided a framework for, not just a rationalisation of, Western governance.59 
Orientalism thus provided core assumptions around which institutions of European 
governance formed as the West expanded its involvement in the East in the 
nineteenth century.60 The ‘institutional forms’ of Western superiority included 
colonial governments, consular corps and commercial establishments (1978:227) 
Therefore, unlike the preceding authors, Said identifies colonial institutions as 
characterising the West. He closely links assumptions and representations of the 
non-West and the Orient with the formation of these institutions. However, these 
institutions themselves act to confirm the shape and character of the non-West as it 
became known to the West through discourses such as Orientalism. In this sense, 
for Said, the boundaries of the West and non-West are constantly enforced and 
reinforced through the interplay of discourse and interaction.
39 In fact, he notes the ‘very close ties’ between Orientalist discourse and ‘enabling socio-economic 
and political institutions’ as a factor which enhanced the durability of Orientalism (Said, 1978:6).
60 For instance. Said quotes Curzon’s comments that Oriental studies were the ‘necessary furniture 
of Empire’, assisting Britain in governing in the East whilst maintaining imperial authority 
(1978:214).
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Whilst Said does not dwell on institutions such as the state, or law, he does refer to 
government as an indicator of significant difference, an institutional boundary 
between West and non-West. The West is represented as characterising itself by 
liberal institutions, in particular by self-government, in contrast to the despotism 
and stagnation of Oriental government (Turner, 1989:631). These assumptions are 
characterised as widespread, with Said drawing on illustrations ranging from the 
conservative Chateaubriand proposing that Europe should teach the Orient about 
liberty: ‘Of liberty they know nothing; of propriety they have none; force is their 
God’ (1978:172); to Marx’s assumption that the replacement of Oriental despotism 
by British governance in India was a necessary stage in social revolution 
(1978:153); to administrators such as Cromer and Balfour, suggesting that the 
Orient is unused to, and effectively incapable of, self-government (1978:32-3, 
228). Even liberals such Joseph Conrad are viewed by Said as assuming the 
governmental incapacity of the non-West.61 Said’s work suggests that the West’s 
low opinion of non-Westem governmental institutions rests upon a sense of 
differentiation which permits it to apply different standards and norms to the non- 
West to those applied within the West, facilitating the toleration of colonial and 
imperial institutions (1978:33). It is founded on perceptions of the normative 
inferiority of the non-West. This further demonstrates the tensions perceived in 
Said’s discussion of the normative dimensions of the West, between the ideals of 
liberal humanism and the practices of imperialism.
Interaction Between the West and Non-West
The interaction between West and non-West which Said sketches entails two key 
features: the employment of dialectical difference, and the imperial strength of the 
West. The West’s perception of difference acts as both a rationale and a normative 
element of its imperial power. Said portrays a relationship between West and non- 
West which is not fixed, but changes in response to the level of the West’s 
involvement with the non-West, and with the intellectual climate within the West.
61 In summarising Conrad’s position, Said writes: ‘Independence was for whites and Europeans; the 
lesser or subject people were to be ruled’ (Said, 1993:26).
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His West is not necessarily homogeneous, but it is consistent in maintaining a 
hierarchical relationship with the non-West (1993:127).
Difference
Said’s work highlights the employment of dialectical difference in constituting 
both non-West and West. The way in which the non-West is constituted is not 
constant, but varies according to relations between the societies and to shifts in 
intellectual trends in the West. Therefore, shifts in perceptions of difference appear 
driven as much, if not more, by trends within the West as the non-West.
Said portrays the West as differentiating itself through a variety of images of the 
non-West. These encompass images of the non-West as a romantic alternative to 
the modem West; as a threat to the West; and as inferior to the West. The Orient, 
argues Said, represents ‘the other’ close to hand, personifying for the West ‘its 
cultural contestant and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other’ 
(1978:1). In the late eighteenth century, many Europeans were inspired by an image 
of the mysterious and beautiful but distant East. Under the influence of the 
Romantic movement, the Orient was looked upon as a source of regeneration for 
Europe, providing ways to overcome the materialism and mechanism of Occidental 
culture (Said, 1978:115). The tendency to romanticise the East as the exotic other 
is for other commentators an important aspect of the West’s relationship to the 
non-West, but it is not an aspect of Orientalism on which Said dwells (Kieman, 
1979; Fox, 1992). For him, this romanticism illustrates a recurrent tendency to 
view the Orient, not on its own terms, but in terms of what it could do for Europe.
/TO
In this context, the East acts as ‘therapy’ for a spiritually depleted West.
62Fox describes this as ‘affirmative Orientalism’. This relates to the positive but equally 
essentialised images of the East that can be found in the ideas of western intellectuals who sought in 
an idealised representation of the East qualities such as spirituality, non-violence, consensuality and 
communalism absent from a Europe which they perceived as modernised, aggressive, capitalist, and 
materialist (1992:152-3). Fox also goes beyond Said, in discussing the possibility that Orientalism 
was used in some cases by ‘Orientals’ such as Gandhi against Western domination.
6j Note also Thomas’ discussion of the trend towards positive but equally idealised and 
essentialised representations of non-Western peoples which have been, and continue to be, 
produced by liberal culture (Thomas, 1994).
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Said’s West is also differentiated through the recurrent image of the non-West, 
particularly the Orient, as a threat. Although the immediate threat to the West 
receded, if not reversed, in the eighteenth century and nineteenth century, Said sees 
its legacy continuing to shape European attitudes through to the present. He notes 
its revival this century with the challenges posed by the Arab Revolts and demands 
for self-government (1978:248). He further links these fears to those of the ‘yellow 
peril’; the apprehension that Europe might be overwhelmed by an unstable or 
expansionist Asia (1978:251) 64
In Orientalism, he is conscious of the renewed sense of menace with which the 
contemporary Arab world was viewed by the West, heightened by the 1973 Arab- 
Israeli Wars and the Oil Crisis (1978:286). American popular images of the Orient 
are perceived as sustaining essentialised, threatening representations; the sense that 
behind the dehumanised images of the scoundrel or the villain lurks the menace of 
jihad, the fear that Arabs or Muslims will take over the world (1978:287). Much of 
Culture and Imperialism was written during the Gulf War. The text is permeated 
by Said’s perception of this conflict sustaining the representations of threat and 
hostility which have characterised the West’s relationship with the Arab world 
(1993:42). Therefore, despite the West’s sense of power, Said identifies a 
perception of vulnerability as an important part of its sense of identity.
A third powerful and perhaps predominant sense of difference which appears in 
Said’s analysis is that based on Western superiority. In both Orientalism and 
Culture and Imperialism, Said describes a West which assumes itself to be a 
superior culture and civilisation (Said, 1978:231; 1993:96). The sense that the 
Orient is primitive and capable only of ‘arrested development’ rather than 
convergence with the West confirms the Orient’s continued inferiority and 
conversely Western superiority (1978:234-5). Thus, the employment of dialectical 
difference in the West which Said describes creates a non-West which is 
simultaneously threatening and inferior.65
64 Interestingly, he argues that it was not so much the fear of destruction, but the fear of the removal 
of the barrier between East and West which so disturbed some Orientalist (1978:263).
63 In this respect, it may be useful to keep in mind Bhabha’s comments about the ambivalence of 
colonial discourse which suggests both fixity and order and, paradoxically, disorder and degeneracy
305
The Integrity of the West
Despite identifying important continuities in discourse and interaction, Said’s sense 
of the West’s relationship with the non-West is not static. He marks changes in the 
nature of interaction, whilst reiterating an underlying sense of Western difference 
and superiority. His discussion implies that changes in the relationship stemmed 
both from differences in the degree and nature of Western involvement in the non- 
West, and from shifting trends within the West.
Said’s West is not homogeneous in respect of its involvement in the non-West with 
differences in both capabilities and attitudes within the West. For instance, he 
identifies significant variations between British and French perspectives on the 
Orient, attributed to the different imperial relationship that these countries 
maintained with the region. The British are described as having a stronger, 
territorial and proprietorial sense of the Orient, rooted in its extensive colonial 
possessions, particularly in the Near East. The French, with fewer possessions, are 
characterised as engaged in ‘intellectual imperialism’ whose most significant 
manifestation was the sense of the mission civilistrice (1993:205-6). In contrast to 
both, the United States had no direct colonial involvement in the Middle East, but 
has had substantial political, economic and military involvement with this region 
since the Second World War.
Said’s work also suggests that the grounds for rationalisation of Western 
interaction with the non-West reflect changing political and intellectual currents 
within the West. As noted above, these shifted from the Romantic perception of the 
restorative nature of the Orient, to the ‘scientific’ perspective which justified the 
appropriation of one culture by a stronger one, as characterised by Napoleon’s 
invasion of Egypt (1978:42).66 In the nineteenth century, Orientalism was
in its constitution of the ‘Other’ (Bhabha, 1983:18). Said’s representation of the West conveys the 
anxieties and insecurities which were often an aspect of colonial rule but, as Thomas suggests, we 
often overlook (1994:15).
66 See Said(1978:116-23, 127) and Dalby( 1980:489) for a discussion of different intellectual trends 
within Orientalism. Said points to four significant currents of eighteenth century thought which 
moulded the emerging secular Orientalism in contrast to its religious antecedent. These are 
summarised by Dalby as imperialist exploration and expansion; a sense of historical and 
civilisational confrontation; a form of historical sympathy; and an urge to encompass and bring 
order to the whole universe of knowledge.
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influenced by trends ranging from positivism, Darwinism, Freudianism, Marxism 
to Spenglerism (1978:43); and in the twentieth century, by a renewed humanism 
(1978:256; 1993:228). The West is perceived as constantly constructing and 
reconstructing the non-West in the context of competing views and varying societal 
conditions within the West. Yet, despite acknowledging the differing nature and 
shifting intellectual rationalisations of Western involvement in the non-West, Said 
argues that there were continuities in perceptions of self and other which provide 
cohesion to Western identity. However, there is a question as to the extent to which 
Said’s West is a real and cohesive community.
Young raises the question of whether the Orient actually exists for Said. Said 
clearly argues that the Orient is a creation of the West, a projection of Western 
needs on the people of the Arab and Islamic worlds. It is not an empirical reality, 
‘an inert fact of nature’.67 If the Orient does not exist as an authentic community, 
what does this imply for its alter ego, the West? Does it exist as an authentic 
community? Said has at times described the West in highly abstract terms, ‘a play 
of projections, doublings, idealisations and rejections of a complex, shifting
/TO
otherness’ (Clifford, 1988:272). It is undoubtedly perceived as a social 
construction:
...as both geographical and cultural entities - to say nothing of
historical entities - such locales, regions, geographical sectors as
‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ are man-made. (Said, 1978:5)
However, to view the West as a social construction does not mitigate its 
authenticity, nor weaken its significance as a locale of power and domination, an 
agent which has the capacity to produce and project representations such as the 
Orient. As Gregory comments, Said’s world is one of both materialism and
67 Clifford notes some ambivalence in Said’s argument: ‘Frequently he suggests that a text or 
tradition distorts, dominates, or ignores some real or authentic feature of the Orient. Elsewhere, 
however, he denies the existence of any ‘real Orient’ (1988:260).
68 For instance, in a 1995 article, Said said: ‘How can one speak of ‘Western civilisation’ except as 
in large measure an ideological fiction, implying a sort of detached superiority for a handful of 
values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, 
travel and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mix of identities?’ 
(1995:5).
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representations which are at once abstractions and densely concrete fabrications 
(Gregory, 1995:476).
A second problem is Said’s tendency to represent the West through generalisations 
which obscure complexities and contradictions within that imagined community. 
Although he rejects suggestions that the Orientalist perspective should be taken to 
represent the West as a whole (Said, 1995:3), he does identify fundamental 
assumptions, concepts and practices which distinguish the West. Consequently, his 
work has been criticised for itself slipping into the practice of essentialisation in 
articulating an all inclusive ‘Occidentalism’ (Clifford, 1988:271).69 Said has also 
been criticised for failing to convey any real sense of heterogeneity in the field of 
Orientalism (Driver, 1992). Not all Orientalists shared the same visions and ideals. 
For instance, in the context of the British in India, Kopf(1980) identifies 
differences between Orientalists sympathetic to Indian culture, and Anglicists who 
sought to undermine it.70 From Said’s perspective, these differences would be 
mitigated by both parties basically seeking the same ends via different means; the 
modernisation of India. Furthermore, it could be argued that exceptions and points 
of difference can always be found within any generalised concept or category. 
However, as Driver points out, to ignore such differences limits our awareness of 
tensions and contradictions within Orientalism and, therefore, within the West 
(1992:32-3).71 Consequently, despite the heterogeneity Said acknowledges in
69 Said’s Orientalism was criticised by many reviewers who felt that his portrayal of Oriental 
scholars was too selective, his treatment of their work reductionist (Hourani, 1979; Kerr, 1980; 
Lewis, 1993) or inaccurate (Greene, 1979; Lewis, 1993). Mani & Frankenburg(1985) are also 
critical of the monolithic, undifferentiated and uncontested image of Orientalism as a form of 
knowledge which Said presents. In Culture and Imperialism, Said does make reference to diverse 
schools within imperial European culture, some more respectful of existing, pre-colonial cultures. 
All, however, appear to be focused on the same aim of governing and modernising or 
‘Westernising’ these societies. Therefore, the differences between them ultimately may be more one 
of method rather than intent. See Said (1993:180).
70 Looking at Orientalism in the context of the Indian subcontinent, Kopf(1980) argues Said’s 
analysis fails to note significant distinctions between these two schools of scholarship. The scholars 
of the Orientalist school, he argues, were respectful of Oriental culture and were in turn respected 
for their contributions to Asian culture. The Anglicist school, Kopf argues, more accurately 
reflected the qualities which Said criticises in Orientalism. Kopf, like Mani & 
Frankenburg(1985:176-7), argues that Said’s discussion fails to highlight the dialectical nature of 
the colonial encounter which shaped Orientalism.
71 MacKenzie(1993) also criticises Said for failing to address the divisions within the West. The 
prime ‘other’ in nineteenth century Britain, he argues, was constituted by rival European powers, 
rather than by outsiders. However, Said does acknowledge the importance of inter-European rivalry,
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Western interests and involvement in the non-West, we are often left with a 
monolithic sense of the West. Admittedly, describing the West is not Said’s 
primary goal, but his projection of a monolithic West is at odds with his declared 
intentions of dismantling such representations.
However, does the existence of differences within the West undermine Said’s 
sense of an underlying Western imperial culture, or alter his perception of 
interaction? In the colonial and post-colonial contexts, the differences within the 
West appear as of less consequence than the gulf of power and expectations which 
separated the coloniser from the colonised, particularly when viewed through the 
eyes of the colonised. As noted above, the West is fundamentally imperial, its 
primary relationship to the non-West is one of dominance, both in colonial and 
post-colonial eras. At this level, Said’s West is united by its domination of the non- 
West.
Imperialism
The imperial relationship is the principal focus of Said’s discussion of interaction 
between West and non-West, and imperialism the principal lens through which 
Western writers viewed societies such as the Orient in his opinion (Said, 1978:11, 
204; 1993). In Said’s West, perceptions of difference and superiority helped to 
rationalise and to constitute imperial power and were reinforced by increased 
involvement with the non-West in the late nineteenth century.72 What Said notes in 
Orientalism is a persistent sense of Europe’s right to suzerainty over the weaker 
Orient (1978:179, 2 1 3 ) , rationalised by the ‘civilising mission’, which is itself
particularly that between England and France (Said, 1993:99). MacKenzie also comments on the 
absence of class relationships from Said’s analysis in Culture and Imperialism. This is perhaps one 
consequence of an absence of more detailed consideration of the material dimensions of power in 
Said’s work.
72 Said’s sense of the growth of European involvement in the region is illustrated by his references 
to, not only to British and French interests in the Orient, but also to Russian involvement 
(Samarkand, Bohara and the Transcaspian railway); German, Austrio-Hungarian and French 
intervention in North Africa; European involvement in support of different factions in clashes in 
Lebanon; the importance of the broader ‘Eastern question’ in European politics; and the question of 
the protection of minorities, such as the Druze, Armenians, and Kurds, which concerned various 
European powers, particularly the French (Said, 1978:191, 220).
7j Said implies that the West’s sense of entitlement, or administrative obligation, was enhanced by 
the state of affairs in the Near Orient region the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century;
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fed by Western growth. Geographic expansion increased knowledge about other 
peoples, and provided opportunities to employ that knowledge in their governance 
which in turn produced the rhetoric of the ‘civilising mission’ (1993:130).
Whilst his analysis links discourses of difference to Europe’s physical colonial 
expansion, Said sees little alteration in the underlying attitudes of inequality 
towards the non-West resulting from the West’s withdrawal from empire. The non- 
West continues to be articulated by the West; the West continues to be seen as the 
central focus of history (Said, 1978:238). However, he acknowledges challenges to 
Western authority, such as the Arab Revolts, calls for self-government, and the 
impact of World War I, which reduced Western global suzerainty and contributed 
to a reassessment of the relationship (1978:248, 257). He also attributes this 
reassessment to a new humanism generated, in part, by the perceived weakening of 
the West’s power. For instance, justification of Oriental studies shifted from the 
need for better management of the Orient, to the need to help the East recover ‘its 
rightful place in humanity’. However, it was further justified as helping the West 
come to know itself better through knowledge of the East (1978:256-7). Once 
again, this suggests for Said that the West’s attitude to the non-West is shaped 
primarily by its own needs, the non-West remaining essentially a passive object of 
study. Furthermore, he suggests that the reassessment of West/non-West relations 
and even decolonisation did not alter the underlying hegemonic assumptions. For 
Said, the West has been persistently unable or unwilling to acknowledge the rights 
of non-Westem peoples to function outside Western tutelage.74
Furthermore, despite the decline of formal empire, Said perceives the West’s 
enduring cultural hegemony as sustaining influence over the non-West. Here, Said 
is not only referring to elements of structural power which Bull and Watson also
for instance, French experiences in Syria, and the weakness of Asiatic Turkey post-World War I- 
viewed as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’, awaiting dismemberment (1978:223).
74 He describes this as the ‘inability of the Western humanistic conscience to confront the political 
challenges of the imperial domains’ (Said, 1993:251). See Said’s discussion of British attitudes to 
India in the early twentieth century, as illustrated by E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India (Said, 
1993:241-52) and French attitudes to Algeria as illustrated in the work of Camus (Said, 1993:204- 
24). Although authors such as Paul Mus (Viet-nam: Sociologie d ’une guerre 1952) are more critical 
of the European critical role, in this case the French in Indochina, Said still detects the persistence 
of the concept of tutelage.
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acknowledge. He also suggests that the West retains the capacity and disposition to 
intervene in the affairs of the non-West. This implies that interaction continues to 
be shaped by imperial discourses. The medium for these discourses, however, has 
shifted, with a less formal, but no less powerful American imperium 
supplementing, then succeeding European empire (1978:285; 1993:7). Despite 
its limited colonial possessions, Said places United States’ foreign policy clearly 
into the tradition of imperialism, expressed through intervention (1993:xxvi, 64, 
357). As Said suggests, its sense of manifest destiny can be perceived as a 
civilising mission, projected in the form of the rule of law and the maintenance of 
order rather than a standard of civilisation.76 Despite its limited colonial 
experience, Said suggests the United States employed Orientalist assumptions in its
77growing involvement in that region in the twentieth century (1978:285-328). 
Through this medium, Said suggests that Orientalist perception have been 
perpetuated in the post-colonial era.
A second medium through which he suggests these images have been perpetuated 
is through their internalisation by the Arab world itself. He portrays the East as 
deeply implicated in the Western Oriental system, through its attachment to the 
market system and to Western ideas about modernisation, progress and culture: 
‘the modem Orient, in short, participates in its own Orientalising’ (Said, 
1978:325). Therefore, Said’s discussion suggests that, whilst direct Western power 
has declined, imperialist discourses which project Western cultural hegemony 
continue to dominate interaction in the post-colonial world. This implies that
73 Said defines imperialism as the practice, theory and attitudes of the dominating metropolitan 
centre ruling a distant territory. Colonialism, defined as ‘almost always a consequence of 
imperialism, is the implanting of a settlement on distant territory’ (1993:8). Although the United 
States never saw itself as a colonial power, it did annex the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam at 
the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898.
6 For Said, this has meant extensive United States intervention in Asia, Central America and the 
Middle East, in forms ranging from the financing of coups and assassinations attempt right through 
to full military intervention to protect regimes or forces considered friendly to United States 
interests but which Said often finds undemocratic and unjust. Said notes that a United States military 
intervention in the Third World occurred every year between 1945 and 1967. See Said( 1993:344- 
67).
77 These included the perception of the need to manage and reconstruct the affairs of the East; the 
employment of essentialised images of Arabs and Muslims as sheikhs, dictators or terrorists; and as 
people lacking literature or art (Said, 1993:356-64).
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interaction is still shaped by discourses which entail a hierarchical view of cultural 
world order, with the West at its peak, despite the appearance of equality which the 
institutions of modem world politics provide.
Conclusion
Said’s conception of the West stands in marked contrast to those previously 
discussed. As noted above, it is a conception that operates at two levels. The first 
entails Said’s representation of how the West saw itself, as illustrated by the 
discourses of Orientalism and imperialism. At a second level, Said himself 
represents the West, focusing on it primarily as an imperialist entity. Imperialism is 
only lightly touched upon by most of the preceding scholars. It is incorporated into 
the international society perspective, but it lies at the very heart of Said’s 
conception. This does not mean that Said does not acknowledge liberal dimensions 
of the West, but these are perceived as co-existing in tension with imperialism. The 
liberal West, therefore, fundamentally lacks integrity in Said’s conception.
Similarly, assumptions about the cultural world order emerge at two levels. That 
which emerges from the West’s own representations, as seen by Said, is 
characterised by civilisational hierarchy with the West at the apex. On a second 
level, however, Said’s own perspective rejects the efficacy of hierarchy, seeing 
instead multiple civilisations existing within a broader community of humanity. 
Therefore, whilst Said’s own perspective is a pluralist one, it differs from 
Spengler’s in seeing humanity as ultimately forming a single community. However, 
at another extreme, it also contrasts with that of Fukuyama in that Said rejects the 
idea of the West as a universal civilisation. Curiously, Said’s suggestion that the 
universalism of the West masks its dominance of other civilisations resonates 
strongly with Huntington’s position on this issue.
Finally, the history of interaction within the cultural world order is seen to emerge 
differently at these two levels. The West’s self-representation implies that 
interaction between West and non-West has been a positive process of 
development and enlightenment. Said’s own perspective suggests, in contrast, a 
history of domination of the non-West, facilitated by and reflected in, Western 
practices of designating space, and of representing other races and religions as
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inferior. Interaction is critical to Said’s conception of the West. The West’s impact 
on other societies is not incidental as in Spengler, or a challenge as in Toynbee, or 
developmental as in Fukuyama. Like Bull, Said understands the interaction 
between the expanding West and other societies as a process which helped to 
constitute the West. But whereas Bull considers how the institutions and structures 
are produced by this process, Said focuses on its constitution of the intellectual and 
representational dimensions of Western identity and power. Said’s West is an 
imagined community which is constituted through the reiteration of assumptions of 
self and other which acquire the status of truth over time.
The use of genealogical methods and historical perspectives are critical to his 
presentation of conceptions of the West. He places the contemporary West in a 
historical context to identify continuities in assumptions and perceptions. However, 
unlike Toynbee, his is not a broad macrohistory, either of the West or of cultural 
interaction. Said selectively focuses on texts and instances of civilisational 
encounter in the context of European imperialism and its aftermath.
Said’s discussion of the West does not dwell on the details of the material society; 
these are assumed. Instead it focuses on the ideas, assumptions and knowledge 
constructions that constitute its material or ‘objective’ boundaries. He attaches 
great importance to the norms and values which differentiate the West from other 
civilisations. However, whilst all authors discussed have identified important 
normative and institutional boundaries for the West, Said’s interpretation of these 
boundaries is infinitely more critical. He does not see these as the symptoms or 
agents of progress or spiritual growth, but as tools used to reinforce the West’s 
image of its own superiority and legitimate its dominance of the non-West. These 
normative and material boundaries are perceived, not just as phenomena of the 
imperial past, but as remaining part of the popular culture and politics of the 
twentieth century, unconsciously replicated in many aspects of Western society. In 
this, Said highlights the role of ideas and norms as important vehicles for 
perpetuation and reproduction of civilisational identities.
Ultimately, Said’s representation and conception of the West are dominated by a 
sense of its power. Interaction is perceived as shaped by inequalities of power. In 
contrast to Spengler, Toynbee, Huntington and even Bull, he does not regard the
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West’s power as under serious threat. In fact, his analysis of the West’s self-image 
suggests that perceptions of threat have significantly enhanced the West’s sense of 
cohesion and identity. In contrast, his conception presents a community which 
retains a huge capacity to dominate other civilisations
Although his work is critical of Western domination, it does not reject the 
influences of the West wholesale. Instead, he draws on core Enlightenment ideas, 
such as emancipation and equality, in criticising the West’s engagement with the 
non-West. One aspect of this criticism pertains to the Euro-centricity of Western 
perspectives, a quality this study has observed in the work of many of the 
preceding authors. In contrast, Said turns Euro/Westem-centricism on its head and 
makes it an object of investigation.
Said does not present as clear a framework for the future as that found in the work 
of Huntington or Fukuyama. However, he does suggest a way of understanding 
world politics from the perspective of those outside the West which accentuates the 
significance of knowledge and representation to relationships. Furthermore, placing 
contemporary interaction into an imperialist historical framework, his work 
suggests that, despite institutions such as sovereign equality, significant 
inequalities and assumptions of hierarchy remain in world politics. He also 
identifies features which could enhance future interaction, such as mutual respect 
between cultures, whilst maintaining an underlying respect for broad human goals. 
Perhaps Said himself best articulates the balance he seeks in this cultural world 
order:
No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, 
sustained habitations, national languages and cultural geographies, 
but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting 
on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life 
was about. Survival in fact is about the connections between things. 
(Said, 1993:408)
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Conclusion
Continuities and Differences: Conceptions of the West and 
Cultural World Order Compared
At the outset, this dissertation recognised a growing interest in the role of 
civilisational and cultural identities among International Relations scholars. 
Assessing the role of such identities presents tremendous challenges. This is in no 
small part due to their complex nature. Civilisational and cultural identities are a 
blend of history, tradition, representation and normative commitments, all subject 
to interpretation. The breadth of scope and ethereal qualities of these identities can 
incline us to seek to reduce their complexity through simplified representations. 
This dissertation does not seek to dismiss but to explore the complexity of 
civilisational identity and its implications. It has focused on one, critical 
civilisational identity in world politics - the West, a group of societies and states 
which has dominated world politics and whose ideas and experiences have shaped 
International Relations. The dissertation has not sought to identify a single, 
authentic representation of this community, nor to portray the West as a static or 
homogeneous community. As is true of discussions of culture in general, there is 
no one account of what constitutes the West. Through examining a variety of 
conceptions, the dissertation has demonstrated its complexity, contingency and 
dynamism. It has also identified significant relationships between these 
conceptions and broader perceptions about the nature of the cultural world order. 
These, it suggests, have significant implications for considering the possibilities for 
interaction in world politics.
Civilisational Frameworks
The dissertation demonstrates that the West is not conceived of simply as a 
territory or a racial community, or defined purely through distinctive political
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institutions. These factors contribute to the identity of the West, but it is generally 
conceived of as a broad cultural and normative community. Conceptions of the 
West are not formed in isolation, but in the context of assumptions about the 
composition and nature of interaction between different civilisational identities in 
world politics which I have here defined as ‘the cultural world order’. The 
dissertation suggests that International Relations theory can be enriched by 
reflection on how our understanding of world politics is framed by assumptions 
about the cultural world order; in particular, the way in which we conceive of the 
West and its role in relation to other civilisational identities. These assumptions are 
not uniform, but reflect a variety of historical and intellectual influences. They help 
to shape an image of the world and frame perceptions of what is feasible and 
desirable in interaction with other peoples.
The dissertation has examined conceptions represented in the work of a variety of 
scholars drawn from different periods of the twentieth century and from different 
schools of thought. These illustrate a range of important perspectives on what 
critical qualities constitute the West, and of the role of the West in world politics. 
Comparison of these conceptions has produced interesting differences and 
parallels. Important differences are evident regarding perceptions of the nature of 
civilisations and of the course of human development which contribute to 
perceptions of the cultural world order and of the role of the West within it. 
Surprising parallels are identified between particular authors of the early era with 
particular contemporary authors, and radical differences between authors from the 
same era. For instance, one of the most radical perspectives which rejects 
conceptions of progress and the unity of mankind, and presents the West as a late 
or post-modern civilisation in a culturally fragmented world comes not from the 
radical critic Edward Said, but from the early twentieth century historian, Oswald 
Spengler. Moreover, strong parallels can be drawn between the almost post-modern 
conception of cultural world order found in Spengler with that found in the work of 
the conservative American scholar, Samuel Huntington. This suggests that 
conceptions of the West are not simply shaped by the influence of the era in which 
they are framed, but are also significantly shaped by the intellectual and normative 
concerns of the particular author.
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Two significant threads can be identified in these perceptions of civilisation. The 
first is the perception of civilisation as a process, a movement towards an ideal 
which encompasses all humanity in a process of progressive historical 
development. The second perceives civilisations as a plurality of separate 
communities pursuing independent histories. Francis Fukuyama’s conception of 
the West, for instance, is strongly influenced by the perception of the West as at the 
forefront of a universal, civilising process. In contrast, both Spengler and 
Huntington analyse the West as a distinct community within a cultural world order 
characterised by separate and largely incommensurable civilisations. Other 
scholars, such as Wight, Bull and, ultimately, Toynbee engage elements of both 
perspectives in their analysis of the West, blending a sense of universal progress 
with the interaction of a plurality of civilisations, resulting in a cultural world order 
which implies a hierarchy of civilisations. Said’s personal perspective, as distinct 
from his representation of Western perspectives, recognises a plurality of 
civilisations, but also acknowledges the importance of their existing within a 
broader human community. There is a marked tendency in all the texts to conceive 
of the West, or argue it conceives of itself, at the apex of a technical and normative 
hierarchy.
The perception of the nature of interaction between civilisations within the cultural 
world order is significant, since it can lead to expectations that civilisations will 
remain independent, or suggest that they may ultimately converge. Interaction can 
be perceived of as primarily conflictual or cooperative. These contrasting 
expectations are most marked in the work of Fukuyama and Huntington. For 
Fukuyama, there is a sense of humanity gradually converging on a model of 
modernisation. For Huntington, differences between civilisations are becoming 
more marked as the sense of cohesion within them develops. In contrast to both, 
Said appears to reject both the sense of civilisational hierarchy or convergence, and 
the representation of civilisations as necessarily segregated, hostile and 
incommensurable. These expectations have important implications for analysis of 
the role of the West and the future of interaction in world politics.
The authors’ varying conceptions of the nature of civilisations are related in part to 
their conceptions of history. For Fukuyama, history is clearly directional, and
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progressive; for Spengler, it is cyclical, as is the growth and decline of civilisations. 
Toynbee understands human history, and therefore the history of civilisations, as 
moving in waves. However, within the history of individual civilisations, he 
identifies patterns of growth and decay. The international society authors have a 
mixed view; Wight identifies ineluctable patterns in the conflictual history of 
humanity, yet simultaneously senses progress in the evolution of the structures of 
international society. A sense of broader human progress is more evident in Bull’s 
work, although this progress continues to be perceived within the constraints of 
power politics.
The authors also vary in the scope and depth of their historical analysis, Toynbee 
painting a broad and detailed historical canvas of which the West was an 
important, but fairly recent component. Spengler’s discussion of the West also 
ranges over an extensive historical period. Neither viewed the history of the West 
as synonymous with that of mankind; both placed it in a broader historical and 
cultural context which challenged the optimistic assumptions of many 
contemporaries and predecessors, particularly assumptions about the West as 
engaged in infinite progress. In contrast, Fukuyama and Huntington’s conceptions 
of the West are cast largely within the context of modem European and American 
history. Their contemplation of other, non-Westem cultures lacks depth. The 
international society authors focus primarily on the evolution of the West and its 
expansion. While their historical analysis is deeper than that of Huntington or 
Fukuyama, their histories of other civilisations are also constructed primarily in 
relation to that of the West. The Westem-centricity of these perspectives is 
highlighted by Said’s approach which accentuates a tradition of imperialism in 
Western culture, using a history of this discourse to show how representations 
supporting domination of the West over the non-West evolve over time.
The historical perspectives of the various scholars are significantly linked to their 
assumptions about the possibility for progress and change in world politics. 
Fukuyama’s Hegelian view of history clearly suggests the possibility of not only 
change, but also progress. This is a possibility which Spengler emphatically rejects 
at the level of human community. Civilisations may achieve a measure of progress 
within the context of their own evolution but, much like any organic entity, their
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progress is finite and bound to lead to decay. Toynbee views progress within 
civilisations as possible, but usually finite, although he holds out some hope for 
reversing the process of decay. Ultimately, he suggests true progress can be 
achieved, but at the transcendental rather than the temporal level. Huntington’s 
perception of the cultural world order implies change though not progress, but his 
discussion of Western political institutions implies the possibility of political 
progress.
Two dimensions to progress can be identified. There is material progress which all 
the authors recognise as a major feature of the West. For Fukuyama, this is a 
significant element in modernisation and the achievement of the universal, rational 
state. However, material progress is not uniformly viewed as positive or infinite. 
Both Spengler and Toynbee are pessimistic about the long-term impact of 
technological progress both on the physical environment, on the human spirit. They 
therefore view material progress as a source of strength but also as a potential 
source of Western destruction. These concerns, voiced in an earlier era, sound 
strangely prescient in the late twentieth century. The second dimension of progress 
is that of moral or normative progress. Here, only Spengler is totally negative 
regarding the potential for human progress, the other scholars all acknowledging 
the potential for progress at some level and the seeds of normative or spiritual 
progress in Western society or thought. For Toynbee, the most significant aspect of 
a civilisation’s growth is the spiritual process of self-realisation. Fukuyama also 
highlights the central role of moral and ideological growth in civilisational 
evolution. Wight and Bull’s work suggests that the Western-based international 
society has achieved some measure of progress in mediating the impact of conflict 
in world politics. Even Said implies some faith in the potential for progress in the 
broader human community based on the ideals articulated in the European 
Enlightenment.
Perceptions of the nature of civilisations, of history and of progress provide the 
foundations for the construction of a cultural world order, the crucial context for 
civilisational interaction. The authors’ understanding of the sources of 
civilisational interaction also vary greatly. Spengler views civilisations as organic 
entities; their internal life-forces and characters providing the source of action and
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interaction. Toynbee views the impetus for change and growth emanating from 
responses to challenges thrown up by other civilisations, the environment or by 
processes of development within a civilisation. The international society scholars 
describe the interdependent evolution of a system, with structures that stem from 
within civilisations and evolve historically; these structures become part of 
civilisational evolution and interaction and, eventually, the framework for inter- 
civilisational interaction. For Fukuyama, ideas are the source of action which shape 
the material world; the drive to achieve the perfect, rational society is the force for 
change. In contrast, Huntington conveys a more ‘Hobbesian’ image of civilisational 
interaction, the units within the cultural world order being independent and 
aggressively seeking security and power. Said’s own cultural world order 
encompasses a singular human community, with the interaction between smaller 
units deeply affected by frequency of interaction, and by power differentials.
The significance attached to civilisational interaction also varies across 
perspectives. For Spengler and Huntington, for instance, interaction is significant 
and challenging, but not a process which defines or drives the West. Yet to others, 
interaction is critical in shaping the West’s identity. Toynbee sees the challenges 
which interaction with other more powerful civilisations posed as formative in the 
West’s evolution. For Bull and Watson, interaction with other civilisations was one 
of the processes through which the West internationalised its structures and 
institutions and enhanced its power and status. From a very different perspective, 
Said also sees the West defining its own identity on an ongoing basis through 
interaction with, and representation of, non-Westem peoples.
Therefore, each of these authors present a distinct image of cultural world order. 
The most significant areas of difference and commonality perhaps lie in 
perceptions of human progress, and regarding levels of human diversity. These 
images of the cultural world order provide the context within which conceptions of 
the West can be understood. But at the same time, it should be recognised that, 
given the level of its influence in world politics, assumptions about the West may 
in turn help to shape perceptions of both the desired and the possible cultural world 
order.
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Conceptions of the West
A sense of the West as a clearly identified community emerges from this survey, 
with points of commonality in the way its identity and history are perceived. This 
provides some sense of continuity regarding who and what constitutes the West 
within the different perspectives. However, each presents a complex and multi­
layered conception of the West which gives a distinct interpretation of objective 
features of the West. Each conception also entails a strong, normative dimension 
which again demonstrates variation in emphasis and interpretation. While 
objective, material criteria are utilised by all in their conceptions, it is the various 
meanings with which these are inscribed which gives substance to the identity of 
this imagined community.
The essential features each selects reflect the different contexts in which these 
representations were produced. However, the variation in conceptions of the West 
produced in the same era, such as that between Bull and Said, or between 
Huntington and Fukuyama, suggest that intellectual and normative influences also 
significantly shape these conceptions.
Territorial Boundaries
Each of these texts views Western Europe and the United States as constituting the 
territorial heartland of the West. Russia is generally, but not always, excluded. For 
instance, Said appears to treat nineteenth century Russia as part of the imperial 
West, but it is clearly excluded from the West by Spengler, Toynbee. Fukuyama 
and Huntington. An implicit sense of the territorial expansion of the West emerges 
from all the texts; but this is linked, not just to the spread of European peoples or 
even ideas, but to the deep inculcation of European norms and institutions into the 
structures of societies outside of Europe. For instance, the international society 
authors, equate the expansion of the West, prior to the creation of a global 
international society, with the expansion, not so much of the European state 
system, but of European international society to colonies such as North America. 
The authors vary in their interpretation of the role of the United States as the 
territorial focus of the West. For the American authors it is very much the focus; 
for the others, the focus shifts over time from Europe, or in Spengler’s case,
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Germany, to the United States as the balance of material power shifts in the 
twentieth century or, for Spengler, as the civilisation begins to decay. There is also 
an interesting variation in the perception of the relationship between the 
community and the geography of the West. For Spengler and Toynbee, land and 
environment critically shape the West’s character. For other authors, the 
occupation and inscription of territory and boundaries is more significant, 
particularly Said for whom geography and power are intrinsically linked. In this 
respect, the perception of geography found in Said, and even in Huntington, is 
strongly political; the relationship of community to land more socially and 
historically constituted than organic. Therefore, territory is a significant feature in 
all the conceptions, but none perceive the West as simply a static, territorial 
community.
Religious Boundaries
There is a clear sense in all of these conceptions of religion playing a critical but 
complex role in defining the West. The legacy of religious identity is commonly 
perceived as differentiating the West and providing a source of normative 
cohesion. However, interpretations of the role and nature of religion vary. For 
instance, for Spengler, religion is not a universal force, but particular to each 
culture; whereas for Toynbee, religion becomes a progressive force which has the 
capacity to save the West and mankind in general. In contrast, the treatment of 
religion in Huntington and Fukuyama is less extensive and less profound.
Religion, and Christianity in particular, are broadly perceived as providing the 
foundations for the West as a community. First and foremost, Christianity 
differentiated members of this community from neighbouring people of other 
faiths, primarily Islam. The confrontational relationship with Islam is widely 
perceived as a defining one for the West. Toynbee, however, also highlights the 
importance of the growing rift between Western Christendom and the Eastern 
Orthodox community as enhancing the sense of a distinct Western community. 
Differentiation from the outside is based on a sense of common interests and values 
within and Huntington stresses the significance of common Christian values as 
fundamental to the modem West. Wight and Toynbee, however, further highlight
322
the foundations provided for the modem Western states-system in the political 
institutions of the society of Christian states which evolved under the papacy.
Christianity is also widely perceived as helping to shape the character of the West. 
Spengler emphasises the strength of individualism which characterises Christianity, 
and in particular, early Catholicism which for him provides the quintessence of 
Western religion. Wight focuses on the universalism and missionary spirit which 
were important elements in the growth of the Christian faith and which 
accompanied European expansion. Fukuyama and Huntington accentuate the socio­
economic dimension of religious influence, noting the relationship between 
Christianity and the institutions of democracy and capitalism; but in marked 
contrast to Spengler, they treat the character of the Protestant rather than the 
Catholic faith as the most significant influence.
The conceptions of the West found in Bull and Watson, and which Said critiques, 
provide a further slant on the role of religion, accentuating the perception of 
Christianity as not only distinguishing the West, but also providing a superior faith. 
From this perspective, religion both distinguishes and normatively empowers the 
West.
However, the West is widely perceived as being distinguished, not only by the 
qualities of Christianity, but by its treatment of religion. Secularism, or the removal 
of religion from the public sphere, is variously applauded and criticised by the 
authors under review, but all recognise its role in distinguishing the West. For 
Toynbee, the rise of secularism marks the West’s transition from the medieval to 
the modem. Whereas Spengler sees the rise of secularism as a sign of the spiritual 
atrophy of the West, for Huntington and Fukuyama it marks the political 
progressiveness of the West in comparison to other civilisations. Said, however, 
accentuates the continuities between the secular and religious West in his argument 
that the secular culture continued to employ the perceptions of superiority towards 
Islam and the non-Christian world developed within the religious culture. For all 
these authors, therefore, the religious identity of the West provides crucial 
foundations for modem Western civilisation, but in different ways.
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Racial Boundaries
None of the scholars discussed perceives the West primarily as a racial community, 
or employs notions of racial superiority based on biological factors. Spengler, for 
instance, claims race is a spiritual rather than a biological category. However, all 
implicitly recognise or employ race as an important source of differentiation. This 
is most explicit in Spengler and Toynbee who both discuss racial differences 
between the West and other peoples as of importance. This is strongest in Spengler 
who identifies an organic link between ‘blood’, land and community, defining 
Western peoples as members of the ‘Faustian’ race. Bull and Said, however, bring 
to light the politics of race, or the way in which during the nineteenth century, as 
Western economic and imperial power became more pronounced, race was 
increasingly perceived as accentuating difference and hierarchy between West and 
non-West. In Bull and Watson’s work, race provides a barrier, first between 
members of European international society and those outside, and then within the 
multi-racial international society, separating West from non-West. For Said, 
assumptions of racial superiority helped legitimise the practices of imperialism.
The role of race is least explicit in Fukuyama and Huntington, but it is not absent. 
Racial differentiation appears as something of an anomaly in Fukuyama’s West, an 
anachronistic legacy of the past which should pass once Western society perfects 
the implementation of its ideology of equality. In Huntington, there is little 
discussion, nor approval of racial differentiation. However, he stresses the 
importance of blood ties, defined as ethnicity, in forming identity and generating 
conflict. He demonstrates serious concerns about threats to the cultural 
homogeneity of the West emanating primarily from the influx but non-integration 
of different ethnic groups. His concerns about challenges to the West from other 
civilisational groups also echo those expressed by Spengler and Toynbee regarding 
the threats the ‘coloured’ races of the world present to West. This raises the 
question of whether race is a latent element in his conception of the West.
Power
The role which power plays in these conceptions is also complex. All perceive the 
West as a civilisation of unprecedented power. Western technical ingenuity is
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recognised as underlying its capacity to expand geographically, and project military 
force, economic enterprise and political institutions. The components of power, 
however, are variously perceived. For most, they encompass technical and material 
capability based on the scientific and industrial revolutions of Europe which 
Toynbee and Bull discuss as allowing the West to unite the world within a single 
technical framework. Fukuyama, more than the others, emphasises the economic 
dimension of the West’s power; its material capability enhanced by the 
development of capitalism which for him has proved the most efficient model for 
development and modernisation. In contrast, Spengler regards capitalism and the 
materialism of which it is a symptom as a sign of atrophy in Western civilisation. 
Huntington acknowledges, but does not explore the economic dimensions of 
Western power. He suggests that the core of Western power vis ä vis other 
civilisations is based on its capacity for organised violence. Military capability is 
perceived as the foundation of the West’s ‘hard power’.
However, there is a further dimension to the West’s power which permeates all the 
texts, this is what Huntington describes as ‘soft power’; that derived from culture 
or ideology. This includes the institutional resources which play such a significant 
role in Wight and Bull’s conception of the power of the West: that is, the West is 
perceived as deriving influence from the internationalisation of structures and 
institutions developed in Western Europe. These, whilst global in scope, reflect and 
therefore privilege Western interests since underlying these institutional structures 
are Western ideas and values. But it is Said who accentuates the cultural hegemony 
of Western ideas as critical. For Huntington, this hegemony is simply correlated to 
the West’s military and economic capabilities; ‘soft power’ built upon ‘hard 
power’. But for Said, cultural hegemony is deeply interwoven with the construction 
and projection of Western authority over the non-West. Western power, perceived 
as imperial in nature, is not only supported but also constructed by the deployment 
of favourable representations of the West in contrast to the non-West. Hard power 
is therefore perceived as interwoven with ‘soft power’.
We can further identify in these conceptions a sense of the West deriving power 
from the strength of its inner resources as well as its external capacity. For 
Spengler, this entails a sense that Western power is based on a questing and
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inquiring spirit; for Toynbee, on the West’s ability to meet challenges; for 
Fukuyama on perceptions of the moral legitimacy of the Western system of 
governance.
Although all the scholars discussed view the West’s power as unprecedented, all 
except Said discuss it as under threat of diminution. Most interesting is that whilst 
the West is perceived as threatened by encroachment from without by, for instance, 
Spengler and Huntington, nearly all seem equally concerned about threats to 
Western cohesion and stability emanating from within. Spengler’s organic 
conceptualisation of the West presents it as approaching exhaustion in its life- 
cycle. Features which to others represent Western progress, such as technology and 
capitalism, are viewed as symptomatic of decline. Toynbee is also concerned that 
the material capacity of the West masks its spiritual depletion. In some respects, 
Spengler and Toynbee echo the fear of earlier authors such as John Stuart Mill on 
the debilitating effects of cultural atrophy, of ennui and complacency, which can 
weaken a developed civilisation. As noted above, both also demonstrate fear of the 
negative physical and spiritual consequences of the spread of technology. 
Fukuyama also identifies potential internal sources of Western decline, but for him 
these are the destructive tendencies which the mediocrity of a system of perfect 
equality and recognition of all citizens could engender. Huntington fears Western 
complacency and weakening normative cohesion, calling upon the West to 
consolidate its existing power. Although Bull and Watson also observe the 
weakening of the West’s capacity to directly control the affairs of non-Westem 
societies, their discussion of institutional structures implies that the West retains a 
large degree of indirect global influence. This, however, is also perceived as under 
challenge from increasingly assertive non-Westem societies, threatening to 
undermine the institutions and norms of the Western-based international society. 
Said stands out in his representation of Western power as neither benign nor 
fading, but still capable of threatening and dominating other peoples. Therefore, the 
West’s power is perceived as finite, although as Said’s work implies, it remains 
substantial.
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Norms
The conceptions of the West examined all entail a strong normative dimension. For 
most, norms are fundamental in distinguishing the West from others and providing 
it with a sense of commonality within. Furthermore, norms appear to contribute 
substantially to establishing an implicit sense of hierarchy, with Western norms and 
values perceived, not only as different, but often as superior to those of other 
societies. However, the identification and interpretation of the West’s key norms 
also leads to interesting points of difference. The study reveals points of 
commonality between authors from very different eras and perspectives, such as 
between Toynbee and Huntington; and points of difference between 
contemporaries such as Fukuyama and Huntington. These derive from their 
interpretation of Western norms within the broader context of the cultural world 
order.
A number of fundamental qualities are identified with the West across the broad 
spectrum of these conceptions. These include individualism, rationality, freedom 
and equality. These norms reflect the ideals of the European Enlightenment and the 
French and American Revolutions which symbolise for most of the authors the 
degree of normative development achieved by the West. However, the 
interpretation of their significance varies; for Fukuyama, they are elements of 
man’s broader moral progress, a belief also implicit in Bull. For Huntington, these 
qualities distinguish Western, but not necessarily human progress. However, his 
work still suggests these demonstrate the West to be the most advanced 
civilisation. For Spengler, however, the norms of the Enlightenment are neither 
permanent nor universal, but symptomatic of the West’s ebbing spirituality and 
gradual decline.
While norms are critical to the conception of the West found in both Spengler and 
Toynbee, these are represented as aspects of the West’s deeper spiritual identity 
which are subject to adaptation as the civilisation meets the challenges of its 
evolution. For authors such as Fukuyama, Huntington and Wight, the norms noted 
above appear more deeply ingrained in the evolved identity of the modem West.
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However, significant points of tension add complexity to the normative coherence 
of the West in a number of these conceptions. In Spengler and Fukuyama, both of 
whom were influenced by Nietzsche, there is a consciousness of tension between 
commitments to respect for the individual and commitments to the community. 
Fukuyama further grapples with the constraints which the norm of equality can 
place on that of individual freedom. However, it is Said who points most clearly to 
tensions and ambiguities between the liberal norms outlined above and the history 
and traditions of domination found in his own conception of the West. In this, 
liberal norms co-existed with those that legitimated imperialism, a co-existence 
facilitated by the spatial separation between the metropolitan West and its empire.
A further significant factor facilitating the co-existence of liberal and imperialist 
norms appears to be the assumption of a normative and civilisational hierarchy 
which is perhaps implicit in many of these conceptions. Bull and Watson, along 
with Said, suggest that the West increasingly saw itself as not only different from, 
but as more advanced than, non-Westem peoples. For Said, the West’s perception 
of itself as normatively superior also empowered it, helping to legitimate policies 
and attitudes of imperialism which are central to his conception of the West. 
However, the perception of Western normative superiority is not confined to 
readings of nineteenth century history. It is implicit in the work of Wight, for 
whom the norms which characterise Western constitutional government present a 
via media between the extremes of realpolitik and revolution; and in that of 
Huntington and of Fukuyama, for whom the West’s victory over the communist 
system is one achieved in the moral as much as the material arena.
Therefore, in a number of these conceptions, norms both distinguish and empower 
the West through implying its superiority. Norms are further viewed as a providing 
a platform for cohesion within the West. Wight and Bull suggest normative 
consensus was foundational to European international society, the institutional 
framework for the evolution of the West. It is clearly evident in Fukuyama’s 
discussion of the moral and ideological evolution of the West in contrast to 
communism; but it is particularly well emphasised in Huntington’s work. The 
importance which he attaches to norms as a source of Western cohesion is 
accentuated by his concern with the diminution of Western normative cohesion, a
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threat emanating from sources such as unassimilated migrants and the advocates of 
multiculturalism.
Western norms are therefore perceived by all as a crucial element of the West’s 
identity, and by some as suggesting the West is a more progressive and advanced 
civilisation. However, Western norms are not uniformly perceived as positive nor 
as providing the foundation for global norms. This is perhaps one of the more 
surprising findings from this survey, given the global expansion and promotion of 
Western political norms. Central to Huntington’s argument is the perception that 
the norms and values of the West are what makes it unique, not universal. He, like 
Spengler and Toynbee, demonstrates scepticism about the possibility of 
transferring norms evolved in one cultural context to another in anything other than 
a superficial manner. Toynbee suggests the practice can have results which are both 
unpredictable and potentially damaging for the new host, weakening its own 
cohesion. These concerns stand in contrast to Fukuyama’s more positive 
perspective which clearly suggests that the West has evolved norms which are 
universal, representing the moral progress of humanity as a whole, and to the 
international society authors who suggest that Western norms have achieved some 
measure of successful globalisation, providing a normative framework for modem 
world politics. At one level, Said clearly rejects the West as providing a universal 
and egalitarian world model. As with Spengler, Toynbee and Huntington, he is 
deeply suspicious that the projection of Western norms as universal is misleading. 
Yet at another level, he is committed to the norms of emancipation and 
enlightenment. However, these norms transcend the West and are not synonymous 
with it for Said, as is made clear by his argument that the West has failed to live up 
to these ideals due to its imperialist traditions.
Although essential normative qualities may be commonly identified across this 
range of perspectives, variations in their interpretations are significantly linked to 
perceptions of the West as a civilisational identity and to its perceived role in the 
cultural world order.
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Institutions
In its discussion of perceptions of institutions which characterise the West, this 
study has focused primarily on perceptions of political institutions. The 
international society authors in particular emphasise the role of institutions in both 
the West’s evolution and in the constitution of its power. Institutions such as the 
sovereign state, international law, diplomacy and the balance of power are treated 
as structures and practices which distinguished the West, but also became vehicles 
for its internationalisation.
Most of the conceptions discussed focus on liberal institutions, such as 
constitutional and democratic institutions and those of the rule of law, as most 
characteristic of the West; but again, interpretations of their role and nature varies. 
For Fukuyama, Wight and Huntington, Western institutions imply a more advanced 
system of governance. In contrast, Spengler recognises that institutions of 
representative government characterise the West, but he treats these as 
symptomatic of the degeneration of leadership rather than as evidence of progress. 
He also recognises the state as the central institution of the West, but perceives it as 
an organic rather than constitutional entity. For Toynbee, the sovereign state and 
parliamentary democracy are central to the West’s identity and success; but their 
value is treated as something transitory and there is a strong sense that, as parochial 
institutions in an increasingly interconnected world, they are becoming redundant 
and inhibiting future growth. Said also acknowledges the value placed by the West 
on liberal institutions of governance, but highlights that these co-existed with 
institutions of colonialism and imperialism which were equally important aspects 
of the West.
Most interesting are the concerns raised, particularly by Toynbee and then by 
Huntington, about the feasibility of the successful transfer of Western institutions 
to other civilisations. To Toynbee, the transfer of the modem Western state and 
parliamentary democracy have had a disastrous and divisive impact on non- 
Westem societies. Fukuyama and Huntington find a rare point of agreement in their 
mutual respect for democracy, particularly as expressed through American 
institutions, as the form of government which best protects the rights of the 
individual, promotes economic growth, and enhances the prospects for
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international peace. Yet both worry about the destabilising impact of the 
introduction of democracy to societies which have not evolved social structures 
which parallel the West’s. However, they differ in their conclusions, with 
Huntington suggesting that the spread of democracy can accentuate conflict and 
encourage anti-Westernism rather than encourage global cultural homogeneity, 
while Fukuyama maintains his faith in democracy as a global model for political 
development. Their interpretation of the role in civilisational interaction of this 
core institution therefore varies in relation to their perception of the nature of the 
West’s role in the broader cultural world order, an observation which can be made 
of the perception of Western institutions in all these conceptions.
Norms and institutions may, then, be perceived as empowering the West in its 
interaction with other civilisations. If culture is seen as forming a barrier between 
civilisations, as implied in Toynbee and Huntington, the transmission of norms and 
institutions is unlikely to be successful. However, as this does not mitigate the 
assumed superiority of Western norms, the West may remain ensconced in a 
position of superiority. If Western norms and institutions are seen as forming the 
basis of international society, as suggested by Wight and Bull, then the West is 
advantaged by having its cultural rules privileged since other societies must adjust 
to the West, not vice versa. But if these norms and institutions are untransmittable, 
they can still add to the sense of cohesion within the West by conjuring up the 
enemy without.
Conceptions of Boundaries: Continuities and Difference
The boundaries perceived to define the West in these conceptions demonstrate 
interesting points of continuity and variation. The objective boundaries are 
variously interpreted, but each conception places importance on norms and values 
in defining their imagined communities. The norms perceived to characterise the 
West imbue the objective boundaries with meaning and are critical to framing 
perceptions of identity and hierarchy amongst civilisations.
Although the conceptions share a great deal in terms of basic perceptions of who 
the West is and how it has related to other peoples, they also differ substantially in 
their interpretation of the essential qualities which define the West, and the nature
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of its interaction with the non-West. Such variation indicates the complexity and 
contingency in these conceptions, and the tensions which exist within this 
complexity. Key tensions include those between the norms and practices of the 
‘ideologies’ of liberalism and imperialism which permitted both norms and 
practices of emancipation and domination by the West in its interaction with the 
non-West. It cannot be argued that the West is simply represented by one or other 
of these ‘ideologies’; the development and unprecedented influence of the West 
which all of these authors acknowledge is premised on both.
Perceptions of Interaction Between the West and Non-West
Discussion of the norms and institutions perceived to characterise the West focuses 
attention on questions concerning the transferability of ideas between civilisations, 
an important aspect of civilisational interaction. The transfer of ideas is viewed by 
some as difficult and dangerous, but by others as a natural and positive process that 
enhances the growth of human community. These views relate to assumptions 
about the role of the West in the cultural world order, and of the nature of, and 
possibilities for, interaction.
Cultural Power Politics
All the authors conceptualise the relationship between the West and non-West 
within the context of Western dominance of inter-civilisational relations. The West 
is perceived as the pre-eminent power in world politics and an agent of significant 
global change. However, there are major variations in the interpretation of the 
relationship of West to non-West. For instance, both Spengler and Toynbee 
accredit the West’s powerful position to its being the only civilisation in a stage of 
growth. Spengler views the West as having maintained a position of dominance, 
but not leadership, of a broader world order, whereas Fukuyama clearly views the 
West as achieving a position of leadership within a world order structured around 
the processes of modernisation and development. Whereas Spengler’s world order 
is perhaps analogous to a forest of competing and co-existing but distinct organic 
civilisations, Fukuyama projects an image of a two-tiered world, with the West 
having completed the processes of ideological development which the rest of the
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world is still struggling to attain. The international society authors represent the 
relationship as one of Western hegemony expressed and maintained through the 
norms and institutions of international society. Through this structure, other 
civilisations came to operate within the context of Western civilisation even when 
no longer directly dominated by Western powers. For Said, in contrast, the 
relationship is one of dominance and imperialism, the non-West always in some 
way subject to the West’s influence or needs, but simultaneously providing the 
critical alter ego through which the West constructs itself.
As noted in our discussion of power, norms and institutions, imperialism is a 
critical feature of Said’s conception of the West’s relationship with the non-West. 
His interest in imperialism highlights the relative lack of attention paid to this 
phenomenon amongst the other conceptions considered. Imperialism is noted and 
accepted by Spengler, Toynbee and Huntington as an aspect of the West’s 
expansion, although for Spengler, it represents an expression of civilisational 
decline. In contrast, Fukuyama treats it as symptomatic of a phase of development, 
perceiving the spread of Western ideas as a process whereby the world catches up 
with Western developments, rather than as processes of domination. Imperialism is 
more fully integrated into the conception of the West found in Bull, Watson, and 
some of Wight’s work1 as a relationship which conditioned interaction between 
the West and non-West. But it is only in Said that imperialism becomes the very 
core of the West’s identity. Where the other authors perceive imperialism to be an 
aspect of the West’s past, Said perceives it to be a relationship which conditioned 
its attitudes in the past and continues to do so. His concept of imperialism is not 
limited to the activities of nineteenth century European powers, but extends to the 
post-colonial period and incorporates the United States. The West is perceived as 
maintaining a strong cultural hegemony in post-colonial world politics. For Said, 
imperialism remains a defining element of the West’s identity and of its 
relationship with the non-West.
1 See in particular Wight’s essay ‘The Theory of Mankind’ (Wight, 1991).
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Interaction
Just as we find differing interpretations of the nature of the West’s relationship 
with the non-West, so we find varying interpretations of the impact of interaction; 
in particular, of Westernisation or modernisation. Spengler sees the absorption of 
modem Western ideas by non-Westem peoples as essentially superficial, his 
perception of the cultural world order emphasising competition rather than cross­
fertilisation between cultures; Toynbee views it as potentially disastrous, 
particularly in relation to the absorption by other civilisations of powerful Western 
ideas such as nationalism. Huntington, however, makes a careful distinction 
between modernisation and Westernisation. While acknowledging that the 
processes of modernisation were ‘invented’ in the West, he argues that 
modernisation does not necessarily mean Westernisation, and denies that 
modernisation will lead to cultural convergence. If anything, it exacerbates existing 
cultural differences. In marked contrast, Fukuyama views modernisation as leading 
to cultural homogenisation. He perceives the West as winning the battle with 
Soviet communism to direct the shape of modernity. Consequently, modernising 
trends will lead to the concepts or ideas found in the Western system with other 
modernising paths seen as either dead-ends or unable to deliver a universally 
acceptable culture.
A Global Framework or False Premises?
Perceptions of the nature of interaction and the impact of the West on other 
civilisations in each of these conceptions are framed by assumptions about the 
cultural world order. These also influence perceptions of the extent to which the 
West provides a model or framework of civilisation. Such suggestions are clearly 
rejected by Spengler, but supported by Fukuyama whose work implies that the 
West provides the pre-eminent theoretical model for political and economic 
development. Toynbee and the international society authors appear to provide a via 
media between perceptions of the West as universal or particular. Toynbee notes 
that the West has provided a framework for a global multicultural society, uniting 
the world at a political and economic level; but this appears to be primarily a 
technical framework since, as noted, he is sceptical of the secular West providing a
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successful normative or institutional model for other civilisations and, at the 
cultural level, he suggests the West has exacerbated division rather than enhanced 
homogeneity. Wight and Bull also suggests the West provides a framework for 
interaction; but theirs is a normative and institutional framework, defined as that of 
international society. In fact, they suggest that the West has succeeded in uniting 
the world in a single, global political system. Wight’s work demonstrates 
confidence in the framework of international society as durable. Bull, however, is 
clearly uncertain as to whether consensus on norms and institutions can be 
maintained indefinitely as the composition of international society broadens. But at 
another level, he appears optimistic that there is a link between the spread of 
Western ideas and the broader development of mankind. Huntington, in contrast, 
accepts that the West has provided an institutional framework for interaction in the 
form of the international system yet denies that this can be construed as a 
normative community, rejecting the existence of a global international society. For 
Said, the West provides not so much a framework for interaction, but a hierarchical 
framework of representations which shape and legitimise the policies of the West, 
and are deeply inculcated into Western and even non-Westem cultures.
Deep divisions are evident amongst these conceptions as to whether the West is 
universal or unique. These do not simply divide early conceptions from later, or 
American from European perspectives, but create strange bed-fellows. For 
instance, both the liberal Fukuyama and the author of Power Politics, Martin 
Wight appear to share the conviction that the West provides a universally relevant 
model for political development, although Wight views this as a model for 
managing rather than eliminating conflicts in world politics. For the post-colonial 
critic Said, the conservative Huntington and the late-modern pessimist Spengler, 
there is a widespread but misleading perception of the West as a universal 
civilisation. All reject this ‘false universalism’ viewing it as a consequence of the 
West’s extensive power which allowed it to exercise cultural hegemony. For 
Huntington, the belief that Western ideas are universal is misleading, provocative 
to other civilisations and, consequently, dangerous for the West. For Said, 
however, it is the danger to the non-West which is most evident, with the West’s 
projection of false universalism forming one aspect of its power and dominance. In
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some respects, this concern for the non-West brings Said and Toynbee closer in 
their perspectives.
By presenting a perspective which critically reviews the West’s identity as 
constructed through its relations with the non-West, Said’s work accentuates the 
Westem-centricity of the other conceptions. Although all consider in varying depth 
the relationship of the West to the non-West, this is done primarily from the 
perspective of the Western interests and history. This is despite the fact that both 
Spengler and Toynbee were themselves highly critical of the Euro-centric focus of 
their own colleagues. Both challenged this by exploring the development of other 
civilisations, but both were themselves ultimately drawn to focus on the history and 
role of the West. Wight discusses non-Westem political systems, but primarily 
with reference to Western-based models of international society. The interests of 
Huntington and Fukuyama clearly focus on the West, and within this, largely on 
American society. The possible exception to this Western-centric trend is the work 
of Bull and Watson, although they too appear most interested in the impact of the 
West and the Western system on non-Westem people rather than canvassing the 
reverse.2
Interaction and Cultural World Order
The dissertation argues, therefore, that conceptions of the West are framed in terms 
of broader assumptions about the nature of cultural world order; and that 
conceptions of the cultural world order are in turn constituted in relation to 
assumptions about the role of the West. These assumptions have significant and 
differing implications for the way in which the possibilities for interaction in world 
politics are perceived. Huntington, for example, presents something close to a 
‘Hobbesian’ image of a cultural world order comprising civilisational spheres of 
influence which confront one another in a struggle for power and security. Within 
such a context, the universalist normative aspiration of the West appear ludicrous 
and misguided, while policies of consolidation and self-defence appear sensible
2 W atson(1992) looks at other forms of international society from a slightly broader perspective 
than that o f Martin Wight in Systems of States.
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and desirable. Universalism at home and multiculturalism abroad characterises 
Huntingtorijprescriptions for the West.
In contrast, Fukuyama’s cultural world order is one of different societies moving 
inexorably towards the perfect society, the model of which has been achieved in 
the ideas of the West. Interaction is shaped by levels of development, or progress in 
the ‘civilising process’. His image of current world politics is a two-tiered one, 
with the prescriptions of power politics still applying to the less developed 
struggling through the processes of history, while relations amongst the post- 
historical societies appear peaceable and ordered. This suggests that the West 
should have a degree of pride in the achievements of its system and encourage the 
broader spread of Western norms, ideas and institutions.
Said provides us with a questioning attitude to approach the structures and 
institutions of contemporary world politics. This attitude implies that the cultural 
world order includes a multitude of cultures and civilisations, but that relations 
between them are shaped by inequalities in power. It probes the appearance of 
universality and of irreconcilable differences in order to understand the power 
structures which influence perceptions of self and other in world politics. However, 
the divisions which Said suggests exist between cultures and civilisations do not 
irretrievably divide them or ultimately undermine the common human identity 
which all people share at a deep normative level. Said’s conception of the cultural 
world order, therefore, neither suggests the West as a universal civilisation, nor the 
irreconcilable fragmentation of humanity. However, it does suggest that significant 
inequalities between the West and non-West continue to exist in the post-colonial 
world.
This discussion of conceptions of the West has highlighted important points of 
continuity and difference, indicating that conceptions of the West are not 
monolithic but complex and contingent. This implies that the West as a 
civilisational identity and imagined community is dynamic; its identity shifting 
across context and era enabling it to retain relevance in diverse locations. 
Awareness of these qualities is crucial to any examination of the role of 
civilisational and cultural identities in world politics.
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Implications for International Relations Theory
This study commenced by observing the absence of reflection on civilisational 
identities and the West in particular in International Relations thought. It concludes 
by briefly considering what we gain by bringing such reflection into the discipline. 
The discussion of assumptions about civilisations suggests that these provide a 
perspective on human interaction which is broad in spatial and temporal scope. 
This perspective provides a sense of the historical context in which structures, 
institutions and ideas have developed. It enriches our understanding of the 
environment, agents and processes of international politics by adding 
considerations of culture to those of systems, structures and institutions of power 
and exchange. Therefore, the civilisational perspective provides a further 
dimension to the study of international relations.
The civilisational perspective does not necessarily undermine existing theories of 
International Relations, but it does suggests the limitations of particular theories by 
noting that these are embedded in the historical and intellectual contexts in which 
they evolved. International Relations theories are largely embedded in the context 
of Western civilisation. This is not to argue they have nothing to contribute to 
understanding interaction in the broader human community, but to note that the 
discipline often fails to reflect on the contingency of the models and assumptions 
which have shaped its understanding of world politics. Therefore, assumptions 
about culture, and in the case of International Relations theory, about the West in 
particular, often remain latent and unexamined.
This study has also sought to heighten our consciousness of the presence of 
civilisational identities in world politics; to acknowledge their complexity; and to 
analyse how assumptions about the West are interwoven with the theories of 
international relations and assumptions about the nature of the cultural world order 
found in these texts.
Recognition of a significant relationship between conceptions of civilisational 
identities and broader assumptions about the nature of the cultural world order is 
significant for studies of world politics. It suggests further consideration of the 
extent to which these conceptions and assumptions frame perceptions of the
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possibilities for global political interaction. The dissertation suggests a variety of 
assumptions about the possibility for interaction can influence our analysis of 
world politics. Assumptions of incommensurability in relations between 
civilisations, as found in Huntington’s analysis, could lead to policies of 
consolidation and homogenisation within broad cultural communities, and the 
pursuit of self-regarding rather than cosmopolitan policies and behaviour without. 
Conversely, assumptions of strong universalist tendencies in civilisational 
interaction, as found in Fukuyama’s work, could lead to policies which accentuate 
and promote perceived commonalties or potential for these, but which perhaps 
disregard important areas of cultural, social and political difference.
A heightened awareness of the role of civilisational identities and their relationship 
to assumptions about world order may also raise consciousness of the degree to 
which notions of progress and hierarchy in global interaction have been absorbed 
from the histories and cultural traditions of our own civilisational identities. This 
study has focused on conceptions of the West and their relationship to assumptions 
about world order. The significance of this relationship is heightened by the West’s 
status in modem world politics. However, the study’s findings with regard to the 
complexity and contingency of civilisational identities and their relationship to 
assumptions about world order could be explored in relation to other cultures and 
identities in order to broaden our understanding of the ways in which conceptions 
of civilisations and cultures frame our perceptions of world politics.
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Appendix
The Concept of Civilisation
A brief survey of the etymology of the term civilisation produces a variety of 
meanings. These entail intellectual, material, normative, developmental and 
cultural dimensions. Civilisations can be used in the singular sense, to imply a 
universal process; or in a pluralist sense, to refer to cultural collectives. Both 
usages remain current. The way in which the term is employed is significant in 
what it says about the cultural world order as conceived by the author.
Civilisation is a term which has evolved different meanings in different eras and 
disciplines. It draws its linguistic roots form the Latin civil, a term associated with 
courtesy; and civis a term associated with citification (Febvre, 1973; Haviland, 
1994:253). The word entered European languages around 1766, apparently 
occumng first in French, soon after to be found in English. At its inception, it was 
associated with good conduct and with the maintenance of order in contrast to 
conditions of barbarism.1 It was increasingly associated with the sense of material 
and moral progress innate to the Enlightenment, and subsequently with the concept 
of modernisation.
In the French context, Elias associates the evolution of ‘civilisation’ with the 
reforming and rationalist Physiocrat movement (1978:35-44). Here, ‘civilisation’ 
became an ideal which reflects the evolutionary and progressive spirit of the 
French revolution. This was the ideal of progress towards a unified, enlightened, 
prosperous and peaceable human society. In this context, civilisation entails 
qualities of universalism and progress (Febvre, 1973:230-8). However, Elias 
observes that as the French revolution proceeded into the nineteenth century, it 
became more moderate, more bourgeois. The concept of civilisation came to
1 See, for instance, John Stuart Mill’s discussion of civilisation in the sense of it being the converse 
of ‘savage life’ (Mill, 1973:46).
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epitomise the French national self-image and provided an underlying justification 
for French expansion. The ‘consciousness of civilisation’ became a consciousness 
of superiority which served to justify colonial conquest as a ‘civilising mission’ 
(Elias, 1978:50).
In the German context, however, Elias explored an intellectual tradition which 
effectively segregated the concepts of Kultur and Zivilisation. Here Kultur, seen to 
represent aesthetic and spiritual improvements of the mind, was elevated over 
Zivilisation, associated with a shallower, cosmopolitan tradition of manners (Elias, 
1978). This trend was pursued in the Romantic movement in which the diversity of 
individual cultures was valued over the more abstract and less humane concept of a 
modem world civilisation. In this respect, the Romantic tradition as characterised 
by thinkers such as Herder rejected a unilinear, progressive conception of the 
history of humanity, emphasising instead the plurality of history and diversity of 
cultures.
By the nineteenth century, then, the concept of civilisation as universal and 
singular was under challenge from the German intellectual tradition, but also from 
intellectual forces unleashed by the Enlightenment itself. The humanist and 
scientific inquires stimulated during the Enlightenment created new disciplines of 
thought, such as archaeology and ethnology, which expanded intellectual horizons, 
increasing awareness of the diversity and complexity of human societies and 
cultures. This instigated a debate between universalists and specialists on the 
nature of human society, leading to a pluralist conception of civilisations defined in 
the sense of a social order rather than as a progressive ideal (Febvre, 1973; 
Braudel, 1980; Williams, 1983; Springborg, 1993).
Therefore, an emergent distinction can be detected between singular concept of 
civilisation as a process, stemming from traditions which also produced the French 
revolution; and a pluralist sense of civilisation loosely related to the German 
Romantic tradition which stresses the individual qualities of distinct civilisations. 
During the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the pluralist notions 
laid increased emphasis on the development of specific qualities in a society. 
Civilisations came to be viewed as large, complex, largely urban, and having 
attained specific characteristics, variously defined as economic and occupational
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specialisation, technological capacity, and intellectual skills such as writing 
(Robinson, 1969; Collingwood, 1992; Springborg, 1993).2 These entail the notion 
of a civilisation as a large and developed culture.
The recognition of the plurality and diversity of cultures by anthropologists, 
ethnographers and sociologists, however, did not automatically lead to the broad 
acceptance of the equality of civilisations. In a sense, these new approaches 
established new hierarchies by subjecting other societies to the rigours, demands, 
scales and measurements of Western culture using Western standards as the norm. 
The nineteenth century appears to demonstrate a division between those who saw 
civilisation as a standard to which all cultures aspired,J and those who saw 
insurmountable distinctions based on colour or race, for instance, which instituted 
a hierarchy of cultures or civilisations.
Co-existing with the pluralist notion of civilisation was the normative concept that 
civilisation implied progress towards a superior form of society, a process which 
the West was commonly viewed as leading. This is implicit in the idea of a 
‘standard’ of civilisation which emerged in Europe in the later nineteenth century. 
In general, the standard reflected characteristics, qualities and institutions which 
had emerged from the growth of the European states-system and reflected 
assumptions which had become implicit in relations between European states 
(Gong, 1984:36-8). The ‘standard’ defined the characteristics which distinguished 
a civilised state deserving the recognition as an equal by other members of 
international society. The ‘standard’ was intrinsic to the construction of 
international law and fundamental to defining the boundaries of modem 
international society (Keal, 1995; Gong, 1984). Although the standard was posited 
as universal, Gong(1984)and Keal(1995) argue the assumptions underlying it
2 Robinson’s essay highlights the importance of the accumulation of knowledge and techniques of 
learning for building civilisations and of language for the development of the intellect: ‘Without 
language civilisation could hardly even have begun and could certainly never attained its higher 
forms. Speech underlies thinking and conscious planning and research. It creates a world of ideas 
which interpenetrates and seems to transcend that of the facts of human experience’(1969:829).
J For instance, social evolutionists, such as Edward Tyler saw human development following a 
single, gradual, progressive pattern out of the natural state to that reached by European civilisation. 
This posited a psychic and genetic unity of mankind, implying civilisation is a learnt, social process 
(Stocking, 1968:173; Robinson, 1969:825-8).
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derived from European culture and history. Its roots lay in European traditions 
which included the legacy of the missionary spirit of Christendom. This was 
manifested in the sense of ‘the sacred trust of civilisation’ and in the concept of the 
‘civilising mission’. This ‘mission’ entailed the sense that it was the duty and 
obligation of Europeans to bring enlightenment and progress to those still living in 
ignorance. In effect, the ‘standard of civilisation’ helped to rationalise colonialism 
and imperialism. Furthermore, the idea of a single standard implied, at one level, 
the existence of a singular civilisation. Assumptions about a clear standard of 
civilisation and the superiority of Western culture have waned under the pressures 
of twentieth century history.4 The pluralist notion of civilisation has become more 
common, but has not always shed normative overtones, or the sense of process and 
progress implicit in the early concept.
4 Confidence in the West as a superior civilisation was undoubtedly challenged and shaken by a 
range of events, which included the destruction and violence of the two world wars and of the 
Holocaust.
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